

The Ancient Greek City-State

Symposium on the occasion of
the 250th Anniversary of
The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters
July, 1-4 1992

Edited by MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN



Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser **67**
Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab
The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters

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Abstract

On 1-4 July 1992 fourteen scholars from six countries met with four Danish members of the Royal Academy to hold a symposium on the origin, development and nature of the ancient Greek city-state. For the names of the participants see the list on page 4. The symposium was planned and organized by the editor of this volume. Nine of the invited scholars submitted papers which had been circulated in advance to all eighteen participants. The nine others were asked each to respond to one of the papers. The motto of the symposium was Aristotle's description of the *polis* as a *koinonia politon politeias*, i.e. a community of citizens participating in the running of the city's political institutions. The motto was chosen by the organizer as an alternative to the traditional modern definition of a *polis* as a small autonomous state consisting of a city with its hinterland. Two of the nine papers treated the origin of the *polis*; two others discussed the *polis* seen as a state and as a society; one dealt with the *polis* in relation to other forms of state in ancient Greece (dependencies, members of an alliance or a federal state etc); two papers focused on Plato's and Aristotle's view of the *polis*; and the last two papers were devoted to the *polis* in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. In the light of the respondent's views and the following discussion of each paper among all eighteen participants the nine papers were subsequently revised by their authors, and are published in this volume with a preface and an introduction by the editor.

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Anthony Snodgrass is Laurence Professor of Classical Archaeology in the University of Cambridge.

Barry Strauss is Associate Professor of History at Cornell University.

Preface

MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN

In 1989 I was commissioned to organize a symposium to celebrate the 250th anniversary, in 1992, of the Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters. Fourteen scholars from six countries were invited to join four members of the Academy in a study of the emergence, nature and development of the ancient Greek city-state. The symposium took place on 1-4 July 1992. Nine of the invited scholars submitted papers which had been circulated in advance to all eighteen participants. The nine others were asked each to respond to one of the papers. Since it would be impossible in one symposium to deal with all aspects of the ancient Greek *polis* the focus was on the *polis* as a citizen-state rather than a city-state, and as a political community rather than an urban centre. Accordingly, I suggested a motto for the conference, namely Aristotle's description of the *polis* as a *koinonia politon politeias*, and the nine scholars who were invited to write papers for the symposium were all asked to have that line in mind when they composed their contributions.

Two of the papers treated the emergence of the city state: Anthony Snodgrass (respondent Jens Erik Skydsgaard) focused on the archaeological evidence while Kurt Raaflaub (respondent Mogens Herman Hansen) presented a picture based on the written sources. Two different views of the nature of the *polis* were the object of the next two papers. Wolfgang Schuller, who is both a historian and a jurist, was asked to discuss the *polis* as a state (respondent Detlev Lotze), whereas Josiah Ober, inspired by John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, viewed the *polis* as a society (respondent Barry Strauss). The next pair of problems to be studied was the autonomous *polis* versus the *polis* as a dependency. Peter Rhodes (respondent Ernst Badian) dealt with the *polis* as a member of a hegemony or a part of a federal state. His paper ought to have been balanced by a paper about the autonomous *polis*. But the person whom I first asked had in the end to decline the invitation, and lack of sufficient funds prevented me from finding a replacement. To make up for the absence of a counterpart to Peter Rhodes' chapter I have devoted a section of my introduction to the concept of "the autonomous *polis*." Since our understanding of the *polis* owes so much to Plato and Aristotle, their work was elucidated in the following two papers submitted by Malcolm Schofield (respondent Karsten Friis Johansen) who concen-

trated on Plato's view in *Republic* Book 2 of the *polis* as a city; and Oswyn Murray (respondent Johnny Christensen) who devoted his paper to the relation between *polis* and *politeia* in Aristotle's *Politics*. Next, on the assumption that the *polis* did not disappear with the rise of Macedon in the 4th century B.C. but flourished at least to the end of the second century AD, the two last papers, by Philippe Gauthier, (respondent Marcel Piérart) and Fergus Millar (respondent Henri Pleket), examined the *polis* in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Finally, in an introduction I treat the concept of the *polis*, especially the emergence of the city-state in the early archaic period and its nature in the classical period.

It remains for me to state my acknowledgements. First, I owe a great debt of gratitude to the participants for a very seminal symposium in the Academy building and for the enjoyable time we spent together in the neighbourhood, not least in the Tivoli Gardens where the skilled silhouettist Inger Eidem portrayed all of us. The caricatures she cut adorn the jacket of this volume. Next, I would like to thank the Carlsberg Foundation and the Danish Research Council for the Humanities for making the symposium possible by very substantial grants. Finally I am grateful to the presiding committee of the Academy for entrusting me with organizing the symposium, for accommodating us in the Academy building and for undertaking the publication of the acts of the symposium.

Copenhagen

Jan. 1993

Mogens Herman Hansen

Introduction

The *Polis* as a Citizen-State

MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN

In the title of this volume I have preferred the modern term city-state to the ancient word *polis*, because I do not share the prevailing view that “city-state” (Stadtstaat, cité-Etat) is a mistranslation of “*polis*”. I have to admit that for this book an even better term would have been “citizen-state”, a word coined only a few years ago by the British sociologist W.G. Runciman.¹ It is an excellent description of the *polis* as a political community; on the other hand, it does not do justice to *polis* in the sense of an urban community. So the time for abandoning the term city-state has not yet come.

In recent years it has become fashionable to criticize the rendering city-state on two counts: first, the *polis* was not a state but a fusion of state and society; and second, the centre of a *polis* was not necessarily a city.² In my opinion, both objections miss the point: first, in the sense of political community the *polis* was a state rather than a fusion of state and society, see below pages 16-8; and second, every *polis* we know about was in fact centred on a conurbation (though far from always on a *walled city*), see below pages 13-6.

My criticism of the rendering city-state takes another turn. There seems to be general agreement that three elements are involved in the concept of a state: a territory, a people, and a government.³ A state is therefore a government with the sole right to exercise a given legal order within a given area over a given population. We nowadays tend to equate a state with its territory – a state is a country; whereas the Greeks identified the state primarily with its people – a state is a people.⁴ Of course the Greeks knew all about the territory of a state: frontiers between city-states are mentioned in numerous sources,⁵ and the frequently-used penalty of exile consisted precisely in the right of anyone to kill the outlaw if found within the territorial bounds;⁶ so the Greeks were perfectly capable of saying “the *polis* stretches to this-and-this point and not beyond”. But territory was not nearly as important for them as for us:⁷ in all the sources, from documents and historical accounts to poetry and legend, it is the people who are stressed and not the territory,⁸ a

habit of thought that can be traced right back to the poet Alkaios round about 600 B.C.⁹ It was never Athens and Sparta that went to war but always “the Athenians and the Lakedaimonians”.¹⁰

One of the corollaries of this difference between *polis* and state is that a high proportion of the population of a *polis* were liable to be not citizens of the *polis* but either free foreigners (often called metics) or slaves.¹¹ In a European state from the late Middle Ages onwards virtually all the inhabitants were also citizens, so that one could identify the state with those domiciled in the territory and, consequently, with the territory. In a Greek *polis* it was not possible to identify the state with those domiciled in the territory and so with the territory: it was necessary to identify the state with the citizens (the *politai*)¹² who had in principle the exclusive right to own and use the territory. Louis XIV of France is supposed to have said “l'état, c'est moi”: a Greek citizen could, with even greater justice, have said “The *polis* is us”.¹³ This view of the *polis* is abundantly attested in the sources,¹⁴ and it is most clearly formulated by Aristotle in the third Book of the *Politics* where he says that “a *polis* is a community (*koinonia*) of citizens (*politai*) with regard to the constitution (*politeia*)”,¹⁵ and *politeia* is further defined as the “organization of political institutions, in particular the highest political institution”.¹⁶ It is at once apparent that Aristotle only picks up two of the three elements that comprise the modern juristic idea of a state, the people and the political system: the territory is left out altogether, and that is not by chance. For Aristotle asserts that no one is a citizen by mere domicile in a particular place,¹⁷ and thus hits upon one fundamental difference between the *polis* and the modern state: it was a people rather than a place, and this difference would be duly emphasized if we adopted the term citizen-state instead of city-state.

To the modern mind a state must be identified, if not with the country, then with its government. Again there is a noticeable difference between ancient and modern priorities, which is most obvious if we compare ancient and modern democracies. A state can be looked at from two standpoints, either as a community of citizens manifesting itself in a set of organs with a government at the head,¹⁸ or as a set of organs, typically a government, exercising rule over its citizens.¹⁹ In modern states, even democracies, there is a tendency to identify the state with the executive and the government rather than with the people,²⁰ but in a democratic *polis*, especially Athens, government and citizens largely coincided,²¹ primarily through the institution of the Assembly of the People,²² and the dominant ideology was that the *polis* was the people (*demos*). This mani-

feats itself, for example, in all the surviving treaties, where the state of Athens is called *ho demos ho Athenaion*, “the People of the Athenians”;²³ and similarly the state of Chios is called *ho demos ho ton Chion*,²⁴ etc.

In conclusion: of the three elements of a state, a modern democrat will rank both the territory and the government over the people, whereas, to a citizen in an ancient democratic *polis* the order of priority was the reverse: first the body of citizens, then the political institutions and last the territory.

The Origin of the *Polis*

For the origin of the Greek city-state we have three different types of evidence: (a) the physical remains of early settlements, (b) the literary and epigraphical evidence of the 8th to 6th centuries and (c) the linguistic evidence obtained by a comparative study of related words in other Indo-European languages.

The linguistic evidence. In this volume the archaeological evidence is treated by Anthony Snodgrass and the written sources by Kurt Raaflaub; but there is no separate treatment of the linguistic evidence. A full paper of twenty or more pages would have been excessive. On the other hand, the study of the etymology of the term *polis* is extremely important, since by extrapolation it takes us back to a period before the earliest written sources we have. I will fill the gap by a short presentation of the problem.

First it should be noted that the early variant form of *polis*, namely *ptolis*, is probably attested in the Mycenaean Linear-B tablets in the form *po-to-ri-jo*. But, alas, *po-to-ri-jo* is not attested as a noun, only as (part of) a proper name,²⁵ and we have no clue to what *po-to-ri-jo* can have meant in Mycenaean Greek.

A comparison with other Indo-European languages yields better results. The Greek word *polis* is related etymologically to Old Indian *púr* (stronghold, fortress, city), Lithuanian *pilis* and Lettish *pils* (stronghold, castle).²⁶ But in both the Baltic languages the word means neither “city” nor “state” but only “stronghold”.²⁷ Thus it is reasonable to infer that the original meaning of *polis* in Greek too must have been “stronghold”. The epigraphical evidence strongly supports this assumption. In many archaic and classical Attic inscriptions *polis* occurs in the sense of *akro-polis*,²⁸ and a similar usage is found in inscriptions from other places e. g. Mykenai²⁹ and Rhodes.³⁰ In the literary sources, on the other hand, *polis* is hardly ever used in this sense. In Homer there are just two (possible)

attestations of *polis* referring to the akropolis of Troy.³¹ In all other cases it is the addition of the adjective ἀκρόη *vel. sim.* that changes the meaning of *polis* from “city” to “citadel”. There is another example in the hymn to Demeter, but the use in the literary sources of *polis* in the sense of stronghold is much more restricted than usually believed.³² This meaning of the word, already rare in the archaic period, died out in the classical and Hellenistic periods, and in the Roman period only men of learning would know that *polis* had once been used synonymously with *akropolis*.³³

From the sense of stronghold *polis* developed three other meanings: (1) city (or town), (2) city plus hinterland, and (3) political community (or state). The meanings “city” and “political community” are frequently attested in all sources from Homer onwards. But the sense of city plus surrounding territory, though sometimes stated by modern historians as the essential meaning of *polis*,³⁴ is not common in classical sources,³⁵ and, in my opinion, unattested in Homer and other early sources.

To sum up: the Indo-European etymology strongly suggests that the original meaning of *polis* was neither city (or town) nor state (or political community) but stronghold (or citadel), and perhaps a fortified *akropolis* of the type found before 800 B.C. in Emborio on Chios, in Koukounaries on Paros, in Agios Andreas on Siphnos, in Vrokastro on eastern Crete and in several other sites of the Geometric period.³⁶

The earliest written and archaeological evidence. When we turn from the linguistic to the literary and archaeological evidence we have to address two much-debated but still unsolved problems: (1) what is the relation between the *polis* as an urban and as a political community? (2) when and where did the Greek *polis* arise (a) in the sense of city; and (b) in the sense of state? How we answer these questions depends upon how we date the Homeric poems and how we interpret the type of society they describe. Today the prevailing opinion – shared by Raaflaub in his paper – is that the Homeric poems reflect a “historical Homeric society” which should be dated to the 8th century B.C.³⁷ In Chapter 1 Anthony Snodgrass has drawn one picture and in Chapter 2 Kurt Raaflaub has drawn another. What happens if we compare the two different types of evidence?

Polis or *ptolis* occurs some 250 times in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.³⁸ The meaning is either “city” or “political community” but often the word carries both meanings at the same time.³⁹ Now, what did the Homeric *polis* look like and how was it organized?

The Homeric *polis* has broad streets⁴⁰ and is enclosed with steep walls⁴¹ and beautiful towers.⁴² Inside the city there is an assembly

place,⁴³ and sanctuaries,⁴⁴ in which (sometimes) temples are erected.⁴⁵ We do not hear much about houses,⁴⁶ but the Homeric *polis* includes one or more mansions, which in some cases are so magnificent that the traditional designation of them as palaces seems well deserved.⁴⁷ The *poleis* about which Homer gives most information are Troy,⁴⁸ Scheria⁴⁹ and the two cities depicted on the shield of Achilles,⁵⁰ but Argos, Sparta, Mykenai and many other settlements are also called *polis* by Homer, and again the epithet “with broad streets” is used.⁵¹ The poet conveys the impression that a *polis* is, if not a city, then a town, and not just a village or a stronghold. The urban character of the *polis* is further emphasized by the fact that the term *asty* is used synonymously with *polis* about all the settlements mentioned above.⁵²

If we ask about physical remains of cities before 700 B.C. there are, to the best of my knowledge, only three sites to be listed, namely Zagora on Andros, Old Smyrna and Megara Hyblaia. But Zagora, though probably a walled 8th-century conurbation, is too small to match the Homeric *poleis*;⁵³ Megara Hyblaia had no walls until a century and a half after its foundation in 728;⁵⁴ and the date of old Smyrna is still in dispute.⁵⁵ There is an astonishing gap between the “Homeric *polis*” as the basic social unit of an 8th-century society and the absence of physical remains of walled conurbations older than the second half of the 7th century.⁵⁶ Archaeologically, the *polis* as a town or city does not belong in the 8th century, but rather in the 7th century (the colonies) or in the 6th century (mainland Greece).⁵⁷

How is this gap to be explained? I can think of at least three possible explanations. (a) We may hope that future excavations will lead to the discovery of 8th-century Greek towns that match the Homeric picture of a *polis*. Only a few decades ago very few would have imagined what was actually found during the excavations of Lefkandi.⁵⁸ Alternatively (b) we may have to down-date by a century or so the final version of the Homeric poems, and consequently Homeric society must be moved to the 7th century.⁵⁹ Or (c) we may give up the idea of a “historical Homeric Society” altogether and assume that the Homeric *polis* is a mixture of reminiscences of walled Bronze-age palaces, a vague knowledge about the great urban centres in the neighbouring near-eastern empires, and a city in a wonderland imagined by the Greek singers of tales.

Pace Finley and others, who held that no trace of the *polis* could be found in the Homeric poems,⁶⁰ it is now generally believed and convincingly argued that *polis* in the sense of political community is amply

attested both in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*.⁶¹ A 6th-century Greek audience listening to a performance of the poems would have had no difficulty in recognizing Scheria as a typical colony founded by Nausithoos, and the two *poleis* depicted on the shield of Achilles as contemporary walled cities. But to establish that *polis* in the sense of political community is well attested in Homer is different from saying that *polis* was the prevailing form of political organization when the poems took their final form.

In the catalogue of ships as well as elsewhere in the *Iliad* most of the individuals are not identified by their *polis* but by the region to which they belong. Agapenor, for example, is the leader of the Arkadians and it is nowhere stated in which of the localities in Arkadia he lived. Nor is any person in Homer identified as coming from Mantinea or Tegea etc. Similarly, in Crete there are a hundred *poleis* but they are all ruled by Idomeneus.⁶² The Boiotians have five leaders. After naming them Homer lists different localities in Boiotia, but never says which leader belongs to which locality.⁶³ According to the catalogue of ships in *Iliad* 2 and many other passages in the *Iliad* as well, the political unit of early Greece was not the *polis* but the region, and this observation forces us to face a much-neglected problem in the study of the emergence of the *polis*: the relation between *polis* and region.

It is a remarkable fact that the federal states formed in the classical and Hellenistic periods almost always follow the regional pattern, i.e. the Arkadian Confederacy, the Boiotian Confederacy etc.⁶⁴ The division into regions can be traced back to the archaic period and even earlier (Geometric pottery styles seem to follow regional lines).⁶⁵ The relation between *polis* and region in the archaic and early classical period is a aspect of Greek history that for some time has not attracted the attention of students of ancient Greek society. Admittedly, German historians have had a tradition for seeing what they call “*der Stammstaat*” as the political community that preceded the *polis*, and in this context they have discussed the region as the principal political entity in the Dark Age.⁶⁶ Among French and Anglophone scholars, on the other hand, the trend is to focus on the city-state and connect all evidence of early social and political structure with the emergence of the *polis*, without paying much attention to the regions or other, larger political units.⁶⁷ This volume was originally planned to include a contribution about *polis* and region but due to lack of sufficient funds we had to cut it out. I hope that these brief remarks are enough at least to draw attention to the problem.

Polis as a city and as a state

When discussing the origin of the *polis* we tend to forget that in early sources and especially in the *Iliad*, *asty* occurs frequently (though not as frequently as *p(t)olis*).⁶⁸ Admittedly, the sense “city” is much more common than the sense “political community”, but there are passages in archaic sources where *asty* denotes the community and not just the urban centre.⁶⁹ In the classical period this sense of *asty* seems to disappear, but the derivative *astos* continues to have the meaning “citizen” and not just “city-dweller”.⁷⁰ Perikles’ citizenship law, for example, prescribed that citizen rights in Athens be restricted to those whose parents were both *astoi*.⁷¹ The synonymous use of *asty* and *polis* in archaic sources, and the synonymous use of *astos* and *polites* even in classical sources suggest that a conurbation was an essential element of the archaic and classical Greek *polis*, and that the modern and fashionable dissociation of the two senses “city” and “state” has been taken too far.

In support of the dissociation of the two senses, historians often claim (a) that there are many examples of *poleis* without an urban centre and, conversely, (b) that many urban centres were not the political, religious and economic centre of a *polis*.⁷²

Re (a): Sparta is the example almost inevitably adduced by historians who hold that a *polis* did not necessarily have an urban centre.⁷³ It is true that Sparta had no walls before the Hellenistic period and that it consisted of four *komai*: Limnai, Kynossoura, Messoa and Pitane. But the four *komai* were so close together that they must have formed a single nucleated settlement. They occupied an area of some 3 square km., and in the early fifth century they must have been inhabited by, sometimes, as many as 8,000 *Spartiatatai* and probably by their families as well.⁷⁴ A population density of several thousand adult male citizens per square kilometre is quite enough to reveal that Sparta must have been a conurbation, in spite of the absence of walls and monumental temples. Thus it is not surprising that, for example, Herodotos uses the term *polis* (in the sense of city) about Sparta.⁷⁵ Similarly, in the famous oracle given to the Spartans during the Persian Wars Sparta is described as an *asty*.⁷⁶ I conclude that Sparta is an ill-chosen example of a *polis* without an urban centre.

To substantiate his claim that “many [*poleis*] were not cities at all, though they all possessed civic centres”, Moses Finley adduces the

dioikismos of Mantinea in 385 B.C. and writes: “the inhabitants of the ”city“ of Mantinea were the owners of landed estates, who preferred to live together in the centre, away from their farms, in a style visible as far back as the Homeric poems and which had nothing to do with city-life”.⁷⁷ Finley’s description is essentially correct, but that does not change the fact that, down to 385 B.C., a four-digit number of Mantinean citizens lived together in a nucleated settlement protected by walls and that, by the *dioikismos*, they were forced to dismantle their houses and move to one of the surrounding *komai*.

Re (b): it is admittedly easier to find attestations of conurbations which were not the political, religious and economic centre of a *polis*. One example is Thorikos in Attika,⁷⁸ which in the classical period was not a *polis*, but considerably larger and more affluent than, for example, any of the four small *poleis* on the neighbouring island of Keos. Other examples of towns that were not *polis*-centres can indeed be found, e.g. Kasmenai in Sicily,⁷⁹ but outside Attika they are, I think, not so numerous as some historians would like to believe. In support of this view I will adduce the fourth-century *Periplus* erroneously attributed to Skylax. He lists some 500 localities which are either explicitly called *polis* or their status as *polis* is secured implicitly by the context. Of these some 430 are Hellenic *poleis*. Since his purpose is to draw a geographical and not a political picture of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, one would expect him to list the important cities and to use *polis* in the sense of conurbation rather than political community. Nevertheless, the localities he singles out as *poleis* are almost invariably some which modern historians take to be *poleis* in the political sense of the term as well.⁸⁰ To conclude, I side with those historians who state that a *polis* “was usually confined to one city and its immediate countryside”.⁸¹

A further objection to be made against the traditional translation “city-state” is that the typical ancient Greek *polis* was much too small to be called a city. Today the term “city” denotes a conurbation with at least a five-digit number of inhabitants, but in the ancient world many conurbations could not even muster a four-digit number, and nucleated settlements inhabited by a five-digit number of persons were very rare even in the Roman period. It is, of course, true that “city” in its modern sense is a misleading rendering of *polis* in the sense of conurbation. In this respect “town” would be a preferable translation,⁸² and we have to admit that many ancient *poleis* were smaller than a large modern village.⁸³ But if, in a historical context, we allow the term “city” to denote even a small nucleated settlement – as all historians do when they speak of “cities” in

medieval and early modern Europe⁸⁴ – I can see nothing wrong about describing the ancient Greek *polis* as a “city”.

The close connection between city and state in the ancient Greek world is further emphasized by a very simple linguistic observation. In most Indo-European languages the words for conurbation and countryside form a pair of antonyms, e.g. city/country (English), Stadt/Land (German), by/land (Danish), cité/pays (French) and *polis/chora* (Greek). In ancient Greek it was the word for city which came to denote the political community, whereas in modern European languages it is invariably the word for country which is also used synonymously with state. In ancient Greece a war was always waged between two *poleis*, never between *chorai*, and it was also the *polis* not the *chora* that defrayed expenses, made peace, had frontiers with other *poleis*, etc.⁸⁵ In the modern world, on the other hand, it is invariably the term country which is used in all such cases, never the city. The most likely explanation of this phenomenon is that a *polis* had a conurbation as its political centre, whereas in the Middle Ages, when the modern European nations emerged, a state had no political centre and no capital. The king and his court moved from castle to castle. Consequently it was impossible to connect the political institutions with any particular locality, and the nation could only be identified with the country as such. Similarly, as has often been noted, all the Greek *poleis* were named after their urban centre, e.g. *Athenaioi*, *Korinthioi*, *Argeioi*, etc., whereas no European nation is named after its capital or major city.⁸⁶

To conclude this section, I venture the following statements: there is no attested *polis* which was not centred on a conurbation and, conversely, almost every conurbation of any consequence was the centre of a *polis*. In spite of the modern fashion, we must not be too eager to dissociate the *polis* as a city from the *polis* as a state. Admittedly, “city” and “state” are two different aspects of the ancient *polis*, but they both refer to the same physical object and often an author uses the term twice in the same period but switches, almost imperceptibly, from one sense to the other.⁸⁷ So – against the prevailing trend among ancient historians – I would like to defend the traditional view that “city-state” is an essentially correct rendering of the ancient term *polis*, and conveys a good understanding of the concept, provided that we remember the very small size of the *polis* both as a city and as a state. Just as the *polis* (in the sense of state) was a political community which often had a few hundred adult male citizens only, and accordingly was much smaller than any modern state, so the *polis* (in the sense of city) was a conurbation which was sometimes inha-

bited by less than a thousand persons and, accordingly, was much smaller than any modern city.⁸⁸

The *Polis* as a State and as a Society

Discussion of the word *polis* in the senses of (a) a political community and (b) a conurbation leads to the question whether the *polis* is best described as a form of state or rather as a form of society.⁸⁹ Since, as explained above, the Greeks took the *polis* to be a people rather than a territory or a government, the best way of addressing this problem is to ask: which persons did a *polis* consist of? Modern historians have two very different answers to this question. According to George Forrest, for example, the *polis* “was a community of citizens (adult males), citizens without political rights (women and children), and non-citizens (resident foreigners and slaves), a defined body, occupying a defined area, living under a defined or definable constitution, ...”⁹⁰ Ernst Meyer, however, offers the following description: “die “Polis” ist also die Gesamtheit seiner Bürger, nämlich aller derjenigen, immer nur männlichen Angehörigen des Volkes, die die politischen Rechte besitzen, “am Staat Anteil haben”.”⁹¹

Both Forrest and Meyer (and their followers) can find support for their view in the sources, for example in Aristotle’s *Politics*. In Books 1 and 3 Aristotle offers two very different accounts of what a *polis* is. In Book 1 he gives a socio-economic analysis of the *polis*. Its atom is the household (*oikia*),⁹² the purpose of which is production of the necessities of life and reproduction of its own members;⁹³ there is no discussion whatsoever of the concepts of citizen (*polites*) and constitution (*politeia*),⁹⁴ and all inhabitants of the *polis* are also members of the *polis*: men, women, children and slaves.⁹⁵ In Book 3 Aristotle represents the *polis* as a political community. Its atom is the citizen,⁹⁶ not the household, and *politai* (matter) and *politeia* (form) are seen as the two essential aspects of the *polis*.⁹⁷ There is no discussion any longer of production (*ktesis*) which, ideally, ought to be left to non-citizens,⁹⁸ and the household (*oikia*) is only mentioned in passing. Accordingly, women, foreigners and slaves are outsiders.⁹⁹

Aristotle’s two conflicting but complementary views of the *polis* match the two related but different meanings of the term *polis*. In Book 1 he treats the *polis* in the sense of “city”, and describes how it developed out of the village (*kome*) which again developed out of the household (*oikia*).¹⁰⁰ In Book 3 the *polis* is seen as a political community, and the

purpose of life is no longer production and reproduction (*to zen*),¹⁰¹ but the citizens' participation in politics (*politike koinonia*) which for a true human being is what life is all about (*to eu zen*).¹⁰²

Thus the two definitions of a *polis* offered by Forrest and Meyer are both correct, but apply in different contexts. As a setting for human production and reproduction the *polis* is a society, not a state; the term *polis* designates a conurbation (sometimes including the hinterland) rather than a political community, and all inhabitants are members of the *polis*. But as a political community the *polis* is a state rather than a society, and the term *polis* designates the adult male citizens only, united by their political institutions, in which the citizens participate completely isolated from women, metics foreigners and slaves.

Thus the Greeks saw the *polis* both as a society comprising all inhabitants and as a political community restricted to adult male citizens. But the sources show that they were perfectly capable of distinguishing the two different meanings of *polis* and the two different spheres. Again, Aristotle's *Politics* may serve as an example. In Book 1 he says that *polis* consists of households (*oikiai*) and that women, children and slaves are members of the household. Thus slaves are members of the *polis*.¹⁰³ But in Book 3 and 7 Aristotle says explicitly that (foreigners and) slaves are *not* members of the *polis*.¹⁰⁴ The apparent contradiction disappears when we remember that the *polis* referred to in Book 1 consists of *oikiai*, whereas the *polis* referred to in the later books consists of *politai*. Similarly, viewed as a society the members of a *polis* are unequal, but viewed as a state all members are equal.¹⁰⁵ Another example is Plato. In *Republic* Book 2 Plato describes the emergence of the *polis* in the sense of a nucleated settlement intended to facilitate production by division of labour;¹⁰⁶ *polites* is used in the (rare) sense of "inhabitant"¹⁰⁷ and the *polis* includes artisans and traders. But in the *Laws* Plato describes the foundation of a *polis* which is to have 5,040 citizens,¹⁰⁸ and here *polites* is used in the sense of an adult male citizen.¹⁰⁹ It is worth noticing that Plato's account of the *polis* in *Republic* Book 2 matches Aristotle's in his *Politics* Book 1, whereas the *polis* described in Plato's *Laws* is a political community, as is the *polis* described in the other books of Aristotle's *Politics*.

There were, however, two spheres of life in which the two different aspects of the *polis* tended to overlap: religion and war.

Every city-state had one or more civic deities symbolically connected with the *polis* as a state; the common hearth in the *prytaneion* was the symbolic centre of the *polis*; and all the major festivals were organized by the *polis* and run by its officials who were also entrusted with the ad-

ministration of the sanctuaries.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the cults of goddesses, even of Athena Polias, were almost invariably in the hands of priestesses,¹¹¹ and some festivals, e.g. the Thesmophoria, were attended by women only.¹¹² So, seen as a religious community the *polis* was *not* exclusively a male society as it certainly was as a political community.¹¹³ Nor was *polis* religion restricted to citizens; metics, women and even slaves were allowed to participate in many of the other festivals.¹¹⁴ They did so undoubtedly as inferiors, but nevertheless, in the religious sphere they were insiders,¹¹⁵ whereas in the political sphere they were invariably outsiders.

Similarly in the military sphere. For its defence a *polis* relied on its phalanx of hoplites, who were mostly of citizen status, and many historians have seen the hoplite phalanx as the essence of the *polis* and one of the important factors in its emergence.¹¹⁶ But the phalanx was not isomorphic with the city. Only upper- and middle-class citizens could afford the equipment. Poor citizens were excluded, so the citizens were not united by being hoplites.¹¹⁷ Conversely, metics served in the phalanx with the citizens,¹¹⁸ and the citizens did not isolate themselves from the foreigners as they did in the political sphere.

The Autonomous *Polis*

It is still a widely accepted view that the *polis* was by definition *autonomos*,¹¹⁹ so that by losing its *autonomia* a political community lost its identity as a *polis*. This has been stated so often and with such a force that for many years I believed it too. The problem is that it has no support in the sources.

(a) No ancient discussion of the nature of the *polis* mentions *autonomia* as a defining characteristic. Plato, for example, treats the concept and nature of the *polis* in the *Republic*, especially in Book 2, and in the *Laws*, especially in Books 3 and 4, but has not a word to say about *autonomia*; he does not even use the word. Similarly, in Aristotle's *Politics* there is no occurrence of the noun *autonomia*, and the adjective *autonomos* is used only once, in a passage in which autonomous citizens are opposed to citizens ruled by a tyrant.¹²⁰ For Aristotle it is the concept of *autarkeia*, not of *autonomia*, that is inseparably connected with the concept of the *polis*.¹²¹

(b) The opposite of *autonomia* is being *hypekoos*. If *autonomia* had been an essential characteristic of the *polis*, the term *hypekoos polis* would have been either a nonsense or an oxymoron. But quite a few sources speak

about *hypokeoi poleis* in a straightforward manner.¹²² Every city-state would of course have preferred to be autonomous, but obviously a city-state did not lose its identity as a *polis* by being subjected to another city-state or, for example, to the king of Persia, or Macedon, or a Hellenistic ruler, or Rome.

(c) Many dependent political communities are called *poleis* and treated as *poleis* in our sources. The most obvious example are the perioikic communities ruled by Sparta,¹²³ but there are innumerable other examples of *poleis* being dependencies rather than independent states (cf. page 20 below and Peter Rhodes' discussion in Chapter 5).

(d) The sources in which the concept of *autonomia* is indeed linked with the term *polis* are the treaties between city-states and alliances of city-states, beginning with the peace of Nikias in 422/1.¹²⁴ But again these treaties show not only that all *poleis* strove for autonomy but also that city-states deprived of their autonomy nevertheless counted as *poleis*. One example will suffice. The King's Peace of 387/6 stipulated that all *poleis*, great and small, be autonomous, apart from those in Asia Minor and a few others.¹²⁵ One result of the peace was that the Thebans had to set the other Boiotian *poleis* free and respect their *autonomia*.¹²⁶ If *autonomia* had been a prerequisite for being a *polis* the Boiotian city-states, apart from Thebes, would not have been *poleis* in the period before 387/6. But the description we have of the Boiotian confederacy in the *Hell. Oxy.* shows that, although they were not *autonomous* in the period before the King's Peace, they were nevertheless *poleis*.¹²⁷

It has not passed unnoticed, of course, that the concept of the autonomous *polis* is hard to reconcile with the fact that so many of the city-states were dependencies. In his count of *poleis*, for example, Ruschenbusch includes only those that were "selbständige *poleis*".¹²⁸ A different line is taken by Ostwald.¹²⁹ He shares the view that a real *polis* must be autonomous, but then prefers to stretch the concept of *autonomia*. He writes, for example, about Aigina in the late fifth century: "By itself neither the razing of her walls, nor the loss of her fleet, nor the payment of tribute constitute a loss of *autonomia* ... We may conclude that a state is *autonomous* when it is left free to exercise on its own the most rudimentary powers necessary for its survival."¹³⁰ But on this interpretation of *autonomia* the Boiotian cities would have been *autonomous* in the period before 387/6. I prefer to believe that *autonomia* meant independence, but to point out as well that the connection between the concepts of *polis* and *autonomia* has been invented by modern historians. To the Greeks the *polis* was a (small) community of citizens united in having common political institu-

tions. Whether or not decisions about e.g. foreign policy and defence were made by the citizens themselves or by a dominating neighbour was, of course, a matter of great importance; every *polis* wanted to be free (*eleutheros*) and independent (*autonomos*); but losing its autonomy did not affect a community's identity as a *polis* as long as its political institutions (housed in a *bouleuterion* and a *prytaneion* etc) were allowed to survive and work. Let me adduce two sources in support of this view. After the sack of Sardis by Kyros in ca. 547/6 the Ionian cities convened a meeting in which, according to Herodotos, Thales the philosopher made the following proposal: the Ionians should set up a common *bouleuterion* for all the Ionian *poleis* in Teos, whereby all the other *poleis*, though kept as urban centres just as before, would change their status and become demes instead of *poleis*.¹³¹ Similarly, according to Thucydides, it was by setting up a common *bouleuterion* and *prytaneion* in Athens that Theseus created the Athenian *polis* out of the many earlier *poleis* in Attica, each with its own *bouleuterion*.¹³²

From the above considerations it follows that *polis*, in the sense of political community, designates not only the small independent city-state but also a whole range of other state forms, namely: (a) dependencies such as the perioikic communities in Lakedaimon,¹³³ the Athenian klerouchies,¹³⁴ *poleis* ruled by other *poleis*,¹³⁵ or small states located within the borders of a federal state but without any representation in the federal organs of government;¹³⁶ (b) constituent states which were members of a federation and represented in the federal organs of government;¹³⁷ (c) members of an alliance, even members deprived of their autonomy;¹³⁸ (d) the two oversized hegemonic city-states, Athens¹³⁹ and Sparta,¹⁴⁰ both coextensive with an entire region. Finally, by an extension of the use of the term *polis* it could be used about (e) the federal state itself which covered a whole region and consisted of a number of *poleis*,¹⁴¹ and (f) a whole barbarian nation such as, for example, the Persian State.¹⁴² In senses (e) and (f) *polis* is used synonymously with the more common term *ethnos* in the sense of "state", and here "city-state" would indeed be a mistranslation.

The *Polis* in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods

It is still a common view that the independent Greek *polis* flourished in the archaic and classical periods, but was crushed by the Macedonians and disappeared in the second half of the 4th century.¹⁴³ The turning

point is often pinned down to the battle of Chaironeia, and from some accounts one gets the impression that the city-state perished on 2 August 338 B.C. For my own part, however, I have always preferred to believe that the independent city-state declined at least a century before Chaironeia,¹⁴⁴ whereas the *polis*, i.e. the political community of citizens united in the running of their city's institutions, continued to exist throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods.¹⁴⁵ Apart from those under Persian rule, most *poleis* were probably autonomous at the beginning of the 5th century before the Persian Wars, and most of the *poleis* along the coast of Asia Minor became autonomous in the wake of the battles of Salamis, Mykale and Plataiai. But at that time the concept of *autonomia* had not yet emerged,¹⁴⁶ and when *autonomia* became a crucial concept in interstate relations, i.e. from the mid-fifth century on,¹⁴⁷ more and more *poleis* lost their independence. During the second half of the fifth century many *poleis* were deprived of their autonomy by becoming members of the Delian or the Peloponnesian league; and during the late fifth and fourth centuries hundreds of *poleis* changed their status from being independent states to being constituent states of a confederacy that regularly comprised all the *poleis* within a region. By the mid fourth century we find federal states in Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris, Euboia, Thessaly, Epeiros, Aitolia, Akarnania, Achaia and Arkadia. Furthermore, many *poleis* along the coast of Asia Minor had once again become subject to the King of Persia, as they had been in the period before the Persian Wars. There is no historical atlas which includes a map of Greece ca. 350 B.C. showing which *poleis* were still independent and which had become dependencies, either by being dominated by one of the hegemonic cities or the King of Persia or by being a member of a confederation. Such a map would reveal that when Macedon under Philip II began to manifest itself as a great power, the independent city-state was no longer the typical form of *polis*. What disappeared with the rise of Macedon in the second half of the 4th century was not the *polis* but the hegemonic *polis* such as Athens, Sparta or Thebes. The other *poleis* could not necessarily tell the difference between being dominated by Athens or the king of Persia and being dominated by the king of Macedon or some other Hellenistic monarch. Thus the *polis* (i.e. the small political community of citizens living in or around an urban centre and united in running its political institutions) survived the end of the classical period, and though the independent city-state had declined long before the defeat at Chaironeia, the *polis* in the true sense of the word existed and prospered throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Accordingly this volume concludes

with two major contributions: Philippe Gauthier's about the Hellenistic *polis* and Fergus Millar's about the Greek *polis* in the Roman world.

By why have so many historians taken the independent city-state to be the typical form of *polis* in the 4th century B.C.? And why do they tend to ignore the large number of *poleis* which, by ca. 350, had been transformed into constituent states or dependencies? I believe that Aristotle is to be held responsible. For better or worse his *Politics*, more than any other source, has shaped modern historians' understanding of the Greek *polis*. Aristotle took the formation of societies to be a natural development, and the formation of the *polis* to be the completion (*telos*) of that development.¹⁴⁸ He describes how many *oikiai* form a *kome* and many *komai* form a *polis*.¹⁴⁹ We can add that, in the classical period, many *poleis* tended to form a federal state (an *ethnos* or *koinon*), but in the *Politics* there is no discussion and no mention of federal states, and Aristotle never says that the *koinon* is a further development of the *polis*. Why not? First, he describes the development of societies in Book I where he treats the *polis* as a society and not as a political community; and a discussion of federal states does not belong in that context. Second, his belief in a natural development of societies led him to see the *kome* as a dwarf and the *koinon* as a giant, whereas the *polis* was the grown-up human being.¹⁵⁰ To maintain this view he had to close his eyes to contemporary developments and, in most of his analysis, to ignore both the federal states in Hellas itself and the big monarchies north and east of Hellas. He could do that because the members of the Hellenic federal states were still essentially *poleis*,¹⁵¹ and because the big monarchies were barbarian and accordingly communities of inferior human beings. His treatise has had an enormous impact on all later political philosophy. It is more surprising that Aristotle's view of the Hellenic *polis* as the summit of the development of human society has also succeeded in shaping modern historians' understanding of the nature of the Greek *polis* in the later classical period.

Notes

1 'Doomed to Extinction' in *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander* ed. O. Murray & S. Price (Oxford 1990) 348.

2 M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Greeks* (London 1963) 45; F. Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (München 1984) 59; R. Osborne, *Demos: the Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge 1985) 8; A. Snodgrass, 'Interaction by Design: the Greek City-State,' in *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change* ed. C. Renfrew & J. Cherry (Cambridge 1986) 47; *idem*, *Archaeology and*

the Study of the Greek City,' in *City and Country in the Ancient World* ed. J. Rich & A. Wallace Hadrill (London 1991); Runciman (*supra* n. 1) 348; I. Morris, 'The Early Polis as City and State,' in *City and Country in the Ancient World* ed. J. Rich & A. Wallace-Hadrill (London 1991) 25; W. Schuller, *Griechische Geschichte* (München 1991) 104.

3 H. Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State* (Cambridge Mass. 1946) 207: "Traditional doctrine distinguishes three "elements" of the State: its territory, its people, and its power". cf. 189: "The State as "politically" organized Society (The State as Power)." cf. J.G. Starkie, *Introduction to International Law* (10th ed. London 1989) 95 referring inter alia to Article I of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which defines a state as follows: "The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: – (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a Government; (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other States." Starkie points out that in international law (d) is especially important.

4 Acknowledged by all historians since the beginning of the last century cf. F. Gschnitzer, 'Stammes- und Ortsgemeinden im alten Griechenland,' *WS* 68 (1955) 121-2.

5 Philoch. (*FGrHist* 328) fr. 155. See R. Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures* (London 1987) 50-2, 119-20; G. Audring, *Zur Struktur des Territoriums griechischer Poleis in archaischer Zeit (nach den schriftlichen Quellen)* (Berlin 1989).

6 Dem. 23.37, 39ff; Philoch. (*FGrHist* 328) fr. 30.

7 Gschnitzer (*supra* n. 4). Following F. Hampl, 'Poleis ohne Territorium,' *Klio* 32 (1939) 1-60 most historians seem to believe that a *polis* could be completely deprived of its territory but nevertheless persist as a self-governing community of citizens, i.e. as a *polis*. In my opinion none of the examples adduced by Hampl carries conviction, not even his first (and best), i.e. Mytilene after 427. I have no quarrel with Hampl's view (1-2) that Mytilene persisted as a *polis* although the land was shared out to Athenian clerouchs; but it does not follow that Mytilene, then, was a "Polis ohne Territorium". There is no indication that the city itself became Athenian property; thus Mytilene may for some years have been a *polis* without hinterland, but not a *polis* completely deprived of its territory. Next, in 446 when the Athenians installed clerouchs in Chalkis they did not deprive the Chalkidians of (some of) their territory only but also of many other rights (7-10). Chalkis became a *hypokeos polis*, not a "Polis ohne Territorium". Both these and Hampl's other examples, which are less convincing, testify to the existence of *hypokeoi poleis*, and he points out quite correctly (16-7) that a city which lost its *autonomia* could persist as a *polis*. But that does not amount to evidence of "Poleis ohne territorium".

8 Aeschyl. *Pers.* 348-9; Soph. *O.T.* 56-7; Eur. Fr 828 (Nauck); Hdt. 8.61.2; Thuc. 7.77.7; Pl. *Definitiones.* 415C.

9 Alc. fr. 426. C.F.Smith, 'What Constitutes a State,' *CJ* 2 (1907) 299-302.

10 Thuc. 5.25.1.

11 Arist. *Pol.* 1326a16-20.

12 Arist. *Pol.* 1274b41; 1275b20; Pl. *Definitiones.* 415C; Andoc. 2.1.

13 *SEG* 27.631.1 (inscription from Lyttos on Crete, ca. 500 B.C.); Thuc. 7.77.4; Dem. 43.72.

14 Hdt. 4.15.1; Thuc. 1.132.1; 3.82.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.35.

15 Arist. *Pol.* 1276b1, the motto of the symposion cf. pages 3 and 7. I have to plead guilty to Oswyn Murray's charge (*infra* page 197) that the phrase [ἡ πόλις] ἐστὶν .. κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας is quoted out of context. And it is fine that he puts it back where it belongs. But my reason for choosing this particular passage from Aristotle's *Politics* Book 3 as the motto for the symposion is that it is the shortest and most elegant formulation of what

Aristotle says again and again in this part of the *Politics*. In a number of passages, for example, πόλις is defined as a number of citizens, πολῖται (1274b41; 1275b20-1); next, a citizen is defined as one who participates in jurisdiction and government (1275a22-3; 1275b18-20); πολιτεία is defined as the organization (τάξις) of those who live in the πόλις (1274b38) and more specifically as the organization (τάξις) of the political institutions (ἄρχαί), in particular the highest political institution (1278b8-10, cf. 1279a25ff). So *polis* is constantly defined by two other terms: *polites* and *politeia*. An Aristotelian *polis*, of course, like any other substance, is a compound of form and matter, and in case of the *polis*, the matter is the *politai* and the form is the *politeia*. Since for Aristotle the form is always more important than the matter, it is no surprise that Aristotle takes a change in the form (*politeia*) of a *polis* to be more important than a change of its matter (πλήθος πολιτῶν). As to the textual problem: κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας is a combination of a subjective and an objective genitive cf. e.g. 1280b40-81a1: πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρχους. The *polis* is the citizens' participation (*koinonia*) in the *politeia*, i.e. in the political institutions. To have both a subjective and an objective genitive depending on κοινωνία is a problem of translation, not of grammar or interpretation. κοινωνία means "participation" as well as "community". It is only in our translation we have to make a choice. If we prefer "participation" we have no difficulty in saying the participation of A in B. but then we miss the connotation "community". If we translate "community" we run into difficulties (in English) with the two genitives, cf. M.B. Sakellariou, *The Polis-State. Definitions and Origin* (Athens 1989) 215 & 227. Incidentally there is no problem in Danish since the word "fællesskab" is the equivalent of "community" but can easily convey the meaning of the objective and subjective genitives in the idiom "borgernes fællesskab om forfatningen". In conclusion, I follow most editors in finding Congreve's conjecture unconvincing and unnecessary.

16 Arist. *Pol.* 1278b8-10.

17 Arist. *Pol.* 1275a7.

18 E. Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford 1951) 91.

19 A. Vincent, *Theories of the State* (Oxford 1987) 29-32.

20 B. Holden, *Understanding Liberal Democracy* (Oxford 1988) 22.

21 As in *IG*. I³ 101.49 & 53 = *M&L* 89.

22 Dem. 3.31.

23 *IG* II² 96.9 = Tod 126; Dem. 9.42. Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia* (Copenhagen 1983) 142 n. 12.

24 Tod 118.16.

25 KN As 1517,12, cf. A. Thumb & A. Scherer, *Handbuch der griechischen Dialekte* II (Heidelberg 1959) 335 §337 13a; A. Morpurgo, *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon* (Rom 1963) 262.

26 Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* II (Heidelberg 1970) 576-7; M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford 1899) 635. K. Strunk, 'Verkannte Spuren eines weiteren Tiefstufentyps im Griechischen,' *Glotta* 47 (1970) 2.

27 In contemporary Lettish, however, *pils* is used in names of cities, e.g. Daugapils = Dynaburg. – It is misleading when E. Benveniste claims: "we have thus here an old Indo-European term, which in Greek, and only in Greek, has taken on the sense of 'town, city', then 'state'." *Indo-European Language and Society* (London 1973) 298. In Sanskrit *pūr* certainly developed the meaning "town", "city" and since many of these cities were actually states I would not preclude that the word may take on the sense of "state" or "political community" as well.

- 28 IG I³ 4 B.3; 40.60 (= *M&L* 52); cf. Ar. *Eq.* 1093; *Lys.* 245; Andoc. 1.132; Is. 5.44 with Wyse's note *ad loc.*
- 29 IG IV 492.3.
- 30 IG XII,1 677.19.
- 31 In two cases *polis* probably denotes the citadel of Troy, *viz.* *Il.* 4.514: ὡς φάτ' ἀπὸ πτόλιος δεινὸς θεός; *Il.* 7.370: νῦν μὲν δόρπον ἔλεσθε κατὰ πτόλιν. But E. Lévy, 'Asty et polis dans l'Iliade,' *Ktéma* 8 (1983) 59-60 is prepared to question even these two occurrences and holds that *polis* in the sense of *akropolis* is unattested in the Iliad.
- 32 *Hymn. Hom. Cer.* 271. Sakkeliariou (*supra* n. 15) 156 adduces two attestations in Pindar: *Pyth.* 4.8 and fr. 119.2. But in the first case the epithet εὐάροματος militates against taking πόλις to mean citadel, and in the second case it is the addition of the adjective ὑψηλός that creates the meaning "citadel" instead of "city".
- 33 Plut. *Pelop.* 18.1.
- 34 S. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London 1978) 130: "In normal usage, *polis* meant a city-state, both territory (*chora*) and the conurbation at its centre (sometimes also called *asty*) where one could find the basic Greek political institutions ..."
- 35 Pl. *Lg.* 746A; Ps. *Arist. Oec.* 1343a10.
- 36 A. Snodgrass, 'Archaeology and the Study of the Greek City,' in *City and Country* (*supra* n. 2) 8.
- 37 S. Scully, *Homer and the Sacred City* (Ithaca and London 1990) 3; K. Raaflaub, 'Homer und die Geschichte des 8 Jh.s v. Chr.,' in *Zweihundert Jahre Homer-Forschung* ed. J. Latacz (Leipzig 1991) 207-15; Raaflaub *infra* 46-59.
- 38 Lévy (*supra* n. 31) 55.
- 39 *Il.* 16.69-70: Τρώων δὲ πόλις ἐπὶ πᾶσα βέβηκε θάροσνος (political community); *Il.* 11.711-2: ἔστι δέ τις Θροῦεσσα πόλις, αἰπεῖα κολώνη (city); *Il.* 18.490-1: ἐν δὲ δύο πόιησε πόλεις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων καλᾶς (both meanings at the same time).
- 40 νῦν γάρ κεν ἔλοις πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν *Il.* 2.12, 29, 68 etc.
- 41 *Od.* 14.472; *Il.* 1.129 (Troy); *Il.* 18.514 (shield of Achilles); *Od.* 6.9 (Scheria).
- 42 *Il.* 3.153 (Troy); *Od.* 6.262-3 (Scheria).
- 43 *Il.* 18.497 (shield of Achilles); *Od.* 6.266 (Scheria)
- 44 *Od.* 6.10, 266 (Scheria);
- 45 *Il.* 1.39; 5.446; 7.83 (Temple of Apollo); *Il.* 6.297-300 (temple of Athena).
- 46 *Od.* 6.9 (Scheria).
- 47 *Il.* 6.242ff (palace of Priam); *Od.* 4.20ff (palace of Menelaos); *Od.* 7.81ff (palace of Alkinoos). Cf. C. Rider, *The Greek House* (Cambridge 1965), Chapter xiv: 'Homeric Palaces' 166-209.
- 48 See Raaflaub's description *infra* 46-7.
- 49 *Od.* 6.7-10, 262-72.
- 50 *Il.* 18.490-540.
- 51 *Il.* 4.52.
- 52 *Od.* 14.473 (Troy); *Il.* 18.493 (shield of Achilles); *Od.* 6.194 (Scheria); cf. *Od.* 1.3.
- 53 A. Cambitoglou *et alii*, *Zagora I* (Sydney 1971).
- 54 F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (Toronto 1971) 107 n. 17.
- 55 See Snodgrass (*supra* n. 2, 1991) 9-10.
- 56 The earliest attestations of other walled cities are Iasos, Leontinoi and Kasmenai, all of the 7th century, For Iasos and Leontinoi cf. Winter (*supra* n. 54) 103, 128; for Kasmenai cf. A. Di Vita, 'L'urbanistica più antica delle colonie di Magna Grecia e di Sicilia: problemi e riflessioni,' *ASAtene* 59 (1981) 64-5.

- 57 F. Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (München 1984) 111.
- 58 *Lefkandi I. The Iron Age*, ed. M.R. Popham *et alii* (London 1980).
- 59 For the view that the Homeric poems reflect Greek society in the 7th century cf. now J.G.B. van Wees, *Status Warriors* (Amsterdam 1992).
- 60 M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (London 1956) 35; M.M. Austin & P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (London 1977) 40.
- 61 O. Murray, *Early Greece* (London 1980) 64; I. Morris, 'The Use and Abuse of Homer,' *Classical Antiquity* 5 (1986) 100-4; K. Raaflaub (*supra* n. 37) 239 with n. 115, cf. *infra* 43-6, 46-59.
- 62 H. *Il.* 2.645-52.
- 63 H. *Il.* 2.494-510.
- 64 J.A.O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford 1968) xvi.
- 65 J.N. Coldstream, 'The Meaning of the Regional Styles in the 8th Century B.C.,' in *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.: Tradition and Innovation* ed. R. Hägg (Stockholm 1983) 17-25.
- 66 G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde I* (Munich 1920) 128-35; Gschnitzer (*supra* n. 4) *passim*; K.W. Welwei, *Die griechische Polis* (Cologne 1983) 16f; 30ff.
- 67 Cf. e.g. F. de Polignac, *La naissance de la cité grecque* (Paris 1984) 41-92; I. Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society* (Cambridge 1987) 171-210; *Idem*, 'The Early Polis as City and State,' in *City and Country* (*supra* n. 2) 25-57. Cf., however, C. Morgan, 'Ethnicity and Early Greek States: Historical and Material Perspectives,' *PCPS* 37 (1991) 131-63.
- 68 Lévy (*supra* n. 31) 55.
- 69 E.g. Hom. *Il.* 6.95: αἶ κ' ἔλεῖσῃ / ἄστῃ τε καὶ Τρώων ἀλόχους καὶ νῆπια τέκνα. Tyrnt. fr. 12 (West) line 24: αὐτὸς δ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσὼν φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν,/ ἄστῃ τε καὶ λαοὺς καὶ πατέρ' εὐκλείσας. Cf. e.g. *IG XII* 7.108: πόλει πένθος ἔθηκε θανῶν, where *polis* is used in the same sense.
- 70 Cf. e.g. Dem. 57.30, 43, 46; 59.107.
- 71 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26.4: μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄστοιν ἢ γεγωνός.
- 72 Kolb (*supra* n. 57) 59, 66.
- 73 Runciman (*supra* n. 1) 348, Welwei (*supra* n. 66) 16.
- 74 Hdt. 7.234.2.
- 75 Hdt. 6.58.1.
- 76 Hdt. 7.220, cf. J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1978) 319: Q152.
- 77 M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Greeks* (London 1963) 45, interpreting Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7.
- 78 Osborne (*supra* n. 2) 29.
- 79 Thuc. 6.5.2. Cf. A. Di Vita, 'Town Planning in the Greek Colonies of Sicily from the Time of their Foundations to the Punic Wars,' in *Greek Colonies and Native Populations* ed. J.-P. Descœudres (Oxford 1990) 350.
- 80 The exceptions include e.g. Pagai in Megaris (39) and the island of Salamis (58).
- 81 Murray (*supra* n. 61) 64; Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (5th ed. Munich 1977) 80; Forrest in *The Oxford History of the Classical World* ed. J. Boardman, J. Griffin and O. Murray (Oxford 1986) 19.
- 82 But then we would lose the derivative "citizen" which is indeed the obvious translation of *polites*.
- 83 E.J. Owens, *The City in the Greek and Roman World* (London 1991) 17; Gschnitzer s.v. *polis* in *Lexikon der Alten Welt* (Zürich 1965) 2389.

- 84** On the size and growth of towns and cities in early modern Europe cf. J. de Vries, 'Patterns of Urbanization in Pre-industrial Europe 1500-1800,' in *Patterns of European Urbanization since 1500* ed. H. Schmal (London 1981) 77-109.
- 85** Aeschin. 3.122 (war); Thuc. 2.70.2 (public expenditure); Thuc. 5.18.1 (peace); Aeschin. 3.133 (frontiers).
- 86** Gschnitzer (*supra* n. 4) 121-5. The exception is Luxembourg.
- 87** Aeneas Tacticus 11.4: ἔτι δὲ συνεβούλευε καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τὴν πόλιν φυλασσόντων ἀπόμισθον ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὡς ἐλάχιστον δῆθεν ἀνάλωμα τῇ πόλει ᾗ.
- 88** It is worth noting Isokrates' view (12.179) that Athens was the only *polis* in Hellas in the true sense of the word, whereas all the other conurbations were just *komai*.
- 89** For the (traditional) distinction between state and society cf. Barker (*supra* n. 18) 3: "By 'society' we mean the whole sum of voluntary bodies, or associations, contained in the nation ... with all their various purposes and with all their institutions". — "By 'the State' we mean a particular and special association, existing for the special purpose of maintaining a compulsory scheme of legal order, and acting therefore through laws enforced by prescribed and definite sanctions". See Ober *infra* 129.
- 90** Forrest (*supra* n. 81) 19 followed by e.g. Ober (*infra* p. 131-2) and Murray (*infra* page 199ff).
- 91** *Einführung in die antike Staatskunde* (Darmstadt 1968) 68. See also: Welwei (*supra* n. 66) 10; Owens (*supra* n. 83) 1, Morris (*supra* n. 2) 26.
- 92** Arist. *Pol.* 1253b1-3; 1260b13.
- 93** Arist. *Pol.* 1353b8-10; 1253b23ff (production); 1259a37ff (reproduction).
- 94** In Book One there is not a single occurrence of the term *polites*, and *politeia* is only mentioned in the last section (1260b15), which is not an integral part of Book One but serves as an introduction to the following books.
- 95** Arist. *Pol.* 1253b6-7.
- 96** Arist. *Pol.* 1274b41; 1275b20.
- 97** Arist. *Pol.* 1276b1-2.
- 98** Arist. *Pol.* 1278a8-11; cf. 1328a34.
- 99** Arist. *Pol.* 1275a7-8; 1326a18-20.
- 100** In Book I the *polis* is seen as a city, created by a form of *synoikismos*: *Pol.* 1252b20 (*synelthōn*), 27-8. See N.H. Demand, *Urban Relocation in Archaic and Classical Greece* (Bristol 1990) 26-7: "synoikisms were frequent in the 5th and 4th centuries ... Aristotle's acquaintance with this form of *polis* creation through power-building synoikisms may well have misled him to apply the concept anachronistically to the problem of the origins of the *polis*".
- 101** Arist. *Pol.* 1278b15-30.
- 102** Arist. *Pol.* 1326b7-9.
- 103** Arist. *Pol.* 1253b1-8.
- 104** Arist. *Pol.* 1275a7-8; 1326a18-20.
- 105** Arist. *Pol.* 1261a24: οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων; 1277a5: ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἢ πόλις; 1287a12: ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλις; 1328a36: ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶν τῶν ὁμοίων.
- 106** Pl. *Resp.* 369Bff. See Schofield's discussion *infra* 186ff.
- 107** Pl. *Resp.* 370C etc.
- 108** Pl. *Lg.* 737E.
- 109** Pl. *Lg.* 740C etc.
- 110** C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *Polis* religion?' in Murray & Price (*supra* n. 1) 295-322; A. Giovannini, 'Symbols and Rituals in Classical Athens,' in *City-States in Classical*

Antiquity and Medieval Italy ed. A. Molho, K. Raaflaub and J. Emlen (Stuttgart 1991) 459-78; L. Bruit Zaidman & P. Schmitt-Pantel, *Religion in the Ancient Greek City* (revised English ed. Cambridge 1992).

- 111** H. McClees, *A Study of Women in Attic Inscriptions* (Diss. Columbia, N.Y. 1920); J. Gould, 'Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women in Classical Athens,' *JHS* 100 (1980) 50.
- 112** L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (2nd ed. Berlin 1966) 50-60.
- 113** P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Recipes for Greek Adolescence,' in *Myth, Religion & Society*, ed. R.L. Gordon (Cambridge 1981) 188.
- 114** *IG* I³ 82.23 (metics); *Ar. Ach.* 253ff.; *Is* 8.19-20 (women); *Philoch.* fr. 97 (slaves). Cf. Deubner (*supra* n. 112) 94, 96, 118, 135, 152.
- 115** W. Schuller, *Frauen in der griechischen Geschichte* (Konstanz 1985) 25-6, 28, 41, 55; R. Just, *Women in Athenian Law and Life* (London 1989) 23.
- 116** Snodgrass (*supra* n. 2, 1986) 51: "The hoplite phalanx was the embodiment of the polis idea translated into action"; (*Supra* n. 2, 1991) 19: "The existence of hoplites is the clearest a posteriori proof of the existence of the polis."
- 117** Morris (*supra* n. 67) 196-7.
- 118** *Thuc.* 2.13.7; *Xen. Vect.* 2.2; D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge 1977) 82-6.
- 119** E. Will, *Le monde grec et l'orient* (Paris 1972) 416; Bengtson (*supra* n. 81) 286 Welwei (*supra* n. 66) 10; A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (London 1980) 28. L.B. Zaidman & P. Schmitt-Pantel, (*supra* n. 110) 7; Morris (*supra* n. 2) 27. For a preferable and more balanced view cf. Hampl (*supra* n. 7) 16-7; Raaflaub (*supra* n. 37) 241 n. 122: "Autonomia keine Bedingung", and Rhodes *infra* 161-77.
- 120** *Arist. Pol.* 1315a4-8.
- 121** *Arist. Pol.* 1252b27-53a1; 1261b10-4; 1275b20-1; 1291a9-10; 1326b2-8; 1328b16-8.
- 122** *Ps. Xen. Ath. Pol.* 2.3; *Thuc.* 4.108.3; 8.64.1; *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.15.
- 123** *Hdt.* 7.234.2; *Thuc.* 5.54.1 (*pace* the note in Gomme/Andrewes/Dover); *Xen. Ages.* 2.24; *Lac. Pol.* 15.3; *Skylax* 46.
- 124** *Thuc.* 5.18-9.
- 125** *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.31.
- 126** *Xen. Hell.* 5.1.33.
- 127** *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3.
- 128** E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7. - 4. Jh. v. Chr.* (Bamberg 1978) 3-7, revised and updated in 'Die Zahl der griechischen Staaten und Arealgrösse und Bürgerzahl der 'Normalpolis,'" *ZPE* 59 (1985) 253-63.
- 129** M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History.* (Philadelphia 1982).
- 130** Ostwald (*supra* n. 129) 28-9.
- 131** *Hdt.* 1.170.3.
- 132** *Thuc.* 2.15.2.
- 133** See *supra* n. 123.
- 134** E.g. Skyros (*Skylax* 58); Imbros (*Skylax* 67); Lemnos (Μυρινᾶιοι, Ἐφαισιτῆς *IG* I³ 267 IV.29-30, cf. 259 *postscriptum* 5-6).
- 135** Cf. e.g. Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων πόλιν (*Thuc.* 1.108.5) or Ἐνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν (*Thuc.* 4.49).
- 136** E.g. Siphai (*Thuc.* 4.89.2 cf. 4.76.2-3; *Skylax* 38); Korsiai (*Theop.* fr. 167; *Skylax* 38).
- 137** E.g. the Boiotian poleis listed in *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3.

- 138** Thuc. 1.144.2, cf. E.J. Bickerman, 'Autonomia. Sur un passage de Thucydide (I.144.2),' *RIDA* 5 (1958) 313-44.
- 139** *Athenaioi* (Thuc. 5.23.1); *Athenai* (Hdt. 5.91.2).
- 140** *Lakedaimonioi* (Thuc. 5.23.1); *Lakedaimon* (Pl. *Resp.* 599D); *Spartiatiai* (Thuc. 1.132.1); *Sparta* (Hdt. 7.234.2).
- 141** E.g. The Boiotians (Thuc. 2.9.1-4); the Akarnanians (*IG II²* 43 A 70-2 & B 10) Tod 144.36.
- 142** A. *Pers.* 213; Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.18; 1.4.25; 1.5.7.
- 143** Cf. e.g. C.G. Thomas, 'The Greek Polis' in *The City-State in Five Cultures* (Santa Barbara 1981) 40; Bengtson (*supra* n. 81) 286, 295; P. Green, *Alexander to Actium. The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990) 53, 56, 80, 220 etc.; Runciman (*supra* n. 1) 348.
- 144** M.H. Hansen, 'Den Græske Bystat og Aristoteles,' *Museum Tusulanum* 24 (1974) 53-4.
- 145** E. g. J.K. Davies in *Cambridge Ancient History* VII,1 (2nd ed. Cambridge 1984) 304-20; S. Price in *The Oxford History* (*supra* n. 81) 334-6. Cf. Gauthier and Millar *infra* 211-31 and 232-60.
- 146** Ostwald (*supra* n. 129) 14-22.
- 147** Ostwald (*supra* n. 129) 22-6.
- 148** Arist. *Pol.* 1252a1-7; 1252b27-53a1.
- 149** Arist. *Pol.* 1252b9-30.
- 150** Arist. *Pol.* 1326a35-b25.
- 151** Arist. *Pol.* 1261a29. The only reference in *Politics* to a federal state!

The Rise of the *Polis*

The Archaeological Evidence

ANTHONY SNODGRASS

(Respondent: JENS ERIK SKYDSGAARD)

Anyone comparing the state of our understanding of the rise of the *polis* today with its condition twenty years ago will probably agree that we have come a long way in a fairly short time. Archaeology can claim some share of the credit for this, as I think can be shown objectively: not merely by citing the increase in the volume of relevant evidence, but by consideration of a different point. The issues on which the nearest approach to consensus has been achieved are the issues in which archaeological evidence can play a major role; where archaeology is by its nature less effective, radical disagreement persists. To illustrate the former category of issue, I would point first to the rise of the major cult-centres of the individual *poleis* and *ethne*, which is in most cases attested first by the sudden growth in the numbers of portable dedications, then later by the construction of the first monumental temple to the deity. Later epigraphical and documentary evidence is of course important too in establishing the identity and role of the deity; but the point still stands that it is the essentially archaeological processes of quantification and dating that have made it possible to identify the critical moment in the life of the cults, and to suggest the political significance of that moment.¹

More fundamental, and therefore even more direct, has been the contribution that archaeologists have been able to make by seeking out and excavating *settlement* sites of the relevant period. Here it has been calculated² that, of some 176 excavated sites with domestic structures of Early Iron Age to Archaic date whose evidence (even if not yet fully published) is nevertheless available for use, over 160 were first dug after World War II and some 118 since 1970. No wonder, then, that there has been an access of new information. One of the important aspects of these new sites, from our point of view, is the degree of *planning* or other centralised activity that they display. Sometimes it is the individual constructions, religious or military, that tell us most about collective endeavour; but more widely usable is the discovery that, at a certain moment, the model of settlement sometimes changed from one of sporadic centrifugal growth

to one of a regular layout, clearly planned by some kind of central authority that was concerned with the community as a whole. Present evidence suggests that that moment arrived in the eighth century B.C. at the latest, after which the process was strongly reinforced by the colonising movement. This has helped us to focus our interest in the same period as was suggested by the evidence of the cults.

The next aspect is demography, which might indeed have been given pride of place, were it not for the fact that it exhibits the weaknesses as well as the strengths of archaeological thought. The obvious weakness (of which I myself plead guilty) is the temptation to take the evidence at face value, a form of positivism to which archaeologists seem to succumb most readily. It was already clear, several decades ago, that the sheer volume of Greek ceramic material from the later eighth century – in technical language, the Late Geometric – represents a huge increase, per unit of time, over that available from the preceding centuries.³ Other media of production, especially bronzework, terracottas and stone buildings, tell a closely similar story.⁴ The mistake lay in inferring from this that population had therefore grown by a comparable factor. The first setback for this line of thought came with Ian Morris' argument, in his book *Burial and ancient society* (1987), that changing selectivity of burial was an additional factor that had to be built into such equations. If a different proportion of the population were receiving formal burial at different periods, then careful adjustments had to be made to the raw counts of graves, and therefore to the quantification of the materials, including pottery, of which such a high proportion had occurred in these graves. The balance of the picture had already been somewhat altered by the discovery of new settlement- and cemetery-sites, such as Nichoria and Lefkandi, whose heyday fell in periods *before* the later eighth century. A colloquial archaeologist's dictum of the late 1960's, "All Geometric is Late Geometric", no longer seems a tolerable exaggeration. When we digest Morris' argument about Athenian burial, and envisage the possibility of its having a counterpart in the case of sanctuary-dedication – presumably, that dedication became an overwhelmingly more frequent practice *for each individual actor* in the later eighth century – then a cloud of doubt and reconsideration envelops the once clear picture of burgeoning population-growth as an accompaniment to the changes of the later eighth century.

It remains true, however, that even after every reasonable adjustment has been made for such distorting factors, present evidence still suggests that there were more people, living in a larger number of settlements, of a

larger average size, and spread over a wider geographical area, in the later eighth century than at any time in the preceding four centuries. Morris himself acknowledged this with his graph of the changes in the incidence of Athenian burials after the hidden factors had been allowed for; and by his statement, referring to the numbers of sites of all types in three different regions, that “the eighth-century increase is most impressive.”⁵ But this growth was hardly the explosive one that it had appeared to be on a first quantification of the evidence. This gives us an opportunity to remind ourselves that, in any case, orthodox demographic theory suggests that population-growth has seldom been a prime mover, but much more often a simultaneous accompaniment or an immediate result, of socio-political change. On this view, what happened to the population of Greece and the Aegean is merely useful confirmation that we are right in identifying the later eighth century as a period of critical transformation.

It was Moses Finley who first pointed out to me the major significance of the next archaeological finding, the abrupt discontinuation of many kinds of grave-goods in burials after the eighth century. Two observations about this phenomenon seem especially appropriate to our subject: first, that it was regionally selective, being detectable in some of the more advanced *polis*- (or prospectively *polis*-) communities of Greece from about 700 B.C., in certain other regions like Crete a little later, and in many of the areas of the future *ethne* not at all. Secondly, in those communities where it did occur, it was a mass-phenomenon, in which the whole community seems to have changed its ways. Thus it is not subject to the effects of another important element of archaeological theory which has recently emerged to complicate the naive, positivist picture: the doctrine of social rationing,⁶ whereby access to certain material goods, or even certain categories of surface decoration, of the kind that we have traditionally called ‘decorative’ or ‘artistic’, was strictly controlled by an exclusive elite. In the rejection of many kinds of grave-goods, we have a practice which seems to show a new cohesion on the part of whole societies.

With the advent of alphabetical writing and the general diffusion of representational art we enter the orbit of another recent archaeological theory: ‘peer polity interaction’, whereby communities, or at least their leaders, appear to be motivated by the feeling that certain innovations are legitimised by the fact that neighbouring communities have adopted them.⁷ Neither of these two changes, writing and representationalism, is universal in the sense that every member of the community practised or

even directly benefited from them. But both are communicated across large areas of the Greek world in a way that can be explained by peer polity interaction. That is to say, they are swiftly adopted by the nascent or future *polis* communities, and more slowly in the areas of the *ethne*; and the adoption takes place in circumstances where no obvious rational or external pressure for it seems to have existed, apart from a desire to emulate neighbours. So alphabetic writing was a marvellous invention, but several generations were to elapse before it was to be used to anything approaching its full potential; meanwhile, it apparently served as a somewhat exclusive curiosity. Figural art, though more broadly diffused, was still at first used only in those selected media which had the legitimation of being employed by other Greek communities. The figure-scenes on Late Geometric pottery are the prime example of this, appearing as they do in at least a dozen regional styles, and following a set of ground-rules that appear to have evolved first in Attica. A few other media for figure-scenes are accepted too – small figurines of terracotta and solid-cast bronze, occasional bronze relief-strips, mould-made gold bands, incised fibulae – before regional independence begins to assert itself with further products such as carved gem-stones and relief-decorated pottery.⁸ An obvious consequence of this slightly convention-bound development was that the scenes were readily intelligible across the boundaries of individual polities – more readily, no doubt, than the epichoric inscriptions, which offered potentially bewildering local discrepancies in sign-values, and which in any case were often not applied to easily portable objects.

In elucidating the diffusion of Greek culture overseas, partly but not only through the medium of colonisation, archaeology has had a time-honoured role; but in recent years, that role has expanded. From addressing themselves largely to chronological problems, archaeologists have begun to apply their minds to more abstract questions, notably to determining the material criteria for inferring the permanent or ephemeral presence of Greeks (and others) at a given site. In the colonial world, this has led to a refinement of the facile equation between the date of the earliest Greek pottery and the documentary evidence for the date of a colony's foundation. Elsewhere, there has been a reconsideration of the old certainties about the Greek presence at eastern sites like Al Mina, Tell Sukas and Ras el Basit. Some of the arguments used – for example, about the relations between visiting Greeks and indigenous states or communities – have repercussions for the question that concerns us here, the rise of the state in the Greek homeland.

Yet of all the material advances so far reviewed, on which archaeology has shed some light, it would be hard to argue that any one was possible *only* in the context of the transition to statehood. Not even alphabetic writing, in the sporadic and improvisatory form in which it first occurs, can carry so strong an implication. It would have been perfectly possible for a pre-state society to undergo this or any other of the changes without an accompanying political or social transformation. The chiefdoms of Iron Age Europe, to look no further afield, offer parallels for some of these and indeed of other, more developed advances; at the same time, they display just the kind of competitive emulation that is the hallmark of peer polity interaction. What is distinctive about the phenomena that we have observed in the Greek world is, first, their concentration in a short period of time; and secondly, the fact that in this case they introduce a progressively better-documented, and ultimately fully historical, epoch. From observing the direct sequel of these advances we can move on to argue that, for processes which took place not long afterwards, state organisation is a necessary prerequisite. This makes it a much stronger inference that the previous developments did indeed signify state-formation.

Consider, for example, the Archaic legal inscriptions on stone, often rather exaggeratedly referred to as 'law-codes.'⁹ In fact, they offer only small glimpses of the way in which society was organised, but these glimpses are enough to reveal the existence of a whole apparatus of elective offices, of a remarkably specialised kind. The systems whose existence is thus attested, by the end of the seventh century B.C., must have taken generations to reach such an advanced stage of development. Tyranny, a phenomenon of at least equal age, is equally something that is scarcely intelligible except against a background of state organisation: tyrants survived by manipulating an existing system, rather than by setting up a new one. A third development of the era was the adoption of hoplite organisation – by which I mean neither the new equipment nor the tactics of the heavy infantry phalanx, but the system by which the infantry army was, or came to be, recruited. Such a system could never have worked on a permissive basis, when default on the part of a number of those who could meet the property qualification, or admission of a number of those who could not, would in either case have spelled military disaster. The system presupposed a quite detailed, centralised list of citizens, accurately recorded by age-groups and clearly categorised according to wealth. The compiling of such a list, and the subsequent

maintenance of the system, must have required a small-scale bureaucracy.

These developments of the seventh century strongly suggest that we look for the initial conception of the *polis* organisation in some earlier period. Unless we join hands with those who would pursue the search back to the Bronze Age,¹⁰ we shall find that one period has an overwhelming claim on our attention, namely the second half of the eighth century, which witnessed the constellation of changes that we have been reviewing.

Yet nothing that has been said so far contributes much to the *explanation* of the rise of the Greek state. The changes that we have considered are no more than epiphenomenal. Even if we accept that state-formation was the decisive factor that caused people to establish communal sanctuaries, to adopt planned settlements, to suppress private funerary display, to begin communicating through the new media of writing and figural art, to send organised groups of settlers overseas, to establish the preconditions for population-increase, all at much the same period – even then, we are no nearer to explaining why that influence began to operate when it did. For that, we should need to be better informed about the condition of Greece in the immediately preceding period; and this is an issue which takes us out of the area of consensus.

There is a long-standing division of opinion between those who believe that Greek society of the Early Iron Age was in general rather egalitarian, and those who on the contrary hold that it was markedly stratified. Broadly speaking, archaeologists have tended to make up the former group and historians – though joined of late by a group of the younger archaeologists¹¹ – the latter. The traditional archaeological approach was always diachronic: when compared with the preceding era of the Late Bronze Age palaces and with the succeeding one of the Archaic tyrannies, the material remains of the Early Iron Age cannot but appear modest. Even today, impressive examples of architecture, public or private, remain few in number; there is a long list of technological skills and artistic media which still appear to be entirely lacking; even the burial-evidence, though prolific, remains comparatively unpretentious in terms of wealth and monumentality. The archaeologist is apt to be attracted by comparisons with eras like the Neolithic or the Middle Helladic, when social stratification is widely held to have been absent or in abeyance. Historians, on the other hand, are likely to have Homer in the forefront of their minds; they are less prone to take the material evidence at face

value, and reader to offer alternative explanations for it, often in behavioural terms.

From the point of view of the rise of the state, it makes a lot of difference which side is right, or at least nearer the truth. If genuine aristocracies controlled Greek society for centuries before the appearance of the *polis*, then either something happened to weaken their grip, or they actively turned to state-formation as a means of maintaining or strengthening it – possibly both in succession. If on the other hand social differentiation had traditionally been slight, then the developments of the eighth century take on a different guise, as products of a power-struggle between newly-arisen groupings. On either account, the success of the solution adopted remains remarkable, with *polis*-institutions spreading in a wave across southern Greece, the islands, Ionia and into the colonial world.

There is, however, a yet more fundamental feature of Early Iron Age society in Greece which is a source of difficulty to both the schools of thought just described, but perhaps especially to the former. This is the fact that the settlement-sites of the Early Iron Age remain so fugitive. For a long time, it was possible to put this down merely to a failure on the part of archaeology: excavators had not looked in the right places. But the past twenty years, as we saw at the beginning of this paper, have seen a major redemption of any such failure. With it has come a second realisation: when recovered, the settlements have proved, on average, decidedly small; many of them lack the space to accommodate even a population of a few hundred. A third, less obvious feature, has also now emerged: the length of their occupation is in many cases relatively brief, on the scale of the several centuries or even millennia of continuous habitation that we often find in Greece.¹² There are, as we are often reminded, a handful of exceptions to the last two generalisations: places like Athens, Argos, Corinth or Thebes whose life probably spans the entire Early Iron Age (and much longer before and after that period), and which show a quite extensive spread of settlement too. But they *are* the exceptions.

With a pattern of few and mainly small, but nevertheless nucleated, settlements another line of explanation immediately suggests itself: is it possible that the rest of the population at this period had dispersed into a scatter of rural dwellings, which had been overlooked in the traditional hunt for 'major' sites? At this point, intensive field survey enters the archaeological scene. Excavation had reached its conclusion of a low Early Iron Age population not so much through the spatial as through the diachronic dimension: again and again, excavated sites had shown

occupation at many periods (some of them previously unsuspected), but not often in the Early Iron Age. Intensive survey now proposed the objective search of a given stretch of territory without prejudice to any particular period. Some fifteen years' work, by a number of expeditions in several parts of Greece, have now given a clear answer. Far from undermining the provisional interpretation of the excavators, survey has done the opposite: isolated houses, hamlets and outlying graves, though unexpectedly common for some eras, are excessively rare for the Early Iron Age. Of periods between the Neolithic and the present day, only perhaps the Early Byzantine has proved quite so elusive to field survey. The hypothesis of a denucleated Iron Age population has to be abandoned. The assumption based on excavation, that what population there was at this period lived in nuclear settlements, however small, has been reinstated. The "higher order" sites were virtually all that there was.

It is now hard to see how there can ever be an escape from this finding:¹³ what was a widespread impression before is today hardening into fact. We have to base our interpretations of Early Iron Age society, for the foreseeable future, on the datum of a tiny population, based in small, widely-separated settlements, with broad tracts of country having no permanent habitation. It is all the more problematic to see how such a society could transform itself into the rapidly-changing and feverishly active world of later eighth-century Greece.

The peculiarities of the Greek picture make it a somewhat discouraging experience to wade through the mass of comparative archaeological literature on state-formation, with its theoretical polemics and its studied avoidance of the Greek world in favour of even less well-documented (but often archaeologically richer) alternatives. Instead, I wish to detach two features of the process that ran its course in Greece, the first relating to the period of *polis* formation, the second to the preceding centuries of the Early Iron Age. A distinctive new feature of the *polis* organisation was its *territoriality*. The notion of territorial boundaries, the idea that any part of the inhabited space must belong either to one community or to its neighbour must, it seems, have arisen freshly in the course of the eighth century B.C. in Greece. No such understanding can have prevailed in the preceding period, where communities were seldom close enough for their concerns to abut on each other in this way. Either by conscious decisions, or as a result of other decisions, the landscape was subjected to a network of new boundaries. Nor was it by any means an automatic process to decide where the primary boundaries, those between polities, should fall. Small though the average Greek polis-territory was by most standards,

things were not allowed to reach the point where each pre-existing settlement became the centre of a new *polis*. Some communities were, from the first, subordinated to larger neighbours. To take a famous example, Hesiod's Askra (which survey has shown to have then been a community of perhaps average size for the period¹⁴) was incorporated by consent or by constraint into the territory of Thespiiai, a few kilometres distant – or so we have always understood the references in the *Works and Days*. Thorikos, archaeologically a well-known example, was incorporated into the *polis* of Athens, very much further away. Seen from this point of view, the rise of the *polis* meant the taking over by larger settlements of their smaller neighbours with a view to establishing a common boundary round a larger territorial unit. This must have involved either negotiation or a show of force – in cases like that of Attica, at quite a long range. The incentives to state-formation, especially where negotiation prevailed, must have been clearly set out by the proposers. It is likely that allocation of land was one of the incentives. If there were land-allotments at this time, then we can surmise that the size of holding would have much larger on average than it became in later historical times. Citizenship would have been the more attractive as an option if it offered the lure of a secure title to a sizeable plot of land. Once accepted, it would have led naturally to those consequences which we know to have occurred: the rise in population, so often found in a newly-established and secure regime of sedentary agriculturalists; the demarcation of state territory by such devices as the establishment of rural sanctuaries; the rapid recourse to colonisation once the available land had been apportioned; the readiness, a little later, to accept service in a citizen-army to defend the state's territory.

For the leaders in the pre-existing society, such an agreement could also offer advantages such as to outweigh the losses. The sacrifice of an arbitrary and spontaneous exercise of local power could be offset by the chance to share in power on a larger scale, through a mechanism which gave official sanction and apparent permanence. No longer need family fortunes be entirely at the mercy of chances of fate and character: for some, the state could give old privileges a new lease of life on a more secure basis. A promise of a lion's share in any local land-distribution would doubtless be a high priority. If land-ownership were the dominant issue, and if we are right to infer that there was more than enough land to go round, then the *polis* solution would have been attractive to almost any form of pre-existing society, whatever its degree of stratification.

It is to this last, still unresolved issue, that I wish to return for my final

observation. It is still my conviction that Greek society before the eighth century, taken as a whole, cannot have reached a high level of social differentiation; and for the simplest of reasons. Over much of the country, it seems that the size of the individual communities was too small for this to happen. An isolated community of less than 500 people cannot generate a sharply-differentiated élite; it cannot afford more than a rudimentary degree of craft-specialisation; it cannot muster an army of more than about 100 warriors. The present evidence of archaeology suggests that there were only a handful of settlements of a size any larger than this in the whole of southern Greece, Ionia and the islands. Maybe it was these few, with at least the potential capacity to produce a long-standing local aristocracy, that provided the momentum for change, although it is quite certain that the *polis* movement rapidly spread far beyond their confines.

The further refinement of archaeological techniques, and especially of intensive survey, can do something to elaborate this picture. It should be able, at least, to document the process of internal colonisation of the Greek countryside in and after the eighth century, by bringing to light new rural settlements of the epoch; but, as I have said, it will be difficult now to modify the image of the preceding, Early Iron Age pattern. This is, I know, very much an archaeologist's conclusion. It is archaeology which, almost alone, has conjured up the picture that I have described, in sharp contrast to the Homeric evidence which gives not a hint of the depopulation, and instead portrays a marked degree of social differentiation among quite populous communities. But it is the archaeological evidence on which I am briefed to talk, and it will be interesting to see whether the claims that I have made are seen as being supported by, or even compatible with, the evidence from the written sources.

Notes

- 1 The evidence for this statement is spread over a large number of sanctuary-excavation publications: some of the results are correlated in my *Archaic Greece* (London, 1980), pp. 52-62.
- 2 Personal communication from Alexandra Coucouzeli (in a graduate seminar given in Cambridge in February, 1990).
- 3 This is immediately clear from a perusal of the successive chapters in J N Coldstream, *Greek Geometric pottery* (London, 1968).
- 4 See B. Schweitzer, *Greek Geometric art* (London, 1971).

- 5 I.M. Morris, *Burial and ancient society* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 72-73, fig. 22; quotation, p. 158.
- 6 For this see J. Whitley, *Style and society in dark age Greece* (Cambridge, 1991), especially pp. 11, 182, 193-4.
- 7 See C. Renfrew and J. Cherry (eds.), *Peer polity interaction and socio-political change* (Cambridge, 1986).
- 8 See B. Schweitzer, *op. cit.* (above, n. 4), chapters vi-ix.
- 9 To be discussed by K.-J. Hölkenskap in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 218 (n. s. 38) (1992), 87-117.
- 10 Most notably, H. van Effenterre, *La cité grecque: des origines à la défaite de Marathon* (Paris, 1985).
- 11 Conspicuously, Morris and Whitley (above, nn. 5 and 6).
- 12 On this, see now J. Whitley, 'Social diversity in dark age Greece', *Annual of the British School at Athens* 86 (1991), 341-365; A. M. Snodgrass, *An archaeology of Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 189-192.
- 13 Nicholas Purcell calls the finding "overemphasized", in his interesting paper 'Mobility and the polis', in O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek city from Homer to Alexander* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 29-58, at p. 34. This is perhaps a tacit admission that it is also, on present evidence, true. Purcell does argue effectively, however, that low population by no means implies lack of long-range communication.
- 14 See J.L. Bintliff and A.M. Snodgrass, 'Mediterranean survey and the city', *Antiquity* 62 (1988), 57-71, especially 60-61; A.M. Snodgrass, 'The site of Askra', in G. Argoud and P. Roesch (eds.), *La Béotie antique (Cahiers du CNRS)* (Paris, 1985), pp. 87-95.

Homer to Solon: The Rise of the Polis

The Written Sources

KURT A. RAAFLAUB

(Respondent: MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN)

I begin with three statements, ranging in date from the middle or late eighth to the early sixth centuries.¹ First, Hektor's battle cry in the *Iliad*:

So fight by the ships, all together. And he among you / who meets his death and destiny,
speared or stabbed,/ let him die! He has no dishonour when he dies defending / his
fatherland (*patre*), for then his wife shall be saved and his children afterwards,/ and his
house and property shall not be damaged – once the Achaeans / go away with their ships...
(15.494-99)

Second, Tyrtaios: The man who fights fearlessly among the *promachoi* “is a common good (*xynon esthlon*) for the community (*polis*) and all the people (*demos*).” If he dies “he brings great honor to the community (*asty*) and the people (*laoi*) and his father.”

Such a man is lamented alike by the young and the elders / and all his *polis* goes into mourning and grieves for his loss./ His tomb is pointed to with pride, and so are his children,/ and his children's children, and afterwards all his *genos*... / But if he escapes the doom of death,... and wins his battle,... / all men give place to him alike, the youth and the elders.../ Aging, he has reputation among his citizens. (9D = 12W)

Third, Solon:

This our *polis* will never be destroyed by the planning / of Zeus, nor according to the wish of the immortal gods;/ such is she who, great hearted, mightily fathered, protects us,/ Pallas Athene, whose hands are stretched out over our heads./ But the citizens (*astoi*) themselves in their wildness are bent on destruction / of their great *polis*.../ So my spirit dictates to me: I must tell the Athenians / how many evils a *polis* suffers from *Dysnomie*,/ and how *Eunomie* displays all neatness and order... (3D = 4W)

Each of these statements is separated from the preceding by roughly one half to three quarters of a century. They seem to indicate a progression in the individual's relationship to his community. In dying for his *patre*, Hektor says, the soldier saves his house and family. Clearly, to this fighter his *oikos* is at least as important as the community. In Tyrtaios the

community, facing no less serious outside danger, takes center stage; the poet focuses on its collective feelings and actions; here the family appears to be secondary. Finally, in Solon's case, the threat to the community comes from within; the poet, directly representing the community itself, addresses his audience in their function as citizens. Thus he even speaks in the collective first person: our polis, we! Of course, the progression is not as straight and simple as that, neither in historical reality nor in the extant sources. Moreover, throughout the archaic and classical periods, concern for family and community remained intertwined in the fighting soldiers' thinking. I cite as a monumental example the battle cry of the Greek sailors and marines at Salamis (according to Aesch. *Persae* 402-5, tr. Vellacott):

Forward, you sons of Hellas! Set your country (*patris*) free!
 Set free your sons, your wives, tombs of your ancestors,
 and temples of your gods. All is at stake: now fight!

Nevertheless, a marked progression toward a stronger emphasis on the community is undeniable, and it makes eminent sense that in our surviving evidence Solon appears as the first explicit spokesperson for the polis.

My first problem concerns the existence and developmental stage of the polis in the times and societies described by Homer and Hesiod (the "early polis" in the late eighth and early seventh centuries) – a vexed issue which is in need of some systematic rethinking. I shall then analyze the sources illuminating the "integration of the polis" in the seventh and sixth centuries, and end with some general thoughts on the rise of the polis. Before I turn to Homer, however, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

1. Preliminary remarks

First, I am not concerned with the question of whether and to what extent the polis was a state and when it might have reached statehood.² Nor shall I try to translate "polis": both "city" or "city-state" are seriously misleading.³ Lacking a reasonable alternative, I shall use "polis" as a technical term throughout this paper, indicating with *polis* (italicized) the Greek word as it appears in the sources.

Second, while this solution eliminates modern connotations inherent in "city" and "state", it does not in itself establish conceptual clarity. For

the word *polis* existed for many centuries before our earliest literary sources allow us to examine terms and concepts more reliably. Although it is uncertain whether *ptolis* is in fact attested in the Mycenaean Linear B tablets, it undoubtedly is a very old Indo-European word for “stronghold, citadel,” belonging to the “Achaean” background of the epic language.⁴ If, as thus seems not unlikely, *ptolis* was used by the Mycenaeans, the word would be one of several social terms (such as *demos*, *basileus*, *eleutheros*, *doulos* and perhaps *asty*) proving terminological continuity from the Bronze to the Archaic Ages. Such unquestionable linguistic continuities have prompted some scholars to assume a high degree of continuity in content as well.⁵ Caution is in order, however. While it is quite probable that terms such as *demos* and *polis* were used continually to designate communities and settlements (or parts thereof), it is certain that in the course of several centuries such communities underwent drastic changes. Accordingly, the meaning of these terms will have changed massively as well. Certainly in Mycenaean Greek *ptolis* would have designated the citadel. This meaning of *polis*, though attested epigraphically, is extremely rare in archaic and classical Greek literature and, interestingly, missing in Homer. As Emile Benveniste observes, we have here “an old Indo-European term, which in Greek, and only in Greek, has taken on the sense of ‘town, city,’ then ‘state.’”⁶ As a consequence, the history of the Greek polis begins for us, not with the Mycenaean *ptolis* but with the Homeric *polis* and its immediate antecedents as far as we are able to glean them from the epics themselves.⁷

Third, in investigating the rise of the polis, we are dealing not with an event but with a process that continued over several centuries. Our scarce written sources offer only intermittent glimpses at the decisive phase of this process (from the eighth to the early sixth centuries), illuminating different stages and conditions in a wide variety of places. Archaeological evidence is accumulating rapidly, providing us with immensely valuable information about changes in population density, settlement distribution and structure, subsistence and trade, social differentiation, and much more (see n. 1). But the rise of the polis entails more than this: it is the history of a relationship between peoples and their communities. To understand this, we need the help of written sources.

Fourth, to trace the rise of the polis means to investigate the evolution of a known entity from its unknown origins through its barely recognizable early stages to its fully developed and well-known form. Thus at least a working definition of “polis” is indispensable. In view of the great

number and variety of poleis existing at any given time, such a definition inevitably is somewhat abstract, approaching an “ideal type”.⁸ What constituted a polis was not necessarily independence nor the existence of a city or town and the unity of urban center and territory – although both factors were important in most cases – because dependent communities did not necessarily cease to be considered poleis, and there were poleis without cities, poleis with several towns and even poleis without territory;⁹ moreover, the city did not create, it presupposed the polis. Rather, the polis was a community of persons or, more precisely, citizens (a “Personenverband” or “Bürgerverband”), of place or territory, of cults, customs and laws, and a community that was able to administer itself (fully or partly). Among these factors, the community of citizens was primary; Aigina was a place: a town, an island; the polis was “the Aiginetans”. *Andres polis*, says Thucydides: “the men are the polis” (7.77.7; cf. Alkaios 426 LP, Campbell; Her. 8.61). Thus, as W.G. Runciman stresses, “a *polis* is a type of society for which the proper label is not ‘city-state’ but ‘citizen-state’.”¹⁰ The mentality and loyalty of the citizens – their sense of community and identification with it – were more important than external features such as urban architecture. For the same reason, as the Phokaians (Her. 1.163-68) and many others demonstrated, the polis was movable. In addition, on both the communal and private levels, the polis was defined by emotional elements that could not be replaced or recreated easily; they are best expressed in the battle cry of Salamis cited above.

Fifth, the Homeric epics provide perilous ground for social analysis. My own interpretation is based on the following considerations. (a) The epics are neither historical nor sociological or anthropological treatises. But they provide much information about social issues. Whether or not these epics were produced by the same poet, they are chronologically close to each other (second half of the eighth century, the *Iliad* about one generation earlier than the *Odyssey*) and thus can and should be examined together. Furthermore, despite more marked differences in genre, purpose and outlook, Hesiod’s poems still are close enough chronologically and in overall experience to provide a useful complement.¹¹

(b) Whatever the mechanisms of their ultimate fixation (see n. 15), all these epics are based on an old tradition of oral composition, performance and transmission.¹² In the course of constant re-performance and re-interpretation by generations of singers, their content was transformed and adapted to changing conditions and the experiences and expectations of changing audiences – both (though more slowly) on the level of

events and actions, and (more rapidly) on that of social life and interaction. Even on the latter level, which concerns us here, the epics present, to some extent, an amalgam, combining conditions and memories of different periods. But the combined weight of such memories, anachronisms and archaisms is relatively insignificant – if compared with the large bulk of the material used to depict the social background and environment, in which the heroes act out their heroic deeds, and which, in contrast to the events and persons, is not marked or emphasized. This background description is not entirely but sufficiently consistent to allow us to recognize a society that makes sense from an anthropological perspective and can be fitted into a scheme of social evolution among early societies. Thus this society must have existed in time and space outside of the epics. The place most likely was Ionia. Given what comparative research has taught us about the characteristics of oral poetry, on the one hand, this society must be dated close enough to the poet's own time to allow recognition and identification by his audience – a crucial factor in the poet-audience-interaction typical of such poetry. On the other hand, we need to take into account both a natural lag-time for adjustments and a conscious effort on the poet's part to preserve what James Redfield calls the “epic distance”;¹³ in other words, the social background of heroic poetry needs to be “modern” enough to be understandable but archaic enough to be believable. Thus, I suggest, “Homeric society” is to be dated within the time-span that could be covered by the audience's collective memory, that is, at the very most three generations or one century before the poet's own time: in the late ninth and early eighth centuries.¹⁴ In contrast to earlier, more static periods, this was a time of profound and rapid change. More than is usually the case, therefore, the old and new overlapped and coexisted, and this in itself may account for much of what in the epics appears to us inconsistent or contradictory.¹⁵

(c) The epics typically combine, on the one hand, traditional components firmly embedded in the story and outlook of heroic poetry but alien to the experience or memories shared by poet and audience with, on the other hand, elements from their world of experience that are needed to fill out the picture. A good example of such “poetic distortion” is provided by the description of fighting and battle formations in the *Iliad*. Our understanding of the apparently inconsistent picture might be facilitated if we recognized as part of the problem the poet's need to combine two heterogeneous elements: the traditional emphasis on heroic fighting, which, though not corresponding to the reality known by an eighth-century audience, was poetically attractive and dramatically effective

(single combat, extended heroic *aristeiai*, and the use of chariots), and “filling material”, which naturally was taken from a real world that *was* familiar to this audience (mass combat in close formations: see below at n.48).

(d) Finally, the epics represent poetic art of the highest order. The poet does not tell us all he knows; he selects and emphasizes according to his own dramatic and interpretative purposes. This factor of “poetic selection” is often underestimated: not all that the poet does not emphasize is unimportant or nonexistent in Homeric society. For example, the *Odyssey* is concerned with a hero’s homecoming and his efforts to regain control in his *oikos*. Although the community is deeply affected by these events, the poet’s primary attention rests on this *oikos*. Thus the community of Ithaka remains in the background. This does not mean, however, that this particular community was unimportant, undeveloped or even hardly existing; nor does it mean, more generally, that the *oikos* was the only social entity that counted for “Homeric” people. Both these conclusions have been drawn by many scholars. It only means that for traditional and artistic reasons the poet chose to focus on Odysseus’ *oikos*. Frequent hints and passing remarks reveal, though, that in the poet’s imagination this *oikos* is no less part of a community than Alkinoos’ and Menelaos’, and in book 2 its assembly appears in the limelight.

2. The Early Polis (Eighth/Early Seventh Centuries)

a. The Polis in Homer

“Cities” and *poleis* are frequent and prominent in both epics. I shall first establish a typology of such communities, then use my working definition of “polis” to determine to what extent the “Homeric polis” corresponds to this general model. This will provide a solid foundation for assessing the concepts associated with the polis and for defining the place of the polis in Homeric society.

Four communities stand out among all the others. The *Iliad* is dominated by two of these: Troy and the fortified camp of the Achaians. With few exceptions, the actions narrated in the epic take place in these communities and in the plain between them. First, Troy is described and characterized with great care, but few details are singled out: its massive “sacred” walls shelter the permanent inhabitants and a large number of allies; the Skaian Gate connects this protected space with the plain, its

tower serves as lookout. The *agora* is near the palace of Priamos and the houses of his most important sons. On the citadel rise the temples of Apollo and Athena. The plain and the foothills of Mount Ida, Troy's territory, are now deserted but in past times of peace offered pastures for herds and were covered with fields and orchards.¹⁶ This community has a history: it was founded¹⁷ by Priamos' ancestor when the people moved from the foothills of Ida to the edge of the plain. Priamos' family has since held the leadership and expects to continue to do so if this war can be won (20. 215-40; cf. 179-83 and 6. 476-79). Priamos is the undisputed political leader but has yielded the military command to Hektor. Assemblies take place in Troy (7. 345-79) and, among the soldiers, in the field (8. 489-542; 18. 243-313; cf. the council of the leaders: 10. 298-332; 13. 741f.); there are occasional allusions to a council of "leaders" or "elders of the people" (*hegetores, demogerontes*: 3. 146-53; cf. 15. 720-23).

Second, by contrast, the fortified camp sheltering the Achaians is a temporary community. Its walls have been erected hastily, without sacrifice – hence they are not sacred – and it will leave no trace after the Achaians' departure (7. 336-43, 433-63; 12. 3-35). It is a community without history and future beyond the immediate purpose of its existence. It is also a community without wives and children (15. 661-66),¹⁸ without a territory and without supportive neighbors (15. 735-41). Quite correctly, therefore, it is called *stratos* (e.g., 15. 657; 16. 73), never *polis* or *asty*, and the accommodations, though in some cases quite elaborate, are not *domata* but *klisiai* (huts: e.g., 15. 656 and esp. 24. 448-56). In every other respect, however, this community is structured like any other, both physically and politically:¹⁹ it is eventually surrounded by a ditch and wall with several gates (12. 3-35, 50-57, 119f., 175); the ships and shelters are arranged in rows (14. 29-36), according to contingents, and separated by "many paths" (10. 66); the *agora*, site of several assemblies within a few days, and the altars of the gods are located near the ships of Agamemnon and Odysseus, presumably in the center (7. 382f.; 8. 222-26, 249f.; 11. 805-7), and there is a market for trade with foreign merchants (7. 467). The council of the leaders meets before an assembly or independently (2. 53-85; 7. 313-43; 9. 12-173; 10. 195-253; 14. 1-134), often hosted by Agamemnon who is overall leader, acknowledged as such by all but not unchallenged in his decisions.

The existence of this improvised city, which reaches its fully developed form rather suddenly in the tenth year, poses difficult questions.²⁰ Two interrelated aspects seem particularly important to our present inquiry. The sudden building of the walls around the Achaian camp, motivated

by Achilles' withdrawal (cf. 9. 349f.), enables the poet to include in his "wrath poem" an extended and highly dramatic wall-battle (*teichomachia*), that is, the storming of a city which, in the case of Troy, is excluded from the poem by its limited time frame.²¹ By this same device the Trojan War could essentially be fitted into the model, familiar to poet and audience, of a war between neighboring communities.²² Here again we find the "poetic amalgamation", mentioned earlier, of traditional elements and contemporary reality.

Third, after his painful adventures among various societies in an unreal *Märchenwelt* – societies which all in different ways provide a negative contrast to normal human societies²³ – Odysseus reaches the community of the Phaiakians on the island of Scheria. This too is a *Märchenland*, but its difference is positive: it is an ideal type of community, living in a golden age setting between gods and humans and between fiction and reality.²⁴ This community is described in considerable detail. Around the main settlement is

a towering wall (*pyrgos*), and a handsome harbor either side of the *polis*, and a narrow causeway, and along the road there are oarswept ships drawn up, for they all have slips, one for each vessel; and there is the *agore*, put together with quarried stone, and built around a fine precinct of Poseidon. (6. 262-67; cf. 7. 43-45; 8. 5-7)

This precinct, called Posideion (6. 266), certainly is a *temenos* with an altar, perhaps one of the temples built when the *polis* was founded (6.10).²⁵ Inside the walls are the homes of the Phaiakians, in particular the splendid house of Alkinoos with its miraculous garden (6. 298-302; cf. 7. 84-132). Alkinoos' estate (*temenos*) and another orchard or garden are outside the walls, in shouting distance, near a grove of poplars sacred to Athena and a spring (291-94). The community's territory seems to comprise the entire island, including some mountains in the distance (5. 279f.).

Alkinoos is *basileus*, as his father was (6. 11f.; 7. 62f.), but there are twelve *basileis* beside him (8. 390f.). They meet and are entertained in Alkinoos' house (6. 53-55, 60f.; 7. 98f.; 8. 41f.), and they preside over meetings of the assembly and other communal events (8. 4-45, 109ff.). Finally, this community, like Troy, has a specific history: Alkinoos' father led the Phaiakians to Scheria, when the Cyclopes, their former neighbors, made life intolerable for them. He settled them on the island "and drove a wall around the *polis* and built houses and erected temples of the gods, and allotted the fields" (6. 4-10). This foundation story most

likely reflects the experience of eighth-century colonization;²⁶ Scheria therefore represents the idealized picture of a community of that time.

Fourth, Ithaka, the community in the shadow: its territory comprises the whole island; Odysseus owns land in some distance from the main settlement (e.g., 15. 504-6; 17. 25; cf. 14. 95-104), while the farm of his father, Laërtes, lies close by (24. 205). Odysseus' house is a large farmhouse, similar to, but much less extravagantly decorated than Alkinoos'; it is situated in the town (e.g., 16. 130f., 150f., 169f.; 17. 5-17), as are those of the suitors (18. 419-28). There is a harbor (16. 321-25) and an *agore* with permanent seats, serving as meeting place for formal assemblies and informal gatherings (see below). Walls and sanctuaries are not mentioned, but there is a grove with a spring right outside the town (17. 204-11).

These four communities are by no means identical. Apart from certain anomalies mentioned before (temporary nature, *Märchenland*), the main settlement of the Phaiakians is a harbor town on a peninsula, while Troy with its citadel rises in the background of a large coastal plain. Ithaka is mountainous and unsuitable for horsebreeding (4. 601-8; 9. 21-27), while Scheria and Troy are blessed with fertile plains. In Troy the aged leader is still in charge but has handed over the military command to his eldest son, while in Ithaka he has yielded all his functions to his son and withdrawn from public life.²⁷ Nor are all the essential features present or mentioned in every case. Nevertheless, in various combinations these communities share certain important elements that allow us to create a composite picture.²⁸ The typical Homeric community comprises territory and main settlement. The latter, often walled, features sanctuaries (shrines or temples), an *agora* (often with permanent seats at least for the leaders), and the homes of the inhabitants, including the large house of the overall leader (*basileus*), where the other *basileis* meet and are entertained. This council meets quite frequently, while an assembly is convened whenever important issues need to be discussed.

It is this type of community for which the epics use the terms *demos*, *polis*, *asty*.²⁹ *Demos*, meaning both "land, district" and "people", describes the largest conceivable social unit, the outermost limit of belonging and community; beyond it there are personal and communal relationships of friendship and alliance but no shared community. *Gaia* (land) and *patre* (fatherland) are often used synonymously with *demos* and *polis*. *Polis* in turn is sometimes linked with *demos* in formulas (such as *demon te polin te*) expressing the communal unity of people and territory. *Polis* appears interchangeably with *asty* as the term for the main settlement but, unlike

asty, *polis* can also describe the larger political community (the “state”), comprising both town and territory.³⁰ Thus Odysseus asks Nausikaa (*Od.* 6. 177f.; cf. 191-95) about the people (*anthropoi*), who live in (hold) this land (*gaia*) and community (*polis*), and about the way to the town (*asty*); Glaukos wants Hektor to tell him how he plans to save his *polis* and *asty* (*Il.* 17. 144). Equally interchangeably, the inhabitants of *polis* and *asty* are called *politai* and *astoi*, while *laos* or *laoi*, originally denoting a group of warriors and followers of a chief, in our epics are mostly equivalent with *demos*, people. Due to its original meaning, however, *laos/laoi* cannot, but *demos* can, include the elite. These, the heads of the largest and richest *oikoi*, are the *basileis*. The same or possibly a somewhat larger group is described functionally as leaders, councilors or elders (*protoi*, *hegetores*, *medontes*, *gerontes*).³¹ Despite differences in wealth, power of the *oikos*, personal qualities, and influence, these men form a fiercely competitive group of equals among whom the paramount *basileus* holds an inherited, though precarious, position of preeminence as *primus inter pares*.³²

The communities discussed above, then, are prime examples of Homeric *poleis*. Presumably all the other *poleis* referred to by name or term are imagined to correspond to the same model. Indeed, the world envisaged by the epics is full of such *poleis*. Many are mentioned in the *Iliad* because they fall victim to Achilles’, the “city-sacker’s” (*ptoliporthos*) relentless raids during the first nine years of the war, and in the *Odyssey* because Telemachos and Odysseus visit them. Indeed, Odysseus is the archetype of a man who has seen the *astea* of many peoples (n.30). The foreign visitor is asked to identify himself by *gaia*, *demos* and *polis* (*Od.* 8. 555) or by *polis* and parents (e.g., 1. 170; 14. 187). In addition, *poleis* feature prominently in similes and on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18, 490-540), mirroring the main dimensions of human life and experience. The natural assumption therefore is that people live in *poleis*, and all important figures (at least in the human world) are indeed connected with a *polis*. Central elements of the epic action take place in a *polis*, mostly in and around its fortified town, and, as Stephen Scully has demonstrated, the crucial function and symbolic significance of the “city” in life and thought of Homeric society is emphasized by a great variety of associations.³³

To what extent, then, does this polis correspond to the classical, fully developed model of the polis, as it was defined above? For some components of this definition the answer is fairly simple. The meanings of *demos* and *polis* show that this polis is a community of space and territory. Communal shrines and temples (mentioned earlier), and communal sac-

rifices or rituals (for example, *Il.* 6. 286-311; *Od.* 3. 4-8) mark it as a community of cult. It certainly is a community of customs. Although there are no written laws, great importance is attributed to observing *themis* (traditional and generally accepted norms of behavior) and *dike* (procedural justice). One of the main functions of the *basileis* is the settling of disputes; in this function – as in that of speaker in the assembly – they hold the staff as sign of an authority that is derived from Zeus, the ultimate protector of justice (*Il.* 2. 101-9; cf. 18. 497-508; *Od.* 3. 406-12). Thus the Homeric polis is a community with a shared concern for customary norms and fair procedure, that is, for justice.³⁴ Furthermore, the poleis we have studied are independent, self-administered communities.³⁵

But is the Homeric polis also, in more than the most superficial sense, a community of persons or citizens?³⁶ Is it more than a loose agglomeration of largely autonomous *oikoi*, which many scholars consider the primary, not only social and economic, but also organizational and psychological units in this society? That is, to what extent is this polis an integrated community with a collective will and collective ability to act, and with a developed sense of communal solidarity and loyalty? And to what extent does such communal thinking and acting transcend the collaboration necessary for survival in times of extreme emergency? Such questions naturally concern a relatively developed stage of the polis, and thus probably one closest in time to the poet and his audience. They concern also the most unheroic aspects of “Homeric society”, most likely to be affected by the principles, discussed earlier, of “poetic selection” and “epic distance”. Beyond the examples mentioned before (emphasis in battle descriptions on individual exploits rather than mass combat, focus on Odysseus’ *oikos* rather than the polis of Ithaka: see above, end of section 1), we see these principles at work in other areas as well. For example, the second half of the eighth century witnessed the beginning of organized communal warfare and wars for the control of land. Such wars did not displace rivalries and raids among poleis and warrior bands, but, where they occurred, they confronted the communities involved with a serious threat to their subsistence or even existence. Nevertheless, this new reality seems excluded from the epics, which prefer the traditional heroic themes of wars about cattle, booty, or a beautiful woman.³⁷ The same period saw the rise of panhellenic sanctuaries, new forms of interstate relations and a gradual formalization of aristocratic leadership, including perhaps elected and rotating offices. Instead of all this, the epics generally preserve somewhat earlier structures and forms of in-

teraction, emphasizing wherever possible the dominant role of the heroic individual. This even applies to the polis itself. Although the Phaiakian community recognizably is modelled after a contemporary colony with its harbor town, as a city it is incomplete: the poet largely omits the residential quarters and the busy sphere of daily life in such a town; instead he focuses on the public sphere, the grand house of the leader and the events that involve his family and his public function. It is as if the poet described the old world of a chief and his followers in the new setting of a polis.³⁸ For our purposes, however, it is crucial that this new setting is clearly visible. Overall, bits and pieces of the new realities “peek through” quite often; put together, they betray a considerable sense of a developed and coherent community.

a) As said before, the polis comprises both territory and town. The concept of “territoriality”, according to Anthony Snodgrass an important indicator of the emergence of the polis, though not emphasized, thus may be assumed to be in existence.³⁹ The polis is the largest unit of belonging; the individual is identified by family *and* polis. Even the Achaian contingents at Troy in the famous “Catalogue of Ships” (2. 484-760) are distinguished, not only by their leader’s name and an ethnic, regional or local indication of origin, as we should expect if we were dealing mainly with groups of followers; the catalogue also lists in great detail the settlements or poleis in each group’s homeland.⁴⁰

(b) The Homeric polis’ main settlement features two types of conspicuous monuments (temples and walls), which, if historically accurate (i.e., contemporary with “Homeric society”) and not primarily the product of ancient Mycenaean or Near-Eastern influences and thus essentially of poetic fiction, would seem to indicate major collective efforts. Monumental, free-standing temples of the type mentioned in the description of Troy and the Phaiakian town are characteristic neither of Bronze Age Greece nor of Near-Eastern cities. But their appearance in post-Mycenaean Greece is dated securely to the late eighth century in an increasing number of places. This phenomenon is generally recognized as important archaeological evidence for the rise of the polis – although by themselves these temples do not give us sufficient information about the social and political conditions that brought them into existence. In combination with other evidence, however, we may conclude that they reflect truly communal efforts⁴¹ rather than mainly those of one or several outstanding leaders and their oikoi, and that they largely represent new beginnings rather than simply continuity on a much more lavish level.⁴²

By contrast, walls and the motif of fighting around walls are attested

for both the Mycenaean period and the ancient Near East. The description of the sacred walls of Troy and the epic theme of storming such walls may partly be inspired by such traditions. Moreover, such walls, surrounding the entire settlement rather than only the citadel, so far are documented archaeologically in extremely few cases of the eighth century.⁴³ Several observations, however, are noteworthy. The walls of both Scheria and the Achaian camp partly consist of wooden palisades and superstructures comparable to those actually found in Old Smyrna. Scheria represents a colonial polis; in the report of its foundation (*Od.* 6. 4-10: above at n.26) the building of walls around the polis is mentioned as an integral part of establishing a colony; thus in the colonial world city-walls may have appeared more frequently at an earlier period than in the old Greek territories. One of the cities on the shield of Achilles, which generally is assumed to reflect conditions close to the poet's own time, is walled as well (*Il.* 18. 514); here as in the defense of Troy the poet betrays close and natural familiarity with the use of such walls in inter-city warfare – more perhaps, as the famous case of the chariots suggests, than could be acquired through fossilized memories of a distant past or the spotty information obtained from foreign lore; such knowledge more likely is grounded in contemporary experience. The question thus remains open; archaeology may in this respect still limp behind.⁴⁴

In any case, even if city-walls were more frequent in the eighth century than we presently think, they hardly were regular features of “the” early polis, and we seem well advised not to count city-walls among the criteria for the formation of the polis. Again, however, the question must be asked what precisely this signifies for the rise of the polis. As Snodgrass writes, “The long delay in building city-walls round even the most famous mainland poleis, or even, as at Sparta, their permanent absence, is a matter of record.”⁴⁵ Certainly, but such negative evidence needs to be explained no less than the positive evidence. We know very little about the nature of warfare and competition among the emerging poleis. The case of Sparta may not have been as unique as it appears to us from the point of view of our fifth-century sources. Even much later, hoplite warfare was remarkably formalized and contained a strong ritual component; thus communities may have relied more on their citizen army than on walls to decide competitions with their neighbors.⁴⁶ In addition, depending on local conditions, many poleis may have found it sufficient to repair existing (Mycenaean) fortifications around the acropolis or even build new ones on such a limited scale.⁴⁷

(c) The battle descriptions in the *Iliad* (see also above, after n. 15)

contain a large amount of evidence for mass combat in relatively dense battle formations. The conclusion seems inevitable that we are dealing, if not with an early form of the hoplite phalanx, at least with its immediate precursor. Some of the images (e.g., 13. 130-34; 16. 212-17) are strikingly close to those of Tyrtaios (8D = 11W. 29-34), who is generally believed to sing about the phalanx. The experience behind these images thus must be similar.⁴⁸ At any rate, there is no question that in the *Iliad* the common soldiers are fully involved in the fighting and, though less conspicuously than the heroes, share the responsibility for victory and defeat.⁴⁹

The Achaian army consists of a large number of contingents from all over Greece, assembled by their leaders in support of their overall leader, Agamemnon. But under this surface we glimpse traces of a different reality: the contingents are not just follower groups, they are primarily affiliated with specific peoples and poleis (above at n.40). At least in one place the community (*demos*) is involved in selecting the leaders of such a contingent (*Od.* 14. 237-39). The conception of the Achaian camp as a temporary fortified city adapts the war to a feud between neighboring poleis, which must have been all too familiar to poet and audience (above at n.22).⁵⁰

In such wars all able-bodied and properly equipped men would help defend their own community or overpower the other. These wars indeed were communal affairs, greatly enhancing cohesion, solidarity and shared responsibility in the polis. The connection, typical of the developed polis, between land ownership, military capacity, and citizenship or political rights, must have existed already in this Homeric polis, albeit in an undeveloped and unformalized way.⁵¹ If so, this has great importance for our understanding of subsequent developments. For example, it effectively eliminates the much-discussed "hoplite revolution" from the historical scene: there was no revolution, only an evolution, starting on a more advanced level than is usually assumed.⁵² The same phenomenon goes far in explaining the relatively small gap between the mass of free farmers and the elite of wealthy landowners, emphasized in recent scholarship, and the latter's difficulties in establishing themselves as a sharply defined aristocracy, separated by effective class barriers from the rest of the population.⁵³

(d) Most scholars consider the Homeric assembly insignificant and powerless: the assembled masses can only shout their approval or disapproval; only the members of the elite are entitled to speak; and at the end the leaders or the paramount leader do what they want anyway. This view, however, is contradicted by some crucial facts.⁵⁴ First, some of

these assemblies, whatever their outcome, are formalized to a considerable degree; they are convened by the herald's announcement, the "right" to speak is determined by status, rank and experience, and the speaker assumes a position of high communal authority by holding the leader's staff.⁵⁵ Second, an assembly is called and public discussion arranged in a polis, an army or a band of warriors whenever an important issue requires debate and decision. Informal assemblies of smaller or larger groups meet at various occasions, and it seems perfectly normal for Telemachos, as for the *basileus* of the Laistrygonians and other nobles, to spend time in the *agora* (*Od.* 20. 146; cf. 10. 114f.; 6. 53-55; 15. 466-68). The assembly thus is a traditional institution, deeply ingrained in the social structures out of which the polis developed. Third, normally the leader makes conscious efforts to convince the assembly (thus the great importance attributed, among the leader's qualities, to persuasive speaking⁵⁶) and, although there is no formal vote, respects the people's opinion. If he refuses to do so and fails in executing his plan, he is liable to censure and makes himself vulnerable.⁵⁷ Fourth, the assembly has an important function in witnessing and legitimizing communal actions and decisions, from the distribution of booty to the resolution of conflicts.⁵⁸ Thus overall, though without the right of initiative, free speech and vote – restrictions which are typical of most ancient societies anyway – the assembly plays a crucial role that should not be underestimated. Fifth, much of this is true for the council of *basileis* as well. It is convened and consulted frequently by the paramount *basileus*, whether before an assembly or separately. In peace and at war, the *basileis* spend much time in consultation and at common meals.⁵⁹ The *Iliad* describes several council debates: there is, among a highly competitive elite of roughly equals, a recognizable hierarchy of speaking, exceptions are explained carefully; the *basileis* consider it their duty to challenge the paramount leader, and he is expected to follow the best advice or the shared opinion of the others.⁶⁰ Finally, assembly and council are seen as such normal methods of communal interaction that quite naturally they are attributed to divine society as well: although this society is equivalent, not to a polis but to a family or an *oikos*, the gods are imagined to meet in assembly whenever an issue needs to be discussed, decided upon, or simply announced.⁶¹

(e) There are indications of a distinction between public and private and of the emergence of a public sphere. Thus the assembly deals only with public matters (*Od.* 2. 30-32, 42-44); Telemachos has to demonstrate that the troubles of his *oikos* (an entirely private problem) affect the well-being of the whole community and therefore are of concern to the

assembly (2. 45-79). One of the first questions a noble visitor answers is whether he is travelling on public or private business (3. 82; 4. 314). Odysseus recalls a public mission he undertook, sent by his father and the other *gerontes*, to recover 300 sheep and their shepherds stolen from Ithaka by some Messenians (21. 16-21): he went to retrieve “a debt (*chreios*) owed him [as the representative of the *demos* of Ithaka] by the entire *demos* [of Messenia]” (21. 17). In other words, the *demos* of Messenia is held responsible by the *demos* of Ithaka for the crime committed by some Messenians against some people of Ithaka. Similarly, Odysseus once saved Antinoos’ father from the wrath of the Ithakan *demos* because he had “thrown in his lot with the pirate Taphians and harried the Thesprotians, and these were friends of our people” (16. 424-30).⁶²

The concept visible, for example, in the plot of the *Iliad*, that the community has to suffer for protecting the crimes of one of its members, is here developed beyond its traditional scope: the perpetrator’s community itself takes communal action to punish him, redress the wrong he did, and thus prevent hostile action on the part of the wronged that could hurt the whole polis. Traces of such thinking are visible in the *Iliad* as well;⁶³ it plays a crucial role in Hesiod’s appeal to the *basileis* to observe the principles of *dike*, and only a small step seems required to the level of formal interstate agreements, in which the individual, whether private or official, is held as responsible for violations as the whole *demos*.⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, then, in the epics the *demos* in the sense of “people” is often described as acting collectively and sharing a common will or experience.⁶⁵

(f) Underscoring further the importance of shared communal experiences and responsibilities, much attention is devoted to the suffering caused to the entire polis by selfish and irresponsible acts of the leaders or serious conflicts among them. The *Iliad* stresses this aspect from the beginning for both the Achaians and the Trojans. Agamemnon’s grave mistakes in violating generally accepted norms of behavior first toward the priest of Apollo and then toward his most important fellow-*basileus*, just as Achilles’ unrelenting wrath and the Trojan leaders’ intransigence in refusing to fully redress the wrong committed by Paris – these are all presented, not just as excessive actions and attitudes typical of heroes but as harmful to the community. They are emphatically decried from the point of view of the people who suffer, yearn for peace, and hate this war and the perpetrator who has caused it. The efforts to bring about reconciliation between the Achaian leaders, and their eventual success

are recounted in great detail, including a careful description of how a leader can admit his mistake, make up for it, and thereby even enhance his reputation.⁶⁶ Equally, despite the *Odyssey's* focus on Odysseus' *oikos*, the suitors' perpetrations⁶⁷ are interpreted as acts which, although committed in the private realm, deeply affect the entire community. In the assembly of book 2, Mentor appeals directly to the people's sense of communal responsibility. He argues, strictly on the political level, that Odysseus was a good *basileus*; for his caring leadership the community is obliged to him and his family. In failing to protect his *oikos*, it sets a negative example: there will be no incentive for future *basileis* to provide responsible leadership (2. 230-41). This line of thought is supported, as in Hesiod, by the praise of the just *basileus* and the blessings he bestows upon his polis.⁶⁸

(g) Finally, there is the much debated question of "polis mentality". Scholars have interpreted the evidence in diametrically opposed ways, some attributing to the Homeric heroes much, some very little sense of communal solidarity or loyalty.⁶⁹ In my opinion, however, the question is not whether or not the heroes' primary concern is private – it clearly is – but to what extent they also feel public responsibility and allegiance to the polis. We are obviously dealing with a very competitive society, in which the individual's concerns are devoted first of all to his family and *oikos*. Competitive values, as Arthur Adkins has shown, often prevail over cooperative values, individual interests over those of the community.⁷⁰ But two points must be emphasized. First, although over time in the individual's range of motives that of communal allegiance gradually increased, the prevalence of individual interests and the tension between these and the loyalty demanded by the polis generally remained unchanged throughout the classical period, particularly among the elite, and caused the polis enormous difficulties, if not harm. Both the level of aristocratic integration in fifth-century Athens and Pericles' citizen ideal were possible only under exceptional circumstances; even then, I think, the latter to some extent amounted to a conscious repudiation of aristocratic values and radical "re-education" of the citizens.⁷¹

Second, the heroes' allegiance to the *oikos*, though primary, is not exclusive. Hektor says clearly that in saving the *patre* one saves one's family (15. 494-99, cited in the introduction), and, "One omen is best, to defend the *patre*" (12. 243). In the hero's competition for influence the power of his *oikos* is crucial, but service to the community is rewarded with honors and privileges, public status is tied to public responsibility, and failure in this respect threatens the leader's position.⁷² Odysseus

yearns for house, wife and son, but also for his *ge* and *patre*. This does not mean, as has been claimed, that he thinks of Ithaka as the island and country surrounding his home rather than as a polis, which thus might appear unimportant to him. Quite the contrary: *patre* and *gaia* are used in such contexts almost synonymously with *polis* not only in Homer but also in Kallinos and Tyrtaios.⁷³ All these terms describe the larger unit of belonging that encompasses the *oikos*. Thus Odysseus consistently talks of “home” as *oikos*/family and country/polis.

Cumulatively, this evidence, gleaned from traditional poetry that does not emphasize these aspects, seems to me sufficient to prove my point: the Homeric polis is indeed a community of persons or citizens and as such more than an agglomeration of autonomous *oikoi* banding together only in times of emergency. The community plays an important role in the lives and thoughts of its inhabitants. These, except for the poor and landless, all have a communal function in army and assembly. There are loose but well established communal structures: assembly and council, though not formalized, play an important and fairly regular role. There is a sense of a public realm, separated from the private, and an awareness of communal will and action, attributed collectively to the *demos*, both domestically and in dealing with other poleis. There is the capacity for communal accomplishment, both in war and peace, and there is a sense of communal responsibility and solidarity.

Confirmation for all this is found in a famous passage in the *Odyssey*, the vivid description of the society of the Cyclopes. These, although overbearing and lawless, live in a setting of golden-age abundance. But

they have neither assemblies for holding council (*agorai boulephoroi*) nor laws (*themistes*), but they inhabit the crests of the lofty mountains, in hollow caves, and each one dispenses the laws (*themisteuei*) for his children and wives, and is not concerned for the others. (9.105-15, cit. 112-15)

This society lacks all that constitutes a polis: it has no shared settlement and communal center, no shared law and no institutionalized communication, not even a shared religion (273-79) or communication by ship with other communities and the outside world (125-30). In other words, there is no community at all, only completely autonomous family units.⁷⁴ This component of the story is not part of the wide-spread folktales (a hero blinding a man-eating giant and a hero outwitting a monster by giving a false name) that are combined in the Polyphemos tale.⁷⁵ Rather, it represents a deliberate effort to conceptualize the polis by defining its

constituent components and attitudes. If the poet is able to do this negatively, by describing the ultimate “anti-polis”, he is also capable of giving a positive picture of the ideal polis. And indeed he does by setting before us the polis of the Phaiakians. They too are blessed by the gods and live in golden-age abundance, but they do everything right and fully share their communal experience; they are hospitable to foreigners and they are the ultimate sailors. As Stephen Scully concludes from these and other passages, the concept of the polis in Homer represents civilization, progress, community, justice and openness; not to live in a polis means primitiveness, isolation, fragmentation, lack of community, and lawlessness.⁷⁶

Thus all the categories we have included in our definition of the fully developed polis can be shown to exist in the Homeric polis, albeit in early and undeveloped forms. What Homer calls *polis* therefore indeed is a polis in the strict sense of the term: certainly an early forerunner of the classical polis, but much more than an “embryo”.

b. Hesiod and the Polis

Hesiod is usually dated to the late eighth and early seventh centuries (above n.11). In his *Works and Days*, he mentions his father and a quarrel about the inheritance, which “gift-devouring” nobles (*dorophagoi basileis*) had decided or might decide unfairly in favor of his brother, Perses – who, at any rate, had spent far too much time and resources on this issue and brought himself close to economic ruin instead of submitting to the farmer’s regimen of hard work.⁷⁷ These and other autobiographical details, though not lacking contradictions, are considered authentic by most scholars.⁷⁸ Thus Hesiod would be the first poet who speaks to us in his own voice and as a real person. His bitter experiences with a quarrelsome and lazy brother and with nobles who failed to uphold straight *dike* (judgment, justice), would plausibly explain his passionate devotion to *dike* and the farmer’s work ethic. But other explanations of the autobiographical elements are possible,⁷⁹ and even acceptance of the *communis opinio* does not imply that Hesiod’s poems had a narrow personal focus and were of limited regional interest. Rather, other considerations (such as the genre of didactic poetry, its Ionic origin which influenced both style and content, and the high probability that Hesiod’s poetry was no less panhellenic in function and outlook than the Homeric epics) strongly suggest that the issues raised by Hesiod were important to audiences all over Greece.⁸⁰

More generally, the *Works and Days* certainly describes the poet’s con-

temporary society. Hesiod speaks from the point of view of a farmer whose life revolves around his *oikos* and neighborhood and is dominated by the changing needs and religious concerns of the agricultural year, who is constantly threatened by debt and impoverishment but through hard labor and luck can also accrue some wealth, and who looks skeptically at the business of town and *agora* or at trade ventures overseas.⁸¹ In a broadly based anthropological analysis, Paul Millett has plausibly argued that the features emphasized by Hesiod are typical of highly competitive and individualistic peasant societies, which draw on limited resources and customarily engage in the practice of reciprocal borrowing.⁸²

What, then, does Hesiod contribute to our inquiry about the rise of the polis? While *Iliad* and *Odyssey* focus on the upper class and largely ignore the non-noble farmers, Hesiod provides their perspective, thus complementing the “Homeric” picture. Competitiveness, a constituent component of interaction among the nobles, here emerges as equally characteristic of the farmers. Hesiod explicitly distinguishes such constructive, positive *eris* from its negative, destructive counterpart (*WD* 11-26).⁸³ Thus fair and peaceful settlement of disputes, vital for the well-being of the community, is important not only on the level of the leaders (as illustrated in the Homeric epics) but also on that of the commoners. As Michael Gagarin writes,

the common man could prosper in eighth-century Boeotia only on two conditions: first of all, he must have the willingness to work hard and the practical knowledge to make his work most effective, and second, there must be peace in the society as a whole and freedom from plundering by others – that is, disputes must be settled through *dike* rather than through force (*bie, hybris*).⁸⁴

Homer illustrates the centrality of war for the leadership and value system of the upper class; so does Tyrtaios for Spartan society at large. Hesiod, by contrast, shows that under different circumstances war and warrior qualities could be perceived as less central;⁸⁵ from his perspective other values and leadership qualities are much more important, both for the individual and the polis. Thus he chooses to focus on the *basileis*, not as political leaders but as judges.⁸⁶ Of course, he is part of a polis (269, see below), but he lives in a village (*kome*, 639), a few miles from town. Having experienced the negative sides of the *basileis*' jurisdiction, he warns of the allurements of the *agora*:

Perses,... do not let malicious Strife curb your zeal for work / so you can see and hear the

brawls of the *agora*./ Not much time for brawls and meetings (*agorai*) can be spared / by the man in whose house the season's plentiful harvest /... has not been stored. (*WD* 27-32)

The farmer, he repeats over and over, has to center his attention and efforts on his *oikos*. The only relationships essential to him are those with his neighbors (342-45). Overall, this outlook illustrates the gap that still existed between the individual and the community, and the obstacles that needed to be overcome in order to integrate one into the other.⁸⁷

This does not mean, however, that Hesiod considers the polis unimportant or ignores it. Although *polis* and *asty* are not mentioned in the *Theogony*, the praise of the good *basileus* and the hymn to Hekate presuppose gatherings of the *laoi* in the *agora* in the setting of a polis.⁸⁸ Apart from one purely traditional phrase, in the *Works and Days* the polis appears once as the victim of the destructive forces of the Iron Age⁸⁹ and four times within about fifty lines in direct connection with Hesiod's main concern, *dike*:

There is a tumult when Dike is dragged away wherever gift-devouring men lead her, judging crookedly, and she follows (where they lead) lamenting for the poleis and the ways of the people, invisible, bringing trouble to those who drive her out and have not judged straightly. (220-24)

But those who give straight verdicts and do not violate proper legal process (*dikaion*)... live in a polis that blossoms, and the people (*laoi*) prosper in it. (225-27)

But far-seeing Zeus... marks out a *dike* (punishment) for wanton wrongdoers who plot deeds of harshness. Many times one man's wickedness ruins a whole polis, if such a man breaks the law and turns his mind to recklessness... (238-41)

The eye of Zeus sees all... and knows exactly what kind of *dike* in this [i.e., our present] case the polis holds within it. (267-69)

As in Homer, here too the natural assumption is that people live in a polis. Thus the values and relationships explored and systematized by the poet, though mostly formulated in general terms, should be seen as central for society primarily in the context of the polis. Certainly, the ability to choose between *dike* and violence (*hybris*, *bie*) is shared by all humankind:

Perses... obey the voice of *dike* and always refrain from *bie*./ This is the law (*nomos*) Zeus laid down for men,/ but fish and wild beasts and winged birds / know not of *dike* and so eat one another./ *Dike*, the best thing there is, he gave to men. (*WD* 274-80)

But such capacity for *dike* can be fully realized only in the framework of a polis.

What makes the *Theogony* an important document in our present inquiry is precisely Hesiod's interest in social values. The poem, an expanded hymn to Zeus, describes, through the genealogy of gods and divine powers, the origins of the world and of Zeus' just regime. It systematizes the forces that influence human lives, including those that are essential for social and political life.⁹⁰ Among its themes the Muses announce their celebration of the "ordinances and good ways (*nomoi, ethea*) of all the immortals" (66f.) – which are thus presented as models. In particular, Zeus appears as an exemplary *basileus*. He is a powerful and resourceful leader in peace and war, capable of attracting strong followers and rewarding them generously, fulfilling all his promises and controlling power with a firm hand (402f.). His regime is based on broad consensus and on a fair distribution of privileges (*timai*: 881-85, cf. 73f.). It is characterized by the powers which serve him (Zelos, Nike, Kratos, Bie: 383-401), are associated to him by marriage (Metis, Themis, Eurynome, Demeter, Mnemosyne) or are the offspring of these marriages (such as Eunomia, Dike and Eirene, the Muses, the Graces: 886-917).⁹¹ Thus, in fact, the *Theogony* is much more than its title indicates: woven into the poem is a political program or ideal that conceptualizes the components necessary for the well-being of the polis and successful leadership in it.⁹²

Furthermore, Zeus and his daughters, the Muses, are sponsors of the human *basileis* (81-84, 93, 96), whom their gifts endow with persuasion and wisdom; thus they are able to "decide settlements with straight verdicts", for which they enjoy respect and influence in the polis (81-92). If the *basileis* make good use of such potential, they and their polis flourish; if not they suffer (*WD* 225-47): this is one of the central themes of the *Works and Days*. The myth of Prometheus and Pandora and that of the Five Ages explain the miserable state of the world and the necessity for *dike* and labor (42-212). The central section (213-85), in which most of the advice to Perses and the *basileis* is concentrated, focuses on the need (and advantages) of observing *dike*, the disasters brought upon individuals and society by the consequences of *hybris*, and Zeus' unfailing concern for these matters. Anticipating Protagoras by more than two centuries, Hesiod postulates *dike* and *aidos* (respect for others) as indispensable values of the polis:⁹³ the misery of humankind reaches its peak when Aidos leaves earth (197-201) and Dike, mistreated by gift-devouring men who "give judgment with crooked verdicts", brings evil upon them and their polis (220-24, 238-47).⁹⁴

Hesiod's exhortations are addressed in part to the *basileis*, in part to

Perses. Responsibility for finding a fair settlement in a specific dispute and for upholding the broader social norms thus rests both with the *basileus* and with the commoner (35f.). Retribution for violations will hurt both, and with them their entire community:

Perses, obey *dike* and restrain from *hybris*,/ for *hybris* is bad for the low-born man; and even the noble / find it an unwelcome burden that weighs them down /and brings them ruin.../ Many times one man's wickedness ruins a whole polis... (213-16, 240)

The last line cited is part of the “diptych” on the “just and unjust city”, which is strongly influenced by Near-Eastern concepts, particularly of divine kingship.⁹⁵ Hesiod, however, has extended the obligation to observe the principles of *dike*, on which the well-being and proper functioning of society and nature depend, from those holding power (the *basileis*) to all members of the community. Thus Hesiod conceptualizes the polis as a community of justice and fairness, in which the common good is a shared responsibility of all, high *and* low.⁹⁶

What, then, compelled Hesiod to emphasize these communal concerns so strongly? Part of the answer may be that it was suggested to him by some of his sources, or else that he was a thinker and early philosopher, who recognized the importance of such issues before others did. Both explanations may be correct but neither is sufficient because Hesiod decisively transformed some of the concepts conveyed to him by his sources, and similar concerns are expressed, though less insistently and systematically, in the Homeric epics as well.⁹⁷ Rather, if panhellenic poetry, whether narrative-heroic or didactic-theogonic, stressed these issues, they must have corresponded to important and wide-spread concerns of the audiences of such poetry. Thus these issues must have represented at that time serious problems, to which there were no easy solutions.

In traditional pre-literate societies, the members of the elite naturally serve as judges and repositories of knowledge concerning customary law. This obviously was true for the Homeric and Hesiodic *basileis*. It was a privilege that brought them material advantages and power, but they were also blamed and held responsible when the system failed. We do not know the cause of such failure. One important factor perhaps was increasing competition among the *basileis* and their tendency to exploit privileges and powers that traditionally were not meant to be exploited. At any rate, the problem caused conflicts, provoked criticism of the elite and appeals to enhance communal responsibility and solidarity.⁹⁸ On the

basis of such experiences, therefore, law and legal procedure were destined to play a crucial role in advancing the integration of the polis.

3. The Integration of the Polis in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries

Both the Homeric epics and Hesiod reflect an early stage of a clearly conceptualized but loosely organized polis, in which the individual, though aware of the importance of the community and his participation in it, is far from fully integrated. There is a sense of “polis mentality” but competing loyalties, particularly to *oikos* and neighborhood, are felt more strongly and immediately. When, then, do our written sources indicate a more integrated form of polis, how is such integration expressed, and what brought it about? To find answers to these questions, I shall first present two case studies, *volens volens* focusing on the two best (though still very insufficiently) documented but rather atypical poleis of Sparta and Athens, and then examine briefly the role played in this process of polis integration by aristocracy and tyranny.

a. Sparta, War and the “Great Rhetra”

Sparta is extraordinary among Greek poleis⁹⁹ but it is precisely this peculiarity, which brings out sharply the impact on the integration of the polis of one factor – extended warfare and intense pressure. This factor probably affected many poleis but none more than Sparta. Nothing, not even the often vastly overrated “Dorian migration”, compels us to assume that Dark Age Sparta differed substantially from other communities in the Greek world.¹⁰⁰ The demographic and economic factors that triggered the crystallization of the polis, social differentiation and the formation of a “proto-aristocracy” were the same here as elsewhere and, as Alkman’s and Terpander’s poetry illustrate, among other things, down to the sixth century Sparta’s upper class participated fully and successfully in the cultural developments and exchanges of archaic Greece.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the absorption of Lakonia and the subsequent conquest of Messenia were Sparta’s response to problems that plagued most of Greece at the time: increase of population and shortage of land.¹⁰² The helotization of large parts of Messenia made it possible to furnish the Spartiates with land, to consolidate their reliance on dependent labor, and thus to free them for their activities and duties as citizens.

All this, however, was not accomplished without serious difficulties. The subjection of Messenia required at least two extended periods of hard fighting and perhaps was not fully settled before c. 600. At the end of the first phase of the war, the nebulous affair of the “Partheniai” led to emigration and the foundation of Taras in 706.¹⁰³ Two generations later, a defeat by Argos and a large Messenian revolt pushed the Spartans to the brink of disaster; the hardships caused by these setbacks provoked wide-spread dissatisfaction and the demand for redistribution of land.¹⁰⁴ In reaction to such crises, the Spartiates transformed themselves into an agrarian elite of professional warriors with a peculiar educational system and lifestyle. Although social and economic differences were not eliminated, in their public function as citizens and soldiers the Spartiates were, if not fully equal, certainly largely “alike”.¹⁰⁵ The creation of the society of *homoioi* was later attributed to a legendary founder figure, Lycurgus, and retrojected into a distant past; most likely, however, it was the result of a lengthy process, which built on old institutions of men’s associations and ended only around the middle of the sixth century.¹⁰⁶

On the political level, the distinctions introduced into Spartan society by the categories of helots, *perioikoi* and Spartiates and, particularly, the privileges and obligations of the latter must have produced, at an exceptionally early time, a fairly precise concept of citizenship. If the Partheniai affair, as it seems, revolved around questions of status and property, it attests an advanced stage of this process of civic self-definition already for the end of the eighth century.¹⁰⁷ With the creation of the society of *homoioi*, the citizens increasingly focused their entire life on the public sphere. At the same time, the polis, represented by its institutions and authorities, increasingly regulated the citizens’ lives; the polis as collectivity thus assumed authority over the individual citizens: it became a political entity.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the political sphere was regulated at an early stage as well. The “Great Rhetra”, cited and explained by Plutarch (*Lyc.* 6.2-10), probably from Aristotle’s lost *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians*, is also reflected in a poetic summary by Tyrtaios (4W = 3a/b D) and thus should be dated, at the latest, around the middle of the seventh century.¹⁰⁸

After dedicating a temple to Zeus Syllanios and Athena Syllania, forming *phylai* and creating *obai*, and instituting a *gerousia* of thirty including the *archagetai*, then from season to season to hold *apellai*... so as to propose and withdraw. But to the *damos* should belong the right to respond (?) as well as power. (Plut. *Lyc.* 6.2)¹⁰⁹

The so-called “Rider” adds the following restriction: “If the *damos* should make a crooked choice, the elders (*presbygeneis*) and *archagetai* are to set it aside” (ibid. 6.8). Tyrtaios gives the following summary:

To be the first in council (*archein boules*) is for the *basileis* (who are esteemed by the gods and whose care is the lovely *polis* of Sparta) and for the aged (*presbytai*) *gerontes*; but then it is for the common people (*demotai andres*) to respond in turn with straight *rhetai*. [They are to speak what is good and do everything that is just, and not to counsel anything crooked for this *polis*, and for the mass (*plethos*) of the *demos* is to be the final decision (*nike*) and power (*kratos*)].¹¹⁰

Having set up a new cult and sanctuary to Zeus and Athena, the divine supporters of the new arrangement,¹¹¹ the community is divided into *phylai* and *obai*. Whatever the correct explanation of these terms,¹¹² what matters here is that for political and perhaps also military reasons the polis underwent an incisive reorganization, which is unthinkable without an urgent need and a strong collective will to do so. The fixed and relatively small number of *gerontes* indicates that the council was formalized and its members were selected from a larger pool of candidates.¹¹³ Although the *gerontes* continued to be chosen from among the leading families, membership was no longer an automatic prerogative of these families.¹¹⁴ The two *archagetai* (*basileis* in Tyrtaios)¹¹⁵ most likely are the successors of the leaders of the two predominant among the four village communities that coalesced in the first half of the eighth century to form the polis of Sparta.¹¹⁶ As such they would have held a position comparable to that of the paramount *basileis* in Homer.¹¹⁷ Now, about a century later, they appear as part of the formalized council. While preserving hereditary succession and other remarkable privileges,¹¹⁸ in this respect they were fully integrated into the collective leadership of the polis. In other words, Sparta had not then, and probably never had before, a “monarchy” in any precise sense of this word.¹¹⁹ The assembly too is now institutionally fixed. It is to meet regularly in connection with the festival of Apollo at a clearly designated place. The assembled *damos* has the final decision: that much is clear from both Plutarch’s commentary (despite the crux in the text) and Tyrtaios’ summary.¹²⁰ This power, however, is restricted. *Basileis* and *gerontes* have the right to make proposals, control the discussion, dissolve the assembly, and even refuse to accept the people’s opinion.¹²¹

Except for the rise to prominence of the ephorate, this system remained intact through the classical period. Such remarkable stability probably is to be explained by the militarization forced upon Spartiate society by

constant pressure: the danger of helot revolts.¹²² Thus constitutional development was frozen at an early stage; through its control over the council the Spartan elite was able to preserve decisive influence in the community,¹²³ and the permanent need for divinely supported military leadership may explain why the *basileis*, though on the “constitutional” level closely tied into the system and merely *primi inter pares* among the *gerontes*, preserved an elevated and divinely sanctioned hereditary position and considerable power in war and foreign policy.¹²⁴

The system outlined in the Rhetra is directly developed from an earlier, more informal one that must have been very similar to that described in the Homeric epics.¹²⁵ It represents, however, a decisive step beyond the “Homeric” model: council and assembly are minimally but effectively formalized, their relationship and their powers defined. A big advance is made here toward establishing in the polis a “political sphere”,¹²⁶ conceptualizing the polis as a civic community and enhancing the citizens’ participation in it. Not surprisingly, therefore, Tyrtaios, as later Solon, strongly emphasizes the “common good” (*xynon esthlon*: 9D = 12W. 15) and the quality of the polis as a shared community that supersedes the claims of the individual. In the emergency of the Second Messenian War, Tyrtaios focuses on the military side of the citizens’ responsibility; he redefines true *arete*, in marked contrast to aristocratic values (below, n.164), as the determination to fight and, if necessary, to die for the community:

No man ever proves himself a good man (*aner agathos*) in war / unless he can endure to face the blood and the slaughter, / go close against the enemy and fight with his hands./ That is *arete*, the finest prize (*aethlon*) among mortals,/ and the noblest a young man can endeavor to win./ A common good (*xynon esthlon*) this is for the polis and the whole *demos*... (9D = 12W. 10-15)¹²⁷

Both Tyrtaios and Solon wrote poems that were later entitled *Eunomia*. Among the few short fragments of the former’s¹²⁸ is the summary of the Rhetra, which thus probably was identified with the ideal of *eunomia* and presented as a solution to the crisis mentioned in the same poem (3a/bD = 4W). Solon’s later poem offers a striking analogy (below, at n.154). In Hesiod, *Eunomia* as the daughter of Zeus and Themis and sister of Dike and Eirene, represents a central aspect of Zeus’ just regime (*WD* 901f.). Alkman, another Spartan poet, no less meaningfully praises *Eunomia* as sister of Persuasion (*Peitho*) and daughter of Foresight (*Promathea*: 44D = 64P). Both Herodotus (1. 65f.) and Thucydides (1. 18) know of a Spartan tradition maintaining that an early state of civic turmoil and

disorder (*stasis, kakonomia*) had been transformed into one of *eunomia*, which gave Sparta exceptional and lasting stability. The ideal of *eunomia* thus stands not only for a good social order but for a political resolution of crisis and *stasis* and for the integration of the polis.¹²⁹

What forces or conditions made such change possible? An answer, I think, must be based on two assumptions: (a) the political reforms summarized in the Rhetra were part of, and thus cannot be separated from, the social and economic reforms that eventually produced the Spartiate society of *homoioi*; (b) such comprehensive and fundamental reforms, affecting every facet of the citizens' life, could not be realized without strong support in all groups of society. Most likely, they were the collective response to overwhelming needs and pressures both from within the community and from outside of it. We can reasonably assume that Sparta's vast conquests created an entirely new situation for all involved. The Spartiates had been engaged over an exceptionally long period of time in warfare for the community. Now they controlled a large territory with many semi-autonomous communities (*perioikoi*) and a vast number of helots. Their gain was enormous: land and economic security for all; but they also incurred an enormous obligation: constantly to defend their property and sustain pressure from below. Thus in Sparta the common well-being depended to an exceptional degree and permanently on the contribution of all citizens. The commoners proved indispensable militarily.¹³⁰ So did the "aristocracy" who provided the necessary political and military leadership. Out of such mutual dependence under constant pressure must have grown the willingness to think integratively and to subordinate the individual, whether high-born or commoner, to the common will and good. Thus it became possible to realize political integration (in the Rhetra) and, eventually, an exceptional degree of uniformity (among the *homoioi*).

b. Athens, Domestic Strife and the Enactment of Written Law

The earliest political documents surviving from archaic Athens – Dracon's homicide law and Solon's poems – were produced shortly before and after 600 BCE.¹³¹ By then Attica had long been unified, and the basic institutions were in place and at least minimally formalized. The source situation is so dismal that, despite much learned effort by generations of scholars, the history of Athens and Attica in the eighth and most of the seventh centuries, and with it the process by which the Athenian polis was formed, are irretrievably lost.¹³² It seems certain, though, that the wars, in which Athens – or some Athenians – were involved in the late

seventh and early sixth centuries did not pose a serious threat to Athens' existence or livelihood.¹³³ war thus certainly never was an integrative force in early Athenian history.

What is known about Kylon's failed attempt to establish a tyranny (c. 636)¹³⁴ shows that in Athens, as elsewhere, tyranny was the ultimate goal of aristocratic ambition in the context of aristocratic rivalries and power struggles. Moreover, it seems, popular dissatisfaction resulting from such factional strife or other causes had not reached critical levels. A few years later, probably in 621, Dracon published a set of laws concerning homicide. What else he did and why he was chosen for this office is unknown. Nor is there any certainty about the reasons that prompted such legislation. It is tempting, perhaps necessary, to connect this legislation with the Kylonian affair and its repercussions, but the chronology is far from certain.¹³⁵

Dracon's case, however, is not an isolated phenomenon. Enactment of written law seems to have been an important feature in the development of many archaic poleis: we know of several lawgivers and enough about their laws to understand their purpose and significance.¹³⁶ Some of them belonged to the "Seven Sages" who were closely connected with Delphi; they stood above the conflicts of the period and became an influential intellectual and political force.¹³⁷ Most of them were appointed in situations of serious civic crisis; the decision to take recourse to written legislation thus was a conscious response to urgent needs, whether the laws enacted were substantive or procedural.¹³⁸ In regulating by statutory law areas that were especially prone to producing conflicts, the early legislators aimed to eliminate such conflicts in the interest of communal peace. They thereby reduced the magistrates' freedom of decision and action and thus the power of the leading families from among whom these officials were chosen; they also restricted the freedom of the citizens at large and extended the power of the polis over their actions. As Gagarin concludes, the laws reflect as well

the growth of the idea of the city and citizenship... [T]he very fact of enacting a set of laws for a particular polis would enforce the idea that those who belonged to that polis were specially characterized by an obligation to obey those laws as well as by a claim on the protection offered by them.¹³⁹

Thus the beneficiary of such legislation was the entire community. Undoubtedly the increasing certainty of law and elimination of arbitrariness in jurisdiction improved the situation of the nonaristocratic citizens. But,

as Walter Eder has argued, the fact that such legislation reduced the potential for conflict and enhanced aristocratic discipline was in the interest of the upper class as well, because it lowered the risk of their collective loss of power to a tyrant.¹⁴⁰

Much of all this probably applies to Drakon's homicide law as well. Its main purpose seems to have been "the detailed elaboration of a procedure for settling disputes" in an area that was particularly sensitive and potentially harmful to the community. He emphasized consideration of intention as opposed to mere fact, made the execution of traditional self-help dependent on a court decision and instituted a jury (the *ephetai*) specifically for this purpose.¹⁴¹ As Eberhard Ruschenbusch observes, two important factors that often produce a sense of community or civic consciousness probably were not yet in place in Attica: it was neither a fully developed community of cult and religion nor a "community of fate" ("Schicksalsgemeinschaft"). There was no outside pressure; regional interests and the claims of powerful families continued to prevail. Thus the only bond that held the polis together was the central legal authority, which imposed laws and legal procedure on all citizens and strove to maintain peace in the community. Here Ruschenbusch sees the root of the Athenian "state".¹⁴² We should not overlook, however, that such legislation not only enhanced communal integration but, in fact, already presupposes the existence of developed communal structures, a formal apparatus for public debate and decision making, and thus a considerable level of communal integration.¹⁴³

In 594 Solon was elected archon; probably at the same time, in a situation of serious tension and civil strife, he was appointed arbitrator with extraordinary powers. We know the symptoms of this crisis but not its causes; modern theories abound but remain hypothetical.¹⁴⁴ Later sources, especially Aristotle and Plutarch, provide much information about Solon's actions but since few items are uncontested it is best to focus on his own statements and some of the laws that are generally agreed to be authentic.¹⁴⁵

Solon strongly blames the unjust deeds, *hybris* and rapacity of the "leaders of the people" (*hegemones tou demou*) for having brought their polis close to ruin (3D = 4W. 5-14; 4D. 1-8 = 4a/cW). Thus competition for wealth and power among the leading families – a traditional feature of aristocratic society – apparently had become excessive and oppressive.¹⁴⁶ Within this framework, two main "factions" were opposed to each other: the wealthy and powerful on one side, the *demoi* on the other (5D = 5W. 1-4; 25D = 37W. 1-5). Both sides eventually were dissatisfied with

Solon's measures; in particular, some of the "*demos*-party" had hoped that, once in power, he would distribute much of the land of the rich to the poor (23D. 13-21 = 34W; 25D. 6-9 = 37W. 7-10; see also 24D = 36W. 20-27). Thus by Solon's time the oppressive effects of aristocratic competition had alienated large parts of the population and created a "revolutionary situation".¹⁴⁷

Defending himself against his critics, Solon cites as his major accomplishment the liberation of the earth from the *horoi* (markers indicating obligations or pledges and thus an encumbrance on the land) and of the debt-bondsmen (24D = 36W. 1-15). "These things I accomplished by the power of my office (*kratos*), fitting together force (*bie*) and law (*dike*) in true harmony, and I carried out my promise" (ibid. 15-17).¹⁴⁸ In connection with his famous *seisachtheia* ("shaking off of burdens"), Solon also prohibited loans on the person of the debtor and his family, which amounted to an abolition of debt bondage.¹⁴⁹ Thereby personal freedom became an inalienable right of the Athenian citizen;¹⁵⁰ henceforth Athenian society was solidly based on a broad class of small and middle farmers. By enacting these reforms, the polis under Solon's leadership brought about deep changes in the traditional social and economic structures. The polis forged its own instruments to redress a crisis and assumed an unprecedented amount of power over its citizens.

Solon's second important accomplishment was his laws: "I wrote laws (*thesmoi*) for the lowborn (*kakos*) and noble (*agathos*) alike, fitting out straight *dike* for each person" (24D = 36W. 18-20). This legislation was comprehensive in all areas of concern to the early lawgivers, including a set of political reforms.¹⁵¹ Among these the introduction of property classes signalled the replacement of birth by wealth as criterion for political power and participation. Whatever changes Solon devised for the assembly itself, the creation of a probouleutic council, if historically authentic, must have increased the assembly's power and significance. Moreover, the citizens' communal responsibility was enhanced by the rule that anyone who wished could take action on behalf of a person who had been wronged, and by the creation of a new court of appeal (*heliaia*), which probably was identical with the assembly. All in all, the number and variety of his laws "suggest an apparently unprecedented involvement of the state and its legal apparatus in the lives of its citizens and in this respect Solon's achievement was unique."¹⁵²

Solon's policy was decidedly integrative, trying to strike a delicate balance: he recognized the need to give the *demos* a share in power and responsibility without impairing aristocratic leadership.

The demos will follow their leaders best if they are neither given too much license nor restrained too much. For satiety (*koros*) breeds *hybris* when too great prosperity comes to men lacking right judgment. (5D. 7-10 = 6W)

To the common people I have given such honor and privilege (*geras*) as is sufficient for them, granting them neither less nor more than their due (*time*). For those possessed of power and outstanding through wealth I had equal regard, taking care that they should suffer no injury... (5D. 1-6 = 5W)

Oswyn Murray characterizes it as revolutionary “that the *demos* is considered worthy of privilege at all.” Given the *demos*’ role in and contribution to the evolution of the polis, the word “revolutionary” seems too strong but is perhaps justified in view of the tendency of the elite, increasingly emphasized in contemporary poetry, to indulge in social prejudice and “attitudes of superiority.”¹⁵³

Such revolutionary ideas were based on Solon’s new understanding of the political mechanisms at work in a polis. This insight, a major advance in political thought, is formulated in the elegy entitled *Eunomia* (3D = 4W):¹⁵⁴ *hybris*, unlawful actions and abuse of power by the wealthy and powerful lead to a sequence of disasters for the polis, including *stasis* and civil war, tyranny, and the destruction of the community (14-25). Such public ill is an inevitable wound (*helkos aphykton*) that with certainty (*pantos*) hits every polis and the entire polis (*pasa polis*). This chain of cause and effect is based on empirical observation: the phenomena Solon cites are attested frequently for poleis of the seventh and sixth centuries. Thus, in contrast to Hesiod (*WD* 238-47), the process triggered by *hybris* and abuse of power is entirely socio-political. The gods invoked by Hesiod as indispensable agents of retribution are emphatically excluded by Solon: they are on our side, he says; it is the citizens (*astoi*) who destroy their polis (1-5). And where Hesiod had to rely on his belief in the justice of Zeus (*WD* 273), Solon postulates certainty (*pantos*) because the laws of politics are as predictable as those of nature (cf. 10D = 9W).

Since the community’s suffering is caused by the citizens themselves and affects the entire community, Hesiod’s recommendation to avoid polis and *agora* and focus on farm and neighborhood misses the point. On the contrary:

Thus the public ruin (*demosion kakon*) invades the house of each citizen, and the courtyard doors no longer have strength to keep it away, but it overleaps the lofty wall, and though a man runs in and tries to hide in chamber or closet, it ferrets him out. (3D = 4W. 26-29)

Solon’s ideal of *eunomia*, therefore, is inclusive and integrative: the evils

caused by *dysnomia* can only be overcome if all citizens are involved, according to status and ability, and share political responsibility for the common welfare. It is only logical that Solon is also the first ancient author and thinker who consciously addresses his audience as the speaker of the polis: our polis, we! (1f.).

My mind orders me to teach the Athenians thus: *Dysnomie* brings most evils to the *polis*, but *Eunomie* makes all things well ordered and fitted and often puts chains on the unjust; she smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, blinds insolence, withers the flowers of unrighteousness, straightens crooked judgements and softens deeds of arrogance, puts an end to works of faction and to the anger of painful strife; under her all men's actions are fitting and wise. (30-39)

c. *Aristocracy and Tyranny*

Even more than Solon's poems those of Alkaios vividly illustrate the intensity of factional strife in many archaic poleis.¹⁵⁵ Often such struggles eventually resulted in tyranny.¹⁵⁶ "Tyranny" represents the monopolization of aristocratic power by one man; thus it is also the ultimate realization of aristocratic ambition – an ambition apparently wide-spread in Solon's time. In fact, his determined refusal to use his position of extraordinary power to establish a tyranny himself, probably was rather unusual.¹⁵⁷ Tyrants used various methods to establish their power, including popular support resulting from dissatisfaction with aristocratic rule. But the tyrant's rule generally was primarily personal: the tyrant usually served the interests of only one constituency, his own (together with his family and friends). Thus his policies were directed first and foremost at securing and protecting his power. To this end he relied on all those, within and outside of his polis, who supported him, and he suppressed all those who opposed him or appeared dangerous to him.

All this does not mean, however, that in pursuing his personal goals the tyrant did not often enact measures that, intentionally or unintentionally, benefited large parts of the community or even the polis as a whole. By suppressing aristocratic rivalries and power struggles and thus securing domestic peace and stability, he generally enhanced prosperity; by killing or forcing into exile the most determined and powerful of his rivals and leaving the others no choice but to submit to his rule, he weakened the aristocracy and their power structures and loosened decisively, if not eliminated, long-standing dependencies that tied large parts of the population to the leading families. Instead, the citizens focused their loyalty on the tyrant and, through him, on the polis. This tendency was further enhanced by many of the tyrant's constructive measures

which either generally improved the social and economic conditions or (as in the case of public building, administrative improvements or innovations in cults and festivals) drew attention to the center of the polis and thus to the polis itself rather than the individual strongholds of aristocratic power. Thus undoubtedly in many cases tyranny in fact proved a positive force that decisively advanced the cohesion and integration of the polis.¹⁵⁸

The sources contemporary to these events generally represent the outlook of the aristocracy; thus they tell us little about those positive aspects of tyranny. What they do tell us is the aristocrats' fear and hatred of the tyrant¹⁵⁹ and their awareness of the harmful consequences of their infighting and abuses for their shared rule and the community as a whole.

But let him [Pittakos]... devour the *polis* as he did in company with Myrsilos, until Ares is pleased to turn us to arms; and may we forget this anger; and let us relax from the heart-eating strife and civil warring (*emphylos mache*), which one of the Olympians has aroused among us, leading the *damos* to ruin, but giving delightful glory to Pittakos. (Alk. 43D = 70 LP, Campbell; tr. Campb.)

Kyrnos, this *polis* is pregnant, and I fear that it will give birth to a man / who will be a straightener of our base *hybris*. The citizens here are still moderate, but the leaders (*hegemonēs*) / have veered so much as to fall into debasement (*kakotes*). / Men who are *agathoi*, Kyrnos, have never yet ruined any *polis*,/ but when the *kakoi* decide to behave with *hybris*,/ and when they ruin the *demos* and render judgments (*dikai*) in favor of the unjust,/ for the sake of private gain, and for the sake of power,/ do not expect that *polis* to be peaceful for long... / From these things arise discord (*staseis*), intestine killings of men,/ and tyrants (*mounarchoi*). May this *polis* never decide to adopt these things! (Theognis 39-52; tr. Nagy)¹⁶⁰

In fact, the aristocrats' role in and contribution to the early polis is ambivalent.¹⁶¹ There is no doubt that their power struggles and "international" orientation, which tended to value allegiance to their peers in other poleis more highly than that to their fellow-citizens, often proved divisive and very harmful to the community. There were good reasons that already the *Iliad* curses the person who longs for bloody civil strife (*epidēmios polemos*) by excluding him from hearth, law and phratry (9. 63f.) and thus from everything that secures protected and civilized life in the polis, that the Mytilenians chose to establish Pittakos in an "elected tyranny" (Arist. *Pol.* 1285a 35-b 1) and that the Athenian aristocrats in exile found no support among the Athenian *demos* when they tried to overthrow the Peisistratids.¹⁶² But at the same time, the polis was formed and integrated under aristocratic leadership: the formalization of offices,

council and even the assembly as well as the wide-spread efforts at written legislation were brought about by aristocrats and with aristocratic support – whatever the “pressure from below”. To a large extent, these measures must reflect attempts to regulate and channel competition and to impose self-discipline among the elite in order to reduce the amount and intensity of conflicts and to avoid the self-destruction of the whole group and community or the monopolization of power by a tyrant – which, from the aristocratic point of view, almost had the same effect.¹⁶³

In addition, much of the extant body of lyric and elegiac poetry was composed for the aristocratic symposium. These poems therefore were created and performed by aristocrats themselves, and it is from among these aristocrats that we hear not only the praise but also serious criticism of aristocratic values and behavior and efforts to promote communal values.

But if anyone were to win a victory with fleetness of foot, or fighting in the Pentathlon... at Olympia, or in wrestling...: to the citizens (*astoi*) he would be more glorious to look upon, and he would acquire a conspicuous seat of honor at competitions, and his maintenance would be provided out of the public stores by the *polis*... So too if he won a prize with his horses, he would obtain all these rewards, though not deserving of them as I am; for my craft (*sophie*) is better than the strength of men or of horses. ... It is not right to prefer physical strength to noble *sophie*. For it is not the presence of a good boxer in the community... that will give a polis more *eunomie*. Small would be the enjoyment that a polis would reap over the athletic victory of a citizen... These things do not enrich the treasure-chambers of the *polis*. (Xenophanes 2)¹⁶⁴

4. Conclusion: the Rise of the Polis

In his important essay of 1937, “When Did the Polis Rise?”, Victor Ehrenberg worked his way backward, along the extant testimonia, from Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* through reforms, inscriptions, laws and fragments of poetry surviving or at least known from the sixth into the seventh century. Several documents from around 600, he concluded, clearly attest to the existence of the polis. In Hesiod we find proclaimed for the first time that the noble is restrained by and responsible for *dike* in the face of the polis. But this *dike*, according to Ehrenberg, is not yet a traditional and admitted principle of the polis; Hesiod reflects a polis still in formation. Thus Ehrenberg dated the rise of the polis to the eighth century, beginning around 800, which in his view agreed with the con-

solidation of the state in Sparta (dated by him to well before the First Messenian War), with colonization and “the fact that the *Iliad* shows no trace of the existence of a Polis, while the *Odyssey* does.”¹⁶⁵

In his dense and stimulating book of 1986, *Individual and Community: The Rise of the Polis*, Chester Starr uses the “earliest true wars,” colonization and other changes revealed by archaeology to date the appearance of the polis to the middle of the eighth century. Although this roughly coincides with the dates he accepts for the Homeric epics, he too denies that the Homeric polis had achieved the quality of an organized state.

In the epics the Zeus-sprung *basileis* occupy the center of the stage, not only in the poetic action but as leaders in an almost static tribal system... In Homer the term *polis* denotes an agglomeration of people, sometimes fortified, or a person's homeland, but does not directly have a political significance. From the eighth century on it does have that meaning, a state marked by regular rules of procedure and a structure by which its citizens (however defined and limited) could establish and administer those rules.¹⁶⁶

In this paper, I have arrived at conclusions that differ from both Ehrenberg's and Starr's. Since we are looking, not for any kind of community in early Greece, but for the origins of one specific type which we know well in its “classical” form, it seemed preferable to work with a minimal definition of the “typical polis”, derived from that period (that is, the polis as primarily a *koinonia ton politon*, a community of citizens, of place or territory, cult, customs and laws, and largely, if not fully, able to administer itself), and to compare with this model the communities described in our earliest post-Mycenaean documents.

This comparison has yielded a clear result: both Homeric epics reflect a form of polis that is very early but certainly more developed and complete than is usually assumed. It is loosely organized, its institutions are not yet formalized, and the individual, though aware of the importance of the community and his participation in it, is far from fully integrated in it, but, and that is crucial, all essential components of the polis are in place. In fact, except for its level of integration and formalization, this polis corresponds in every respect to our working definition of the classical polis. No less important is that especially the poet of the *Odyssey* is able to conceptualize the polis: he is acutely aware of its constituent elements, its qualities and values, and he uses such knowledge creatively. From a different social, but equally panhellenic and thus at the time widely acceptable perspective, Hesiod confirms both the centrality of the polis for civilized society and a wide-spread concern for justice and communal solidarity. He too conceptualizes the values that are essential for

social and political life in the polis, but he does it more broadly and systematically, and he extends the responsibility for communal well-being to all citizens. Thus the contemporary literary sources confirm what other evidence suggests as well: changes in population and settlement patterns, the appearance of monumental temples, intensified colonization, and the beginning of organized communal warfare for the control of land – these and other changes all date to the last third of the eighth century and presuppose the existence at least of an early form of the polis.

The first phase of the “rise of the polis” – its “formation” or “crystallization” – therefore precedes the creation of the epics. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do not illuminate this process itself but, due to their origin in oral poetry, preserve traditional social terminology and remember earlier social conditions, which partly preceded the polis and partly overlapped with it, and which can be explained with the help of archaeology and anthropology. The fact that such pre-polis conditions are still vividly remembered in the epics suggests that the process of polis formation was going on within the time-frame of “oral memory”, covering the late ninth and eighth centuries (above, at n. 14). This seems to accord well with the changes indicated by archaeology in the same period.

What were the structures from which the polis originated? A combination of Anthony Snodgrass’ archaeological and Walter Donlan’s historical-philological analyses, both solidly based on anthropological insights, may provide a plausible answer.¹⁶⁷ Snodgrass emphasizes wide-spread pastoralism as a model that helps to explain the archaeological evidence of the Dark Ages. According to Donlan’s reconstruction, based on Homeric social terminology, after the disintegration of the Late Bronze Age structures the natural social units of Dark Age Greece were small

villages and hamlets, along with their farms and close-in pastures. The word for the territory (and its people) was *damos*; the word for its main settlement was *polis*... [Each *damos*] would have consisted of a small group of families, engaged in subsistence farming and herding, who followed the lead of their ablest man. The local leader, a “big man” type, was called *basileus*... In retrospect, the subsequent evolution of community appears as a process of crystallization... In time, separate communities (*damoi/demoi*) came to regard themselves as the *demos*, a single “land-people”. One settlement (for whatever various reasons) emerged as the main population center and as the center of political, economic, and religious activity in the *demos*. Crystallization ended either at some natural boundary or by collision with another *demos*’ frontiers. This is the picture of the eighth-century community given to us in the Homeric epics.

How exactly we have to imagine this process of polis formation, what

started and propelled it, and why it happened almost simultaneously in the entire Aegean area but not everywhere, so that large parts of the Greek world preserved different structures (the *ethnos*) – all this is still very unclear.¹⁶⁸ In his contribution to this volume, Snodgrass points out that, according to demographic theory, population growth is “not a prime mover, but always an immediate result or simultaneous accompaniment, of socio-political change. What happened to population in Greece and the Aegean is, on this view, merely useful confirmation that we are right in identifying the later eighth century as a period of critical transformation.”¹⁶⁹ In looking for “distinctive new features of the polis organisation,” Snodgrass emphasizes the concepts of territoriality, land ownership and citizenship. The first two are attested in Homer, all three in Sparta at the end of the eighth century. They certainly are connected with the formation of the polis. But, I suggest, fixed and protected boundaries of the community and secure ownership of land emerge as central social concerns only when land becomes scarce. Similarly, justice and communal values become central concerns only when corresponding problems abound. Neither probably was the case at the time of the fugitive population and the “pathetically small” and scattered settlements of the Dark Ages described by Snodgrass, in which lived the big man-follower groups reconstructed by Donlan. But both concerns are attested for, or can plausibly be assumed to have existed in, historical societies of the late eighth century and in Homeric society. Like the increased social differentiation revealed by the epics and archaeology, all this requires a vastly grown and much more condensed population.

The demographic changes observed by archaeologists and the formation of the polis thus should be seen as interrelated processes, but it seems to me that population growth, if not the prime mover, certainly is *the* essential precondition: without it or before it, there simply could be no polis. The question, then, remains: How do we get from the scattered and elusive big man groups of the Dark Ages to the stratified and differentiated polis society of the late eighth and seventh centuries? Probably we have to think in terms of many small and slow changes: at the beginning, under gradually less turbulent conditions, small groups settled down, nomadism and pastoralism decreased in favor of farming, the population began to grow, social differentiation began to increase, and so on. The pace of these interrelated changes then picked up until the “multiplier effect” accelerated this process even more.¹⁷⁰ As a general picture, this is plausible enough, but the details still elude us. And why did this process produce poleis only in some areas and not in others?

Three characteristics of the emerging polis society, however, seem especially important in our present context. First, settlement patterns in the area of later poleis seem to indicate the co-existence of several small villages/big man-groups which probably tended to balance each other.¹⁷¹ There emerged local “chiefs” and perhaps regional “paramount chiefs” but these were never able to establish a strong and permanent base of power. Leadership remained relatively weak and precarious; even a strong *basileus* was no more than a *primus inter pares*. Thus, it seems, by the time of Homer and Hesiod the option of establishing a real monarchy, if it ever existed, was long gone. Accordingly, in archaic Greece there never was a “monarchy” properly speaking; “kings” did not disappear, they never existed, and thus the traditional terminology (“kings”, “kingship”, “monarchy”) should be eliminated from our books.¹⁷²

Second, as Snodgrass observes in his essay, early Iron Age society before the eighth century was not highly differentiated (although, at least in some areas, more highly than we used to think, and this assessment may change further if Lefkandi turns out to be less exceptional than it appears now¹⁷³). Despite massive and rapid changes in the eighth century, we should avoid the mistake of overestimating the degree of social differentiation in Homeric society. The elite of big men that developed into the “proto-aristocracy” of the Homeric polis and eventually into the aristocracy of archaic Greece, was not very strong. In spite of its ambition, proud self-representation and increasingly refined lifestyle, which we find reflected so impressively in the Homeric epics and the monuments of eighth-century art, economically and socially this elite of *basileis* remained relatively close to the large group of free farmers.¹⁷⁴ They never succeeded in establishing strict class barriers; as the *Odyssey* and sixth-century poetry show, social mobility was always possible and perhaps more frequent than the elite liked to admit.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, some sort of aristocracy did emerge in the early archaic period, and it is clear that, like so much else, its development and that of the polis were inseparable and interrelated processes.

Third, while the Homeric epics and archaeology provide us with a fairly rich picture of the upper class, neither source helps us form a comparable impression of the most important group of their fellow citizens: the free farmers. Hesiod fills this gap only partly because he gives us some information about the circumstances and problems of a moderately well-off farmer but none about the general distribution of wealth and property in this class. Yet there are strong indications that a large part of these men must have played an important, even indispensable role al-

ready in the early polis.¹⁷⁶ This role, visible in the assemblies and, particularly, in the army described in the Homeric epics, forces us, I think, to reassess the socio-political impact of the hoplite phalanx. While it is entirely possible that public and private forms of warfare co-existed for a long time,¹⁷⁷ by the second half of the eighth century in communal wars mass fighting in close formations somewhat resembling the phalanx was common enough to be integrated in battle descriptions by the poet of the *Iliad*. Scholars seem to have been so preoccupied with the question of whether or not the *Iliad* reflects *the* hoplite phalanx – it does not – that they failed to pay enough attention to the phenomenon of mass fighting as such. This phenomenon indicates, I think, that the type of “heroic warfare” preceding the hoplite phalanx in modern discussions is no less a construction than the cavalry warfare preceding it in Aristotle’s scheme. Whatever the form of fighting in private raids, on the communal level, I suggest, once the polis began to crystallize, some form or other of mass combat in close formation soon prevailed, and this form gradually developed into the hoplite phalanx and tactics. Mass fighting thus evolved along with the formation of the polis and, I should add, with the concept of territoriality, and the masses of citizens providing the bulk of this pre-hoplite infantry army were an integral part of the emerging polis.

Thus the concept of a “hoplite revolution” is a modern construct as well. By adopting the hoplite phalanx, the polis did not incorporate into the army a whole new class of citizens who for the first time fought on equal terms with the hitherto predominant aristocrats and thus eventually claimed and received a share in political rights as well. Rather, the phalanx emerged, as is well-known by now, as the result, not of a sudden reform but of a long and gradual process of perfection and homogenization in equipment, formation and tactics.¹⁷⁸ Along with these changes, on the socio-political level, recruitment for the hoplite army was regulated more strictly and the rights connected with such military status were defined more clearly. The evolution of the hoplite phalanx in the strict sense of the word and the *integration* of the polis thus were interrelated processes involving the same people. Since the predecessors of the hoplites had been part of the polis’ army ever since the polis came into existence, their political integration was not – or at least not directly – a function of the hoplite phalanx but probably rather a function of the integration of the polis as a whole. As a consequence, the integration of the polis should be seen as the result of the collective will of the entire citizen body – certainly under the leadership and serving not least the

needs of the aristocracy, but also, more broadly, in a complex exchange of give and take serving the needs of the entire community.

When, then, did this second phase of the “rise of the polis” occur, when do we see indications of a more integrated polis, and what factors brought such integration about? This process certainly still is far from fully understood. Scattered testimonia such as the “Great Rhetra” in Sparta and the famous law of Dreros (650-600 BCE), both mentioning formalized institutions, as well as the emergence of written legislation all point to the middle of the seventh century.¹⁷⁹ Archaeological evidence, particularly the appearance of monumental temples, perhaps suggests an even earlier date, but too little is known about the social implications of such communal construction to allow firm conclusions. At any rate, while Tyrtaios still speaks to the citizens about the polis, Solon speaks for the polis, and in the law of Dreros as in an early sixth-century decree from Kyzikos¹⁸⁰ the polis speaks for itself: “The *polis* has thus decided!” (*had’ ewade poli*) or “the *polis* gave this” (*polis edoke*). The seventh and early sixth centuries thus appear to be the decisive period for the integration of the polis.

The factors that made such integration possible were both external and internal. Extended, if not permanent pressure exerted on the polis either from a hostile environment (as in the case of many colonies) or (as in the case of Sparta) by long wars and a large subjected population must have enhanced the unity and solidarity of the community and forced it to formalize its institutions, to adopt (written) laws and thus to eliminate as far as possible the causes of domestic discord. It probably is no accident that early testimony of such legislation and constitutional reform comes from Sparta and some western colonies. Experience in communal integration gained in the colonial world may in turn have influenced thoughts and actions in the motherland.¹⁸¹ Although the extant documentation is too poor to allow certainty, we may safely assume that neighborhood wars for the control of land and subsistence or, in extreme cases, about the very existence of rival communities had a comparable impact on many poleis during their formative stages. As Chester Starr writes, “By the classical era the boundaries of the poleis seem so firmly set that one may forget how much the wars of the eighth and seventh centuries changed the map of Greece, and in doing so required conscious organization of the body politic and military.”¹⁸² After all, already in the *Odyssey* (2.28-32, 42-44) war is singled out as the most important public issue to be discussed in an assembly. It is only in the later seventh and

sixth centuries that such neighborhood wars seem to have had less dramatic consequences,¹⁸³ and it is equally late that, for example, the Athenians did no longer fully integrate newly acquired territories (Eleutherai, Oropos, Salamis) but attached them with a different status of citizenship.

In those poleis – probably the majority – that were not affected by such pressure, integration may have been brought about by way of imitation – a factor which almost certainly was very important but is difficult to assess.¹⁸⁴ Another highly important factor, affecting an unknown number of at least the larger poleis all over the Greek world and, if not initiating at least greatly enhancing polis integration, was the plague of domestic tensions resulting from factional strife among aristocratic families and from the resistance such infighting and its consequences eventually provoked among the *demos* of free and/or dependent farmers. The reforms and laws enacted in Athens by Drakon and Solon in reaction to such crises stand as impressive examples for many others;¹⁸⁵ their significance for our understanding the processes involved is increased by Solon's own statements, which, though unique in their political focus and penetrating analysis, are supported by a strong current of similar sentiments in the poetry of the archaic period. It is important to note, however, that laws and the development of systems of justice as integrative factors worked in two dimensions: horizontally among the elite in order to avoid destructive infighting, disintegration and tyranny, and vertically between the elite and the “middle” and lower classes in order to avoid other forms of civil unrest, civil war and again tyranny. The co-existence of such horizontal and vertical tensions, I suggest, was crucial: it was dangerous but also very productive for the polis, not the least because it forced all involved to find solutions on a communal level and to think and act politically. Hence the evolution of “the political” and of political thought in the context of this phase of polis integration.¹⁸⁶

Victor Ehrenberg emphasized correctly that the great political figures (the legislators and tyrants) did not make the polis possible or bring it into existence (although, as Walter Donlan points out, their unknown predecessors in the late ninth and early eighth centuries may have contributed much to that accomplishment),¹⁸⁷ but there is no doubt that they greatly advanced its integration and stability in the second phase of its development.¹⁸⁸

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Notes

I The question I have been asked to address in this paper is what our written sources tell us about the rise of the polis. I interpret "written sources" as literary and epigraphic evidence contemporary to the process in question, that is, of the 8th to 6th centuries BCE. For comments on the linguistic evidence, see below n. 4 and Mogens Hansen's introduction to the present volume. This paper complements that of Anthony Snodgrass which is to be compared throughout. Thus I have, with few exceptions, refrained from discussing archaeological evidence, for which see, previously, Snodgrass 1971, ch. 7, esp. 402ff., 416ff.; id. 1977, 1980, chs. 1 and 2, 1986, 1987, 1991; Coldstream 1977 and 1984; J. Bouzek, *Homerisches Griechenland im Lichte der archäologischen Quellen* (Prague 1969); V.R. d'A. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaean and their Successors* (Oxford 1964); id., *The Greek Dark Ages* (London 1972); J.M. Hurwit, *The Art and Culture of Early Greece, 1100-480 B.C.* (Ithaca, NY/London 1985); W.D.E. Coulson, *The Greek Dark Ages: A Review of the Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research* (Athens 1990); P. Blome, "Die dunklen Jahrhunderte – aufgeheilt," in Latacz (ed.) 1991. 45-60; Hiller 1991; Deger-Jalkotzy 1991 (all with rich bibliography). For a brief summary of the eighth-century evidence, including the related questions of the connection between colonization and the rise of the polis (see further P. Oliva, "Kolonisation und Entstehung der Polis," in W. Will/J. Heinrichs [eds.], *Zu Alexander dem Grossen:*

Festschrift G. Wirth II [Amsterdam 1988] 1099-1122) and of possible eastern (phoenician) influences on this process (see further n. 168), see Raaflaub 1991. 238-44. I have used (but adapted freely) the following translations: Lattimore, Fagles (*Iliad*); Lattimore, Cook (*Odyssey*); Athanassakis, West (Hesiod); Lattimore, von Fritz/Kapp, Murray (Solon). Modern scholarship, abbreviated in the footnotes, is cited in full in the bibliography at the end of this paper. Since the topic of this paper is broad and difficult, and the scholarship on every part of it immense, I have concentrated on discussion of the ancient evidence and reduced bibliographical references to a minimum, mostly citing recent publications that also serve as guides to earlier scholarship. Note also Musti et al. 1991; Welwei 1992; van Wees 1992, which I received only after this contribution was completed.

2 See, for example, R.A. Posner, "The Homeric Version of the Minimal State," *Ethics* 90 (1979/80) 27-46; W.G. Runciman, "Origins of States. The Case of Archaic Greece," *CSSH* 24 (1982) 350-77; R. Osborne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge 1985) 6-10; W. Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis: Entstehung, Geschichte und Kritik der modernen althistorischen Grundbegriffe der griechische Staat, die griechische Staatsidee, die Polis* (Stuttgart 1985; cf. K. Kinzl's remarks, *EMC* n.s.7 [1988] 403-12, and those by K.-J. Hölkeskamp, *AAAH* 42 [1989] 197-204; D. Lotze, *AAntHung* 33 [1990-92] 237-42, among many others), Starr 1986. 43-46; Stahl 1987, part 3; Sakellariou 1989; Morris 1991, and the bibliography cited by Snodgrass 1991. 4 n.1.

3 See recently Kolb 1984. 58-61; Gawantka, *loc. cit.*; Sakellariou 1989, part 1. On the polis "as the essential Greek state" ("der griechische Staat schlechthin") in archaic and classical Greece: V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (2nd ed. London 1969) xif. 26-102; id., *Der Staat der Griechen* (2nd ed. Zurich/Munich 1965) viiif. 32-125 (citations: 22 and 27, respectively); id., "Von den Grundformen griechische Staatsordnung," in *SB Akad. Heidelberg* (1961 no.3), repr. in id. 1965. 105-38. Critical discussions of Ehrenberg's views are listed by C. Meier, *Rev. of Ehrenberg, Staat, Gnomon* 41 (1969) 365-79, at 366 n.1.

4 See A. Morpurgo, *Mycenaeae Graecitatis Lexicon* (Rome 1963) 262, s.v. *po-to-ri-jo* (attested as part of men's names, perhaps containing *ptolis*); M. Ventris/J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (2nd ed. Cambridge 1973), no. 39 on p. 172, line 13, with comment: "*Po-to-ri-jo* is more likely a man's name than the genitive of *ptolis*." For the etymology of *polis*, its Indo-European roots and "Achaean" background, see C.J. Ruijgh, *L'élément achéen dans la langue épique* (Assen 1957) 75-78; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* II (Heidelberg 1970) 576f.; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots* IV. 1 (Paris 1977) 926f. See also Scully 1990. 193 n. 53.

5 See the brief comments in Raaflaub 1991. 207 n.10. For discussion, see the bibliography cited there; F. Gschnitzer, "Basileus. Ein terminologischer Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte des Königtums bei den Griechen," in *Festschrift L.C. Franz* (Innsbruck 1965) 99-112; C.G. Thomas, "The Roots of Homeric Kingship," *Historia* 15 (1966) 387-407; "The Dorians and the Polis," *Minos* 16 (1977) 207-18 (where the use in Mycenaean Greek of both *polis* and *asty* [*wa-tu*] and of the "same bipolarity between the central nucleus and peripheral areas" [*damoi*] as in later Greek is assumed confidently); "From Wanax to Basileus: Kingship in the Greek Dark Age," *Hispania Antiqua* 6 (1979) 187-206; G. Wathélet, "Mycénien et grec d'Homère: *anax* et *basileus* dans la tradition formulaire de l'épopée grecque," *ZAnt* 29 (1979) 25-40; G. Maddoli, "Damos e basileus: contributo allo studio delle origini della polis," *SMEA* 12 (1970) 7-57; D. Musti, "Recenti studi sulla regalità greca: Prospettive sull'origine della città," *RFIC* 116 (1988) 99-121; the contributions by D. Musti, M. Sakellariou, P. Carlier and E. Risch, in Musti et al. 1991, and the articles by S. Deger-Jalkotzy cited in n.42, esp. "Diskontinuität und Kontinuität". An extreme case is H. van Effenterre, *La cité grecque des*

origines à la défaite de Marathon (Paris 1985), whose theory justifiably has met massive opposition (reviews are listed in Raaflaub 1991. 239 n. 115). Starr 1961. 77ff.; 1986. 15f. emphasizes discontinuity. For Athens Welwei 1992 now provides detailed discussion.

6 Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society* (London 1973, tr. from the French ed., Paris 1969) 298. Epigraphic evidence: e.g., *IG* III. 40 = Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no. 52 = Fornara 1983, no. 103, line 60; see generally R. Koerner, "Die Bedeutung von *polis* und verwandten Begriffen nach Aussage der Inschriften," in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III. 360-67, at 361f. Homer: thus M.H. Hansen in his comment on this paper: "In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* I have not yet found one unquestionable example of *polis* meaning citadel or stronghold."

7 Cf. for example Thomas 1981. 32-35; Scully 1990. 82f., both emphasizing the marked differences between Mycenaean and archaic Greek community structures.

8 Variety of poleis: E. Ruschenbusch, "Zahl und Grösse der griechischen Staaten," in id., *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7.-4. Jh.v.Chr.* (Bamberg 1978) 3-17 (summarized in id. 1983. 305-10); id. "Die Zahl der griechischen Staaten und Arealgrösse und Bürgerzahl der 'Normalpolis'," *ZPE* 59 (1985) 253-63. For the following definition, see Ehrenberg, *State* (n.3) 88-102; *Staat* (n.3) 107-25; id., *From Solon to Socrates* (London, 2nd ed. 1973) 7; Jeffery 1976. 39; E. Meyer, *Einführung in die antike Staatskunde* (Darmstadt 1976) 68-80; M.I. Finley, "The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond," *CSSH* 19 (1977) 305-27 = id. 1982. 3-23; Snodgrass 1980. 28; Thomas 1981. 31f.; Kolb 1984. 61-67; Osborne, *Demos* (n.2) 6-10; Gawantka, *Polis* (n.2); Sakellariou 1989, part 1; E. Lévy, "La cité grecque: Invention moderne ou réalité antique?" in C. Nicolet (ed.), *Du pouvoir dans l'antiquité: Mots et réalités* (Geneva 1990) 53-67. For additional references, see the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 239-41 with nn. 115, 122.

9 Poleis without cities: e.g. Panopeis (Paus. 10.4.1) and, of course, Sparta (Thuc. 1.10.2); see Kolb 1984. 71-77 on the preconditions for urbanization and the absence of these conditions in most small poleis. Poleis with several towns: Athens is an obvious example. Poleis without territory: F. Hampl, "Poleis ohne Territorium," *Klio* 32 (1939) 1-60 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 403-73. Dependent poleis: e.g., the subjects of the Athenian empire and the Spartan *perioikoi*; see also F. Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum*. Zetemata 17 (Munich 1958).

10 Runciman, "Doomed to Extinction: The *Polis* as an Evolutionary Dead-End," in Murray/Price (eds.) 1990. 347-67, at 348.

11 For the dates accepted by most scholars, see West 1966. 40-48; A. Lesky, "Homeros," *RE* suppl. vol. 11 (1967) 687-846, at 687-93; R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in Epic Diction* (Cambridge 1982), esp. 188-200, 228-31; J. Latacz, *Homer. Der erste Dichter des Abendlands* (Munich 1985) 77-90; G.S. Kirk on Homer and J.P. Barron/P.E. Easterling on Hesiod, in Easterling/Knox (eds.) 1985. 47-51, 93f. Among those suggesting seventh-century dates for the Homeric epics, see West 1966. 46f.; W. Burkert, "Das hunderttorige Theben und die Datierung der Ilias," *WS* 89 (1976) 5-21. Differences between the socio-political descriptions of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, often emphasized (e.g., by Starr 1986, ch.2) and not to be ignored, should be understood in terms not only of date but also of content and focus.

12 For this and the following paragraphs, cf. the more detailed discussion and bibliographical references in Raaflaub 1991. 207-15, 248-52; in addition, B. Patzek, "Mündliche Dichtung als historisches Zeugnis: die 'Homerische Frage' in heutiger Sicht," *HZ* 250 (1990) 529-48; *Homer und Mykene: Mündliche Dichtung und Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich 1992);

van Wees 1992, ch.1; J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich 1992), ch. 7.

13 J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector* (Chicago 1975) 35-39.

14 I thus disagree both with Finley 1977. 47f., who dates the "Homeric society" to the 10th and 9th centuries, and with Morris 1986 and others, who fully identify it with the poet's own.

15 I leave open the question of how and when the text of the epics was fixed in writing. Despite B. Powell, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet* (Cambridge 1991), I consider this question still unresolved; see, e.g., A. Parry, "Have We Homer's *Iliad*?" *YCS* 20 (1966) 177-216; A. Dihle, *Homer-Probleme* (Opladen 1970); M. Skaife Jensen, *The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory* (Copenhagen 1980), ch.6; Latacz, *Homer* (n.11) 23-31, 77-90; R. Friedrich, "The Problem of an Oral Poetics," in H.R. Runte/R. Runte (eds.), *Orality and Literature: Proc. XIth Congr. Intern. Comp. Lit. Assoc. 1985 IV* (New York 1991) 19-28; G. Nagy, "Homeric Questions," *TAPA* 122 (1992) 17-60, esp. 31ff. If, as many believe, the epics were not fixed, in writing or otherwise, before the middle of the seventh century, we would have to expect some of what we read today to reflect "post-Homeric" Greek society of the early seventh century – which would complicate the picture even further; see, e.g., Lorimer 1950. 509-15; Burkert, "Theben" (n.11) 19f.

16 All this is carefully analyzed and amply documented in Scully 1990. The description of Troy (esp. Priamos' family and palace [6.242-50]) most likely is influenced by reports about Near-Eastern marvels and/or fossilized memories of Mycenaean conditions; see Scully 1990; Deger-Jalkotzy 1979, who, however, overrates the difference between Trojan and Achaian features: Troy still basically is a Greek polis (see below n.28). Lorimer 1950. 442-49 suggests sixth-century interpolations in the scenes focusing on the temple of Athena (6.86-92, 269-80, 297-310); *contra*: Kirk 1985/90. II. 164-68; Scully 1990. 32-35; W. Burkert, *Greek Religion, Archaic and Classical* (Oxford 1985, tr. of the German ed., Stuttgart 1977) 96 (on the installation of the priestess by the community).

17 "Made into a walled polis" (*pepolisto*: 20. 217; cf. 7. 453); on the importance of this verb, see Scully 1990. 24f., 48 with reference to *Od.* 11. 260-65.

18 The difference between Trojan and Achaian battle exhortations is marked: 15. 494-99 vs. 502-5; 557f. vs. 561-64. There are women, of course, but they are captives, concubines.

19 Cf. Thomas 1966. 7; Murray 1983. 64. Starr 1986. 18f. mentions as a distant and partial analogy Xenophon's army of Greek mercenaries after Cunaxa: on their march home, "they resembled a moving *polis*." See Polyb. 6.2.2 for another example, on which cf. F. Gschnitzer, "Von der Fremdartigkeit griechischer Demokratie," in K. Kinzl (ed.), *Demokratia: Der Weg zur Demokratie bei den Griechen. Wege der Forschung* (Darmstadt 1994).

20 See the discussion by Kirk 1985/90. II. 276-78 with bibliography. The analytical school typically attributed this fortification, like the second duel in bk.7, to a second poet (cf. P. Von der Mühll, *Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias* [Basel 1952] 138).

21 For the attractiveness of this topic, see the Meleagros story (9. 529-99); see further below at n.43. A parallel effort to include in a condensed time frame the highlights of the whole story can be seen in the *teichoskopia* ("viewing from the walls") in 3. 161-246 (see Kirk 1985/90. I. 286-88) and perhaps also in Pandaros' treacherous arrow shot, which reaffirms within the epic's narrative the injustice of the Trojan and the justice of the Achaian cause (Raaflaub 1988. 201-3).

22 For such wars, see *Il.* 1. 152-57; 9. 529-99; 11. 655-762; 18. 509-40.

- 23 P. Vidal-Naquet, "Land and Sacrifice in the *Odyssey*: A Study of Religious and Mythical Meanings," in id. 1986. 15-38, at 18-30.
- 24 C.P. Segal, "The Phaeacians and the Symbolism of Odysseus' Return," *Arion* 1.4 (1962) 17-63; Vidal-Naquet, *loc. cit.* 26-30; Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 289-92 with bibliography.
- 25 Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988 at 6. 266.
- 26 The erection of freestanding temples (*neoi*) seems to me decisive for excluding vague memories of the Ionian migration (as suggested by Finley 1977. 48 and 156). 8th century: e.g., A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (Manchester 1963; rev. repr. Chicago 1983) 29; Morris 1986. 97f. See also *Od.* 9. 116-41 for a description of an ideal location for a colony.
- 27 Cf., for further contrast, the case of Nestor who, equally aged, still maintains full leadership and even participates in the Trojan expedition, while Peleus stays at home and sends Achilles to lead the Myrmidons against Troy.
- 28 My interpretative approach thus differs from that of Deger-Jalkotzy 1979. While she explains the sum of differences between the social and political structures of Troy and those of the Achaeans or Phaiakians with the poet's use of different models (the west-semitic city-states of the Levant for Troy, the Greek polis for the others), I do not deny Near-Eastern influences but consider most of these differences less significant and explain them at least in part as reflecting poetic selection and real differences among early Greek poleis.
- 29 For the following, see, e.g., W. Donlan, "Changes and Shifts in the Meaning of Demos in the Literature of the Archaic Period," *PdP* 25 (1970) 381-95; id. 1989. 13-16; C. Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451/50 B.C.* (New York 1981) 151-74; E. Lévy, "Asty et polis dans l'*Iliade*," *Ktéma* 8 (1983) 55-73; id., *Astos et politès d'Homère à Hérodote*, ibid. 10 (1985) 53-66 (cf. also the articles by M. Casevitz, M. Woronoff and others in the same vols.); M. Casevitz/E. Lévy/M. Woronoff, "Asty et polis. Essai de bilan," in *Lalies: Actes des sessions de linguistique et de littérature* (Paris 1989) 279-85; Scully 1990. 8f.; R. Koerner, "Bedeutung" (n. 6), J. Harmatta (*laos*), E.C. Welskopf (*laos, demos*), P. Musiolek (*asty*), S. Lauffer (*politès*), in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III, and the index of references, ibid. I, II. I did not consult D.R. Cole, "Asty" and "Polis": "City" in *Early Greece* (unpublished diss. Stanford 1976).
- 30 *Contra*: Lévy, *loc. cit.* (1983). In cases such as Tyrt. 12W. 24 (cf. 15) the two terms are indeed used in very similar ways; but the similarity concerns the community in the sense of "city, town" rather than "state" ("Gemeinde" rather than "Staat"); cf. for example *Od.* 1. 3; 15. 492; 16. 63 (*Odysseus* has seen the *astea* of many peoples) or Archil. 64D = 133W, 88D = 172W, 109D = 170W (*astoi* as "Mitbewohner" rather than "Bürger").
- 31 Thus in Troy (*Il.* 3. 146-53; 15. 720-23) and among the Phaiakians (*Od.* 6. 53-55, 60f.; 7. 98f., 136, 189; 8. 10f., 41f., 390f.; 13. 186). In *Od.* 7. 189, *pleonas* may indicate either that not all *gerontes* = *basileis* were present in Alkinoos' house when *Odysseus* arrived or that *gerontes* refers to a larger group than the *basileis/ hegetores/medontes*.
- 32 These *basileis* are neither kings nor aristocrats, and the paramount *basileus* is no king either, if such words are to be used in any precise sense. Given their later connotations, such terms are mostly misleading and useless; they should be avoided altogether. For an anthropological analysis of the status and function of such *basileis*, see Finley 1977, ch. 4; Donlan 1980, ch. 1; id., "Reciprocities in Homer," *CW* 75 (1982) 137-75, at 172f. and *passim*; Qviller 1981. 109 and *passim*. See generally for *basileis* in Homer and in early Greece, apart from the bibliography cited in n. 5, Deger 1970; J.V. Andreev, "Könige und Königsherrschaft in den Epen Homers," *Klio* 61 (1979) 361-84; R. Descat, "L'idéologie homérique

du pouvoir," *REA* 81 (1979) 229-40; J. Cobet, "König, Anführer, Herr; Monarch, Tyrann," in Welskopf (ed.) 1981/85. III. 11-66, at 11-47; Drews 1983; P. Carlier, *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (Strasbourg 1984), parts 2 and 3; Starr 1986, ch.2; E. Lévy, "Lien personnel et titre royal: *Anax* et *basileus* dans l'*Iliade*," in id. (ed.), *Le Système palatial en Orient, en Grèce et à Rome* (Leiden 1987) 291-314; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 33ff.; Sakellariou 1989. 358-66; Ulf 1990, ch. 3. P. Barcelò, *Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis: Untersuchungen zu Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechenland* (Stuttgart 1993).

33 Scully 1981 and 1990.

34 Hence the *basileis* are called *dikaspoloi* (*Il.* 1. 258; *Od.* 11. 186). Staff: P. Easterling, "Agamemnon's *skeptron* in the *Iliad*," *PCPhS* Suppl. 16 (1989) 104-21. Cf. in general V. Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (Leipzig 1921) 3-17, 54-62, 103-6, 128-33; Bonner/Smith 1930, ch.1; K. Latte, "Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum," *A & A* 2 (1946) 63-76 = id., *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1968) 233-51; E. Wolf, *Griechisches Rechtsdenken I* (Frankfurt/M. 1950) 70-119; Gagarin 1973. 82-87; id. 1986, ch.2; Havelock 1978, chs. 7-10; Cobet, "König" (n.32) 20ff.; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (2nd ed., Berkeley/Los Angeles 1983), chs. 1-2; A. Lesky, "Grundzüge griechischen Rechtsdenkens," *WS* n.s. 19 (1985) 5-40 and 20 (1986) 5-26. On the trial scene on Achilles' shield, see recently R. Westbrook, "The Trial Scene in the *Iliad*," *HSCP* 94 (1992) 53-76 (with earlier bibliography).

35 Although both Agamemnon (*Il.* 9. 149-56) and Menelaos (*Od.* 4. 174-77) are imagined to be overlords over several poleis, which they can give to vassals and sons-in-law, and other *basileis* rule over large numbers of poleis as well. Many interpretations of this motif have been proposed: it belongs to the oldest (Mycenaean) layers of epic tradition (Andreev, "Könige" [n.32] 365); it proves the existence of certain forms of feudalism in Homeric society (Will 1957. 45 and others [listed by Andreev, *ibid.* 365 n.15]; *contra*: M.I. Finley, "Homer and Mycenae: Property and Tenure," *Historia* 6 [1957] 133-59, at 139; Deger 1970. 89f. [with n. 379], 111); it certainly is not "a reflection of political reality, either in the Mycenaean age or subsequently" (Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 204f. [at *Od.* 4. 174-77]); it is a poetic fiction supporting the concept of a Mycenaean overlordship (G. Jachmann, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog und die Ilias* [Cologne 1958] 98-105); it presupposes the experience of the First Messenian War (E. Schwartz, "Tyrtaios," *Hermes* 34 [1899] 428-68, at 445, and others [listed by Burkert, "Theben" (n.11) 19 n.44]; *contra*: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die Ilias und Homer* [Berlin 1916] 66).

36 For the following discussion, see generally Hoffmann 1956; Starr 1957; id. 1986; Thomas 1966; Deger 1970; Finley 1977, ch. 4; Spahn 1977, ch.1; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1977. 49-53; Luce 1978; C. Mossé, "Ithaque ou la naissance de la cité," *Ann. del sem. di studi del mondo class., sez. archeol. e storia ant.* 2 (Naples 1980) 7-19; Donlan 1980, ch.1; id. 1989; Gschnitzer 1981, ch. 2; "Zur homerischen Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung," in Latacz 1991. 182-204; K.W. Welwei, "Adel und Demos in der frühen Polis," *Gymnasium* 88 (1981) 1-23; Qviller 1981; Murray 1983, ch. 4; J. Halverson, "Social Order in the 'Odyssey'," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 129-45; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, ch. 1; Sakellariou 1989. 349-92 (with a survey of scholarship, 349-55), and the contributions in Musti et al. (eds.) 1991. More literature is cited in Raaflaub 1991. 239-47.

37 See the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 223-25.

38 Cf. Finley 1977. 155f.; Drerup 1969. 131, 133. Finley's conclusions are refuted by Morris 1986. 100-4. See also Snodgrass 1971. 435.

39 See Snodgrass' contribution to the present volume, and F. de Polignac's study of the

emergence of rural cults in the eighth century and their significance for territorial demarcation (*La naissance de la cité grecque* [Paris 1984]; cf. Snodgrass 1991. 18).

40 The historicity of this catalogue and the period to which it refers are much debated; see recently A. Giovannini, *Etude historique sur les origines du catalogue des vaisseaux* (Berne 1969: eighth or seventh centuries); R. Hope Simpson/J.F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford 1970: 13th cent.), and the useful summary by Kirk 1985/90.I. 166ff. (with bibliography and commentary), who emphasizes that towns provide the vast majority of place names (173). See also Sakellariou 1989. 378-92, and the contribution by D. Marcozzi/M. Sinatra in Musti et al. 1991. 145-54.

41 See in general Coldstream 1977. 317-27; id. 1984. 9-11; id., "Greek Temples: Why and Where?" in: P. Easterling/J.V. Muir (eds.), *Greek Religion and Society* (Cambridge 1985) 67-97, at 68-72; Snodgrass 1977. 24-26, 29f.; id. 1980. 33, 55-60; id. 1986a (on communication, competition and imitation among early Greek poleis); id. 1991. 17f.; Starr 1986. 39f. As Snodgrass emphasizes (see also his contribution to the present volume), temple construction was only one aspect of a whole complex of relatively sudden changes in the religious sphere, some of which affected all citizens, indicating that the whole community changed its ways. The emergence, in the same period, of rural sanctuaries (see n.39) and of the great panhellenic sanctuaries needs to be mentioned here as well. On the latter, see recently C. Rolley, "Les grands sanctuaires panhelléniques," in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.: Tradition and Innovation* (Stockholm 1983) 109-14; C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles: The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge 1990).

42 In his comments on my interpretation of "Homeric society," M.H. Hansen raised the following objection, among others: To "find both a palace and a temple in Troy is very strange... The temple is indeed an integral part of the Greek polis... Palaces on the other hand are unattested in Greek architecture between the bronze age and the late classical period... The palace of Priam is probably one of the bronze age anachronisms, and to have a palace and a temple within the same walls is a chimera." The same combination, however, exists in Homeric Scheria. The description of Priamos' palace certainly owes much to ancient memories or Near-Eastern lore (above n.16) and that of Alkinoos befits the leader of a fantastically blessed *Märchenwolk*. "Palace," however, is a modern term. The epics call these structures "houses": *domos*, *doma* in sg. and pl. (*Il.* 6. 242; *Od.* 6.13, 299, 302; 7.46 etc.). These words are used as well for the "palaces" of Menelaos (*Od.* 4.2), Nestor (3.387) and especially that of Odysseus, obviously a large farmhouse (1.116, 126 and often; see generally H. Strasburger, "Der soziologische Aspekt der homerischen Epen," *Gymnasium* 60 [1953] 97-114 = id., *Studien zur Alten Geschichte* I [Hildesheim/New York 1982] 491-518). Lorimer 1950. 406-33; A.J.B. Wace, "Houses and Palaces," in Lorimer/F.H. Stubbings (eds.), *A Companion to Homer* (New York 1962) 489-97; B.C. Rider, *Ancient Greek Houses* (Chicago 1964) 166-209, and many others (listed by Drerup 1969. 129 n.157) have sought the model for these "palaces" in Mycenaean palace architecture. More recently, Drerup 1969. 128-33 (with bibl.) and others have demonstrated that in this case too the model more likely is to be found in the Geometric period, in the architecture of the leader's large house with *Herdsaal* and many other corresponding details, even frequent and artful use of bronze. See also Snodgrass 1971. 423-29, 435; Coldstream 1977. 304-10; K. Fagerström, *Greek Iron Age Architecture*. Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology 81 (Göteborg 1988), and the lit. cited by Hiller 1991. 81-83. See now also A. Veneri, "Omero e il palazzo miceneo: alcuni aspetti della evoluzione semantica di termini architettonici nel contesto della tradizione linguistico-stilistica dell'epos," in Musti et al. 1991. 177-86. For the prehistory and cultural signifi-

cance of such “chiefs’ houses” in the post-Mycenaean period and Dark Ages, see S. Deger-Jalkotzy, “Frühgriechische Herrschaftsformen in mykenischer Zeit,” *Jahrbuch der Universität Salzburg 1985-1987* (Salzburg 1989) 133-51, at 143-47; “Diskontinuität und Kontinuität. Aspekte politischer und sozialer Organisation in mykenischer Zeit und in der Welt der Homerischen Epen,” in Musti et al. 1991. 53-66; 1991. 147f.; Blome (n.1) 48-52, 58.

43 Traditions: Scully 1990. 24-31, 41-53, 82-86, 95-98, 141-57. Rareness of city fortifications: see F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (Toronto 1971), who concludes: “On the whole, between the mid-eighth and the mid-seventh century Greek fortifications advanced some distance beyond the level of the Geometric period. This progress was not confined to the newer colonial settlements; it is also found in the older centres, especially in Asia Minor” (292); cf. H. Lauter-Bufé/H. Lauter, “Die vorthemistokleische Stadtmauer Athens nach philologischen und archäologischen Quellen,” *AA* (1975) 1-9, at 1f. Most of the oldest known city-walls, however, seem to date to the early 7th century (e.g., Eretria, Corinth [Lauter/Lauter, *ibid.*], Leontinoi, Iasos [Winter 103, 128]). There are a few Geometric fortifications, but they hardly qualify as “city walls” and in several cases there is no continuity to the subsequent polis period (see Snodgrass 1986b. 126, 128f.). Only Old Smyrna (Drerup 1969. 44-46 with earlier bibliography), if the traditional date is upheld by the reinvestigation currently under way (Snodgrass 1991. 9), seems to be older. See generally A. Wokalek, *Griechische Stadtbefestigungen: Studien zur Geschichte der frühgriechischen Befestigungsanlagen* (Bonn 1973), and the bibliography cited in the following notes.

44 Wooden structures: *Il.* 12. 54-7, 258-60; *Od.* 7. 44f.; Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 323 at 7. 45 with literature. (In the discussion of his 1986b article [418], however, Snodgrass thinks of “imaginary fortifications”, perhaps based on memories of Bronze Age constructions.) Walls in colonial cities: Winter, *loc. cit.* 290-92; Snodgrass 1991. 9f.; *id.* 1986b. 129, and the contributions by A. Wasowicz, M. Coja, D. Adamesteanu, V.P. Tolstikov and H. Tréziny, in P. Leriche/H. Tréziny (eds.), *La fortification dans l’histoire du monde grec* (Paris 1986), who all emphasize the lack of systematic exploration, the gaps in our evidence and knowledge, and the uncertainties in dating some of the early remains – which all hamper a reliable assessment of this issue. Shield of Achilles: K. Fittschen, *Bildkunst I: Der Schild des Achilleus*. Archaeol. Homeric II vol. N1 (Göttingen 1973), esp. 10-17 with bibl., 25-27; M. Edwards, *The Iliad: A Commentary V* (Cambridge 1991) 200ff. (200: “the shield displays... scenes familiar to the poet’s audience from their everyday life”; cf. 208f., 34-37). To the supporters of a seventh-century date of the epics the archaeological evidence, of course, poses fewer difficulties.

45 Snodgrass 1991. 9. No criterion: Wokalek, *Stadtbefestigungen* (n. 43) 27f.; Snodgrass 1991. 7-10 (cf. *id.* 1977. 21-24; 1980. 32; 1986b. 130); W. Eder, “Epilog,” in K. Raaflaub/E. Müller-Luckner (eds.), *Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike: Die nahöstlichen Kulturen und die Griechen* (Munich 1993) 427-49, at 434, with reference to F. Lang, *Archaische Siedlungen in Griechenland* (Diss. Berlin, forthcoming).

46 See esp. Connor 1988 and below under (c).

47 Snodgrass 1991. 10 emphasizes local conditions but dismisses fortifications of the citadel; cf. *id.* 1986b. 126, 130: repairs but no new fortifications are documented so far. I do not find Snodgrass’ tentative explanation plausible: “This was perhaps because oligarchies continued to dominate many Archaic cities and because, as Aristotle says, ‘a citadel is suitable to oligarchies and monarchies’” (1986b. 130).

48 I consider it significant that later authors, such as Polybius, certainly an expert (18. 29. 6, referring to *Il.* 13. 131-33), and Diodorus (16. 3. 2) had no difficulty in recognizing the phalanx in Homer’s battle descriptions: Pritchett 1985. 24 n.78.

49 See esp. 4. 446-56; 8. 60-63; 11. 67-73; 12. 77f., 86f., 105f.; 13. 125-35; 16. 210-17, 563-69, 632-44; 17. 356-65; Nestor's warning, 4. 303-5; the contempt for archers, 11. 385-90; the battle cry of 9-10,000 men, 14. 147-49. J. Latacz, *Kampffaränese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios* (Munich 1977); Pritchett 1985, esp. 7-33; P. Krentz, "The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *CA* 4 (1985) 50-61, are especially useful. See further, on warfare in Homer, Lorimer 1950, ch. 5; G.S. Kirk, "War and the Warrior in the Homeric Poems," in Vernant (ed.) 1968. 93-118; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, *Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages* (Cambridge 1973); H. van Wees, "Leaders of Men? Military Organisation in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986) 285-303; id., "Kings in Combat: Battles and Heroes in the *Iliad*," *CQ* n.s. 38 (1988) 1-24; id. 1992; Ulf 1990, ch. 4.2, and the literature cited in n. 178.

50 For another model possibly underlying the poet's description of the Trojan War, see Raaflaub 1991. 223.

51 See Snodgrass 1980. 37-40 on the connection between the political phenomenon of the advent of the polis and the economic one of the increasing importance of land ownership; see also below at n.169.

52 See the brief discussion in Raaflaub 1991. 225-30, and Detienne 1968. 132f., 141; Meier 1980. 66f. = id. 1990. 37f.; Snodgrass 1986. 15f.; Morris 1987. 196-201. See also n. 178 below and the bibliography cited there.

53 Starr 1977, ch. 6; id. 1986. 30-33; Murray 1983. 68.

54 For discussion of assembly and council in Homer, see, e.g., Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 333-41; R. Martin, *Recherches sur l'agora grecque* (Paris 1951) 17-41; Vernant 1962, chs. 3 and 4; M. Detienne, "En Grèce archaïque: géométrie, politique et société," *Annales ESC* 20 (1965) 425-41; Finley 1977. 78ff., 108ff.; Spahn 1977. 29ff., esp. 34ff.; J.V. Andreev, "Die politischen Funktionen der Volksversammlung im homerischen Zeitalter," *Klio* 61 (1979) 385-405; id., "Volk und Adel bei Homer," *Klio* 57 (1975) 281-91; W. Donlan, "The Structure of Authority in the *Iliad*," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 51-70; F. Gschnitzer, "Der Rat in der Volksversammlung. Ein Beitrag des homerischen Epos zur griechischen Verfassungsgeschichte," in P. Händel/W. Meid (eds.), *Festschrift R. Muth* (Innsbruck 1983) 151-63; Starr 1986. 18-21, 25f.; J.F. McGlew, "Royal Power and the Achaean Assembly at *Iliad* 2.84-393," *CA* 8 (1989) 283-95; Sakellariou 1989. 366-71. See now also P. Carlier, "La procédure de décision politique, du monde mycénien à l'époque archaïque," in Musti et al. 1991. 85-95. E. Ruschenbusch, "Zur Verfassungsgeschichte Griechenlands," in Kinzl (ed.), *Demokratia* (n. 19) offers good observations but claims, based on a far too unspecific definition of "democracy", that Homeric assemblies are democratic.

55 The assemblies in *Il.* 2 and 9.9-79, *Od.* 2 and 8. 4-45 are especially important. In *Od.* 8. 16 as in *Il.* 2. 99 the crowds quickly fill the *hedrai* in the *agora*: wooden benches or permanent seats? See also *Od.* 3. 136-50 for attention to proper procedure. The "twenty-year hiatus" in Ithakan assemblies (*Od.* 2. 26f.) has often been vastly overrated. In the poet's real world, it probably was normal to suspend assembly meetings during absences of the leader and his men: even if such absences (for example, for a raiding expedition) lasted longer than a few days or weeks, this would have caused no problem. In this case, however, this normal experience seems to have been grafted upon an old tradition of a war that in every respect (manpower, distance, time) had assumed truly heroic dimensions (thus ten years, just as in the case of Odysseus' *nostos* or the siege of Veii in Rome's heroic past: I cannot understand why such a figure should be taken literally). If so, the twenty-year hiatus represents a poetically distorted rather than an authentic piece of evidence and cannot be used for any historical conclusions on the political significance of the assembly in the Homeric polis.

- 56** See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 35-39 with bibl.
- 57** The prime example, of course, is Agamemnon in the *Iliad*, books 1, 2, 9 and 19; see also n.60.
- 58** Detienne, "En Grèce archaïque" (n.54) 429-41; Havelock 1978, ch. 7. Thus it is fitting that it is Themis who is the sponsor of assemblies (*Od.* 2. 68f., cf. Hekate in Hesiod, *WD* 430f.).
- 59** *Od.* 15. 466-68 with Heubeck/Hoekstra 1989. 260f.; cf. 6. 53-55, 60f. We are reminded of Alkaios' complaint, 130B LP, Campbell.
- 60** E.g., 2. 53-83; 7. 323-44; 9. 89-173 (with 9-79); 14. 27-134. Cf. also, for the Trojan side (Hektor and Poulydamas), *Il.* 12. 210-50; 13. 723-48; 18. 243-313 with 22. 99-110. On competition among equals and the decisive role of speech and persuasion: Vernant 1962. 40-45.
- 61** Accordingly, in the epics Zeus is not called *basileus* but *pater* (father in a patriarchal family; cf. the Roman *paterfamilias*) and *anax* (master of a hierarchically structured *oikos*): see H. Erbse, *Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Götter im homerischen Epos* (Berlin/New York 1986) 209-18.
- 62** Nestor's story in *Il.* 11. 669-761 contains similar elements.
- 63** Thus in Achaian and Trojan reactions to Pandaros' violation (4. 73-140) of the treaty of 3. 67-120 (4. 157-68; 7. 345-80, 390, 393, 400-2), although no one considers punishment of Pandaros. B.G. Wickert-Micknat, *Unfreiheit im Zeitalter der homerischen Epen* (Wiesbaden 1983) 18-21, 90-92 suggests that curse prayers such as *Il.* 3. 297-300 (cf. 4. 155-68, 234-39) might reflect early efforts to secure peace by oath and treaty.
- 64** See, e.g., Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no. 17 (a sixth-century treaty between Eleans and Heraians), on which cf. Ehrenberg 1937. 151 = 1965. 88: "we could not desire a plainer statement that the whole stands for the one, the one for the whole." For a slightly later period: Heuss 1946. 49-53 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 74-80.
- 65** The evidence is collected in Donlan 1989. 14.
- 66** Havelock 1978, ch. 7. See generally F. Gschnitzer, "Politische Leidenschaft im homerischen Epos," in H. Görgemanns/E.A. Schmidt (eds.), *Studien zum antiken Epos* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 1-21; Raaflaub 1988. 201-15; id., "Homer and the Beginning of Political Thought in Greece," in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1988) 1-25; "Die Anfänge des politischen Denkens bei den Griechen," *HZ* 248 (1989) 1-32, and the bibliography cited in id. 1991. 248 n. 141; in addition, see now W. Nicolai, "Gefolgschaftsverweigerung als politisches Druckmittel in der Ilias," in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner, *Anfänge* (n.45) 317-41.
- 67** For a brief discussion of the manifold problems, see Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1988. 56-60.
- 68** *Il.* 16. 384-92; *Od.* 19. 106-14; cf. Raaflaub 1988. 208-14; id. "Beginning" (n.66) 11-15; *contra*: P. Spahn, "Individualisierung und politisches Bewusstsein im archaischen Griechenland," in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner, *Anfänge* (n.45) 343-63. Communal responsibility is also expressed in, and a certain level of communal integration presupposed by, the obligation, enforced by Zeus himself, to care for the poor, suppliants and other outsiders (see Havelock 1978, ch.9).
- 69** See the bibliography cited in n.36; in addition, H. Strasburger, "Der Einzelne und die Gemeinschaft im Denken der Griechen," *HZ* 177, 227-48 = id., *Studien I* (n.42) 423-48 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 97-122; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, "Patriotism in the Homeric World," *Historia* 21 (1972) 528-37; Spahn (n.68).
- 70** A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford 1960; repr.

Chicago 1985), chs. 2 and 3; id., *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (London/New York 1972), ch. 2; see also G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987); Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, ch.1.

71 See the works cited in n.70 and my essay on "Democracy and Power in Fifth-Century Athens," forthcoming in J.P. Euben/J. Ober/J. Wallach (eds.), *Educating Democracy: The Contemporary Significance of Athenian Political Thought* (Ithaca NY 1994).

72 For a brief discussion, see Donlan 1980, ch.1; Nicolai (n.66).

73 Kallinos 1D = 1W. 7, 16-19; Tyrnt. 9D = 12W. 15, 24, 28, 34, 39. On Kallinos, see R. Leimbach, "Kallinos und die Polis," *Hermes* 106 (1978) 265-79.

74 I deliberately focus here on the social and political aspects. There is much more to the story: see for example Vidal-Naquet, "Land and Sacrifice" (n.23) 21f.; R. Friedrich, "Heroic Man and *Polymetis*: Odysseus in the *Cyclopeia*," *GRBS* 28 (1987) 121-33.

75 See Heubeck/Hoekstra 1989. 19f.

76 Scully 1981. 5ff.; id. 1990; see also Redfield, *Nature* (n.13).

77 Father: 633-40; brother: 27-41 and often. See M. Gagarin, "Hesiod's Dispute with Perses," *TAPA* 104 (1974) 103-11; Erler 1987. 7-9, both with (different) earlier bibliography. On *dorophagos*, see R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907) 419-21; Gagarin, *loc. cit.* 105 with n.5, 109f. with n. 19; West 1978. 151; Erler 1987. 8 with nn. 14 and 17.

78 Gagarin, *loc. cit.*; West 1978. 33-40; Millett 1984. 85f. with bibliography.

79 See, for example, P. Walcot, "Hesiod and the Law," *SO* 38 (1963) 5-21; F. Krafft, *Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod* (Göttingen 1963) 86-92; M. Griffith, "Personality in Hesiod," *CA* 2 (1983) 37-65, and esp. Nagy 1982. 49-66.

80 Didactic poetry: West 1978. 3-30; Martin 1984; doubts in M. Heath, "Hesiod's Didactic Poetry," *CQ* n.s. 35 (1985) 245-63. H. Diller, "Die dichterische Form von Hesiods Erga," *Abh. Akad. Mainz, geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl.* 1962, no.2, 41-69 = E. Heitsch (ed.), *Hesiod. Wege der Forschung* 44 (Darmstadt 1966) 239-74, argues for parenetic poetry with close connections to some Homeric speeches. Ionic models in form and content: M.L. West, "La formazione culturale della *polis* e la poesia esiodea," in R. Bianchi Bandinelli (ed.), *Storia e civiltà dei Greci I* (Milan 1979) 254-90, at 258. Panhellenic poetry: Nagy 1982. 43-49 and *passim*.

81 For summaries, see A.R. Burn, *The World of Hesiod* (London 1936), ch. 2; M. Detienne, *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode* (Brussels 1963); Spahn 1977. 51-58; 1980. 533-44; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 57-63.

82 Millett 1984. 92-107, with discussion of earlier interpretations of the economic situation reflected in Hesiod. See esp. Ed. Will 1957; Detienne, *Crise* (n.81) 21-27; *contra*: E. Will, "Hésiode: crise agraire ou recul de l'aristocratie?" *REG* 78, 542-56; Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1977. 58-60; Spahn 1980. 537.

83 See West 1978. 142f. and recently M. Gagarin, "The Ambiguity of *Eris* in the *Works and Days*," in M. Griffith/D.J. Mastronarde (eds.), *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays... in Honor of T.G. Rosenmeyer* (Atlanta 1990) 173-83.

84 Gagarin 1973. 88; cf. 92, 94.

85 See H.T. Wade-Gery, "Hesiod," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 81-93 (= id., *Essays in Greek History* [Oxford 1958] 1-16), at 91f.

86 In *Theog.* 81-93 this function is described very positively, in the *Works and Days* much more critically. West 1966. 44 explains this with the poet's addressing different audiences. This is possible but unlikely, given the panhellenic nature of such poetry. Rather, the *Theogony* generally provides a positive example of leadership (Zeus' just rule among the

gods: see below), while the *Works and Days* criticizes a negative example (the arbitrariness of human *basileis*): see Raaflaub 1988. 216-24.

87 Thus also Spahn 1980. 544.

88 *Theog.* 80-93 (reminiscent of *Il.* 18. 497-508 and *Od.* 8. 166-77; on the latter, see Martin 1984 with bibl.), 430-34.

89 527 (*demon te polin te*); 189 ("and they will sack one another's poleis"), on which see West 1978. 201.

90 I do not mean to imply that these political aspects dominate the poem, but they are an important part of it and obviously emphasized with great care.

91 The social and political significance of all these powers is obvious; that of the Muses is emphasized in *Theog.* 81-93 (below; cf. West 1966 *ad loc.*; D. Boedeker, *Descent from Heaven: Images of Dew in Greek Poetry and Religion*. Am Class. St. 13 [Chico, CA 1984] 84-88); on that of the Graces, see C. Meier, *Politik und Anmut* (Berlin 1985) 31ff. and *passim*.

92 For a more detailed analysis with references, see F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca, NY 1949) 3-75; N.O. Brown, *Hesiod, Theogony* (Indianapolis 1953) 7-50; Raaflaub 1988. 216-20; see also Jaeger 1965. 57-76; Havelock 1978, ch.11.

93 Plato, *Prot.* 322C ff.; for *aidos*, see Martin 1984. 38-45 with earlier literature.

94 On all this see recently H. Erbse, "Die Funktion des Rechtsgedankens in Hesiods 'Erga'," *Hermes* 121 (1993) 12-28. Gagarin 1973. 81, cf. 91f.; 1986. 46-50, emphasizes the limited semantic scope of *dike*. In the *WD*, it "may mean 'law' in the sense of a process for the peaceful settlement of disputes," but it "does not apply to actions outside this narrow area of law and does not have any general moral sense." Even on the semantic level, this probably is too narrow (cf., e.g., Wolf, *Rechtsdenken* [n.34] 120-51; Erler 1987), but Gagarin also seems to overlook that *dike* does not cover the whole range of the *concept* of justice: although *dike* is of special importance, Hesiod's concern for, and Zeus' protection of, social and moral norms extend far beyond the specific realm of *dike*: see, e.g., 42-106 (esp. 47-49, 56-59, 91-93, 106), 174-201, 286-92, 320-35.

95 See P. Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff 1966), esp. 72f.; West 1978. 213; Erler 1987. 14-21 with literature, who also discusses analogies and differences in *Il.* 16. 384-92; *Od.* 19.106-14. Cf. also Vidal-Naquet 1986. 16.

96 Thus also Erler 1987. 12-21; cf. B. Snell, *Dichtung und Gesellschaft* (Hamburg 1965) 61. *Contra*: Starr 1986. 25: "In both the *Odyssey* and in Hesiod's works, the responsibility for justice is in the hands of Zeus, watching over the *basileus*; there is not yet any idea that men by their own actions can secure or restore justice to a community." My own analysis leads to a different conclusion: "Anfänge" (n.66), esp. 27f.; "Beginning" (n.66), esp. 18f.

97 See the passages cited in n.88 and 95. For justice in Homer, see above n. 34.

98 Competition and exploitation: Starr 1961. 313ff.; 1977. 46-54; Spahn 1977. 54f., 121ff., and see above at n.70. Criticism of the elite: W.G. Forrest, *CAH* III.3 (2nd ed. 1982) 288, and the literature cited in n.66.

99 See the discussions by Finley 1968; J.V. Andreev, "Sparta als Typ einer Polis," *Klio* 57 (1975) 73-82; P. Cartledge, "The Peculiar Position of Sparta in the Development of the Greek City-State," *PRIA* 80 (1980) 91-108; also K. Bringmann, "Die soziale und politische Verfassung Spartas – ein Sonderfall der griechischen Verfassungsgeschichte?" *Gymnasium* 87 (1980) 465-84 = Christ (ed.) 1986. 448-69; S. Hodkinson, "Social Order and the Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta," *Chiron* 13 (1983) 239-81. Most aspects of early Spartan history present hotly debated and probably insoluble problems (C.G. Starr, "The Credibility of Early Spartan History," *Historia* 10 [1961] 257-72 = id. 1979. 144-59; cf. M. Clauss,

Sparta. Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte und Zivilisation [Munich 1983] 14-23). In the following section I take a middle position that is accepted by most scholars (C. Mossé, "Sparte archaïque," *PdP* 28 [1983] 7-20, provides a model). For detailed discussions see Michell 1964; Oliva 1971; Cartledge 1979, and the literature cited there; brief discussions in Sealey 1976. 66-88; Jeffery 1976. 111-32; Welwei 1983. 95-139; Murray 1983. 153-72. K. Christ, "Spartaforschung und Spartabild. Eine Einleitung," in id. (ed.) 1986. 1-72, offers a *Forschungsgeschichte* and *ibid.* 471-503 a good bibliography.

100 For discussion of the situation in the tenth and ninth centuries, see Cartledge 1979. 75-101; for a brief sketch, Welwei 1979. 187-92. See also Roussel 1976. 236 and, more generally, Deger-Jalkotzy 1991.

101 Kiechle 1963. 133-41; id., "Eunomia und Oligarchie," in *XIII Congr. Intern. des Sciences Historiques* I (Vienna 1965) 279-90; cf. briefly Murray 1983. 165f. On Alkman and Terpanther, see, e.g., C.M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides* (Oxford 1961), ch.2; A.J. Podlecki, *The Early Greek Lyric Poets and their Times* (Vancouver 1984), ch. 4; C.P. Segal in Easterling/Knox 1985. 168-85.

102 Lakonia: Kiechle 1963, chs. 2 and 3; Cartledge 1979, ch. 8. Messenia: F. Kiechle, *Messenische Studien* (Kallmünz 1959); Oliva 1971. 102-14; Cartledge 1979. 113-27.

103 P. Wuilleumier *Tarente des origines à la conquête romaine* (Paris 1939) 29-47, esp. 39-42; Kiechle 1963. 176-83; Cartledge 1979. 123-25. For emigration and colonization from Sparta, see also I. Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

104 Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1306b 37-1307a 1.

105 Cf. Forrest 1968. 51; Spahn 1977. 101f., 109f.

106 See, e.g., Finley 1968; Oliva 1971. 29-32; Sealey 1976. 78-80; Murray 1983. 166-72.

107 Forrest 1968. 61; Cartledge 1979. 123-25. For status distinctions among the Spartiates (the elusive *hypomeiones*), see Kahrstedt 1922. 50f.; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 659.

108 For discussion of authenticity, date and content, see, among others, Busolt 1920. 43-52; H.T. Wade-Gery, "The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch, *Lycurgus* VI," *CQ* 37 (1943) 62-72; 38 (1944) 1-9, 115-26 = id. *Essays* (n.85) 37-85; A. Andrewes, *Probouleusis: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Government* (Oxford 1954) 16-19; W.G. Forrest, "The Date of the Lykourgan Reforms in Sparta," *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 157-79; id. 1968. 40-60; A.H.M. Jones, "The Lycurgan Rhetra," in *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies pres. to Victor Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966) 165-75; R. Sealey, "Probouleusis and the Sovereign Assembly," *CSCA* 2 (1969) 247-69, at 250-57; id. 1976. 74-78 (opposes authenticity); Oliva 1971. 71-102; Jeffery 1976. 117f.; Cartledge 1979. 131-35; Murray 1983. 159-64; F. Ruzé, "Le conseil et l'assemblée dans la Grande Rhètra de Sparte," *REG* 104 (1991) 15-30.

109 Talbert's transl. (modified).

110 The last section (in square brackets), which is given only by Diod. 7.12.6, not by Plut. *Lys.* 6.10, is considered spurious by most scholars; but see, e.g., Bringmann 1975. 519f.

111 On the puzzle of the epithet and the significance of this cult, see J.H. Oliver, *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World* (Baltimore 1960), ch.1, with my critical comments (Raaflaub 1985. 125f., 140-44); Oliva 1971. 77f.; Cartledge 1979. 101.

112 *Phylai*: e.g., Forrest 1968. 30; Cartledge 1979. 93f. *Obai*: e.g., Forrest 1968. 42-46, 66f.; Cartledge 1979. 107. A different (and, I think, more plausible) explanation is proposed by Roussel 1976. 233-45; accepted, e.g., by Welwei 1979. 193f. See also Kiechle 1963. 150-52.

113 *Gerousia*, lak. *gerochia* (*geras echein*: to hold an honorary gift or portion); *gerontes* as in Homer, but in Sparta they had to be over sixty years old, beyond the age of military service. For discussion of the number, see Michell 1964. 137-39.

- 114** For details and sources: Kahrstedt 1922. 246-49; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 679-82; Michell 1964. 135-40; E. David, *Old Age in Sparta* (Amsterdam 1991) 15-36; cf. Forrest 1968. 63; Welwei 1979. 182-84 against Bringmann 1975. 526-29. Election from among the upper class is confirmed by a combination of Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 10.1, 3 (with parallels in Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 680 n.1) and Aristot. *Pol.* 1270b 23-25, 1271a 9-12, 1294b 29ff., 1306a 18f.
- 115** On the title *archagetai*, see the discussion by I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden 1987) 241-50.
- 116** For discussion of the puzzling dual kingship, see Kahrstedt 1922. 119-43; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 672; Michell 1964. 101-4; Forrest 1968. 28f.; Oliva 1971. 23-28; Jeffery 1976. 114; Cartledge 1979. 103-6.
- 117** Cf. the good remarks by Roussel 1976. 236.
- 118** See below n. 124.
- 119** Murray 1983. 155f. offers some good observations.
- 120** Tyrnt. 4W = 3aD. 5-9; Plut. *Lyk.* 6.2 (with the app. crit. in Ziegler's Teubner ed.) and 6. For recent discussion of possible emendations, see Oliva 1971. 72-74; Bringmann 1975. 517 n.10; E. Lévy, "La Grande Rhète," *Ktema* 2 (1977) 85-103. For discussion of content, see the bibliography in n.108.
- 121** Moreover, there was only a collective voice vote, and even elections were decided by an "archaic" system of comparing the "decibel level" of approval evoked by each candidate; see now E. Flaig, "Die spartanische Abstimmung nach der Lautstärke: Überlegungen zu Thukydides 1. 87," *Historia* 42 (1993) 139-60. On the assembly, Kahrstedt 1922. 255-67; Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 691-94; Michell 1964. 140-46.
- 122** For discussion and bibliography, see recently R. Talbert, "The Role of Helots in the Class Struggle at Sparta," *Historia* 38 (1989) 22-40 (who opposes this view), and P. Cartledge, "Richard Talbert's Revision of the Sparta-Helot Struggle: A Reply," *Historia* 40 (1991) 379-89; more generally: J. Ducat, *Les hilotes. BCH* suppl. vol. 20 (Athens/Paris 1990). For the effects of a comparable phenomenon on archaic Rome, triggered there by intense outside (enemy) pressure over an exceptionally long period, see K. Raaflaub, "Freiheit in Athen und Rom: Ein Beispiel divergierender politischer Begriffsentwicklung in der Antike," *HZ* 238 (1984) 529-67, at 552-63; id., "The Conflict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach," in id. (ed.), *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1986) 1-51, at 29-34.
- 123** The contrary view of A. Andrewes, "The Government of Classical Sparta," in *Studies Ehrenberg* (n.108) 1-17, based on 5th and 4th century evidence, hardly applies to the 7th and 6th centuries.
- 124** For details, see Her. 6. 56-60 with Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 671-78; Michell 1964. 101-18. From an unknown date, in a monthly exchange of oaths between *basileis* and ephors, the *basileia* was tied to the *nomoi* of the polis (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.7 and Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 677 n.1).
- 125** Thus, for example, Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 673, 675, 676, 679 and *passim*; Forrest 1968. 50; Roussel 1976. 235; Sealey 1976. 78.
- 126** For discussion of the emergence of "the political" and a "political sphere", although focusing mostly on 6th century Athens, see P. Lévêque/P. Vidal-Naquet, *Clisthène l'Athénien* (Paris 1964); J.-P. Vernant, "Espace et organisation politique en Grèce ancienne," in id., *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs I* (Paris 1965) 207-29; Meier 1980, part A = 1990, part I.
- 127** See W. Jaeger, "Tyrtaios über die wahre Arete," *SB Preuss. Akad. Berlin* 26 (1932) 537-68 = id. 1960 II. 75-114 and (in English) id. 1966. 103-42; id. 1965. 87-98; Stein-Hölkes-

kamp 1989. 123-25. See also the references to *polis*, *asty*, *demos*, *laoi* in 6/7D = 10W. 1f., 13f.; 21W. 15.

128 Referring to the Spartans' shared origins and descent, to the support of Zeus who himself gave the Spartans their polis (2D. 1-4 = 2W. 12-15), and to the crisis caused by the war and the demand for redistribution of land (Aristot. *Pol.* 1306b 37-1307a 2 = Tyrnt. 1W).

129 On *eunomia*, see A. Andrewes, "Eunomia," *CQ* 32 (1938) 89-102; V. Ehrenberg, "Eunomia," in id., *Aspects of the Ancient World* (Oxford 1946) 70-93 = id. 1965. 139-58; P. Steinmetz, "Das Erwachen des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins in der Polis," in id. (ed.), *Politeia und Res Publica. Beiträge... dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet* (Wiesbaden 1969) 52-78, at 60-71; see also C. Meier, *Entstehung des Begriffs 'Demokratie'* (Frankfurt am Main 1970) 15-25.

130 The Rhetra has been called "the first hoplite constitution" (Murray 1983. 162). This is correct insofar as the Spartans were probably using the fully developed phalanx by the time the Rhetra was adopted, but doubtful insofar as Murray is thinking in terms of the "hoplite revolution" (see below at n. 178). If what was said above (at n.48) about mass combat in the *Iliad* is correct and, as is likely, applies to early Sparta as well, many or most members of the Spartan *damoi* had been involved in their community's wars before (except for the poor who perhaps qualified now because of the distribution of *kleroi* in conquered territories; such distribution may have had the same effect as the *kleruchies* in the Athenian empire: A.H.M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* [Oxford 1957; repr. Baltimore/London 1986] 7, 167-77). The big difference was made, I think, less by the phalanx *per se* than by the fact that, due to Sparta's peculiar situation, this hoplite army assumed extraordinary and permanent importance for the community, and that all citizens were part of that army. A comparable case is provided by the Athenian *thetes* after the Persian Wars.

131 For Drakon's date (621), see Stroud 1968. 66-70; Rhodes 1981. 109. Solon was archon in 594. The question is whether he realized his reforms in (or around) that same year or, as some believe (e.g. Sealey 1976. 121-23) somewhat later. For summaries of the discussion, see Rhodes 1981. 120-22; Chambers 1990. 161f. These commentaries, as well as that by Manfredini/Piccirilli 1977 (on Plutarch's *Solon*), listing sources and modern scholarship, serve as excellent guides to all issues discussed in this section.

132 On the problem of the opening section of Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* see Rhodes 1981. 15-30, 65ff. *passim* and at 4.2-5; Chambers 1990. 84-91, 154-58; on later Athenian tradition in general, F. Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949); on the controversial interpretation of some of the archaeological evidence concerning increases and decreases in eighth and seventh century settlements and population, see Snodgrass 1977. 10-14; 1980. 19-25; 1991. 11-16; Coldstream 1977. 109; Morris 1987 and 1991; for a brief summary (with more bibliography): Raaflaub 1991. 215-17. See also D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study* (Princeton 1986) 5-16; Snodgrass, *CAH* 3. 1 (2nd ed. 1982) 657-95; Andrewes 1982; Welwei 1992, part II.

133 The difference to Sparta's experience is obvious from a comparison of Solon 2D = 1-3W with Tyrnt. 6/7D = 10W. For brief discussions of these wars, see Andrewes 1982. 372-75; F. Frost, "The Athenian Military before Cleisthenes," *Historia* 33 (1984) 283-94; see also T.J. Figueira, "Herodotus on the Early Hostilities between Aegina and Athens," *AJP* 106 (1985) 49-74; id., *Athens and Aegina in the Age of Imperial Colonization* (Baltimore/London 1991) 132-42. On the war with Megara about Salamis, see Plut. *Sol.* 8-10 with Manfredini/Piccirilli 1977, 130-43. Claims on Megarian territory are perhaps reflected in legends about early kings: M.P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund 1951) 56ff. On the war about Salamis: A. French, "Solon and the Megarian Question," *JHS* 77 (1957)

238-46; Frost, *loc. cit.* 288f. On sixth-century expansionist policies resulting in control over territories beyond Attica's natural boundaries in other areas as well, see Figueira, *Athens and Aigina* 142-60.

134 See the discussions by Berve 1967 I. 42f. with II. 539f.; Sealey 1976. 98f.; Rhodes 1981. 79-84; Andrewes 1982. 368-70; Welwei 1992. 133-37.

135 For the date: above n.131. For general discussion, Busolt/Swoboda 1926. 800-17; Stroud 1968; Sealey 1976. 99-105; Rhodes 1981. 109-12; M. Gagarin, *Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law* (New Haven/London 1981); Andrewes 1982. 370-72; S.C. Humphreys, "A Historical Approach to Drakon's Law on Homicide," in M. Gagarin (ed.), *Symposion 1990: Papers on Greek and Hellenistic Legal History* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 1991) 17-45; Welwei 1992. 138-46.

136 For discussion, F.E. Adcock, "Literary Tradition and Early Greek Code-Makers," *Cambr. Hist. J.* 2 (1927) 95-109; Bonner/Smith 1930, ch. 3; C.G. Thomas, "Literacy and the Codification of Law," *SDHI* 43 (1977) 455-58; A. Szegedy-Maszak, "Legends of the Greek Lawgivers," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 199-210; Ruschenbusch 1983. 317-23; Eder 1986; Gagarin 1986. 58-80 (on whose analysis I draw for the following summary); G. Camassa, "Aux origines de la codification écrite des lois en Grèce," in M. Detienne (ed.), *Les savoirs de l'écriture en Grèce ancienne* (Lille 1988) 130-55; K.-J. Hölkeskamp, "Arbitrators, Lawgivers and the 'Codification of Law' in Archaic Greece," forthcoming in *Metis* 8; "Written Law in Archaic Greece," *PCPhS* 38 (1992) 87-117; id., *Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland*, forthcoming in *Historia Einzelschriften*.

137 Meier 1980. 70-79 = 1990. 40-46.

138 According to Gagarin, the latter provide the vast majority both in the early laws known through epigraphic evidence (1986, ch. 4), and in early literature (ch.2). R.W. Wallace/R. Westbrook, *AJP* 110 (1989) 362-67, and K.-J. Hölkeskamp, *Gnomon* 62 (1990) 116-28, among others, express serious reservations.

139 Gagarin 1986. 78, 80; cf. Snodgrass 1980. 118-20. On the emergence of the concept of citizenship, see H. Reinau, *Die Entstehung des Bürgerbegriffes bei den Griechen* (Diss. Basel 1981); R. Sealey, "How Citizenship and the City Began in Athens," *AJAH* 8 (1983) 97-129; P.B. Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1990).

140 Eder 1986; cf. Snodgrass 1980. 121.

141 Gagarin 1986. 88f.; cf. E. Ruschenbusch, "PHONOS. Zum Recht Drakons und seiner Bedeutung für das Werden des athenischen Staates," *Historia* 9 (1960) 129-54, at 147ff., esp. 149-52.

142 Ruschenbusch, *loc. cit.* 153, who also thinks of military authority ("Befehlsgewalt"), but in view of what was said above about Athens' wars, this seems less certain. See also Sealey 1976. 105: In "pre-Peisistratean conditions the law of homicide may have been the field of activity in which the ordinary free man was made most aware of public power and of the unity of Attica."

143 See Hölkeskamp, "Arbitrators" and the other works cited in n.136.

144 See, e.g., the discussions by J.R. Ellis/G.R. Stanton, "Factional Conflict and Solon's Reforms," *Phoenix* 22 (1968) 95-110; Sealey 1976, ch.5; Rhodes 1981. 90-96; Gschntzer 1981. 75-84; Andrewes 1982. 377-82; T.W. Gallant, "Agricultural Systems, Land Tenure, and the Reforms of Solon," *BSA* 7 (1982) 111-24; Murray 1983. 180-85; Oliva 1988. 25-28, 50-53; Chambers 1990. 143-46; Welwei 1992. 150-206. More literature is cited in Raaflaub 1985. 54f., esp. n.107.

145 For the latter, see the collection by E. Ruschenbusch, *SOLODOS NOMOI: Die Frag-*

mente des solonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte. *Historia Einzelschr.* 9 (Wiesbaden 1966).

146 Solon's language in the two poems leaves no doubt about this. See also the comment by Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 5.3. Cf. Starr 1977. 46ff., 52f.; id. 1961. 313f., 351ff., 358; Spahn 1977. 121ff.; Gschnitzer 1981. 60ff.; Lintott 1981. 34f.

147 The reconstructions provided by Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 2 and 5.1-2; Plut. *Sol.* 13, assuming a simple dichotomy between the few rich nobles and the many oppressed "serfs" (see the commentaries of Rhodes, Chambers and Manfredini/Piccirilli on these passages), obviously are based on Solon's own statements. Besides these two groups, however, there must have existed a large group of independent farmers who were perhaps threatened by, but not directly involved in this conflict: Rhodes 1981. 95; Spahn 1977. 135ff., 150ff.

148 M. Gagarin, "Dike in Archaic Greek Thought," *CP* 69 (1974) 186-97, at 192 n.41: "an apparent allusion to the opposition of *bia* and *dike* in Hesiod."

149 See the bibliography cited in n. 144 above and the commentaries on Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 6; Plut. *Sol.* 15; see also M.I. Finley, "La servitude pour dettes," *RHDFE* 4th ser. 43, 159-84 = "Debt-Bondage and the Problem of Slavery," in id. 1982. 150-66.

150 For the significance of this aspect, see Raaflaub 1985. 54ff., esp. 62-65.

151 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 7-9; Plut. *Sol.* 18f. and the commentaries; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1986) 5-15.

152 Gagarin 1986. 71.

153 Murray 1983. 185; on the attitudes of the elite: Donlan 1980, ch.3.

154 See W. Jaeger, "Solon's Eunomia," *SB Preuss. Akad. Berlin* 17 (1926) 69-85 = id. 1960 I. 315-37 and (in English) id. 1966. 75-99; id. 1965. 136-49; G. Vlastos, "Solonian Justice," *CP* 41 (1946) 65-83; Meier, *Begriff 'Demokratie'* (n.129) 15-25; Raaflaub 1988. 234-39.

155 Esp. Alk. 69, 70, 129, 130B LP, Campbell. Cf., on Alkaios, D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955); W. Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe. Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios* (Munich 1980); A.P. Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (Cambridge MA 1983), part 2; D.A. Campbell, *The Golden Lyre: The Themes of the Greek Lyric Poets* (London 1983) 99-107; Podlecki, *Lyric Poets* (n.101), ch.3; on *stasis*, Stahl 1987. 56-105; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 157-65 (H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis* [Munich 1985] does not deal with this early period).

156 For the following section, see generally Heuss 1946. 45ff. = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 68ff.; H. Berve, "Wesenszüge der griechischen Tyrannis," *HZ* 177 (1954) 120 = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 161-83; id. 1967, part I, esp. 164ff.; M. White, "Greek Tyranny," *Phoenix* 9 (1955) 1-18; A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956); id., "The Tyranny of Pisistratus," *CAH* III.3 (2nd ed. 1982) 392-416; H. Pleket, "The Archaic Tyrannis," *Talanta* 1 (1969) 19-61; K. Kinzl (ed.), *Die ältere Tyrannis bis zu den Perserkriegen. Wege der Forschung* 510 (Darmstadt 1979, with Kinzl's own contribution); P. Oliva, "The Early Tyranny," *DHA* 8 (1982) 363-80; Murray 1983, ch. 9; Stahl 1987. See also Welwei 1992. 229-65; J. McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca NY 1993).

157 Solon 23D = 33, 32, 34W; cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 6.3, 11.2; Plut. *Sol.* 14.9; further Archil. 22D = 19W.

158 This is true especially, but not only, for Athens; see Stahl 1987; W. Eder, "Self-Confidence and Resistance: The Role of *demos* and *plebs* after the Expulsion of the Tyrants in Athens and the King in Rome," in T. Yuge/M. Doi (eds.), *Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity* (Tokyo 1988) 465-75; H.A. Shapiro, *Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens* (Mainz 1989); see also McGlew, *Tyranny* (n.156).

159 See n.140 above. There even seems to have been a pre-Solonian law against tyranny: Plut. *Sol.* 19.4; Rhodes 1981. 220-23.

160 Cf. Solon 3D = 4W. On Theognis' poem, see G. Nagy, "Poet and Tyrant: *Theognidea* 39-52, 1081-1082b," *CA* 2 (1983) 82-91; cf. id., "Theognis of Megara: The Poet as Seer, Pilot, and Revenant," *Arethusa* 15 (1982) 109-28, and "Theognis and Megara: A Poet's Vision of His City," in Figueira/Nagy (eds.) 1985. 22-81. On Theognis and Megara, see also the contributions by L.A. Okin and T.J. Figueira in the same volume; *ibid.* 309-21 a rich bibliography.

161 On the aristocracy, see generally L. Gernet, "Les nobles dans la Grèce antique," *Annales d'hist. écon. et soc.* 10 (1938) 36-43 = "The Nobility in Ancient Greece," in id., *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece* (Baltimore/London 1981, tr. from the French ed., Paris 1968) 279-88; M.T.W. Arnhem, *Aristocracy in Greek Society* (London 1977); Donlan 1980; Murray 1983, ch.12; Starr 1986; id., *The Aristocratic Temper of Greek Civilization* (New York/Oxford 1992); Herman, *Ritualised Friendship* (n.70); Stahl 1987; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989 (with bibliography).

162 For the sources, see Berve 1967 II. 558f.

163 See n. 140 above.

164 Xenophanes here focuses entirely on athletic accomplishments; by contrast, Tyr. 9D = 12W includes other aristocratic qualities as well (*charis*, the quality of a *basileus*, speech and *doxa*). See also Xen. fr. 1 (with emphasis on the *chreston*) and 3 with Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 125-27. For criticism of aristocratic values, see *ibid.* 123-33; W. Donlan, "The Tradition of Anti-Aristocratic Thought in Early Greek Poetry," *Historia* 22 (1973) 145-54; see also Donlan 1980, chs. 2 and 3; P.A.L. Greenhalgh, "Aristocracy and its Advocates in Archaic Greece," *G & R* 2nd ser. 19 (1972) 190-207.

165 Ehrenberg 1937 (citation: 155 and 93, respectively).

166 Starr 1986. 35f.; cf. 23, 35 (in Hesiod and the Homeric epics "the *polis* as known in historical days does not yet exist"). It is unclear why Starr recognizes "states" in *Hymn. Ap.* 30ff. (35). Although Starr operates with a definition of *polis* close to my own (36f.), he links the emergence of the *polis* proper with that of the state; thus his emphasis on "regular rules of procedure" (36) or a "clearly marshalled order" (23f.). In my view, to put it simply, the *polis* "crystallized" (Starr's term, 34 and often in ch.3) as a pre-state; in a second stage of development, it reached a more integrated form and as such achieved or approached statehood (see n.2 for discussions of this question). Moreover, I find in the epics much more communal action and a more important role assigned to the *demos* than Starr does.

167 Snodgrass 1987, ch.6; Donlan 1989. 20f. This combined model ignores the *ethnos*, out of which, according to traditional views, the *polis* emerged (see, e.g., F. Gschnitzer, "Stammes- und Ortsgemeinden im alten Griechenland," *WS* 68 [1955] 120-44, repr. in id. [ed.] 1969. 271-97; id., "Stadt und Stamm bei Homer," *Chiron* 1 [1971] 1-17). These traditional views seem to me incompatible with the position presented here and the recent scholarship it is based upon. I consider the political or communal role of the *ethnos* in the Dark Ages an open question; Starr 1986, e.g., 27, 37, 50f., is far too vague. For recent discussions, see Snodgrass 1980. 42-47; Welwei 1983, part II; 1992, part II; id., "Ursprünge genossenschaftlicher Organisationsformen in der archaischen Polis," *Saeculum* 89 (1988) 1ff.; C. Morgan, "Ethnicity and Early Greek States: Historical and Material Perspectives," *PCPhS* 37 (1991) 131-63; P. Funke, "Stamm und Polis: Überlegungen zur Entstehung der griechischen Staatenwelt in den 'Dunkeln Jahrhunderten'," in *Frankfurter Althistorische Studien. Koll. zu Ehren von A. Heuss* (Kallmünz forthcoming).

- 168** For suggestions, see, for example, Qviller 1981; Starr 1986, ch.3; Donlan 1989. 21f. *Ethnos*: see previous note. An important question that urgently needs systematic investigation is that of foreign (esp. Phoenician) influence on the process of polis formation in Greece. In view of large-scale Greek imitation of Near-Eastern models in the Bronze Age, despite different topographical and geo-political conditions, and of a wide range of Near Eastern influences in the archaic ("orientalizing") period (see my introduction and the contribution by H. Matthäus, "Zur Rezeption orientalischer Kunst-, Kultur- und Lebensformen in Griechenland," in K. Raaflaub/E. Müller-Luckner [eds.], *Anfänge* [n.45] XVII-XX, 165-86) this possibility must be taken seriously, but the modalities are still elusive. R. Drews, "Phoenicians, Carthage and the Spartan Eunomia," *AJP* 100 (1979) 45-58; F. Gschnitzer, "Die Stellung der Polis in der politischen Entwicklung des Altertums," *Oriens antiquus* 27 (1988) 287-302, at 293, 299-301, and M. Bernal (below) emphasize such influence; Snodgrass 1980. 32 considers it possible; Starr 1977. 101 and 1986. 42 argues against it. See also the discussion on Bernal's contribution ("Phoenician Politics and Egyptian Justice in Ancient Greece", 241-62) in Raaflaub/Müller-Luckner (above) XXIf., 394-404.
- 169** See also above n. 131 for discussions of demographic changes.
- 170** See Snodgrass 1980. 54f.
- 171** For a different (plausible?) explanation, see recently Morris 1991.
- 172** For earlier discussions, see C.G. Starr, "The Decline of the Early Greek Kings," *Historia* 10 (1961) 129-38 = id. 1979. 134-43; Drews 1983. *Contra*: Welwei 1992. 80 n.9 with bibl.
- 173** That Lefkandi was in fact less exceptional is proposed with great confidence by Deger-Jalkotzy (above n.42); see also P. Blome, "Lefkandi und Homer," *WJA* n.s. 10 (1984) 9-21; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989. 46f. (with bibl.); others, however, are more cautious: see, e.g., Fagerström, *Architecture* (n.42) 161.
- 174** See esp. Starr 1977, ch.6, whose term "semi-aristocrats", however, I find unfortunate.
- 175** *Od.* 14. 199-234; Theogn. 53-58, 183-92, 1109-14, 1117f. and frequent complaints about loss of status because of impoverishment. See above n. 161 and, on the formation of the aristocracy, the brief discussion (with bibliography) in Raaflaub 1991. 230-38. A comparison with Rome is revealing; see Raaflaub (as cited in n.122).
- 176** Morris' reconstruction (1987. 173-83) seems flawed by his narrow focus on what he perceives as a feudal relationship between the *basileis/agathoi* and their dependents (serfs, *kakoi*). In his view, what made the formation of the polis possible was the emancipation of these serfs so that eventually *agathoi* and *kakoi* as citizens stood above a new dependent class of slaves. Clearly, though, the polis was based on the integration, not of the former *dmoes vel sim.* of the *basileis*, but of the free farmers.
- 177** Cf., e.g., Frost, "Athenian Military" (n.133); Heuss 1946. 50f. = Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 76-78. Early Italy provides a good example: K. Raaflaub, "Expansion und Machtbildung in frühen Polis-Systemen," in W. Eder (ed.), *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik* (Stuttgart 1990) 511-45, at 533-35; D. Timpe, "Das Kriegsmonopol des römischen Staates," *ibid.* 368-87.
- 178** For discussions of the beginning of the hoplite phalanx, see M.P. Nilsson, "Die Hoplitentaktik und das Staatswesen," *Klio* 22 (1929) 240-49 = id., *Opuscula selecta* II (Lund 1952) 897-907; H.L. Lorimer, "The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus," *ABSA* 42 (1947) 76-138; A.M. Snodgrass, *Early Greek Armour and Weapons from the End of the Bronze Age to 600 B.C.* (Edinburgh 1964); id., "The Hoplite Reform and History," *JHS* 85 (1965) 110-22; id. 1980. 97-111; id. 1986. 14-17; P. Courbin,

“La guerre en Grèce à haute époque d’après les documents archéologiques,” in Vernant (ed.) 1968. 69-91; Detienne 1968; P. Cartledge, “Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta’s Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare,” *JHS* 97 (1977) 11-27; J.B. Salmon, “Political Hoplitism?” *ibid.* 84-101; A.J. Holladay, “Hoplites and Heresies,” *JHS* 102 (1982) 94-103; Murray 1983, ch. 8; J.K. Anderson, “Hoplites and Heresies: A Note,” *JHS* 104 (1984) 152; P. Ducrey, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* (New York 1986), ch. 2; Connor 1988; G.L. Cawkwell, “Orthodoxy and Hoplitism,” *CQ* n.s. 39 (1989) 375-89. Generally on hoplitism: F.E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1957), ch. 1; J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1970); V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Oxford 1990); *id.* (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London/New York 1991).

179 Law of Dreros: Meiggs/Lewis 1969, no.2; Fornara 1983, no.11; cf. V. Ehrenberg, “An Early Source of Polis-Constitution,” *CQ* 37 (1943) 14-18, repr. in *id.* 1965. 98-104 and (in German) Gschnitzer (ed.) 1969. 26-35. More evidence will be found in the collection and analysis of all known archaic laws by Hölkeskamp, *Schiedsrichter* (n.136). Archilochos mentions *polis*, *politai*, *astoi* several times (7D = 13W.2; p.10D [*POxy* 2310, fr.1] = 23W.17; 36D = 49W.7; 52D = 109W.1; 64D = 133W.1; 88D = 172W.4; 109D = 170W) but gives no clue as to the nature and level of integration of these communities. For the following, see generally Starr 1986, chs. 4 and 5.

180 *SIG* no. 4 (3rd ed.); see Ehrenberg 1937. 152 = 1965. 89.

181 Snodgrass 1980. 41f., 1986. 13f.; Murray 1983. 118f. The demand for *isomoiria* (equal shares of land: Sol. 23D. 21 = 34W. 9; cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12. 3) may have been influenced by colonial experiences. See also Arist. *Pol.* 1265b 12-16.

182 Starr 1986. 39.

183 Raaflaub 1985. 82-92, esp. 90.

184 See now Snodgrass 1986a on “peer polity interaction”, and the comments (with bibl.) by Hölkeskamp, *MHR* 5 (1990) 76.

185 Ruschenbusch 1983. 317-23, however, warns of generalizations and considers the number of such lawgivers very small. See also the works by Hölkeskamp (cited in n.136).

186 See Vernant 1962; Meier 1980, part A = 1990, part I; Raaflaub 1988, esp. 255-61; “Beginning” (n.66) 18-22.

187 Ehrenberg 1937. 157 = 1965. 94; Donlan 1989. 22-26.

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Die *Polis* als Staat

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I

Das sehr lakonische Thema könnte dazu verführen, die Leser, die Zuhörer und den Autor damit zu langweilen, umständliche, scholastische und skrupulöse Ausführungen dazu zu machen, was Staat sei; mir als einem (ehemaligen) Juristen könnte das besonders nahe liegen, und vielleicht hat Mogens Hansen auch an diese meine Eigenschaft gedacht, als er mich für dieses Thema einteilte. Gleichwohl genügt es nicht, das Wort "Staat" eher umgangssprachlich für jedes beliebige über das Private hinausgehende öffentliche Gebilde mit umfassendem Vertretungsanspruch zu verwenden und dann mit der Beschreibung zu beginnen. Immerhin hat es ja in der Allgemeinen Staatslehre, in der Staatsrechtslehre und in der Geschichtswissenschaft bedeutende Untersuchungen gegeben, die sich zunächst auf allgemeingültige, dann aber auch auf historisch spezifische Ausprägungen des Staates bezogen. Hinsichtlich der griechischen *polis* fehlt eine solche Diskussion,¹ und daher ist es vielleicht nützlich, im folgenden einmal im Anschluß an die in den Nachbarwissenschaften entwickelten Gedanken etwas zum Verständnis der *polis*, aber auch zur Spezifikation des Staates und des Staatsbegriffs beizutragen. Ganz wenig wird es sein, aber das versteht sich ja in diesem Rahmen von selbst.

Klassisch ist der – rechtliche – Staatsbegriff Georg Jellineks in seiner Allgemeinen Staatslehre,² wonach ein Staat drei Kriterien zu erfüllen habe: Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk und Staatsgewalt. Dieser Begriff, obwohl ersichtlich das Produkt der übersichtlichen Verhältnisse des 19. Jahrhunderts, hat eine erstaunliche Konstanz bewiesen und liegt immer noch den maßgeblichen Darstellungen zugrunde.³ Seine praktische Bedeutung scheint im Völkerrecht zu liegen, wo er bei der Frage der Anerkennung von Staaten ein wesentliches Kriterium bildet.⁴ Wenn man nun hinsichtlich der griechischen *polis* "der Versuchung" nachgibt, seine "Aufgabe mit der richterlichen Technik gesetzesstaatlicher Subsumtion durchzuführen",⁵ dann ist alles ganz einfach: Natürlich hatte die *polis* ein Staatsgebiet,⁶ es gab wahrlich ein Staatsvolk, und sie übte auch Staatsgewalt aus, erhebliche sogar. Danach war sie ein Staat – auch Jellinek hat ein

Kapitel über den “Hellenischen Staat”⁷ – und man könnte sie, scherzhaft gesprochen, völkerrechtlich anerkennen.

Leider sind die Dinge nicht (mehr) so einfach. Abgesehen davon, daß schon Jellinek selber den Staat nicht nur als rechtlichen Begriff faßte, hat es hinsichtlich des modernen und des mittelalterlichen Staates erhebliche Veränderungen gegeben. Zunächst ist der Moderne Staat (mit einem großen M) von der Allgemeinen Staatslehre scharf als ein Typus sui generis erkannt worden, der eben auch Jellineks Vorstellung bestimmt habe.⁸ Die Folge ist: Jellineks “Staatsbegriff versagt in jedem Falle und muß versagen, weil es unmöglich ist, mit Eigenschaften des ‘modernen’ Staates auch das mittelalterliche Reich, das Imperium Romanum, die attische Polis und die Herrschafts- und Machtkomplexe des alten Orients in ihren entscheidenden Merkmalen insgesamt rechtlich zu treffen”.⁹ Das spezifische Merkmal, das den Modernen Staat ausmacht, ist die Souveränität – ein Begriff und ein Sachverhalt, den wir nun in der Antike vergebens suchen werden, der sich vor allem in nur oberflächlicher Weise mit *eleutheria* und *autonomia* vergleichen läßt.¹⁰

Die Souveränität wurde von Jean Bodin Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts erstmals und folgenreich begrifflich etabliert, in Absetzung zum mittelalterlichen Staat, und auch dieser selbst bekam in seiner Analyse durch die moderne Forschung ein anderes Gesicht als er es noch im 19. Jahrhundert gehabt hatte. Otto Brunners “Land und Herrschaft” von 1939 beschrieb die Aufgabe so: “Es muß der Versuch einer Darstellung des inneren Baues der politischen Verbände des Mittelalters gemacht werden, die mehr ist als ein System des positiven Staatsrechts und die dabei doch nicht auf die Darstellung der Rechtsnatur dieser Verbände verzichtet, die sich nicht darauf beschränkt, als Verfassung nur jene Rechtsinstitute anzuerkennen, die heute ihren Platz im Staatsrecht haben ... Es geht um eine Darstellung des Baues dieser Verbände, die sich bewußt ist, daß wesentliche Begriffsmerkmale des neuzeitlichen Staates den mittelalterlichen Verbänden fehlen, und die sich darum doch nicht als ‘privat’ oder als ‘Gesellschaft’ betrachtet.”¹¹

Gilt dieses Verdikt auch für die griechische *polis*? “Fehlen” ihr “wesentliche Begriffsmerkmale des neuzeitlichen Staates” und kann man auch bei ihrer Subsumtion unter den Jellinekschen Staatsbegriff davon sprechen, daß es “nicht Subsumierbares” gibt, das dann “ungedeutet” bleibt,¹² oder könnte man, umgekehrt, sagen, daß vielleicht nicht gerade etwas fehlt, sondern daß sie Spezifika aufweist, die zu den gängigen Kriterien hinzukämen? Ins Auge fällt, daß die Griechen der *polis* sich selbst und ihre *polis* in ganz ungewöhnlichem Maße als Personenverband

gesehen haben. Das ging nicht so weit, daß wir mit Franz Hampl sogar "poleis ohne Territorium"¹³ anzunehmen hätten, aber es fällt doch auf, daß sie den politischen Verband, den sie bildeten, nicht territorial, sondern personal benannten: die Athener, die Korinther usw. Dem entspricht der aristotelische Satz, daß die *polis* eine *koinonia ton politon* sei, der ja wohl nicht ohne Grund unserem Kolloquium zugrundeliegt. Wir wollen uns daher in den folgenden Betrachtungen auf diesen Aspekt konzentrieren und danach fragen, wie es mit dieser Gemeinschaft der Politen bestellt ist, um dann am Schluß noch einmal zum Staatsbegriff zurückzukehren.

Es fragt sich also, welche Art von Organisation diese Gemeinschaft möglich gemacht hat – freilich nicht institutionell-aufzählend, sondern nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der praktischen Verwirklichung der Gemeinschaft der Staatsbürger.¹⁴ Dabei werde ich sehr schnell auf die athenische Demokratie zusteuern, nicht nur aus Reverenz unserem Gastgeber gegenüber, sondern einfach deshalb, weil wir von ihr am meisten wissen. Freilich könnte wegen der untypischen Größe des athenischen Staates, das heißt wegen der untypisch großen Anzahl seiner Staatsbürger das ganze Bild untypisch werden und nicht verallgemeinert werden können; jedoch dürfte es so sein, daß in Athen die Charakteristika, die für die *polis* allgemein gelten, nur besonders intensiv ausgestaltet wurden. Es kommt mir nämlich darauf an, die Prinzipien aufzuzeigen, nach denen die Organisation der Staatsbürger in einer *polis* funktionierte, und dafür ist eine besonders komplexe Organisation besonders geeignet.¹⁵

Das kann natürlich nicht bedeuten, daß für eine Gesamtbetrachtung die Verhältnisse vor der Demokratie und diejenigen außerhalb Athens vernachlässigt werden könnten. Ihre ausführliche Betrachtung würde jedoch weit über den hier zur Verfügung stehenden Platz hinausgehen, und zudem kann es deshalb hier mit kurzen Verweisen sein Bewenden haben, weil vieles in anderen Beiträgen dieses Bandes abgehandelt ist und weil vor kurzem das zusammenfassende Werk "Public Organization in Ancient Greece" von N.F. Jones erschienen ist, das (fast) alle institutionellen Einrichtungen bequem dokumentiert.¹⁶ Es bestätigt sich der Eindruck, daß auch außerhalb Athens die Organisation der *polis* als Personenverband stark ausgeprägt war und zu den im konventionellen Sinne politischen Institutionen hinzugerechnet werden muß.¹⁷

Hinsichtlich Athens werde ich nun im folgenden die Staatsorganisation selber darstellen, wobei ich mit den Demen, den Phratrien und anderem weitere Bereiche der Staatsorganisation über die unmittelbare zentrale Politikebene hinaus einbeziehe. Zweitens werde ich mir Gedan-

ken darüber machen, welche Verfahren es ermöglicht haben oder ermöglichen sollten, bei dieser Größe und Komplexität doch eine *koinonia ton politon* zu erreichen; auch hier will ich über den unmittelbar politischen Bereich hinausgehen. Drittens werden die Prinzipien benannt werden, die sich aus all dem ergeben und die die athenische *polis* charakterisieren. Möglicherweise wird dadurch schließlich ein Ansatz dafür geliefert, den *polis*-Staat als eigenen Typ gegenüber dem Modernen und dem mittelalterlichen Staat vorläufig plausibel zu machen.

II.

Zuvor freilich ein Wort über Vorkehrungen, die nicht im üblichen Sinne staatlich organisatorischer Art sind, die aber doch in den Zusammenhang der Mittel gehören, mit denen eine Gemeinschaft der Staatsbürger erreicht wird. Das ist als erstes der gesamte Bereich des Militärischen insofern, als Krieg und Vorbereitung auf Krieg in einem Bürgerheer doch wohl die intensivste Form gemeinschaftlichen Handelns darstellt. Jedoch kann das aus Raumgründen hier nur erwähnt werden, ebenso wie der religiöse Bereich, der, Frieden und Krieg und das gesamte Leben von Tag zu Tag umfassend, noch wichtiger ist. Kulte und Feste haben natürlich eine in das undurchdringliche Dunkel der Vorzeit zurückreichende Ahnenreihe, aber die Tatsache, daß die athenischen Phylenheroen und ihre Kulte im Zuge der von Kleisthenes ausgetüftelten Phylenreform installiert worden sind zeigt überdeutlich, wie auch auf diesem Gebiet bewußt vorgegangen wurde.¹⁸ Hinzu kommt die herausragende Bedeutung Athenas als Göttin der Demokratie,¹⁹ ja sogar die vergöttlichte Demokratie selbst.²⁰ Schließlich ist das Theater – nicht nur in Athen, sondern auch in den Demeen – ein mächtiges Mittel der Herbeiführung inneren Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühls gewesen.²¹

Nun zum eigentlich Organisatorischen. Für die Demokratie selbst hat Aristoteles im 6. Buch der Politik einige Prinzipien formuliert, in dem er aus den beiden Grundsätzen der Freiheit und Gleichheit eine ganze Anzahl institutioneller Folgerungen ableitet: Für die Besetzung der Ämter gilt aktives und passives Wahlrecht für alle, wobei das passive nach Zensusgesichtspunkten nur leicht eingeschränkt werden darf; im übrigen ist ohnehin das Losverfahren am demokratischsten und soll nur da durch Wahl ersetzt werden, wo besondere Fähigkeiten erforderlich sind. Ein Amt soll möglichst nur einmal im Leben innegehabt werden (außer den militärischen Ämtern, die Sachkunde erfordern), und die Amtsdauer

muß kurz gehalten werden. Richter müssen alle sein und über alles richten dürfen. Die Volksversammlung muß über alles entscheiden dürfen, die Ämter über nichts. Für die politische Betätigung in den Organen der Demokratie hat es Diäten zu geben.

Diese aristotelischen Grundsätze und Regelungen sind uneinheitlichen Charakters. Derjenige Teil von ihnen, der interne Gleichheit garantieren soll, ist nicht spezifisch demokratisch, sondern er ist überall da anzutreffen, wo überhaupt Machtzusammenballungen verhindert werden sollen und bezieht sich daher auf alle anderen *poleis*. So sind die Prinzipien der Kürze der Amtsdauer und des Verbots der Iteration natürlich auch in aristokratischen oder oligarchischen Verfassungen wie in Rom anzutreffen, und ebenso ist das Prinzip, daß jeder zu allem berechtigt ist, auf beliebig große und eben auch kleine Gruppen anzuwenden und angewendet worden. Selbst das erdemokratische Losverfahren muß nicht notwendigerweise auf die Demokratie beschränkt sein, sondern garantiert ebenfalls nur in Gruppen beliebigen Ausmaßes das Prinzip der absoluten Gleichheit. Ja selbst die Regelung, daß die Volksversammlung das Entscheidungsmonopol hat, läßt sich auch in nichtdemokratischen Verhältnissen denken, wo es sich um kleinere Gruppen handelt, deren Mitglieder der Verselbständigung ihrer Organe entgegenwirken wollen und daher auf ihrer eigenen alleinigen Entscheidungsgewalt bestehen. Genuin demokratisch, nämlich die organisierte politische Herrschaft der großen Masse aller Vollbürger betreffend, ist danach nur die Übertragung dieser auf interne Gleichheit in Oligarchien sehenden Grundsätze auf das gesamte Volk und die Sicherstellung der Beteiligung aller durch die Diätanzahlung. Das ist nun gewiß nichts Marginales, es verlohnt aber doch die Mühe, nach Organisations- und Verfahrensprinzipien Ausschau zu halten, die, teilweise auf anderer Ebene, außerdem noch festgestellt werden können.

III.

Im folgenden soll versucht werden, für die organisatorischen Verkehren Charakteristika und Prinzipien über das eben Vorgetragene hinaus zu entwickeln. Wir beginnen mit der personalen und politischen Gliederung der athenischen Bürgerschaft und sehen sofort, daß sie eine erhebliche Komplexität zeigt, die scharfes Kalkulieren und Durchrechnen erforderte. Sie sei zunächst selber kurz dargestellt. Fangen wir von unten, mit Elementarem an. Jeder Athener²² gehörte einer Phratrie an,

also einem Personenverband auf lokaler Ebene.²³ Die Hauptaufgabe der Phratrien in klassischer Zeit war es, die Kinder der Phratores aufzunehmen und damit ihre Eigenschaft als athenische Bürger festzustellen oder zu begründen. Jede Phratrie war in einer noch nicht endgültig geklärten Weise in sich unterteilt. Zusammengesetzt war sie aus Gene und Homogalaktēs auf der einen und den einzelnen privaten Kultvereinen der Orgeonen auf der anderen Seite; aufteilen tat sie sich in *thiasoi* zu Kultzwecken. Jede Phratrie hatte einen eigenen Kult mit eigenen Priestern, sowie einen oder mehrere Phratriarchen als Vorsteher der Phratrie, die auf ein Jahr gewählt waren. Es gab eine Phratrierversammlung, die Agora, in der geheim abgestimmt wurde und die ihre eigenen Regeln aufstellte, *nomoi*.²⁴ Aus unserer Hauptquelle, der Demotioniden-Inschrift, entnehmen wir allein drei verschiedene Beschlüsse zur Frage der Aufnahme in die Phratrie. Es muß also eine erhebliche Menge solcher Beschlüsse für ganz Attika gegeben haben, und auch wenn wir vielleicht annehmen können, daß in ihnen eine gewisse Einheitlichkeit geherrscht haben könnte, so sollte man da angesichts des Befundes für diese einzige Phratrie vorsichtig sein. Wir dürfen oder müssen aber sogar die Phratrie in unsere Uebersicht aufnehmen, weil es für die Bürgereigenschaft eines jeden konstitutiv war, einer Phratrie anzugehören und weil insofern die Phratrie trotz des offenbaren Fehlens der territorialen Dimension staatliche Aufgaben erfüllte.

Ihr Korrelat auf der untersten lokalen Ebene war der *demos*.²⁵ Das Staatsgebiet Attikas war in 140²⁶ Demen aufgeteilt, die vielfältige Aufgaben hatten. Die wichtigste stand wieder im Zusammenhang mit dem Bürgerrecht, denn in den Demen wurde für jeden einzelnen mit der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres darüber entschieden, ob er in die am Ort geführte Bürgerliste aufgenommen und damit vollberechtigter und – verpflichtet Staatsbürger wurde,²⁷ wenngleich das genaue Verhältnis zwischen Phratrie und *demos* nicht geklärt ist.²⁸ Im übrigen waren ihre Aufgaben zahlreich, besonders wichtig war die Bestimmung der Abgeordneten in den Rat der 500, dann rechtliche Funktionen sowie die Verwaltung des Demenvermögens, das, wenn aus Grundbesitz bestehend, verpachtet wurde;²⁹ größere Demen hatten eigene Theater, für vierzehn Demen bezeugt.³⁰ Entsprechend ausdifferenziert waren ihre Institutionen. Neben den Priestern für die eigenen Demenkulte gab es den für jeweils ein Jahr gewählten Demarchen sowie weitere Beamte unterschiedlichen Typus, besonders natürlich Schatzmeister.³¹ Nach dem Muster der zentralen *ekklesia* arbeitete die Demenversammlung, ebenfalls Agora genannt, von denen die meisten wohl in der Stadt Athen tagten,

deren Häufigkeit des Zusammentretens und deren Verfahren außer der Tatsache, daß auch hier geheim abgestimmt wurde, nicht gut belegt ist.³² Immerhin gibt es eine nicht geringe Anzahl inschriftlicher Zeugnisse, darunter zahlreiche Versammlungsdekrete.³³

Sehr viel weniger Inschriften, ganze zwei,³⁴ besitzen wir dagegen von der inneren Organisation der Trittyen, der nächsthöheren Einheit. Wir müssen daher wohl annehmen, daß sie kein intensives Innenleben hatten, sondern eher rechnerische Einheiten waren. Daß sie, in die mehrere Demen so zusammengefaßt waren, daß das gesamte Staatsgebiet in 30 Trittyen aufgeteilt war, auch territoriale Einheiten waren, ist den *Trittys-Horoi* zu entnehmen, die jedoch vor allem Funktionen für die militärische Organisation gehabt zu haben scheinen.³⁵ Wichtig waren die Trittyen dann eher darin, daß sie jeweils ein Drittel – 17, 17 und 16 Personen – der 50 Abgeordneten einer jeden Phyle stellten.³⁶

Damit sind wir bei den politisch gewichtigen zehn Phylen. Dadurch, daß ihre jeweils 50 Abgeordneten im Rat als Prytanen³⁷ die Geschäfte für ein Zehntel des Jahres führten, waren sie ein zentrales Organ der gesamten *polis*; und dadurch, daß das Heer nach den zehn Phylen gegliedert war, waren sie die entscheidende organisatorische Einheit der Landesverteidigung. Für die Frage, inwieweit der einzelne athenische Staatsbürger über die Organisationseinheit der Phyle in das gesamte Staatsleben integriert war, ist aber ebenfalls die innere Organisation der jeweiligen Phyle selber von großer Bedeutung. Auch sie hatten, wie allgemein bekannt, in Gestalt der Phylenheroen ihre eigenen Kulte; auch sie hatten ihre eigenen jährlich bestellten Beamten (drei *Epimeletai* pro Phyle je einer pro *trittys*], Schatzmeister, Schreiber, *Syndikoi*) sowie zahlreiche Beamte für besondere Aufgaben, und sie hatten ihre eigenen Versammlungen, wieder Agorai, wohl in der Nähe der Akropolis.³⁸ Hinreichend viele Inschriften mit Versammlungsbeschlüssen sind erhalten, und aus ihnen sowie aus literarischen Erwähnungen können wir entnehmen, daß auch die Phylen eigenes zu verwaltendes Vermögen hatten und daß sie rechtsprechende Funktionen ausübten.³⁹

Wenn wir jetzt zu den zentralen Institutionen kommen, stehen wir vor der umgekehrten Schwierigkeit wie bisher: Während bisher die Aufgabe war, aus verhältnismäßig schmaler Ueberlieferung zusammenhängende Vorstellungen zu entwickeln, stellt jetzt die Fülle der Quellen und der Institutionen dergestalt ein Hindernis dar, daß jede Reduzierung die Komplexität des Sachverhalts verdunkeln und banalisieren müßte. Ich trete daher die Flucht nach vorne an und beschränke mich überhaupt nur auf Stichworte – in dem festen Glauben an die Paradoxie, daß

radikalste Vereinfachung noch am ehesten wieder den Eindruck des Komplexen hervorrufen kann:⁴⁰ Zentrum aller Politik die Volksversammlung, bestehend aus den männlichen Staatsbürgern über 18 Jahren, 40 mal im Jahr mit normalerweise über 6000 Teilnehmern zusammentretend, mit Ausnahme von Gesetzen über alles Beschlüsse fassend, in sich ungegliedert; Rat der 500, die Tagesordnung kanalisierendes und vorbereitendes, aber niemals die Volksversammlung beschränkendes Organ, mit zahlreichen ad-hoc-Aufgaben betraut, in zehn Prytanien aus je 50 Abgeordneten -alle über 30 Jahre alt- pro Phyle gegliedert, von denen je eine ein Zehntel des Jahres in Permanenz die Geschäfte führt, die anderen neun den Vorsitz in der Volksversammlung ausüben; 700 (Ehren-) Beamte, meistens mit einjähriger Amtszeit, teils gewählt, teils erlost, dazu zahlreiche spezielle Ausschüsse; ein Reservoir aus 6000 Geschworenen über 30 Jahren, aus denen bei Bedarf auf Initiative der Volksversammlung das Gremium der Nomotheten zusammengestellt wird, das als einziges Gesetze beschließen darf; Volksgerichte in der Größe von 201 bis 1501 Richtern, die für jeden einzelnen Prozeß aus dem Reservoir der 6000 Geschworenen durch Los zusammengesetzt werden. Weiter gab es Institutionen für besondere Bevölkerungsgruppen beziehungsweise für besondere Sachverhalte: Auf den Wehrdienst wurde durch die zweijährige Ephebie von 18 bis 20 Jahren vorbereitet, danach war man Teil des nach Phylen gegliederten und aus Infanterie, Kavallerie und Marine bestehenden Bürgerheeres mit gewählten Kommandeuren; die männliche Bevölkerung war weiter nach Vermögensklassen eingeteilt, die weniger für die Besetzung staatlicher Ämter als vielmehr durch teilweise Einteilung der Betroffenen in Symmorien für die Heranziehung zu finanziellen Sonderleistungen, Liturgien, dienen, so für die Abgabe der *eisphora*, für die Ausrüstung eines Kriegsschiffes (Trierarchie) oder einer kultischen Theateraufführung (Choregie); schließlich gab es eine große Zahl religiöser Kulte und staatlich organisierter religiöser Feste, kein Berufspriestertum, sondern öffentlich eingesetzte Priester und Priesterinnen (freilich in manchen Familien erblich) sowie staatliche Kultbeamte.

Wir ziehen eine vorläufige Bilanz. Das erste Charakteristikum der staatlichen Organisation der (demokratischen) *polis* ist das detaillierte Teilen und Einteilen der Bevölkerung. Abgesehen vom timokratischen Einteilen in Vermögensklassen haben wir die gentilizische Einteilung in Phratrien, dann die territorial-personal gemischte in Demen, Trittyen und Phylen; nach dem Altersprinzip die Einteilung in Volljährige, Epheben und über Dreißigjährige; die immer stärkere Ausdifferenzierung der

Ämter und Gremien auf der zentralen Ebene, also die Schaffung neuer Ämter und Kommissionen (die Nomotheten als wichtigstes Beispiel); es gab im Ämterwesen Einteilungen nach Zehnern wegen der Phylen, außerdem nach Dreißigern.⁴¹ Sichtbare Zeichen dafür waren die zahlreichen Abzeichen und Marken,⁴² am sinnfälligsten vielleicht die Richtertäfelchen mit ihrer Eintragung nicht nur von Namen und Vatersnamen, sondern auch des *demos* sowie – eine Feindifferenzierung, auf die wir noch kommen werden – eines der Buchstaben von A bis K, und das nicht wegen der Zehnzahl der Phylen.⁴³

Diese Aufteilungen geschahen ganz funktional. Einerseits waren die meisten Gruppierungen und Untergruppierungen Bestandteile einer übersichtlichen Hierarchie, andererseits waren sie ineinander verzahnt.⁴⁴ Phratrien und Demen hatten ihre konstitutive Rolle bei der Begründung des Bürgerrechts, die Trittyen im Heerwesen und in der Zusammensetzung der einzelnen Phylen, die Phylen wechselten sich über das Prytaniesystem in der Leitung des Staates ab; durch die sich über das ganze Land erstreckende Herkunft der einzelnen Mitglieder der Phylen wurden diese zu zwar stabilen Einheiten, die aber wegen der unterschiedlichen Herkunft ihrer Angehörigen und ihrer relativen Kleinheit bei allem Identitätsgefühl nicht zu Staaten im Staate werden konnten.

All das hatte nur zum geringeren Teil etwas mit historisch Gewachsenem zu tun, sondern war größtenteils das Ergebnis eines Kalkulierens und Rechnens, wie man es sich nicht nüchtern und kühl genug vorstellen kann. Einen subjektiven Zweck erschließen zu wollen ist problematisch, wie sich an den endlosen Debatten um die kleisthenische Phylenreform zeigt; objektiv jedoch ist als Ergebnis nach wie vor das nicht falsch, was Aristoteles Mischung⁴⁵ genannt hat, und was wir darüber hinaus provisorisch mit Stichworten wie Nivellierung, Uebersichtlichkeit, Verzahnung und Integration belegen wollen.

IV.

Dieses zwar komplexe, aber gleichwohl immer noch statische Bild wird mit Dynamik erfüllt, wenn wir uns als zweite Dimension der Betrachtungsweise nach der der Gliederung und Einteilung die *Verfahren* ansehen, in denen die politischen Vorgänge abliefen. Denn eines ist doch wohl klar: Dieses komplexe Geflecht von Organisationsprinzipien konnte nur funktionieren, wenn es durchschaubar war. Daher fragen wir, ob es Verfahren gab, die der Uebersichtlichkeit oder Handhabbarkeit dienten.

Das dürfte, auf eher technischer Ebene, für die Schriftlichkeit der Tagesordnung und der Antragstellung in der Volksversammlung oder für die Anklage bei bestimmten Strafverfahren zutreffen, für bestimmte obligatorische Agenda in der Volksversammlung, für die Institution des *probuleuma* oder auch für die fixe Regel, daß genau 40mal im Jahr eine Volksversammlung stattfinden mußte. Auch inhaltliche Bedeutung haben zunächst zwar alle die Bestimmungen, die auf die Verhinderung von Machtzusammenballungen gerichtet waren, doch trug sie, in feste Regeln gefaßt, auch zur Uebersichtlichkeit des öffentlichen Lebens bei. Hierhin gehören die kurze zeitliche Dauer der Ämter, das Rotationsverfahren oder auch M.H. Hansens Entdeckung des Prinzips "Initiative und Entscheidung";⁴⁶ hierhin gehört das Losverfahren in allen seinen Prozeduren, von der Reihenfolge der Phylen und Schreiber angefangen bis hin zur Auslosung der Richter für die konkreten Prozesse;⁴⁷ hierhin gehört auch schließlich die geheime Abstimmung, sei es durch einfaches Umdrehen der Scherbe beim *ostrakismos*,⁴⁸ sei es das raffinierte Verfahren mit den durchbohrten und massiven Stimmsteinen,⁴⁹ und wenn uns heute bestimmte Prozeduren in Finanzdingen zu kompliziert vorkommen – wie etwa die *antidosis*-, so dürfte das an der Schwierigkeit der Rekonstruktion liegen, weniger am Verfahren selbst.

Eines der Hauptprobleme, das durch die Massenhaftigkeit der athenischen Bevölkerung in Verbindung mit der Massenhaftigkeit der Partizipationsmöglichkeiten gegeben war, war das Zeitproblem; und selbst in kleineren und anders verfaßten *poleis* dürfte es ein generelles Bedürfnis gewesen sein, die politische Tätigkeit so zu dimensionieren, daß sie nicht zum Selbstzweck wurde und andere, existentielle Betätigungen nicht ernsthaft beeinträchtigte. Die Fülle der Geschäfte, die Schwerfälligkeit größerer Menschenmengen, der Grundsatz, daß jeder zur Sache sprechen konnte und es auch tat – all das machte es zu einer praktischen Notwendigkeit, daß die politischen Geschäfte mit möglichst großer Zügigkeit und ohne Reibungsverluste abgewickelt werden konnten.

Die Tagesordnung einer Volksversammlung (sie wurde fünf Tage vorher schriftlich durch Aushang bekanntgegeben) konnte sehr umfangreich sein (neun Punkte und mehr). Nun waren alle Tagesordnungspunkte vorher durch den Rat der 500 gegangen, der nach Möglichkeit für die vorliegenden Anträge ausformulierte Beschlußvorlagen ausgearbeitet hatte (konkrete *probuleumata*) oder aber die Sache ohne Beschlußvorlagen zur Debatte stellte (offene *probuleumata*). Bei konkreten *probuleumata* wurde eine Vorabstimmung (*procheirotonia*) mit der Frage veranstaltet, ob überhaupt eine Debatte stattfinden sollte. Wurde auch nur eine Stimme

für eine Debatte abgegeben, fand sie statt; erhob sich keine Hand für eine Debatte, war das *probuleuma* ohne Diskussion einstimmig angenommen, und da viele Tagesordnungspunkte Routineangelegenheiten betrafen, war das sehr oft der Fall.

Die Abstimmungen selbst erfolgten durch Handaufheben (*cheirotonia*), aber die Stimmen wurden nicht ausgezählt, sondern abgeschätzt, und auf diese Weise konnte das Ergebnis sehr schnell festgestellt werden. In einigen Fällen, etwa bei einem erforderlichen Quorum, kam es auf die genaue Anzahl der Stimmen an, und hier mußte mit Stimmsteinen (*psephoi*) abgestimmt werden. Da es sich nun in diesen Fällen immer um die zweite Lesung eines Antrages handelte, der schon in einer vorhergehenden Sitzung debattiert und angenommen worden war, brauchte nur noch, mit ja oder nein, abgestimmt zu werden, und das geschah so, daß die Volksversammlungsteilnehmer beim Betreten der Pnyx ihre Stimmsteine abgaben, die dann während der Sitzung ausgezählt wurden.⁵⁰

All diese Vorkehrungen hatten nicht nur zur Folge, daß allgemein keine überflüssige Zeit verschwendet wurde, sondern sie trugen dazu bei, daß die Dauer einer Volksversammlung auch wirklich kürzer war, als allgemein angenommen wird.⁵¹ Ohne weitere Ueberlegung wird ja davon ausgegangen, daß – auch wegen einer unbefragt vorausgesetzten ungehemmten Debattierlust der Athener – eine Volksversammlung einen ganzen Tag dauerte, und da im Jahr 40 Volksversammlungen stattfanden, liegt der Schluß nahe, daß sich eher wenig Athener oder jedenfalls nur die, die keinen längeren Anmarschweg hatten, einen regelmäßigen Besuch der Volksversammlung leisten konnten. Demgegenüber kann festgestellt werden, daß die überlieferten Volksversammlungsreden kürzer sind als die – sogar durch organisatorische Maßnahmen zeitlich limitierten – Gerichtsreden, vor allem aber, daß eine Volksversammlung in der Regel nicht länger als bis zum Mittag gedauert hat; danach hielt regelmäßig der Rat der 500 noch am selben Tag seine Sitzung ab. Wenn das so war, dann war der Besuch der Volksversammlung sehr viel eher auch für diejenigen zumutbar, die es sich nicht leisten konnten, ganze Tage diskutierend oder zuhörend zu verbringen (nachmittags konnte dann nämlich Geschäften nachgegangen werden), und somit war auch auf diese Weise die Beteiligung vieler an der Demokratie leichter gemacht worden.

Ingeniös und scharf durchdacht war das Verfahren der Richterlösung.⁵² Jeder der 6000 jährlich erlost athenischen Richter hatte ein Richtertäfelchen, auf dem Name, Vatersname, *demos* (Gemeinde) und ein Buchstabe von A bis K verzeichnet waren. Aus dem *demos* ergab sich

seine érerbte Phylenzugehörigkeit, und innerhalb der Phyle gehörte er (ebenfalls durch Los) einer der zu diesem Zweck gebildeten zehn Abteilungen an, die durch die eben genannten ersten zehn Buchstaben des Alphabets gekennzeichnet waren. Für die Auslosung wurden zu Beginn des Gerichtstages zehn Losungsstellen, eine pro Phyle, vor dem Gerichtsgebäude auf der Agora errichtet, je eine unter der Leitung eines der neun Archonten und der des Sekretärs der sechs Thesmotheten. Die Richter, die für den zu bildenden konkreten Spruchkörper ausgelost werden wollten, warfen an ihrer jeweiligen Auslosungsstelle ihr Richtertäfelchen in den jeweils zugehörigen Kasten von zehn aufgestellten Kästen, die mit den Buchstaben A bis K gekennzeichnet waren. Der Archon bestimmte durch das Herausnehmen je eines Täfelchens aus jedem Kasten, die vorher gemischt worden waren, zehn mit der weiteren Prozedur Betraute, die damit gleich ausgelost waren, und diese steckten die Täfelchen in zwei Apparate, die mit je fünf von A bis E und von Z bis K gekennzeichneten senkrechten Reihen von Schlitzten versehen waren. Waren die Täfelchen eingesteckt, warf der Archon eine vorher errechnete Anzahl weißer und schwarzer Marken in eine im Apparat angebrachte Röhre, die eine Vorrichtung hatte, durch die man immer nur eine Marke herausfallen lassen konnte. Die Reihenfolge des Herausfallens der Marken wurde nun auf die waagerechten Reihen von A bis K bezogen: Eine schwarze Marke bedeutete, daß die betreffende Reihe nicht zum Zuge kam, eine weiße, daß die Athener, deren Tafeln in der betreffenden Reihe steckten, zu Richtern für die anstehenden Verfahren bestimmt waren.

Für die Zuteilung zu den einzelnen Spruchkörpern waren weitere Marken mit Buchstaben von A an vorbereitet, die ebenso zufällig gegriffen wurden, und für jeden durch einen solchen mit Buchstaben symbolisierten Spruchkörper gab es Stäbe unterschiedlicher Farbe, die der Richter gegen seine Marke eintauschte: So war auch äußerlich die Zuteilung sichtbar und eine Manipulation war verhindert. Da nun dieses Losverfahren nach Phylen, also aufgrund der Zehnteilung der Bürgerschaft, an zehn Stellen gleichzeitig vonstatten ging, und da die Angehörigen jeder einzelnen Phyle noch einmal in die Abteilungen von A bis K gezehntelt worden waren, war dieses an sich umfängliche Geschäft schnell abgetan.

Ebenso das Gerichtsverfahren selbst. Zunächst einmal wurden die Volksgerichte nur nach einem Vorverfahren tätig, das jedenfalls auch dazu gedacht war, die Möglichkeit zu geben, den jeweiligen Rechtsstreit jetzt schon endgültig zu beenden. Unter der Leitung eines der neun Archonten wurde in diesem Vorverfahren oft durch einen erlost Schiedsrichter zur Sache verhandelt, es wurden Beweise erhoben, Zeu-

gen vernommen usw., und den Parteien wurde nach Abschluß dieses Verfahrens ein Vorschlag zur Beilegung ihres Streites gemacht. Nur wenn eine der Parteien nicht einverstanden war, kam die Sache an das Volksgericht. Vor dem Volksgericht nun fanden nur die – mittels der Wasseruhr zeitlich begrenzten – Parteivorträge statt, in die die Ergebnisse der Beweisaufnahme eingebaut waren. Das Gericht verhandelte nicht, beriet auch nicht, sondern stimmte sofort durch Stimmsteine über die alternativen Anträge der Parteien ab. Dieses Verfahren ist gewiß teilweise aus dem Prinzip der Demokratie selbst zu erklären: Es gab ja keinen Juristenstand, kein wissenschaftlich durchgebildetes Recht, sondern das zu Gericht sitzende Volk sollte ohne Zwischenschaltung anderer Instanzen unmittelbar selbst Recht sprechen. Gleichzeitig bestand aber auch die Notwendigkeit, das Verfahren zeitlich nicht ausufern zu lassen, sondern durch straffe Durchführung jedem in Betracht Kommenden zu ermöglichen, ohne großen Zeitverlust Richter zu sein.

Schließlich sei noch auf ein Verfahren hingewiesen, das die Erfordernisse der Sachgerechtigkeit bei einer hochkomplexen Materie, der Durchsichtigkeit, der Schnelligkeit und der Wahrung der ungehinderten Meinungsäußerung miteinander verband. Es ist das Verfahren, das bei der Auswahl der Theaterstücke und bei ihrer Bewertung angewandt wurde; und obwohl es nicht zum politischen Bereich im engeren Sinne gehört, soll es hier aus schierer Bewunderung und deshalb erwähnt werden, weil ja auch die Theateraufführungen der Herstellung der *koinonia* dienen.⁵³ Bemerkenswert ist bereits, daß entgegen der üblichen Praxis die Auswahl der Stücke bei einem einzigen Mann lag, bei dem *Archon* (*eponymos*). Hier vertraute man in einer so unmeßbaren Angelegenheit dem Judiz eines einzigen Mannes, und die griechische Literaturgeschichte zeigt, daß die Athener gut dabei gefahren sind. Dann wurden vom Rat aus jeder Phyle mehrere Männer bestimmt, auch sie nicht durch Los oder sonstwie aufs Geratewohl, sondern hier hat möglicherweise doch der Gesichtspunkt der Kompetenz eine Rolle gespielt. Die Namen der Ausgesuchten kamen nach den zehn Phylen in zehn dann versiegelte Urnen. Aus ihnen zog der *Archon* vor Beginn der Aufführungen je einen Namen, die Ausgesuchten wurden auf Unparteiischkeit vereidigt und schrieben nach den Vorstellungen die von ihnen prämierten Stücke auf ein Täfelchen. Diese zehn Täfelchen kamen in eine Urne, und aus ihr zog der *Archon* nur fünf, ihr Ergebnis entschied die Reihenfolge der Stücke. Auf diese Weise war also für mehreres gesorgt: Es urteilten Leute, denen man Kompetenz zutraute, und das Urteil war Massenstimmungen entzogen; auf der anderen Seite zeigt das Verfahren, daß man nicht dem Glauben anhing, die Qua-

lität eines Stückes könne objektiv festgestellt werden, sondern man ließ dem persönlichen Ermessen und wohl auch dem Zufall angemessenen Raum; und drittens konnte keiner der Richter wegen des letztlichen Spruches unter Druck gesetzt werden, denn niemand konnte wissen, wessen Stimmen gezählt waren und wessen nicht.

V.

Nach diesen eher technischen Vorkehrungen kehren wir zu allgemeineren Strukturprinzipien zurück und erwähnen als erstes als ein die *koinoniaton politon* ermöglichendes Begriffspaar Offenheit und Einschränkung. Das Lebelement der athenischen *polis* war es, jedem einzelnen Bürger unmittelbare, ja spontane Mitwirkung zu ermöglichen. Bestimmende Zwischeninstanzen waren ausgeschaltet, und obwohl Gleichheitsvorstellungen anscheinend nie auf die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse bezogen wurden, gab es doch jedenfalls hinsichtlich des Lebensstils egalitäre Tendenzen, die etwa in der Komödie oder auch in den neuentdeckten Typenhäusern zu fassen sind.⁵⁴ Hinzu kommt – als gesellschaftlich-politisches Faktum –, daß es weder Klientelbeziehungen wie in der römischen Republik noch auch politische Gruppierungen gegeben hat, die auch nur von ferne an Parteien oder ähnliches erinnerten.

Dem entsprachen die politischen Verfahrensweisen und – im Rahmen des unter ungleichen und ungleich erzogenen Menschen Möglichen – auch die politische Realität. Mit Recht ist *ho bulomenos*, jeder der will, als Protagonist der athenischen Demokratie bezeichnet worden. Jeder, der wollte, hatte das Initiativrecht für Beschlüsse der Volksversammlung, und jeder, der wollte, konnte in der Volksversammlung das Wort ergreifen – der jeweilige Tagesordnungspunkt wurde durch die Frage des Herolds eingeleitet: *Tis agoreuein buletai?* Wer will sprechen? Eine Sitzordnung nach irgendwelchen Stimmkörpern oder Gruppierungen gab es nicht, und die Abstimmungen gingen ohne irgendwelche wesentlichen Vorstrukturierungen oder irgendeinen organisierten Meinungsdruck vor sich, von dem wir wüßten. Jeder, der wollte, stellte sich auch als Kandidat für die Auslosung der Abgeordneten im Rat und die Auslosung der Richter zur Verfügung, ja es wird heute sogar nicht ohne Grund die Meinung vertreten, daß einen, auch ohne daß man eigens kandidierte, das Los treffen konnte – Ratsherr mußte danach also sogar auch jeder werden, der nicht wollte.⁵⁵ Wem dieses Bild im Faktischen zu rosig erscheint, der sei auf die Tatsache verwiesen, daß dieses Idealbild nicht

nur wegen der hohen Teilnehmerzahl, sondern auch deshalb der Wirklichkeit entsprochen haben muß, weil die Gegner der Demokratie gerade das, nämlich die so ausgeübte Herrschaft des *demos*, anprangerten. Wer allerdings meint, ganz ohne Strukturierung könne es doch wohl nicht abgegangen sein, der hat recht.

Die athenische *polis* hatte nämlich eine Fülle von Restriktionen und Beschränkungen erfunden, die den spontan auftretenden Volks- oder Einzelwillen kanalisiert und ihn sich insofern in einem gewissen Ausmaß doch nur mittelbar auswirken ließ; freilich nie so sehr, daß er behindert worden wäre. Die bekannteste Regelung ist das schon erwähnte *probuleuma*, die Vorberatung durch den Rat der 500. Der Zweck war offensichtlich die Verhinderung des überfahrens der Volksversammlung durch unangekündigte Anträge, nicht jedoch eine Entscheidungsmaßnahme durch den Rat. Einmal nämlich stand es jedem frei, Zusatzanträge zum Thema zu machen (und das geschah auch), und zum anderen wissen wir von keinem einzigen Fall, in dem der Rat etwa einen Antrag abgelehnt hätte. Schließlich konnte die Volksversammlung den Rat verpflichten, zu einem bestimmten Thema ein *probuleuma* zu erlassen, das dann in der Volksversammlung zur Debatte und Abstimmung gestellt wurde.

Charakteristisch ist weiter das im 4. Jh. eingeführte Nomotheseverfahren. Möglicherweise aufgrund negativer Erfahrungen mit hastigen Gesetzgebungsbeschlüssen der Volksversammlung entdeckten die Athener nicht nur den ja auch heute grundlegenden Unterschied zwischen Gesetzen und Einzelfallentscheidungen, sondern sie bestimmten, daß der Volksversammlung das Gesetzgebungsrecht entzogen und auf die Nomotheten übertragen wurde. Die Nomotheten rekrutierten sich aus den 6000 jährlich ausgelosten Geschworenen, aus denen von Fall zu Fall eine Anzahl wiederum erlost wurde, die bestimmte Gesetzesvorhaben zu beraten und zu verabschieden hatte. Die Demokratie litt durch dieses Verfahren keinen Schaden. Einmal waren ja die Nomotheten demokratisch erlost, und zum anderen wurden sie durch die Volksversammlung nach deren Gutdünken jeweils ad hoc eingesetzt.

Von weiteren Regelungen, die allzu rasche Volksbeschlüsse verhindern und eine ruhige Beratung garantieren sollten, seien nur noch die Aufhebungsverbote, die Doppelbehandlungen und die Quoren erwähnt. Bei Volksbeschlüssen, die für besonders wichtig erachtet wurden, konnte in den Text eine Bestimmung eingefügt werden, die schon den Antrag auf Aufhebung unter schwere Strafe, oft Todesstrafe, stellte. Freilich war eine Änderung oder Aufhebung doch möglich: Es mußte zunächst das

Aufhebungsverbot aufgehoben werden, und dann konnte man zur Sache beantragen. Damit war zur Aufhebung des Beschlusses bereits implizit eine Doppelbehandlung vorgesehen. Eine weitere Doppelbehandlung – oder: zwei Lesungen – war vorgeschrieben bei der Bürgerrechtsverleihung an einen Ausländer. Hier mußte die Verleihung auf einer Versammlung durch *cheirotonia* angenommen und auf der nächstfolgenden mit Stimmsteinen bei einem Quorum von 6000 Athenern (beim Hineingehen) noch einmal bestätigt worden sein. Ein solches Quorum war dann noch in zwei weiteren Fällen erforderlich. Zum einen dann, wenn die Nomotheten mit der Aufgabe eingesetzt werden sollten, kein abstraktes und allgemeines Gesetz, sondern nur einen eine Einzelperson betreffenden Beschluß zu fassen, und zum anderen dann, wenn gegen eine Entscheidung des Volksgerichts Straffreiheit (*adeia*) gewährt werden sollte.

Schließlich sei noch auf die oben schon erwähnte Entdeckung hinsichtlich der Struktur des politischen Entscheidungsprozesses hingewiesen, die Hansen kürzlich gemacht hat. Während die moderne Gewaltenteilung nach gesetzgebender, ausführender und rechtsprechender Gewalt unterscheidet, scheint es in Athen eine andere Art der Aufspaltung der staatlichen Gewalt gegeben zu haben, nämlich nach Initiative und Entscheidung. Ausgehend von einer Bemerkung des Aristoteles ist nachgewiesen worden, daß die Organe der athenischen Demokratie, die das Initiativrecht hatten, keine Entscheidung treffen konnten, und daß die Organe, die entschieden, kein Initiativrecht hatten: Initiative hatten die Privatpersonen und die Ämter (Wahl- bzw. Losbearnte einschließlich des Rates der 500), sie konnten aber nichts entscheiden; entscheiden taten über die Anträge die Volksversammlung, die Nomotheten und die Gerichte, jedoch konnten sie nichts initiieren. Auch dadurch wurde eine allzu ungestüme Spontaneität gebremst, ohne daß die Unmittelbarkeit litt.

VI.

Unsere Übersicht hat Prinzipien für die athenische Staatsorganisation ergeben, die die bisher seit Aristoteles beschrieben und entdeckten ergänzen; sie sind teilweise sehr abstrakt, teilweise sehr konkret, aber alle erklären sie sich aus der praktischen Notwendigkeit, die Bevölkerung so unter den Gesichtspunkten der Gleichheit und Freiheit zu organisieren, daß jedem, der das wollte, ungeminderte Beteiligung an der politischen Gemeinschaft ermöglicht wurde. Dazu war zuerst eine Gesamtorganisa-

tion nötig, die die Bürgerschaft so einteilte, daß einerseits kleine überschaubare Einheiten Nähe und Geborgenheit garantierten, daß aber andererseits lokale oder sonstige Loyalitäten kein Uebergewicht bekamen, sondern daß die Gesamtheit der Bürger das letzte Wort bekam – relativiert und gebremst wieder durch die kleineren Einheiten. Diese Integration geschah durch die Phratrien und Demen auf der einen und die Zentralinstitutionen auf der anderen Seite; und die entscheidende Vermittlung und Verzahnung geschah über die, sozusagen, Mittelinstanz der Phylen.

Diese Integration und Verzahnung machte es notwendig, scharf zu kalkulieren und zu rechnen, und dieses rationale Kalkül der Staatsorganisation ist ein Charakteristikum, das überall anzutreffen ist. Das Ergebnis solchen Durchrechnens ist oft sehr kompliziert gewesen, und diese Kompliziertheit von Organisationsformen und Verfahrensregelungen hätte, wenn sie wirklich überhand genommen hätte, das Gegenteil von Integration und Mitwirkung erreichen können. Nötig waren ja im Gegenteil Uebersichtlichkeit und Einfachheit, und bei näherem Hinsehen waren sie auch gegeben. Zunächst muß gesagt werden, daß unsere Sichtweise die Kompliziertheit der Sachverhalte stärker erscheinen läßt als sie in Wirklichkeit war. Vor allem schiebt sich unsere oft mühsame Rekonstruierungstätigkeit dazwischen, die an sich einfache Sachverhalte nachträglich schwieriger aussehen läßt; hinzu kommt der ganz anders geartete historische Kontext, der den Zeitgenossen auch in seiner historischen Entwicklung selbstverständlich war. Selbst ein so verzwickt erscheinendes und so mühsam rekonstruiertes Verfahren wie die Richterlosung ist im konkreten Vollzug glasklar, und die komplexe Interaktion von Phratrien, Demen, Trittyen, Phylen und zentralen Institutionen ist schließlich so logisch und einsichtig, daß sie heute bequem in übersichtlichen Schaubildern dargestellt werden kann.

Diese Praktikabilität der *polis*organisation ist nicht nur den sozusagen groß dimensionierten Institutionen zu verdanken, sondern eine entscheidende Konstituante sind rein technische Detailvorkehrungen, von denen ich diejenigen hervorgehoben habe, die der Schnelligkeit der Verfahren dienten und zu denen auch die zu zählen sind, die Unparteilichkeit und Ungehindertheit der freien Entscheidung garantierten. In der Mitte zwischen Groß- und Detailvorkehrungen liegen schließlich die Regelungen, die die Offenheit und Spontaneität der politischen Betätigung durch einschränkende und kanalisierende Bestimmungen ermöglichten.

All das führt schließlich zu einem letzten Prinzipien-Paar, nämlich zu

dem von Bewußtheit und Anonymität. Man kann sich den Grad des hellen Bewußtseins, der klaren Zielgerichtetheit bei den Institutionen der athenischen Verfassung nicht hoch genug vorstellen. Ueberliefert ist eine Zielrichtung bei Kleisthenes – ironischerweise ist unklar, welche es konkret gewesen ist, aber daß hier jemand planmäßig ans Werk gegangen ist, ist selbstverständlich. Ueber dieser Selbstverständlichkeit macht man sich selten klar, was dabei alles getan werden mußte. Man mußte die Bevölkerung ganz Attikas aufnehmen und durchrechnen, also eine Art angewandter Demographie betreiben, um die Buleutenquoten zu bekommen, man mußte die Grenzen zwischen den Demen festlegen und die Detailkombinationen durchkalkulieren, bis hin zur Aufstellung von Grenzsteinen. Dasselbe gilt für die zahllosen Einzelregelungen der athenischen Verfassung, vom globalen Grundsatz “Initiative und Entscheidung” bis hin zum Austüfteln des Verfahrens bei der Bewertung der Theaterstücke oder bei der Richterlösung. Hinter allem steht ein starker, rationaler, konstruktiver Wille.

Und dieser Wille war anonym. An sich scheut man sich nach allen Ideologien, die wir am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts erlebt haben, sich allzusehr in die Nähe eines Kultes anonymer Massenprozesse zu begeben, aber eindrucksvoll ist der Sachverhalt doch. Einige wenige Namen an einigen Stationen der athenischen Verfassungsentwicklung sind natürlich bekannt, aber die große Mehrheit der Institutionen, Verfahren, Detailregelungen, die ja teilweise erst von uns heute erschlossen und nachgewiesen werden mußten, hat keine bekannten Väter – von all den Verfahren angefangen, die die schwierige Balance zwischen Offenheit und Spontaneität einerseits und übersichtlicher, kanalisierter Geregelt-heit andererseits herstellten, bis hin zu den technischen Vorkehrungen, die den praktischen Vollzug des demokratischen Prozesses so zügig und mit so wenig Aufwand wie möglich gestalteten.

Zum Schluß unserer Ueberlegungen über die staatliche Organisation der Athener noch der Hinweis auf den attischen Seebund des 5. Jahrhunderts und die Verfassungsentwürfe von 411. Im Seebund haben die Athener genau das in großem Maßstab wiederholt, was die Griechen seit der archaischen Zeit in den einzelnen *poleis* getan haben: Sie haben, um ihre Herrschaft praktikabel und sicher zu machen, durch die verschiedenen Herrschaftsmittel politische Macht rechnend und kalkulierend kanalisiert; und die oligarchischen Verfassungsentwürfe des Jahres 411 taten nichts anderes, als was die Verfassungen der entstehenden *poleis* ihnen vorgemacht hatten.

VII

“Terminologische Fragen lassen sich allgemeingültig nicht mit Richtig und Falsch beantworten, sondern nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Zweckmäßigkeit.”⁵⁶ Und: “Ein Begriff existiert nicht um seiner selbst willen, sondern er dient der Verständigung und der Orientierung.”⁵⁷ Wenn wir also am Ende unserer Ueberlegungen wieder zum Staatsbegriff zurückkehren, dann wollen wir uns hüten, allzu mechanisch unter wie auch immer geartete Kriterien zu subsumieren oder gar uns einen eigenen Staatsbegriff zurechtzuzimmern;⁵⁸ das soll nicht heißen, daß etwa Formulierungen wie “specialized, permanent, nonkin governmental roles”⁵⁹ oder “a complex, permanently hierarchical social and political organisation with formal offices of government”⁶⁰ nicht durchaus das Richtige trafen. Natürlich ist die *polis* kein “Moderner Staat”, gerade wegen ihres ausgeprägten Charakters als Personenverband, wie wir ihn im Vorstehenden skizziert haben. Aber gerade dessen komplexe, gleichwohl durchsichtige Strukturierung weist in ihrer besonderen Rationalität erstaunlich moderne Züge auf. Daß Rationalität im allgemeinen eines der Charakteristika der *poleis* ist, ist schon bemerkt worden.⁶¹ Ich meine zusätzlich, daß diese Rationalität einen ganz spezifischen Charakter aufweist, nämlich den, rechenhaft, kalkulierend, rein zweckmäßig zu sein, ohne jede Rücksicht auf traditionelle Bindungen.⁶² So wie diejenigen gerechnet haben, die in archaischer Zeit die Phylen und die politischen Institutionen begründet haben, so hat Kleisthenes gerechnet, so haben Anonymi den Attischen Seebund im 5. und die entwickelte Demokratie im 4. durchorganisiert. Die jeweiligen politischen Zwecke waren unterschiedlich, das rationale Kalkül war immer von derselben Art.

Hier breche ich ab. Im Vorstehenden ist der Versuch gemacht worden, die Staatsqualität der *polis*, vorwiegend Athens, nicht dadurch abzuhandeln, daß von einem Staatsbegriff ausgegangen und unter ihn subsumiert wurde. Ich habe es vielmehr umgekehrt gemacht. Ich habe vorausgesetzt, daß wir es bei der antiken *polis* in einem lose definierten Sinne mit einem Staat zu tun haben und bin dann induktiv vorgegangen. Die Vorführung der Strukturprinzipien, mit denen der Personenverband der *koinonia ton politon* verwirklicht wurde, hat vielleicht plausibel machen können, daß wir es bei der griechischen *polis* möglicherweise mit einem spezifischen Staatstyp zu tun haben, der gleichrangig neben dem mittelalterlichen und dem Modernen Staat steht. Dieser Vermutung

müßte natürlich intensiver nachgegangen werden; daß sie überhaupt formuliert werden kann liegt an der unermüdlichen Einzelforschung der letzten Jahrzehnte.

Noten

- 1 Es fehlt nicht an gelegentlichen Tastversuchen – siehe etwa Verf., *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund*, Berlin und New York 1974, 198; ders., *Die Stadt als Tyrann – Athens Herrschaft über seine Bundesgenossen*, Konstanz 1978; W.G. Runciman, 'Origins of States: The Case of Archaic Greece,' *CSSH* 24 (1982) 351-377; M. Dreher, *Sophistik und Polisentwicklung; Die sophistischen Staatstheorien des fünften Jahrhunderts v. Chr. und ihr Bezug auf Entstehung und Wesen des griechischen, vorrangig athenischen Staates*, Frankfurt am Main und Bern 1983; M. Stahl, *Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen Athen. Untersuchungen zur Ueberlieferung, zur Sozialstruktur und zur Entstehung des Staates*, Stuttgart 1987; I. Morris, 'The early Polis as city and state,' in: J. Rich/ A. Wallace-Hadrill (Hrsgg.), *City and country in the ancient world*, London und New York 1991, 25-57; bemerkenswert von einem komparatistischen Ansatz St. Breuer, *Der archaische Staat. Zur Soziologie charismatischer Herrschaft*, Berlin 1990; zu Rom siehe etwa W. Eder (Hrsg.), *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik*, Stuttgart 1990.
- 2 G. Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 3. Auflage, Berlin 1914, 394-434 (ich zitiere nach dem 5. Neudruck von 1929; es gibt zahlreiche weitere Ausgaben).
- 3 Siehe zuletzt R. Zippelius, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Politikwissenschaft), 11. Auflage, München 1991, 47-88; dann etwa J. Isensee, in: J. Isensee und P. Kirchhof (Hrsgg.), *Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band I. *Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung*, Heidelberg 1987, 603f.
- 4 J. Isensee, a.a.O. (vorige Anmerkung); dazu Th. Darsow, *Zum Wandel des Staatsbegriffs. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre und Praxis internationaler Organisationen, der Mikrostaaten und der PLO*, Frankfurt am Main u.a. 1984.
- 5 H. Quaritsch, *Staat und Souveränität*. Band I: *Die Grundlagen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, 29.
- 6 Siehe zuletzt G. Audring, *Zur Struktur des Territoriums griechischer Poleis in archaischer Zeit (nach den schriftlichen Quellen)*, Berlin 1989.
- 7 a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 292-312. Den Höhepunkt der Gleichsetzung des griechischen mit dem modernen Staat stellen die Arbeiten U. Kahrstedts dar: *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen. Studien zum Öffentlichen Recht Athens*, Teil I, Stuttgart Berlin 1934, und: *Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen. Studien zum Öffentlichen Recht Athens*, Teil II, Stuttgart 1936; zu Sachfragen immer noch sehr brauchbar.
- 8 Siehe vor allem H. Quaritsch, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), 22-26; weiter H. Krieger, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart u.a. 1966, 145f; R. Herzog, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Frankfurt a. M., 1971, 85-89; vgl. allgemein auch A. Vincent, *Theories of the State*, Oxford 1987 sowie Th. Tsatsos, *Peri Politeias. Staatstheoretische Studien*, Frankfurt 1972.
- 9 H. Quaritsch, a.a.O. (Anm. 5) 25.
- 10 Ders., a.a.O. (Anm. 5); zur Herkunft des Begriffes ders., *Souveränität. Entstehung und*

Entwicklung des Begriffs in Frankreich und Deutschland vom 13. Jh. bis 1806, Berlin 1986. - Eleutherie und Autonomie sind Begriffe, die erst durch den Verlust des sie ausmachenden Sachverhalts entstanden, während die Souveränität mit dem Modernen Staat selbst entstand. Daher gibt es auch Poleis ohne Eleutherie und Autonomie.

11 *Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, 6. Auflage, Darmstadt 1970, 163.

12 H. Quaritsch, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), S. 29.

13 *Klio* 32 (1939) S. 1-60.

14 Siehe auch D. Lotze, 'Die Teilhabe des Bürgers an Regierung und Rechtsprechung in den Organen der direkten Demokratie des klassischen Athen,' in: E. Kluwe [Hrsg.] *Kultur und Fortschritt in der Blütezeit der griechischen Polis*, Berlin 1985, 52-76 und R.K. Sinclair, *Democracy and participation in Athens*, Cambridge u.a. 1988). Auf Ausführungen über die spezifische Bedeutung von koinonia verzichte ich hier (siehe zuletzt E. Schütrumpf, *Aristoteles, Politik*, Buch I, Berlin 1991, 172f; besonders verweise ich auf M. Riedel, *Metaphysik und Metapolitik. Studien zu Aristoteles und zur politischen Sprache der neuzeitlichen Philosophie*, Frankfurt am Main 1975, 31), verweise aber vorsichtshalber doch darauf, daß das deutsche "Gemeinschaft" in der Soziologie eine spezifische Bedeutung hat, die hier nicht gemeint sein muß: K. v. Klemperer, 'Zur Ehrenrettung des Gemeinschaftsbegriffs,' in: *Weltbürgerkrieg der Ideologien* (Festschrift für E. Nolte, hrsg. Th. Nipperdey u.a.), Berlin 1993, 87-98. Im Gegenteil könnte vielleicht das einigermaßen konkrete Vorführen der Mittel, durch welche die koinonia im praktischen Vollzug verwirklicht wird, etwas für den Begriff selbst ausgeben. - Zum von der Fragestellung her interessanten und nötigen Buch von L.B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, Oxford 1986, siehe die kritische Rezension von P. Cartledge, *Hermathena* 142 (1987) 60-64; und mit der Teilhabe im Sinne eines im Gegenteil höchst unruhigen, nämlich eines herausgehobenen Politikerdaseins befassen sich P.J. Rhodes, 'Political Activity in Classical Athens,' *JHS* 106 (1986) 132-144 und J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens. Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*, Princeton 1989. - Ein Vorläufer meiner Bemerkungen ist der Artikel 'Neue Prinzipien der athenischen Demokratie,' *Der Staat* 26 (1987) 527-538, und die Fragestellung ist ähnlich wie in 'Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund', (oben Anm. 1), wo ich nach Athens Herrschaftsmitteln frage, während ich hier den Mitteln nachgehe, die die koinonia ermöglichen.

15 Daß das spezifisch Demokratische nicht das Primäre einer Polisstruktur sein muß, zeigt R. Sealey, *The Athenian Republic. Democracy or Rule of Law?*, University Park und London 1987, besonders Kapitel 5.

16 N.F. Jones, *Public Organization in Ancient Greece. A Documentary Study*, Philadelphia 1987.

17 Siehe zusätzlich und insbesondere für wichtige außerathenische Details: Ph. Gauthier, 'Quorum et participation civique dans les démocraties grecques,' in: C. Nicolet (Hrsg.), *Du pouvoir dans l'antiquité: mots et réalités*, Genève 1990, 73-99; ders., 'L'inscription d'Iasos relative à l'ekklesiastikon (I. Iasos 20),' *BCH* 114 (1990) 417-443; M. Piérart, 'Phratries et "kômai" d'Argos,' *BCH* 107 (1983) 269-275; ders., 'Athènes et Milet. I. Tribus et demes milésiens,' *MH* 40 (1983) 1-18; ders., 'Athènes et Milet. II. L'Organisation du territoire,' *MH* 42 (1985) 276-299; ders., 'Modèles de repartition des citoyens dans les cités ioniennes,' *REA* 87 (1985) 169-188; F. Ruzé, 'Les tribus et la décision politique dans les cités grecques archaïques et classiques,' *Ktêma* 8 (1983) 299-306; G.R. Stanton, 'The Territorial Tribes of Korinth and Phleious,' *CA* 5 (1986) 139-153.

18 U. Kron, *Die zehn attischen Phylenheroen. Geschichte, Mythos, Kult und Darstellungen*, Berlin 1976; E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica*, London 1989.

- 19 I. Kasper – Butz, *Die Göttin Athena im klassischen Athen. Athena als Repräsentantin des demokratischen Staates*, Frankfurt am Main u.a., 1990.
- 20 O. Palagia, 'A Colossal Statue of a Personification from the Agora of Athens,' *Hesperia* 51 (1982) 99-113.
- 21 F. Kolb, 'Polis und Theater,' in: G.A. Seeck (Hrsg.), *Das griechische Drama*, Darmstadt 1979, 504-545; W. Rösler, *Polis und Tragödie, Funktionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen zu einer antiken Literaturgattung*, Konstanz 1980; Ch. Meier, *Die politische Kunst der griechischen Tragödie*, München 1988.
- 22 Auch Athenerinnen? Trotz einer möglichen "Assoziierung" (M. Golden, 'Donatus' and Athenian phratries,' *CQ* 35 [1985] 9-13) doch wohl nicht.
- 23 Die Phratrien werden üblicherweise in Gesamtdarstellungen der Demokratie stiefmütterlich behandelt, wohl weil man sich eher auf die staatlichen Institutionen im engeren Sinne beschränken möchte (so wohl auch zu erklären, daß sie Jones [oben Anm. 16] ganz wegläßt); zu ihnen jetzt im Detail Ch. W. Hedrick, Jr., 'Old and New on the Attic Phratry of the Therrikleidai,' *Hesperia* 52 (1983) 299-392; ders., 'A Honorific Phratry Inscription,' *AJP* 109 (1988) 111-117; vor allem ders., *The Decrees of the Demotionidai*, Atlanta 1990; zu ihrer Anzahl und der Zahl der Mitglieder M.A. Flower, *IG II² 2344 and the size of phratries in classical Athens*, *CQ* 35 (1985) 232-235; zum Ganzen siehe auch R. Osborne, 'The Demos and its Divisions in Classical Athens,' in: O. Murray und S. Price (Hrsgg.), *The Greek City. From Homer to Alexander*, Oxford 1990, 265-293.
- 24 Letzter Stand bei Hedrick 1990 (vorige Anmerkung); siehe aber noch dazu D. Roussel, *Tribu et cité. Études sur les groupes sociaux dans les cités grecques aux époques archaïque et classique*, Paris 1976, 139-151 sowie F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du génos. Étude d'histoire sociale athénienne – périodes archaïque et classique*, Lille/Paris 1976, 595-710.
- 25 Jetzt umfassend D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica. A Political and Social Study*, Princeton 1986.
- 26 J.S. Traill, *Demos and Trittys. Epigraphical and Topographical Studies in the Organization of Attica*, Toronto 1986, 123.
- 27 Whitehead (Anm. 25), 97-104.
- 28 Hedrick 1990 (Anm. 24), 85.
- 29 Whitehead (Anm. 25), 150-160.
- 30 ebd., 219f.
- 31 ebd., 121-148.
- 32 ebd., 93f.
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- 43 J.H. Kroll, *Athenian Bronze Allotment Plates*, Cambridge, Mass. 1972; ders., 'More Athenian Allotment Plates,' in: *Studies St. Dow*, 1984, 165-171.
- 44 David Whitehead nennt das ein "interlocking system" (Anm. 25), 255; siehe auch F.Ruzé a.a.O. (Anm. 17).
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- 62 Die Bronzetäfelchen aus Lokroi Epizephyrioi gewähren einen faszinierende Einblick in die Durchorganisiertheit einer griechischen *Polis*, siehe A. de Franciscis, *Stato e società in Locri Epizefiri. L'archivio dell' Olympieion Locrese* (Napoli 1972), sowie D. Musti (Hrsg.), *Le tavole di Locri. Atti del colloquio sugli aspetti politici, economici, culturali e linguistici dei testi dell' archivio locrese* [Napoli 26-7 aprile 1977] (Roma 1979).

The *Polis* as a Society Aristotle, John Rawls and the Athenian Social Contract

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In a key sentence from book III of the *Politics*, Aristotle (1276b1-2) suggests that the *polis* may be a *koinonia* of *politai* arranged in respect to the *politeia*. What is at stake in this claim? The *Politics* is typically (and fruitfully) read as a teleological theory of the state as a natural entity. Moreover, M.H. Hansen has recently argued that the term *polis*, when used of a “community” rather than of a physical “city,” means state and not a fusion of state and society. Here I will argue that when analyzing the *polis*, neither the state/society distinction nor the community/city distinction can be fully sustained at the level of either Aristotelian theory or Athenian practice. Viewing the *polis* as at once society and state can, I think, contribute in meaningful and useful ways to our understanding of Aristotle’s *polis* and the historical *polis*.¹

First, definitions: If we posit a human population inhabiting a given territory, “society” is the sum of participants in the overall set of rules, norms, and practices whereby social goods (e.g. rights, privileges, powers, property) are produced and distributed. This larger society will encompass sub-societies with specialized rules and norms; the interaction between sub-societies helps to determine the structure of the whole society. “State” denotes the arrangement by which formal political power (legitimate coercive authority backed by physical force) is distributed among recognized institutions and deployed by them. Thus the procedural rules of governmental institutions fall largely outside the purview of this paper, but some “political” aspects of production and distribution are within its scope.² I will attempt to make three points: 1. When Aristotle uses the term *polis* he always assumes the existence of, and sometimes refers specifically to, the society at large. 2. In the *Politics*, in modern liberal democratic theory, and in Athenian practice alike, the problem of stabilizing the political regime is inseparable from issues of social justice. 3. While fourth-century Athenian social practice did recognize a distinction between state and civil society, that distinction was far

from clearcut and interchange between the public and private spheres was constant and meaningful.

Aristotle

In several passages from Book III Aristotle seems specifically concerned with the state:

The *politeia* is an ordering (*taxis*) of the *polis* in respect to various powers (*archai*) and especially [in respect to the power] which is authoritative over all (*tes kurias panton*). For what is authoritative (*kurion*) everywhere is the governing body (*politeuma*) of the *polis*, and the governing body is the *politeia* (*politeuma d' estin he politeia*). I mean, for example, that in democracies the *demos* is authoritative (*kurios*), while by contrast it is *hoi oligoi* in oligarchies; we say that the *politeia* too is different in these [two] cases. (1278b8-12) ... *politeia* and *politeuma* signify the same thing (*semainei tauton*), and *politeuma* is the authoritative element (*to kurion*) in *poleis*, and ... it is necessary that the authoritative element be one person, or a few, or the many (1279a25-28).³

The abstraction *politeia* is thus identified with the *politeuma* (cf. 1308a6-7), which is the element (either an individual or a sociological part, e.g. *hoi oligoi*) of the *polis* that is authoritative (*kurion*). If the *polis* is only a state (according to the definition used above) “authoritative over all” would mean the monopoly of legitimate authority to deploy force both internally (within the *polis*, e.g. by inflicting legal punishments) and externally (e.g. by dispatching military expeditions).⁴ This formulation leaves aside the question of social goods and yet the *Politics* is deeply concerned with how social goods are produced and distributed.

When Aristotle uses *politeia* as an abstraction that “signifies the same thing” (has the same root meaning) as the authoritative governing element, he is not merely defining the institutional “locus of sovereignty.” In book II Aristotle (1273a21-25) noted the intimate connection between the ideological predisposition (*dianoia*) of *hoi polloi* (regarding wealth requirements for office) and the form taken by the *politeia*, and (1273a39-b1) states specifically that whenever the authoritative element (*to kurion*) assumes something to be worthy of honor, by necessity this opinion (*doxa*) will be adopted by the rest of the citizenry.⁵ The authoritative element is (at least in a democracy) the sociologically defined segment of the *polis* which takes the lead in establishing and maintaining the terms by which the members of a *koinonia* as a “community of interpretation” (in the terminology of Stanley Fish) will discuss the world and will (in the

terminology of J.L. Austin) perform, through felicitous speech acts, social realities within the world. Ergo, the term *politeia* embraces not only the constitution (legal arrangement of governmental institutions), but the ideology (the system of beliefs by which actions are organized) and social practices promoted by the dominant sub-society within the *polis*.⁶ And hence, “*politeia* is the particular way of life (*bios tis*) of the *polis*” (1295b1).⁷

For Aristotle, that way of life is founded on social relations. Sociological articulation into “parts” (*mere, moria*: especially economic classes [e.g. 1303a1-2, 1318a30-33], but also occupational groups, families, etc.) defines a *polis*’ *politeia*, just as physical attributes determine an animal’s species (1291a23-38).⁸ Governmental powers (*archai*) are distributed according to preexisting relations of power (*dunamis*) among the parts (1290a7-13). Thus, while Aristotle surely does have the state in mind at III.1278b-1279a, his discussion presumes that the state will be embedded in a matrix of preexisting social divisions and practices.⁹ We may now hazard a more elaborate restatement of the key sentence: “the *polis* is a *koinonia* of citizens whose practices and norms are arranged in respect to the beliefs and powers of the dominant sub-society (i.e. *politeia/politeuma*).” Turning from general to specific, “the *polis* of Athens is a *koinonia* of Athenian citizens; because the *demos* is the authoritative element in this *polis*, the Athenian *koinonia* is arranged in respect to the ideology of the mass of ordinary citizens.”

The definition of the *polis* as a *koinonia* of citizens might seem to exclude noncitizens from consideration.¹⁰ And yet Aristotle devotes much space in the *Politics* (especially in book I) to categories of noncitizens: children, women, slaves, and free males. The tension between conceptualizing the *koinonia* that is the *polis* as a society of citizens and as a more heterogeneous entity that includes noncitizens is evident in the beginning of book III: Aristotle begins by stating that for one investigating the *politeia* it is necessary to decide “what the *polis* is (*ti pote estin he polis*).” He then points to a dispute among those who use the term *polis*: some say it was not “the *polis*” that performed some action (*peprachenai ten praxin*), but rather “the tyrant” or “the oligarchy” (1274b32-36), on the grounds that such regimes exist through domination (*toi kratein*) rather than for the common advantage (*to koinei sumpheron*: 1276a12-13).¹¹ But if the *polis* is not simply equated with its government, then it must be equated with the territory and its residents (or some part of them) and therein lies the problem:

We see that the entire activity of the *politikos* and the legislator is concerned with the *polis*,

and the *politeia* is a certain ordering of those who inhabit the *polis* (*ton ten polin oikounton esti taxis tis*). But since the *polis* belongs among composite things (*ton sugkeimenon*), and like other composite wholes is made up of many parts (*morion*), it is clear that the first thing to be sought is the *polites*; for the *polis* is a certain multitude (*plethos*) of *politai*. (1274b32-41)

In this brief passage, Aristotle uses *polis* in two different ways: first, when explaining that *politeia* is a certain ordering of “those who inhabit the *polis*,” he clearly means *polis* as a geographical term (*polis* as city or territory: “geo-*polis*”), and here the “inhabitants” so ordered must include noncitizens.¹² In the second part of the passage, “the *polis* is ... the citizens” (*polis* as community of citizens: “politico-*polis*”). The difficulty of separating the affairs of the politico-*polis* from the larger society is intrinsic to Aristotle’s understanding of *ta politika*. His primary concern was with the citizens (those who “had a share” in the *polis*) and with how the *politeia* was affected (sustained or threatened) by sociological subdivisions within the citizenry. Yet he could not ignore the fact that citizens and noncitizens (those lacking a share) cohabited within the geo-*polis*. More to the point, he saw that explaining the terms of their cohabitation was fundamental to a comprehensive understanding of what sort of *koinonia* the *polis* was. Aristotle could distinguish “the advantage of the entire *polis*” from “the common (*koinon*) advantage of the *politai*”.¹³ Thus, while he focused on citizen-society, he assumed the existence of a broader society (*koinonia tes zoes*: 1278b17) of which the citizenry formed only one (key) part. In the opening passage of book I, the *polis* is described as a *koinonia politike* which is “most authoritative of all and encompasses (*periechousa*) all the other [sorts of *koinonia*]” (1252a5-6). One of the purposes of the *Politics* is to explain how the broader society could be encompassed by the narrower citizen-society. If we translate *koinonia* as “society,” then in the key sentence Aristotle is asking “what sort of society is the *polis*?”

But why “society” rather than (e.g.) “partnership”?¹⁴ The answer is Aristotle’s concern with the fundamental significance of difference, inequality, and autarky in the definition of the *polis*. Autarky, which demanded both an ability to defend against aggression and a sufficiency of material goods, was the end (*telos*) of the *polis* and was best for it (*beltiston*).¹⁵ Defense required military service; material sufficiency required productive labor. Depending on the *politeia*, the citizens themselves (or some of them) might work productively, but much of their time and energy was devoted to “political” affairs: deliberation, rule, and military service. Thus it was unlikely that the citizens could, by themselves, produce enough substance to maintain the *polis*’ autarky. Noncitizen resi-

dents of the *geo-polis* were not distracted from production by direct participation in politics and the surplus value of their labor was necessary for the *polis* to remain autarkic. Thus the presence of noncitizens in the *polis* was foundational rather than epiphenomenal; were they removed from the *koinonia*, the *polis* could not exist.¹⁶

Moreover, the primary productive unit of *polis* society was the *oikos*. Within the confines of the *koinonia* that was the *oikos*, the (adult free male) citizen was master (*despotes*: 1260a7-10). But to produce the material goods that sustained the *oikos* itself (on the micro-economic level) and the *polis* as a whole (on the macro-economic level) he relied upon cooperation (based on a recognition of mutual interests) as well as coercion in dealing with noncitizen *oikos* members (his wife, children, and slaves – if he had them: 1252b9-12, 1323a5-6). The productive *oikos* was the basic building block of the *polis* (1253b2-3); in Aristotle's naturalized developmental scheme, *oikoi* banded together into villages and villages into a *polis* in order to achieve autarky (1252b15-16, 27-29).¹⁷ Thus, at the fundamental level of the productive activity which allowed the *polis* to achieve its *telos*, the interests of citizens and noncitizens were conjoined.

Aristotle claims that the *oikos* was characterized by “masterful” and “economic” relationships and the *polis* by “political” relationships and he describes the society-building process as natural. Yet only the first of the three steps in this process (formation of 1. *oikos*, 2. village, 3. *polis*) did not involve human choice (*ouk ek proaireseos*: 1252a28).¹⁸ The society-building process may be regarded as quasi-contractual in that it was rational and consensual. It was rational in that even the involuntary first stage (which brought together master and slave, man and woman into an *oikia*) furthered the common material and security interests of all parties. The second stage was consensual because the relevant parties (masters of *oikiai*) are assumed to be capable of recognizing and acting in their own interests: their households were joined together in part in order to gain a long-term (*me ephemerou*: 1252b16) necessity – the avoidance of unjust treatment.¹⁹ Thus, while natural, the society-building process is not automatic or naturally predetermined. Although Aristotle's theory does not aim at the social contract, it is founded upon a contractarian assumption: the *polis* could not exist without the prior agreement of households to live together justly and profitably.²⁰

Aristotle's *polis* is logically prior to the individual or *oikos* (1253a18-19), but it is neither historically prior nor a precondition for human existence. Although Aristotle knows of no historical period in which men ordinarily lived outside *oikoi*, he states that “in antiquity” (*to archaion*) families were

scattered and each was under the sole authority of the head of household (1252b23-24). Man is the most “political” of animals (1253a7-8), but living together and cooperating in human affairs is always difficult (*chalepon*: 1263a15-16, cf. 1286b1). Thus, although “there is in everyone an impulse (*horme*)” to live in a *politike koinonia*, nonetheless he who first brought men together (to live in a *polis*) was the cause (*aitios*) of the greatest of goods.²¹ Moreover, once achieved, the *polis* can be destroyed by improper, unjust actions by its members (*phtheirousi ten polin*: 1281a18-20, book V passim). In sum, the desirable natural *telos* of the *polis* is (unlike an oak, a horse, or an *oikos*) predicated upon human agency, consent, and practice, even though not predicated upon the free choice of each individual.²²

Slaves were obviously problematic from the point of view of consent: it was difficult for anyone living in a society that valued *eleutheria* as a primary good to argue plausibly that a slave would recognize his best interests in the productive practices organized by his master. Enter Aristotle’s elaborate theory of natural slavery: The assumption that being ruled as a human possession was a natural condition for certain people allowed Aristotle to postulate that “the same thing is advantageous for the master and slave” (1252a34) and that slavery was therefore just (1255a1-3). This explained affection between slave and master (1255b12-15). Despite his innate inability to deliberate about or to choose the circumstances of his life (1260a12, 1280a34), the slave was rational and could be expected to understand that his best interests were furthered by his membership in the *koinonia* of the *oikos*.²³

Women were, collectively, a part of the *polis* constituting half of its population (1269b15-17) and were necessary to *oikos* and *polis* alike for biological reproduction (1252a26-31). No woman could be a *politai*, but her interests were conjoined to those of her *politai*-husband through the institution of marriage. Although (unlike the slave) she possessed deliberative ability, her lack of citizenship could be justified by her natural “lack of authority” (1260a12-13) which led her to enter into a relationship that offered her protection.²⁴ Male children were (potential) future *politai*. When properly educated (i.e. after he had been coerced into mastering and internalizing the principles of the *politeia*), and after his deliberative faculties had matured (1260a13-14, 31-32), the child would come to understand his true interests clearly. Ensuring through education that children understood their interests to be one with those of previous generations of *politai* guaranteed the political and cultural reproduction of the *polis*.²⁵ Aristotle concludes book I with a general sug-

gestion that, since the household as a whole (*oikia...pasa*) was a part (*meros*) of the *polis*, and since women made up fully half the free population and children were future sharers in the *politeia*, that it is clear that both wives and children of citizens should be educated “looking towards (*blepontas pros*) the *politeia*” (1260b15-20). Here noncitizens are connected to both *polis* and *politeia* and so are surely to be regarded as encompassed within the *koinonia* of the *polis*.²⁶

Aristotle emphasizes the necessity to the *polis* of the concept of difference when, at the beginning of book II, he refutes Plato’s *Republic* as a valid description of a *polis* on the grounds that it was based on a higher level of commonality (or sameness) than any actual *polis* could tolerate. Aristotle points out that Plato’s *polis*

attempted as far as possible to be entirely one... And yet it is evident that as it becomes increasingly one it will no longer be a *polis*. For the *polis* is in its nature a certain sort of multitude (*plethos*), and as it becomes more a unity it will be an *oikos* instead of a *polis* and [then] a human being instead of an *oikos*... So even if one were able to do this, one ought not to do it, as it would destroy the *polis*. Now the *polis* is made up not only of a number of human beings, but also of human beings differing in kind; a *polis* does not arise from persons who are similar (*ex homoion*). (1261a15-24).

Not only is actual sameness ontologically destructive, but so is perfect ideological homogenization: “that ‘all say the same thing’ is in one way fine (*kalon*) but impossible, while in another way it is not even productive of concord” (*homonoetikon*: 1261b31-32). The differences necessary to allow the existence of the *polis* pertain between citizens and noncitizens (who possess different sorts of *arete*: 1259b18-1260b20), but there must also be inequalities among the citizens themselves: As we have seen, Aristotle can describe the *polis* as a multitude (*plethos*) of *politai* and a composite entity, made up of “parts.” The parts are both households and sociologically defined subgroups of the *politai*. The latter includes especially the *penetes* and the *plousioi*, but also the well-born and the base-born, and the skilled and the incompetent.²⁷ In his discussion of Plato’s *Laws* and the ideas proposed by Phaleas of Chalcedon (1264b26-1267b20), Aristotle denies that it would be either possible or desirable to eliminate all differences in wealth (or income – cf. 1309a15-16) by equalizing property holdings.

The upshot is that each *polites* necessarily played various and differentiated roles in the *polis*. As a master of an *oikos*, his interests were attached to those of women, children, and slaves (if he had them). His interests might also be connected, at least through relations of production and

exchange, with free foreigners – metics, visitors to the *polis*, or men he met when he travelled outside the *polis*. As a member of an economic class, his interests were identified with those of one part of the citizen body and likely to be in conflict with another. He might further identify his interests with other groups within the citizenship, e.g. the well-born or the highly skilled and this identity could potentially lead to conflict. Finally, he was a *polites* tout court, and in this role he must identify his interests fully with those of his fellow *politai* and with the *polis*. But the *polis*' interest in autarky meant that even when acting in the public sphere he could not ignore the existence of noncitizens, nor did he shed his sociological identity.

As he moved from the public sphere to the private, the citizen's role and behavior must necessarily change: most obviously he was a master within his *oikos* and a deliberating equal among his fellow-citizens.²⁸ He played yet other roles when his *polis* was at war, when he engaged in economic relations with fellow-citizens and foreigners, and when he dealt with members of different sociological subgroups as (e.g., in the case of an Athenian) *phrater*, demesman, and Initiate.²⁹ If the citizens were unable to move with facility from sphere to sphere, unable in practice to differentiate between the behavior appropriate to each role and to mix spheres where appropriate, the *polis* would not survive: it would fail to reproduce itself culturally, would lose its autarky, or would degenerate into civil war.

In sum, Aristotle's *polis* is a pluralistic, differentiated society as well as a state.³⁰ It is a *plethos* (or *plethe*) of persons subdivided into diverse groups (*mere*, *moria*). These groups inhabit a common territory (1260b40-1261a1) but their interests are not identical, nor are their desires standardized. Their interests cannot be homogenized because perfect communalization and perfect material equality are unattainable. A safe and stable *polis* cannot be achieved by equalizing the distribution of goods, or by eliminating sources of conflict through ideological means.³¹ Aristotle's problem at this point (which I take to be the central problem of the *Politics* and of the historical Greek *polis*) was how to "preserve" (*sozein*) the *polis* in the face of the competing interests of society's composite parts.

For Aristotle, predicating a natural hierarchy on naturalized slavery and naturally subordinate women (which linked the interests of slaves and women with the interests of the citizens through a utilitarian calculus), solved one part of the puzzle of how to preserve the *polis*. Yet the *polis* was founded on *politeia*: to change the *politeia* was to change the *polis* (1276b10). Because *politeia* was identified with *politeuma*, stability – sav-

ing the *polis* – meant avoiding any change in the criteria for becoming a *polites*. It also meant functionally integrating, through a just distribution of social goods, the identities and practices of various naturalized social groups – the residents of the *geo-polis* clustered into parts. The system which determined who was a *polites* and how social goods were distributed was the *politeia*. Thus the *polis* was preserved through the integrative and distributive powers of the *politeia*.

I have suggested above that Aristotle's discussion of *polis*, *politeia*, and *politeuma* leads to a definition of *politeia* as including the "ideological" system of norms, beliefs, and practices on the basis of which social goods were distributed. My argument that *politeia* must include ideology is strengthened by Aristotle's claim that the *polis* is not to be preserved through equalization of material goods but rather through just and consensual inequality, i.e. through the willing agreement to continue the current form of *politeia* by the various "parts" of the *polis*: "If a *politeia* is going to be preserved, all the parts of the *polis* must wish it to exist and to continue on the same basis" (1270b21-22).³²

Although conceivably disaffection of any part of the *polis* could endanger the *politeia*, Aristotle is primarily concerned about the threat from the military and "militarizable" classes: disgruntled groups of free males.³³ He did not regard either justly treated (1330a32) "natural" slaves or women as serious threats.³⁴ This makes sense in light of his theory of *polis* formation: women and slaves were integrated into the *koinonia* of the *oikos* through a purely natural (nonvolitional) process (1252a26-34). The next two steps (village and *polis* building) required (free male) heads of *oikoi* and then the "kingly" heads of *komai* to leave behind the realm of absolute mastery (1252b15-22, 27-30; cf. 1285b31-33) and enter into a political life that entailed "being ruled" as well as ruling. Compromising pristine authority was in a sense natural in that it allowed the *polis* to achieve its *telos* of autarky and the *politai* to "live well." But it was a volutary compact (an exchange of sovereign authority for happiness), and so (unlike the fully natural *oikos*) liable to breakdown under the pressure of circumstances. Breakdown meant civil war and the destruction of the *polis*. Aristotle's concern with preserving the *polis* through management of existing relations between free males points to the residual quasi-contractarian element in his natural scheme.³⁵

Aristotle's focus on disgruntled free males as a potentially dangerous category explains why the "uncorrupted" regime that he rather confusingly calls "polity" (*politeia*) was concerned to keep those sharing in the *politeia* more numerous than those not sharing (1297b4-6). It may also

help explain why he regarded democracy as the best of the debased regimes (e.g. 1289b4-8): in a democracy, other than metics, there was no militarizable body of free men stranded outside the citizen body, and within that body the numerically superior ordinary citizens were the dominant element (*politeuma*; cf. 1302a8-13, 1302b25-27). Yet majority rule could not ensure stability (1294b34-41); in a democracy, as in other regimes, the dominant element was responsible for enunciating a *politeia* that would win the willing consent of all other parts. Individual members of the *koinonia* must believe that their interests as subgroup members were likely to be protected by the continuation of the current regime.

The *politeia* thus had to do a lot of work in the *koinonia* that was the *polis*. It was the ideology which maintained the authoritative status of the current *politeuma*. It was the cultural means by which the *politai* created and reproduced over generations their distinctive identity within the whole society and the legal means whereby they formulated rules for ordering the *koinonia* as a whole. The *politeia* must define the extent and legitimate occupants of the public sphere and coordinate the various private spheres. It must provide the individual with norms for conducting his private relations with members of other *oikoi* and other sub-societies, and for moving from the private sphere to the public. It must ensure that his behavior (when multiplied by similar actions of many individuals) did not destabilize the authority of the existing *politeuma*. It must distribute social goods equitably and protect the interests of all parts of the *polis*. Only if it did all these things could the *politeia* preserve its own integrity and that of the society.

In sum: the *politeia* by which the society was organized, while devised (in large part) by a part of the citizenry, must win and retain the voluntary consent of all citizens and (at least indirectly) those noncitizens connected to them. And this means it must generally be regarded by the members of society as a just system. A just *politeia* provided for stability through principles governing the distribution of material goods, political rights, and status privileges, such that each of the parts regarded it as worthwhile to support the current socio-political order. Thus, if the *polis* is a society, the *politeia* represents the terms of the social contract.³⁶ It is, indeed, also the basis of procedural law. But the politico-*polis* (community of citizens) is a subset of the *polis*-as-society and neither *polis* nor *politeia* will be preserved intact if the *politeia* qua social contract is regarded as substantively unjust by any social group capable of bringing destabilizing force to bear. State institutions provided an important part

of the social context, but any analytic hierarchy in which prescriptive state laws (how a law-making authority at a given time thought an institution was supposed to work) are elevated above actual social practice (how it was in fact used at a given time) can result in a serious misunderstanding of the *polis*. Aristotle makes this exact point when he states that a *polis* may be oligarchic or democratic according to its *nomoi*, but in disposition and actual practice it may be the opposite (1292b11-21). Returning to Aristotle's zoological analogy: viewing the *polis* as a society provides the substantive tissue and sinew without which the *polis*-as-state would be no more than a heap of unarticulated procedural bones.³⁷

John Rawls

The understanding of the *polis* as a society developed above is indebted not only to Aristotle's *Politics*, but also to the moral philosophy of John Rawls. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls defines "a society" as

a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in accordance with them... these rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking part in it... [However] a society... is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests... There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed... A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.³⁸

Rawls goes on to suggest (4-5) that a (utopian) "well-ordered society" is regulated by a public and universally-shared conception of justice, and that this conception of justice in turn limits the pursuit of other ends (i.e. regulates desire) and so constitutes the society's "fundamental charter." Like Aristotle, Rawls sees political equality as intrinsically desirable, but rejects complete equalization of access to most social goods (things that any rational person would want more rather than less of) as neither feasible nor desirable.³⁹ Rawls substitutes for equalization the "difference principle" by which inequality is to be allowed, but regulated by selecting social institutions on the basis of their maximization of payoffs to the

“least advantaged” member(s) of society. Thus, Rawls’ well-ordered society would permit distinctions in wealth and income, but its institutions would ensure that as the rich got richer, so did the poor.⁴⁰

Rawls attempts to generate the fundamental, substantive principles of social justice appropriate to a well-ordered society by a complex thought experiment: He employs a conception of “justice as fairness” – a version of social contract theory (derived primarily from Locke and Kant) – to mediate what he sees as fatal flaws in utilitarian and intuitionist traditions of moral philosophy. Briefly, Rawls posits a group of rationally self-interested persons in an “original position” of equality. They must unanimously agree on the fundamental social rules under which they (and their descendants) will govern themselves forever. The catch is that they must debate possible rules under a “veil of ignorance” – that is to say, while each player has a basic understanding of economics, psychology, and politics, he does not know who he is: he is ignorant of his economic and social status, his powers and abilities, even his desires (other than his desire for justice). Finally, Rawls assumes that under the conditions of uncertainty that he has established, the players will employ the rather conservative “maximin” principle of decision-making – that is, each player will attempt to reduce his risk of falling below a minimum standard (he will seek to maximize his minimum) rather than choosing to gamble by risking his minimum in hope of a potentially higher payoff.⁴¹

The final results of this thought experiment (the hypothetical agreement that arises from the negotiations within the original position) are two “principles of justice”:

I. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

II. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged... (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.⁴² (302).

The working of these two principles is further defined by two “priority rules” which state, in essence, that liberty is prior to all other goods (ergo I cannot be compromised to increase any other good) and that the principle of justice enunciated in I is prior to (and so cannot be compromised in favor of) efficiency of production or the overall welfare of the society. Thus, Rawls’ well-ordered society is characterized by equal liberties (right to vote and hold office; freedom of speech, assembly, conscience, and thought; freedom of the person and to hold property; freedom from

arbitrary arrest and seizure: 61) and unequal, but fair, distributions of material goods and other powers.

Can Rawls' theory of the just society really help us to understand the *polis* as a society? *A Theory of Justice*, while very influential, has been attacked as a universal, objective description of social justice on a variety of grounds including the following: (a) the veil of ignorance robs the players in the original position of the resources with which to make humanly meaningful decisions; (b) the maximin rule is an excessively conservative decision-making principle; (c) the liberality of the two principles of justice are the result of liberal assumptions Rawls has built into the original position rather than a logical outcome of negotiations within it.⁴³ Moreover, we must keep in mind that Rawls did not concern himself with classical antiquity or the *polis*. Finally, his moral philosophy is far from identical to that of Aristotle. Most centrally, at least for our purposes, Rawls' theory avoids teleological naturalism in favor of a genuine and individual-centered social contract. Rawls' lexically ordered principles forbid fixed hierarchies based on naturalized categories of persons. The first priority rule thus disallows the institution of slavery, regardless of any advantages accruing to slaves and masters (cf. 62-63). But the two philosophers' goals are not antithetical: both are interested in substantive rather than merely procedural justice, in ends rather than simply means, in a society that is the best possible not simply in one that is functionally workable. Rawls' conception of justice is much more extensive than Aristotle's "common interest" (*to koinei sumpheron*: 1282b16-18), but both men tend to see justice as congruent with goodness. Both imagine the well-ordered society as a balance of political equalities and social inequalities; both are interested in stable (ideally permanent) regimes. In sum, I believe that there is sufficient common ground between Aristotle and Rawls on the subject of the just society to make measuring an actual society against the gap between their positions into a useful exercise.⁴⁴

Athens

Athens in the fourth century B.C. was a society characterized by (a) fundamental differences between citizens and noncitizens, and inequalities between sociologically-defined groups within the citizenry; (b) both conflict and identity of interests between and within the diverse groups; (c) a set of rules, norms, and practices – enunciated by the *demos* (mass of ordinary citizens qua dominant political element) and perpetu-

ated by popular ideology – which required the consent of potentially disruptive subgroups (notably the Athenian elites). Since Athens was a relatively stable society in the fourth century, we may ask (following Aristotle and Rawls) whether the various parts of the Athenian *polis* consented to the *politeia* enunciated by the *demos* because they recognized it as substantively just, or whether their consent was coerced or based on deception.⁴⁵

The rest of this paper focuses on a few of the ways the *polis* of Athens resolved or avoided destabilizing problems that have beset other societies (especially conflicts between households and between rich and poor citizens). It concludes by asking whether Athens' social stability was secured justly.⁴⁶ This exercise seems to me worthwhile in that it allows us to explore the “fit” between two important theories of society and a concrete historical example. It helps to define the extent to which Aristotle took Athens as a model and suggests responses to some of Rawls' critics.⁴⁷ Measuring classical Athens against carefully articulated conceptions of the well-ordered society should also make it easier to compare Athens to other human societies: In what ways was Athens historically distinctive? Can Athens be assimilated to the model of either “Mediterranean society” or Western society generally? Was the Athenian *politeia* more or less just than other known societies?

If, like Aristotle, we begin with the *oikos*, we may ask how the Athenian *politeia* affected the private realm and mediated between civil society and the state.⁴⁸ What rules governed an Athenian's behavior as he moved from *oikos* to *ekklesia* or *dikasterion*, from the role of *despotes* within his *oikos* to deliberating *polites*? Were these roles integrated or differentiated? Did the Athenian citizen enter the public realm as a representative of his *oikos*, or as an individual? Did he carry forward the interests of the noncitizens with whom he was associated? The first question confronting us is whether in practice a distinctly private sphere can be distinguished from the Athenian public sphere.⁴⁹ Although scholarly opinion has ranged between the poles of complete integration of the private within the public realm and more or less full distinction, recent work on the Athenian family (and its constituent members) seems to point towards a middle ground: The *polites* did not forget his role as *oikos*-member when he entered the public realm; certain accepted techniques of self-representation within public institutions allowed, encouraged, or even required him to make that membership explicit.⁵⁰ Yet the *demos* did try to keep public and private spheres sufficiently distinct as to prevent private interests from unduly influencing public decision making. The differentiation

of the citizen's public and private roles was an important factor in the overall structure of Athenian society. On the other hand, the limited and conditional nature of that differentiation ensured that public decision-making performed a significant role in the functional integration of the constituent sub-societies of the Athenian *polis*.⁵¹

The Athenian approach to the education of future citizens illustrates the interplay of public and private realms.⁵² The amount and kind of "formal" education that a given child received was left to the discretion of his *oikos*; there were no public schools, no standard curriculum. The state showed no interest in ensuring that Athens was a literate society or even that citizens could read public announcements.⁵³ Nor, until the reform of the *ephebeia* in the mid-330s, did the Athenian state involve itself in formally educating future citizens in social values.⁵⁴ The contrast with Aristotle's best possible *polis* seems stark: The incomplete book VIII of the *Politics* is a detailed discussion of the educational system which would ensure that children developed the *arete* which would reproduce, over generations, the *polis* and its *politeia*. Yet the Athenians were actually no less interested than Aristotle in socio-cultural and political reproduction. They tended to believe, however, that the experience of life in the democratic *polis*, including participating in informal public discussion of the decisions made in Assembly and lawcourts, would in itself provide a normative education (*koine paideia*: Aeschines 1.187) in social values. Rather than entering into the complexities of arranging by democratic means to create and maintain a necessarily coercive public institution, the Athenians supposed that the democratic *politeia* would imbue future citizens with its values through exemplary decisions by its deliberative and judicial institutions and thereby gain their voluntary assent to its central principles.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, the system of choosing public officials by lot simply took for granted that those Athenians who chose to enter the lottery would be well enough educated to fulfill the duties of office. There was no "civil service examination"; access to whatever advantages office-holding might have offered remained open to all.⁵⁶

How permeable was the boundary between the world of the citizen and of the *oikos*, when it came to public deliberation?⁵⁷ Noncitizens lacked *isegoria*, and thus had no formal right to participate in public debate. Yet Aristotle could have found in Athens the empirical proof of his conviction that women possessed deliberative ability (*to bouleutikon*). Most Athenian women did not live truly secluded lives. Anecdotal evidence shows that some women went regularly to the agora and that the Athenian citizen discussed public matters with female (as well as juvenile male) members

of his *oikos*.⁵⁸ Although normal Assembly procedure assumed that citizen speakers would be addressing citizen audiences, noncitizens (e.g. ambassadors) could address the Assembly if invited to do so by an appropriate decree (Aesch. 2.58). Spectatorship was not unknown in the Assembly and common in the *dikasteria*.⁵⁹ Women gave legally binding depositions under oath before arbitrators in public places; the practice of employing public state-appointed arbitrators (beginning in ca. 400 B.C.) for private disputes is itself evidence for the overlapping of public and private spheres.⁶⁰ By the latter part of the fourth century, metics and even slaves were participating (as principals and uncoerced witnesses) in certain trials before the People's courts.⁶¹ Finally, complex networks of gossip and rumor played a major role in public decision-making and flowed easily across social borders. Gossip permeated Athenian society, linking the private life of its target with his public performance, and (at least potentially) allowed all residents of the *geo-polis* to participate in the enforcement of social norms. Because Athenian norms tended to equate a politician's private behavior with his public value, gossip and rumor had profound effects on political practice.⁶²

On the other hand, differentiation of public and private roles had significant effects on Athenian social behavior and distinguishes Athens from other Mediterranean societies. As Paul Millett has recently argued, when compared to the society of ancient Rome, Athens is remarkable for its lack of emphasis on patron-client relationships. Although it is certainly possible to find evidence for specific instances of "patronistic" behavior, Athens does not manifest the characteristics of a society fundamentally defined by clientage. Lesser *oikoi* were not formally tied to "great houses" and relations of power were not institutionalized into a public/private power pyramid.⁶³ While there were indeed a few very wealthy families in Athens, these families were unable to control Athenian society through the matrix of reciprocal and inter-familial, but unequal and cross-generational, obligations that typifies the society based on patronage.⁶⁴ This conclusion has profound consequences for our understanding of Athenian society. While the lower-class Athenian (and his family) might work for and/or be in debt to members of the upper classes, the Athenian citizen did not enter the public sphere as his employer/creditor's client. His vote was not owned or directly controlled by another and thus Athenian decision-making was dominated by interests, desires, and perceptions of the many rather than of the few. The democratic political system was implicated in, and in turn strengthened, a set of social norms which discouraged clientage in private life.⁶⁵

The differentiation of public and private roles meant that the common (at least in Mediterranean societies) and socially volatile notion of esteem as inviolability (i.e. “that object of pride which must be defended at all costs”) seems to have found its primary locus in the individual citizen rather than in the *oikos*. Whereas in other Mediterranean societies the “flashpoint” of potentially catastrophic dishonor tended to be the household (and especially female relatives qua sexual beings or objects),⁶⁶ in Athens it was, *imprimis*, the citizen’s body and his standing. The prime target of the hubristic man was held to be the bodily integrity or rights of other citizens; arrogantly disrespectful behavior of this sort (*hubris*) called for public action.⁶⁷ This suggests, in turn, that the ordinary Athenian often represented himself in public as individual citizen and member of the citizen group. His irreducible need for esteem may more accurately be described as a cooperative desire to ensure the maintenance of the personal dignity properly accorded to each citizen, than as a competitive desire to augment his family’s honor. Consequently, he was likely to demand from those in his society equal recognition rather than (or at any rate, before) special distinction. And thus the Athenian *politeia* was fundamentally democratic (based on equal dignity), rather than hierarchical (based on differential honors).⁶⁸ This certainly did not preclude Athenians from lusting after honors; *philotimia* was a psychological state as well known to Athenian public speakers (and their audiences) as to philosophers. But in democratic Athens desire for outstanding honor remained a psychological condition (albeit a common one within elite status groups) rather than a generalized, definitive social value.⁶⁹ The Athenian was an *eleutheros* (free from the threat of being subjected to unanswerable indignities) before he was a *philotimos* – the democratic insistence on the public recognition of individual dignity is one reason that *eleutheria* was regarded as the definitive value of a democracy (e.g. 1294a9-11). Public honor and distinction had (in most cases) to be earned, rather than demanded on the basis of membership in a particular *oikos*.⁷⁰ And this meant that the Athenian *demos*, as the ultimate source of major public honors, could employ *philotimia* and its satisfaction as a form of social control over the elite. Likewise, *atimia* (and its verb forms) in Athens meant, *imprimis*, disenfranchisement (rather than personal or familial dishonor): it represented a withdrawal by the citizen group of its guarantee to safeguard someone’s claim to equal dignity.

The issue of wealth inequality and the tension between economic classes will serve as a final illustration of public-private interchange. If the heads of wealthy and impoverished *oikoi* met as equal individuals in

the public realm, did the Athenian *politeia* promote anything resembling Rawls' difference principle? Arguably it did: As I (among others) have argued elsewhere, the system of public liturgies, along with certain legal procedures (notably *antidosis*) and the operation of the social norm of *charis* within the People's courts, served a redistributive function within the *polis*. The richest Athenians were required and encouraged to materially subsidize (in direct and indirect ways) their poorest fellow-citizens.⁷¹ Moreover, the democratic procedures of the Assembly and courtroom prevented the private-realm wealth-power of the rich man (and of the rich as a class) from being generalized into an unassailable position of socio-political superiority. As Demosthenes emphasized time and again in *Against Meidias*, the collective legal power of the people could and should be used to humble any hubristic rich man who threatened the individual and collective dignity of the citizens. Indictments of wealthy litigants signalled to the wealth elite as a class that their control of material resources did not place them outside the norms of society or render them invulnerable to the wrath of the many.⁷² He who violated the dignity of his fellow citizen would be punished by the collectivity. And thus the practice of Athenian law served social ends.⁷³ The principle of hierarchy was undermined in favor of democratic equality at the level of material distribution and everyday social behavior. As a result, power was discontinuous, rather than becoming a naturalized, seamless web. If we are to believe the complaints of various critics of Athenian democracy, this discontinuity may even have affected the treatment and behavior of noncitizens.⁷⁴

If we follow Aristotle in focusing on the *koinonia* of citizens, fourth-century Athens provides quite a close fit to Rawls' well-ordered society. First, the fundamental principles of the *politeia*, reenacted in the democratic restoration of 403 (which one might almost think of as the Athenian "original position"), remained stable for some 80 years (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 41.1). The details of how the rules worked remained revisable through the enactment of *nomoi* and *psephismata*; but, as Aristotle (1289a13-15) recommended, (procedural) laws were enacted with a view to the (substantive) *politeia*, rather than vice versa. In accord with both Aristotle and Rawls, the Athenian *politeia* was founded on a balance between acknowledged social distinctions and political equalities. The Athenian emphasis on liberty as individual and collective dignity and on equal access to deliberative assemblies and public office (and its associated rewards) is a practical example of Rawls' first principle of justice and first priority rule; it also confirms Aristotle's (e.g. 1291b4-35, 1317a40-b17)

comments about the priority of freedom and political equality in the democratic *politeia*. Moreover, the Athenian tolerance for economic inequality, counterbalanced by legal redistributive mechanisms which kept in check inequalities of power and (to some extent) of resources, seem to be reasonable approximations of Rawls' second principle of justice. In this respect, Athens also conforms to Aristotle's requirement for dissimilarity within the *polis*.

Thus, if we stay within the citizenship, the Athenian social contract at least roughly recapitulates the principles developed within Rawls' thought experiment. Moreover, in emphasizing dignity before honor, the Athenians do seem to have employed what could be described as a maximin principle of limiting risk under conditions of uncertainty. The conditions of Athenian citizen society are, of course, far from an empirical proof of the universality of Rawls' principles or the assumptions that underlie them. The Athenian preference for a maximin approach to decision-making may, for example, find its roots in the realities of peasant culture and subsistence agriculture rather than in human nature.⁷⁵ But in light of criticisms that have been leveled at Rawls' theory (and Rawls' own retreat from claims of universality), it is notable that the Athenian citizenry does seem to have come up with something like Rawlsian social justice without the problematic veil of ignorance and without a knowledge of liberal democratic principles, practices, or institutions.

When we move to the broader *koinonia* of those resident within the *geopolis*, the Athenian social order no longer conforms closely to Rawls' model of justice. Although Athenian society was stable and more or less autarkic in the fourth century,⁷⁶ the legally mandated and socially accepted positions of slaves, women, and metics violate Rawls' first principle. Yet, without attempting an *apologia*, it may be worthwhile noting a few points in Athens' favor. Most obviously, no other known *polis*, and no other known complex ancient society, even approximates the Rawlsian ideal of social justice, either at the level of whole society or of citizen society. Next, certain social practices and fourth-century changes in legal procedure might be read as a (tentative and conditional) extension of certain basic liberties to certain noncitizens.⁷⁷ The emphasis on citizen dignity over family honor, the lack of formal clientage, and discontinuities within the manifestation of power may have ameliorated (again in tentative and conditional ways) the oppression of noncitizens. Finally, (unlike Aristotle) the Athenians never succeeded in representing unjust social relations to themselves as completely natural. No doubt most Athenians managed, most of the time, to ignore the contingent, prob-

lematic, and exploitative nature of their own social system. But the contradiction of a just society of citizens embedded in an unjust society at large created unease and ambivalence for which critics of the Athenian regime (e.g. Plato in the *Republic*, Aristotle in *Politics* VII and VIII) attempted to find theoretical solutions. Yet those theoretical solutions seem, on the whole, rather *less* just than Athenian practice when viewed from a Rawlsian perspective. Moreover, that unease found a public forum in Athens: by sponsoring tragedy and comedy in the Theater of Dionysos, the Athenian state not only sanctioned, but institutionalized the exploration of problems of social justice.⁷⁸ Nothing in Aristotle's surviving text suggests that his best possible state would have encouraged this sort of introspection. Thus, if Rawlsian and Aristotelian visions of the just society can be regarded as distinct trajectories intersecting a common ground, the trajectory of fourth-century Athenian society intersects that same ground and at a point somewhere between the two.

In conclusion, the Athenian state is not fully coextensive with Athenian society at large. It is misleading to claim complete homology or total isomorphism between the behavior of individual citizen, government institutions, the citizenry, and the society as a whole. Yet both Aristotelian and Athenian *politeiai* were deeply interested in the production and distribution of social goods; "state" (as defined above) does not exhaust the meanings of *polis* in the *Politics* or in Athens. If the politico-*polis* was not fully homologous to the *polis* as a society, nor was it separable from it. The citizenry remained an internally diverse subset of a larger society; the practices of the political sphere affected the larger society, and vice versa. The state remained socially embedded; social norms were created, maintained, and revised by the operations of state institutions. The *polis* was a *koinonia* defined by tensions generated by the play of difference between and within the society of citizens, civil society, and society at large. Attempts to deal with these tensions provided the substance of Aristotle's *Politics* and Athenian politics.

A final word of caution: Describing the *polis* in the functionalist and contractarian terms I have employed in this essay cannot offer a fully satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of the *polis*. The approach I have adopted here takes society as self-sufficient and so ignores the consequences of international relations.⁷⁹ Moreover, it defers the important issue of the *polis* as a system for creating meaning; it leaves aside the positive content of citizenship as self-identification and empowerment.⁸⁰ In Aristotle's terms it skirts the *telos* (living well) and focuses on somewhat pedestrian antecedent conditions. The picture of the *polis* presented

here is thus only a sketch of certain features; it lacks the color and detail that make for real social existence. But I think that attempting to define the terms of the social contract underpinning the *polis* is worthwhile. For most modern readers, any assessment of the spiritual meanings the *politai* devised for themselves is likely to be based on a prior moral judgment of the *polis* as a society. After weighing Athenian society in the scales of social justice we may still wish to celebrate the ideals of democratic, participatory citizenry; but we will have reminded ourselves of the deep and enduring injustices which characterized even the best of *poleis*.

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Notes

- 1** The society/state distinction became prominent in western political thought in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, especially in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1821). For a review of the issue as it applies to the *polis* see Murray 1990a with bibliography. *Polis* as neither state nor society, but a political sphere which renders the former irrelevant and the latter marginal: Meier 1984, 7-44. *Polis* as state only: Hansen 1989b, 16-21, 1991, 55-64, taking his definition of "state" from the fields of international law and jurisprudence. What I mean by useful and meaningful is explained in Ober 1989b. I would like to thank the other participants at the Copenhagen Greek *Polis* colloquium for many useful comments. Special thanks are due to Barry Strauss for his thoughtful commentary and to Mogens Hansen. My difference with the latter over Aristotle's definition of *polis* is in part attributable to my "unitarian" conviction that books 1 and 2 of the *Politics* should be read in conjunction with books 3 and 4.
- 2** My definitions leave much in abeyance (notably issues of how meanings and identities, collective and individual, are constructed – see conclusions, below). They should be regarded only as starting points for distinguishing an understanding of "*polis* = both state and

society” from “*polis* = state only.” In other work I employ a more extensive definition of the term “state.” On civil society see Bobbio 1989, 23: the “complex of relations not regulated by the state and so the residue once the realm in which state power is exercised has been well defined.”

3 The plural *archai* is here better translated as “powers,” or “authorities” (*LSJ* s.v. II.1) than the more usual “magistracies” or “government offices” (*LSJ* s.v. II.4) because *demoi* is used here as a sociological or a political term (“the mass” or “the whole of the citizenry” compared with *oligoi*), rather than as an institutional term (“the Assembly”). Cf. 1289a15-18: *politeia* is a *taxis...peri tas archas*, in what manner they are distributed (*nenementai*), what element is *kurion* in respect to the *politeia*, and what what is the *telos* of each *koinonia*. Translations of *The Politics* are adapted from C. Lord in Aristotle 1984.

4 Cf. Hansen 1989, 41 n. 126: “The *polis* was a legitimate political power which – apart from a few survivals of legitimate self help – monopolized the use of force.”

5 Problem with sovereignty concept: Ober 1989c. For the ideological nature of *politeia*, cf. 1294a19-20: it is *eleutheria*, *ploutos*, *arete* that “contend for equality” within the *politeia*.

6 Fish 1980; Austin 1975. For a fuller definition of what I mean by “ideology” see Ober 1989a, 38-43. Cf. 1286a2-3 where Aristotle makes a sharp distinction between the study of *nomoi* and the study of *politeia*; 1289a13-15: *nomoi* are and should be enacted *pros tas politeias* and not vice versa; 1289a18-20: distinctly different *nomoi* are among the things (ergo not the sum of distinguishing characteristics) by which a *politeia* is distinguished (*ton deloun ton*), according to which *archontes* rule.

7 Compare 1292a32-34: ideally *nomos* should rule overall (*archein panton*), yet in specific cases *archai* and *taute politeia* should judge (*krinein*). In practice, the reality of power (ergo who *kratousi*) is sometimes quite different from the existing *nomos*: 1292b11-21.

8 Compare 1289b27-90a8, 1290b38-91a10.

9 On the embeddedness of politics in society see Finley 1983 and the references gathered in Ober 1991a, 113 n.2.

10 Cf. Hansen 1989b, 19: “the *polis* did not comprise all who lived within its borders, but only the *politai*, i.e. the citizens.”

11 Since Aristotle (1276a13-16) then attempts to refute the distinction by pointing out that certain democracies exist through domination, it is clear that the “some” in question were supporters of democracy against oligarchy or tyranny. *Politeiai* which look to the common advantage are in accord with unqualified justice; *despotikai politeiai* look to the advantage of *archontes* alone (1279a17-21).

12 Aristotle cannot be using *oikountai* as a synonym for *politai* in light of the discussion in book I, esp. 1252a20-21: we must investigate “what the *polis* is composed of (*ex hon sugkeitai*),” followed by a discussion of the relationship between free men, women, and slaves. See also 1277a7-10: the *polis* is made up of (*sunesteken*), inter alia, husband and wife, master and slave. Cf. below, n. 25.

13 *pros to tes poleos holes sumpferon kai pros to koinon to ton politon* (1283b40-42), taking the *kai* as conjunctive rather than explanatory: “and the common advantage” rather than “that is to say, the common advantage.”

14 Lord and Jowett translate “partnership”; Sinclair, “association”; *LSJ* s.v. includes “society” among various possibilities, including “communion” and “fellowship.”

15 Definition of *autarkeia*: 1252b27-53a1. Aristotle’s ideal of autarky does not imply a degree of self-sufficiency that would obviate all interest in trade (e.g. 1321b14-18: trade is

the readiest way to achieve *autarkeia*), but rather an absence of dependence upon any foreign power; cf. Nixon and Price 1990.

16 See 1277b2-3: “[it is] not [the case that] all those are to be regarded as citizens without whom there would not be a *polis*” (with specific reference to children and *banauoi*); 1252a26-34: the *polis* is built up of union between “those who cannot live without one another”: men and women, masters and (natural) slaves. I do not mean by this that the *polis* is necessarily “based on” slavery; but it is (materially) “based on” the labor of noncitizens – including women, children, and metics. For discussion see Wood 1988; with Ober 1991b.

17 At 1280b33-35, the building blocks of the *polis* that will live well and autarkically are *oikiai* and *gene*, which I take to be the equivalent of *oikoi* and *komai*.

18 Cf. 1280a32-34: *proairesis* is a precondition for the existence of the *polis*.

19 1252a34-1253a1; I identify the long-term necessity as avoidance of injustice on the basis of 1280a25-1281a1, where avoidance of injustice is linked with material prosperity as concerns of living, and contrasted to the *telos* of living well.

20 What I am calling Aristotle’s social contractarianism differs substantially from modern versions (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau). First, since the process of *polis* formation is natural, the parties are impelled to join together. Next, Aristotle puts little emphasis on individuals. After the first step (forming the natural partnerships of man-woman, and slave-master), the parties to the contract are heads of *oikoi* (along with *komai* and *gene*). Moreover, while living together ensures justice and material security, these are not the ultimate purpose of the *koinonia*; nor sufficient conditions for the existence of the *polis* (1280b23 – 1281a1: a passage taken by J. Barnes in Miller 1991, 21, as an explicit rejection of “the view that the state’s authority rests on any ‘social contract’”). Yet these are necessary conditions (1280b30-31). Finally, while *eudaimonia* is the highest good of the *politai* and of the *polis* as a *koinonia politike*, living under a regime of justice and enjoying material security is (at least by implication) the highest good accessible to women, slaves, and other noncitizens.

21 1253a29-31. See also 1285b6-9 where the process of being brought together (*to sunagein*) is one of the benefits that members of a *plethos* willingly (*hekonton*) received from heroic monarchs of the past. Thus the process was voluntary, rather than imposed. Cf. 1286b34-40: the coercive power of constitutional monarchs should be inferior to that of *to plethos*; once again underscoring the consensual nature of the political order.

22 Cf. 1278b15-30. While modern contract doctrine postulates the social contract as a way of escaping the state of nature, Aristotle assumes it as a precondition of attaining a natural state. The modern contractarian begins and ends with the contract; Aristotle imports an implied contract to get his developmental scheme off the ground (to transform a scattering of *oikoi* into a *polis*) and retains it as a means to achieving the stability that is a precondition to the end of living well. The contract, for Aristotle, thus conjoins two natural conditions (*oikos* and autarkic, eudaimonic *polis*). These important distinctions must not obscure the common element: the necessity of human agency and consent in the formation of a complex society. Harris (forthcoming) points out the links between Hobbesian contract theory and classical theory’s natural teleology.

23 The slave was assumed to be capable of rational understanding (1259b28, 1260b5-7) and (unlike the *banauos*) was part of *koinonia* of the *oikos* (*koinonos zen*: 1260a39-40).

24 For Aristotle on women and their role in the *polis*, see Saxenhouse 1991.

25 Gently coercive nature of education: 1259b10-11; education *pros tas politeias* is the

greatest of those things which preserve the *polis*, although the most overlooked: 1310a12-14. Cf. the legal decision in *Board of Education v. Pico* (457 U.S. 853 [1984]) which endorsed the right of the state to “inculcate” in its citizens “the democratic ideology that infuses its institutions” (with comments of Harris [forthcoming]). On education as cultural reproduction and the problem of coercion, see Gutmann 1987, 3-48.

26 Cf. 1280b30-35: “the *polis* is ... a *koinonia* in living well of both *oikiai* and *gene* for the sake of a complete and autarkic life”; 1280b40-81a2: “the *polis* is a *koinonia* of *gene* and *komai* for the sake of a complete and autarkic life.”

27 On the necessity of inequality to the *polis* see 1280a7- 25; 1282b14-83a23. Economic class, status, and order, and their place in Aristotle’s understanding of the *polis*: Ober 1991a.

28 Of course in Athens a man of twenty was a citizen, yet he might not yet be the master of an *oikos*. The complexities introduced by this disjunction between public and private standing are explored in Strauss (forthcoming).

29 If we look ahead to Athenian practice, there is in each case a significant grey area between public and private spheres: The soldier might be unable to serve the state as a hoplite without aid from a neighbor (Lysias 16.14, 31.15, 19); if captured by the enemy he might depend on private beneficence to bring him home (Lysias 19.59; Dem. 8.70-71). The trader in grain was legally required to ship his cargo to Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 51.4; Dem. 34.37, 35.50-51; Lycurgus 1.27). Membership in a phratry (an association with links to cult, neighborhood, and perhaps kinship) could be brought forward to prove citizenship in the state (Dem. 57.54; cf. Hedrick 1991, who emphasizes the political as opposed to the tribal origins of the phratry). The mix of public and private interaction in the demes is too complex to sketch here, but see Whitehead 1986, esp. 223-252; Osborne 1985. The Initiate might sit on a jury of fellow Initiates empanelled by the state to try sacrilege (Andocides 1).

30 On the concept of differentiation see Luhmann 1982; with discussion in Ober 1991a, 117, 132-133. On the issue of differentiation my understanding of the *polis* is closer to that of M. Weber than to that of E. Durkheim; for the distinction see Murray 1990a.

31 Cf. 1297a7-13, where Aristotle explicitly rejects deception of the *demoi* (one is tempted to say that he rejects false consciousness) as a route to good order. On conflict in Aristotle’s *polis* see Yack 1985.

32 Compare 1281b21-30, 1294b34-41, 1296b14-17, 1309b16-18, 1267a39-40: a part of the *polis* that “shares in nothing” (*oudenos metechon*) will be hostile (*allogtron*) to the *politeia*; 1274a17- 18: Solon made the Athenian *demoi kurios* regarding elections and audits, lest it become *doulos* and thereby *polemios*. This last is an example of the hostility and instability that results from the enslavement of those who are not “natural” slaves (see 1255b14- 15). Ideological stability is prior to preserving a specific set of institutional relationships between governmental entities, which is why *Ath. Pol.* can see the *demokratia* of 462 to that of his time (with interruptions of 411 and 404) as essentially continuous.

33 Potential destabilization of *politeia* from disaffected *politai* and other free males: 1277b33-78b5, esp. 1278a37-40: the free male who does not share in the prerogatives (*timai*) of citizenship is equivalent to (*hosper*) a metic, and in some *poleis* this is concealed for the sake of deceiving the (excluded) inhabitants.

34 Nevertheless, women could be described as a *plethos*, comparable to the *plethos* of males (1269b15-17). Since women possessed the power of deliberation (1260a12-13), this *plethos* could presumably organize itself for common action. These sorts of considerations provoked much unease in other literary genres, notably Aristophanic comedy and Euripidean tragedy; see below.

35 A voluntary compromise of personal sovereignty is also entailed in the “best *politeia*,” whose citizen will be *dunamos kai proairoumenos* of ruling and being ruled by turns: 1284a1-3; cf. 1277a12-25. The nondeterministic role of nature in social relations is further underlined by the assumption that all deviant regimes (which are the commonest forms of *politeia*) are to be regarded as unnatural (*para phusin*: 1287b39-41). *Demokratia* is one of these, yet, it is “not easy” for any regime other than democracy to arise now that *poleis* are large: 1286b20-22.

36 Cf. 1276b29: *koinonia d'estin he politeia*.

37 For the tendency of Athenian law to focus on procedural, rather than substantive matters, see for example Todd and Millett 1990. The flesh and bones metaphor was previously employed, in reference to the relative importance of political factions and the “Constitution,” by Connor 1971, 4-5. Connor’s approach is attacked by Hansen 1989a. My own concern is more with substantive social practices than with political factions, but I believe that Connor’s strictures on the limits of narrowly constitutional history (i.e. the evolution of procedural rules) remain valid.

38 Rawls 1971, 4, referring specifically to the “macro-society” rather than to various subgroups within society: cf. Rawls 1971, 8, 61; Wolff 1977, 68, 77-80, 196, 202-203. Parenthetical numbers in the text of this section refer to the page number of Rawls 1971.

39 Rawls 1971, 61, states his general conception of justice as follows: “all social values... are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution ... is to everyone’s advantage.” Primary social goods are rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth: Rawls 1971, 62, 92. Cf. Wolff 1977, 75.

40 Difference principle: Rawls 1971, 75-83; Wolff 1977, 63-65.

41 Rawls’ sources of inspiration: Rawls 1971, vii-viii, 11, 15, 22-45; Wolf 1977, 11-15. The original position: Rawls 1971, 17-22; the veil of ignorance: Rawls 1971, 12, 136-142. Maximin: Rawls 1971, 152-157; Wolff 1977, 50-51, 82-83.

42 Rawls 1971, 302-303; cf. 60-90.

43 See, for example, discussion in Wolff 1977; Barber 1988, 54-90; Pogge 1989. Rawls has defended and refined his theory in a series of articles, e.g. Rawls 1987.

44 Rawls on substantive vs formal or procedural justice: 1971, 54-60. Problem of inequality: 7, 96. Stable, permanent regime: 6, 12-13. His theory in accord with the “traditional” theory of justice which is based on Aristotle: 10-11, cf. 424- 433. See also Wolff 1977, 208-209; Nussbaum 1990; Wallach (1992), with bibliography. Contrast MacIntyre 1981, who would subordinate the moral rules typified in Rawlsian liberal tradition to the larger context of moral virtue which he finds in Aristotle.

45 Stability of Athens in the fourth century (and the necessity of explaining it): Ober 1989a, esp. 17-20.

46 Here I deliberately avoid the question of whether, in an ideological society, voluntary consent is possible. I deal with this issue in detail in several forthcoming studies devoted to criticism (by Thucydides et al.) of Athenian democracy.

47 For another approach to “historicist” political theory see Wallach (1992). The sort of analysis I am proposing is inevitably based on limited evidence, but would have been much more difficult two decades ago, before the flowering of studies of democratic Athens as a state (for which see the bibliography in Hansen 1991) and as a society, for which see the studies cited below.

48 Cf. Hansen 1989b, 19: “Family life ... belonged in the private and not in the public sphere...the *polis* did not regulate all matters but only a limited range of social activities, mostly those connected with the state.”

49 Cf. Hansen 1989b, 18: "in many aspects of life the Athenians practiced a separation between a public and a private sphere ... the dichotomy of the public and the private is apparent in all aspects of life."

50 E.g. *dokimasia* (and especially the *dokimasia rhetoron*: Aeschines 1); oaths taken in the *dikasteria* which entail death and destruction for one's *oikos* in the case of foreswearing (Aeschines 2.87); the display of family members as character witness at trials (Humphreys 1985c); legal actions concerning rights to citizenship (Dem. 57); attacks on one's opponents' family members in political trials and defense based of family members' liturgical service (Ober 1989a, 226-233).

51 The bibliography on the relationship between *oikos* and *polis* is large and growing rapidly, see, recently, Humphreys 1983b; Foxhall 1989; Jameson 1990; Winkler 1990, 45-70; Halperin 1990, 88-112; Cohen 1992; Strauss forthcoming.

52 Cf. Hansen 1989b, 19-20: "education [et al.] were not political issues but mostly left to private enterprise ... not much discussed in the *ekklesia* and citizens were allowed to do as they pleased."

53 See e.g. Harris 1989, 65-115; Thomas 1989.

54 In the mid 330s B.C. the *ephebeia*, formerly a system of military training, added a component of moral education: Ober 1985, 90-95; Humphreys 1985b with literature cited.

55 Complexities of democratic control of education, and of designing an education in democratic values: Gutmann 1987. Athenian belief in the normative value of public political practice: Ober 1989a, 159-163.

56 On the question of whether or not magistrates received regular state pay in the fourth century and the nature of their other perquisites, see Hansen 1979; Hansen 1980; Gabrielsen 1981. There is no way of determining the extent of voluntary abstention by the illiterate and no evidence to suggest that questioning at *dokimasiai* focused on basic competence.

57 Cf. Hansen 1989, 20: "The Greek *polis* was a community of citizens to the exclusion of foreigners and slaves...the Athenian citizens isolated themselves from metics and slaves to debate political issues in the assembly, in the council and in the popular courts."

58 Women in the *agora*: Dem. 57.33-34; cf. *Pol.* 1300a6-7, 1323a5-6. Husbands discuss court cases and Assembly business with their wives, daughters, sons, and mothers: Dem. 59.110-111; Lycurgus 1.141; Aeschines 1.186-87; cf. Aristophanes, *Ekk.* 551ff (a scene which assumes for its comic force that such conversations were normal). Activities of women outside the home at Athens: Cohen 1989, with catalog of passages.

59 Spectators: Aristophanes, *Ekk.* 241-244: Praxagora learned rhetoric by overhearing Assembly debates when her family was billeted in the city during the Peloponnesian War; spectatorship may have been more difficult after the construction of Pnyx II in the late fifth/early fourth century. References in the orators and archaeological remains make it clear that at least some Athenian courtrooms also allowed spectatorship; Aeschines 1.117 goes so far as to claim that the spectators judged the *dikastai*; cf. Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 59 and n. 170 with references cited.

60 Date: MacDowell 1971 (although cf. Humphreys 1983a, 240-242). Previously dispute arbitration had been an entirely private phenomenon, and hence the line between a private realm of arbitration and a public realm of lawcourts may have been clearer; cf. Humphreys 1983a, 6. Women's depositions under oath: Dem. 29.26, 33, 56, 39.3-4, 40.11, 59.45-48. Arbitration in temples: Dem. 33.18, 36.15-16, 40.11, Isaeus 2.31; cf. Gernet 1954, 210 n. 2. In the *Heliaia*: Dem. 47.12. In the *Stoa Poikile*: Dem. 45.17. Public arbitration in general: Gernet 1939; Harrell 1936.

61 Metics: Cohen 1973; metics and slaves: Cohen 1991.

- 62** Gossip: Ober 1989a, 148-151; Hunter 1990 (with catalog of references); Humphreys 1989.
- 63** Millett 1989. This is one reason that prosopographical approaches to Athenian political history are generally unsatisfactory: they are implicitly predicated on a misleading parallel with the social structure of republican Rome (derived primarily from R. Syme) and, at a second remove, upon the elitist model of political behavior which Syme explicitly adopted. See Syme 1939, vii: "the composition of the oligarchy of government... emerges as the dominant theme of political history"; 7: "in all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the facade..."; cf. Linderski 1990. Syme's latter comment is a virtual paraphrase of Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" – first published in 1911 (German edition) and 1915 (English and Italian); see Michels 1962. Ober 1989a was intended in part as a challenge to elitist political theory in general and Michels' Iron Law in particular.
- 64** Patronage as reciprocal but unequal obligations that can endure between family groups over generations: Saller 1982; Wallace-Hadrill 1989.
- 65** I am not making an argument for priority (i.e. claiming that open social relations came first and thus democracy flourished, or vice versa). Rather I suppose that a non-clientistic social culture and a democratic political culture were mutually empowering and so grew up together.
- 66** Male honor and the family in Mediterranean society: Cohen 1992, with literature cited. For other societies: Mandelbaum 1988; Small 1991.
- 67** Definition of *hubris* as willfully and gratuitously inflicting shame (*aischune*) upon another: Arist. *Rhet.* 1378b23- 26. *Hubris* as an assault on the individual in Athens: Murray 1990b; Fisher 1990. The alternative argument, that adultery and *hubris* fit Mediterranean norms of honor and shame associated with family and sexuality: Cohen 1990. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1391a 14-19) links *hubris* and adultery as misdeeds typical of the newly wealthy.
- 68** For the two models of honor, distinction, hierarchy vs dignity, recognition, democracy, see Taylor 1989. On Athenian conceptions of the individual self, honor, and dignity, see also Gouldner 1969, 87-110. I explore the issue of honor and dignity in more detail in Ober (forthcoming).
- 69** *Philotimia*: Whitehead 1983; Ober 1989a, 332-333. Cf. Goode 1978. In decentering the concept of honor as aggressive masculinity I am going against the grain of some recent anthropologically oriented work on Athenian society, e.g. Halperin 1990; Cohen 1992. I tend to think that the aristocratic value of honor has been overgeneralized to a universal Athenian (or Greek) value. What makes Athens distinct from other societies is not its hierarchical tendencies, but rather its egalitarian tendencies. Thus, even those who follow Foucault 1980 in assuming a high degree of isomorphism of political and the private should be looking for tendencies to equality and distributive justice at the private level, since these ideals dominate the Athenian public realm.
- 70** The exception that proves the rule is honors done the descendants of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton: Taylor 1991, 1-5. Athenian litigants did indeed mention great deeds of their ancestors in court, but tended to do so as part of an argument that they themselves are likely to act in the same way, rather than as part of demand for distinction on basis of membership *ipso facto*; cf. Ober 1989a, 226-230.
- 71** Redistributive function of liturgies, taxes, and fines: Ober 1989a, 199-202; Osborne 1991.
- 72** Cf. discussion in Ober 1989a, 209-211

- 73** See, for example, discussion by Humphreys 1983a, 1985a, 1985c; the essays collected in Cartledge, Millett, Todd 1990; Todd 1990; Cohen 1991, 1992.
- 74** Complaints that democracy blurs distinctions between slaves, metics, women, and citizens, and renders discipline impossible: Aristotle, *Pol.* 1313b32-38, 1319b27-30; Ps-Xenophon, *Ath. Pal.* 1.10-12; Plato, *Rep.* 562b-563c; cf. *Dem.* 9.3, 21.47, 49. Varying views on Athenian treatment of slaves: Gouldner 1969, 33-34, 88-90; Garlan 1988, 145-153; Patterson 1991, 64-180.
- 75** Athenian citizens as peasants: Wood 1988; Todd 1990. The conservative risk-management strategies typical of peasant societies: Gallant, 1991; cf. Sallares 1990.
- 76** This does not, of course, mean that Athens did not require imports (although the necessity has often been overrated: Garnsey 1988, 89-164), but rather that Athens was able to produce and defend goods adequate to secure the material needs of the population.
- 77** See, for example, Foxhall 1989; Hunter 1989a; Hunter 1989b; Ober 1991c.
- 78** Drama, and especially comedy, as (*inter alia*) political and social commentary: see the essays by S. Goldhill, J. Ober and B. Strauss, J. Henderson, J. Redfield in Winkler and Zeitlin 1990; Rothwell 1990; Konstan 1990. Others have seen drama rather as a form of social control: e.g. Olson 1990. See Podlecki 1990 for a review of the vexed question of whether women attended the theater.
- 79** On which, see Raaflaub 1985, 1991; Ober 1991d.
- 80** For thoughtful discussions, see Manville 1990; Meier 1984; Euben 1990.

The Greek *Poleis*: Demes, Cities and Leagues

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Our series of papers is linked by the definition given in book III of Aristotle's *Politics*. – 'The *polis* is a kind of community (*koinonia*); it is a community of *politai* in a *politeia*'¹ – and I have been asked to write about the *polis* as an independent unit and as a member of a hegemony or a part of a federal state. I have extended my brief somewhat, to include smaller units within the *polis* as well as *poleis* within a larger unit.

The theme which I explore happens to be highly topical, more so than could have been realised when the planning for this meeting was begun in the early summer of 1989 (and the Danish referendum of 1992 made it more appropriate than ever that this theme should have been discussed in Denmark in 1992). What is a state? What kind of unit should be the sovereign body, and what kinds of power should be enjoyed by smaller units within the sovereign body or by larger units in which the sovereign body is included? What should the relationship be between what was Yugoslavia and its constituent parts, or what used to be called the Soviet Union and its constituent parts, or the United Kingdom and its constituent parts? Has Europe a 'federal destiny', and if so what does this mean for the European Community and for the separate states which have joined in that Community?

It is a notorious fact that classical Greece was bedevilled by tension between impulses to unity and impulses to separation. The world of the Greeks, the mainlands surrounding the Aegean and the islands of the Aegean, is divided geographically into a large number of small habitable areas, communication between which is not particularly easy, so that natural units tend to be small units, as they do not (for instance) in much of Italy. It is not clear that bronze-age Greece was based on small independent units, but there were small units in the Greece which emerged from the dark age into the archaic period, and a strong attachment to one's local unit was something which persisted into the classical period and beyond.

Many of the earliest units, however, were too small to survive as totally independent units when life became more settled, more inter-dependent and more prosperous, and one's nearest neighbours did not have to be regarded as enemies. From an early date we find various kinds of combination, which tend to be lumped together under the single label *synoikismos*. Boeotia was a large plain, by Greek standards, containing a number of settlements around a central lake. Already by the end of the dark age some small settlements had coalesced to form larger units, either concentrated on an urban centre or remaining a loose union of separate villages.² It has been claimed that we see this process going wrong in Hesiod's township of Ascra: Thespieae, the nearest larger town, tried to absorb Ascra against the will of the people; Ascra was defeated and its territory taken over by Thespieae, but the people fled to Orchomenus and were received into that community. However, Snodgrass has remarked that the destruction of a *kome* by a *polis* in this way would be strange, and suggests that the allusion is to the suppression of an attempt by Ascra to secede between 386 and 364.³ At any rate, the organisation of the federal state of Boeotia (at which we shall look later) reflects traces of the coalescence of the Boeotian communities into a limited number of *poleis*. Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae and other communities were in a state of *sympoliteia* with Plataea before the Peloponnesian War, but in the early years of the war their inhabitants migrated to Thebes and at the beginning of the fourth century they could be described as *συντελούντων* to Thebes;⁴ Hyettus remained a separate community with a separate name, but was to some extent subordinate to Orchomenus; and Eutresis and Thisbae were likewise subordinate to Thespieae.⁵

Similarly in Arcadia five villages united to form the *polis* of Mantinea, probably about 470;⁶ after the Peace of Antalcidas Sparta insisted on splitting up Mantinea into its component villages once more;⁷ but after Sparta had been weakened by its defeat at Leuctra the single *polis* was reformed,⁸ and it then went on to join in the foundation of a federal state of Arcadia.

Different patterns are displayed by the development of what became the two largest *poleis* of Greece, Athens and Sparta. Athens achieved a political but not a physical *synoikismos*: the people lived in their many separate settlements dispersed throughout Attica, but all men of native Attic stock were *politai* of the *polis* of Athens.⁹ One of the achievements of Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century (possibly, indeed, the achievement which made his complicated reorganisation popular¹⁰) was to give political machinery and a political identity of a subordinate kind to the

individual settlements, the demes whose inhabitants became their *demotai*, and to the intermediate units, the *trittyes* and the tribes, through which the demes were incorporated into the *polis*. There were limits beyond which this process of incorporation did not go. Eleusis was a comparatively late accession to the Athenian state, but not too late to be included.¹¹ On the other hand, the island of Salamis was probably acquired by Athens in the first half of the sixth century,¹² but at the end of the century Athenian cleruchs were sent there, and Salamis was not included in Cleisthenes' organisation but was ruled as subject territory.¹³ Eleutheræ, in the far north-west of Attica, was probably acquired under the tyranny,¹⁴ but it too became subject territory;¹⁵ and so did Oropus at such times as it belonged to Athens.

In the development of Sparta we can trace several different stages. First comes the political but not physical amalgamation of the original four villages, probably into two pairs as the origin of the two royal families, and then into the single unit of Sparta; next the incorporation of Amyclæ.¹⁶ In the organisation attributed to Lycurgus the division of the Spartan citizens into the three Dorian tribes was crossed with a division into *obes*,¹⁷ and I am among those who believe that there were five *obes* based on the five villages.¹⁸ We do not know for the archaic and classical periods whether the *obes* functioned simply as a means of articulation within the citizen body as a whole, for instance by serving as a basis for units in the army, or whether they also functioned as local units with local powers like the demes of Attica, so that a matter concerning Amyclæ alone might be decided by the *obesmen* of Amyclæ alone; but the development by which individual citizens came to have land throughout Laconia and Messenia, and the nature of the citizens' life in classical Sparta, both suggest that attachment to the locality of their particular *obe* came not to count for much with Spartan citizens.¹⁹

What we do know is that the Spartans did not go on from the five villages to incorporate the rest of Laconia in the Spartan *polis* in the way in which Attica was incorporated in the Athenian *polis*. The inhabitants of other towns in Laconia became *perioikoi*, and the essential feature of their status seems to have been that they had local autonomy, to run the affairs of their own townships in their own way, but they had no foreign relations of their own but were obliged to follow the lead of the Spartans:²⁰ perioecic towns can be called *poleis* by classical writers,²¹ and the *perioikoi* were *Lakedaimonioi*, who fought alongside Spartan citizens in what can be called the army of the *Lakedaimonioi*²² or even (to contrast it with the forces of Sparta's allies) τὸ πολιτικὸν στρατεύμα.²³ Logically if

not chronologically after the *perioikoi* comes the subjection of those inhabitants of Laconia who became helots, serfs belonging in one sense to the whole Spartan *polis* but in another to individual Spartan citizens whose land they worked, and then the extension of that status to the inhabitants of Messenia when that was conquered in the late eighth and seventh centuries.²⁴

So already by the late archaic period different answers had begun to emerge to the questions – which of course had not yet been consciously formulated – what it meant to be a *polis*, what it meant to be a *polites*, and how small units and their members could be combined in larger units. The larger unit might be the only reality, with the smaller units politically if not physically obliterated, as happened at Mantinea; or it might be the only unit with any independent functions, while the smaller units survived physically and as components of the larger, but with no powers of their own, as with the obes of Sparta. Lesser settlements around a major one might be fully incorporated in a *polis* in such a way that everybody belonged to his own local community and to the *polis* as well, as in Attica after Cleisthenes everybody belonged to his own deme and to the *polis* of Athens, and decisions affecting a particular deme were taken by the members of that deme but decisions affecting the whole *polis* were taken by the whole *polis*. Alternatively the major city might become not merely the seat of administration for the *polis* but the dominant part of the polis, as in Laconia, where the *perioikoi* could take decisions for their own townships, which were in a sense *poleis*, but they were not *politai* of the dominant *polis* of Sparta, and had no say in the decisions of that *polis* yet were required to obey decisions taken by the *politai*. (And the helots remind us that, although I have used the word ‘everybody’, not every inhabitant of a political unit in the Greek world, or even every free inhabitant, was a member of that unit with political rights – but that is not the particular concern of my paper and I shall not labour the point.)

Aristotle was to argue in book VII of the *Politics* that there should be lower and upper limits to the size of the *polis*: lower, because a unit which is too small cannot be self-sufficient, and upper, because that makes it hard for there to be a *politeia*. A large number cannot be orderly, no *strategos* can command them, no man can address them in the assembly, appointments cannot be made and lawsuits cannot be decided when the citizens do not know one another; and if the territory is too large it cannot all be seen from the city.²⁵ Most Greek *poleis*, in population and in territory, did not exceed Aristotle’s limits. Attica and Laconia did. Athens had up to 60,000 adult male citizens in the mid fifth century and prob-

ably 30,000 in the time of Aristotle,²⁶ and for those living farthest away the journey to the city centre was thirty miles / fifty kilometres or more. That pushed to the extreme and beyond the ideal of a *polis* in which every *polites* was a member of a single *koinonia*, knowing and known to all the other *politai*, and equally able with them to take his turn at ruling and being ruled. Sparta, with a theoretical 9,000 citizens and a probable 8,000 in the early fifth century,²⁷ was in its heyday one of the largest in terms of citizen population, but as it continued to expand its territory until it controlled more than three times the area of Attica it had not continued to expand its citizen body. Far from having to face the problem of making polis institutions work for an exceptionally large citizen body, Sparta gave its already large citizen body a way of life which both enabled and required each citizen to spend an exceptionally large proportion of his time in the company of his fellow citizens.

The tension with which I began, between impulses to unity and impulses to separation, continued throughout Greek history, as the large and strong units tried to control or absorb the small and weak, and the small and weak tried to preserve their independence. The archaic Spartan kind of expansion, by direct conquest and subjection of the conquered population to the conquering *polis*, failed for Sparta in the sixth century and was not attempted on a large scale by any other *polis*. Herodotus tells us how Sparta, after conquering Messenia, tried in the sixth century to conquer Tegea but was unsuccessful; after a change of policy symbolised by the taking to Sparta of what were claimed to be the bones of Orestes, Sparta overcame most of the Peloponnese²⁸ – but in such a way that the *poleis* now ‘overcome’ retained their identity as independent *poleis*, and Tegea was later to claim to be the senior ally of Sparta.²⁹ The combining of separate *poleis* in a block of allies was to be the classical Greek way of organising units too large to function as a single *polis*.

Alliances between one *polis* and another had probably been made before the sixth century, for a particular occasion if not for a longer term. The earliest instances that we know of a larger grouping for a long term are religious leagues like the amphictyony of Anthela, which as a result of the First Sacred War at the beginning of the sixth century acquired responsibility for Delphi as well as Anthela. This was an organisation whose members were united for a single purpose only, the administration of particular sanctuaries: they did not to a significant extent give up their sovereignty to a superior or pool it in that of the larger body, but remained independent *poleis*, fully entitled to run their own affairs and go

their own way, and indeed to fight against one another, without detriment to their continuing membership of the amphictyony.

The different strands of Greeks in Asia Minor and its offshore islands had some consciousness of solidarity which could extend beyond a common religious interest. When Aeolian Smyrna was attacked by Ionian Colophon about 700, the other eleven Aeolian cities of the mainland are said to have supported it and to have taken in the fugitives. There is no good evidence for the *Panionion*³⁰ earlier than the sixth century, or for regular meetings there,³¹ but Herodotus does mention meetings of the Ionians there to discuss policy at the time of the Persian conquest and during the Ionian Revolt,³² and in the early sixth century he credits Thales with a proposal that the Ionians should establish a single *bouleuterion* at Teos and that the other cities 'should be inhabited but should be of no more account than if they were demes.'³³ How much truth there is in that we do not know. Clearly among the east Greeks there was some sense that cities of the same stock should cooperate in an emergency, but it was not taken very far. In the Ionian Revolt, though the separate cities sent *probouloi* to the *Panionion*, no command structure was produced, and the appointment of Dionysius of Phocaea was an *ad hoc* measure which did not hold for long.³⁴

Sparta's organisation of the Peloponnesian League was therefore something new. Beginning with Tegea, Sparta made alliances during the sixth century with various Peloponnesian states, and it looks as if these alliances made Sparta the senior partner, whose lead the other state was to some extent bound to follow.³⁵ After Cleomenes' attack on Attica about 506 had been frustrated by the withdrawal of Demaratus and of the Corinthians, the Spartans did a deal with their allies, which resulted in the Peloponnesian League. De Ste Croix has given a detailed but misleading analysis of the League's constitution³⁶ – misleading, because there were no precedents and the Spartans were not skilled constitutional lawyers, and it is overwhelmingly likely that many questions were answered not in advance when the League was organised but *ad hoc* as they arose. The essential features of the League were that the alliance was not for a limited purpose or a limited time but was general and permanent; Sparta had the right of initiative and the executive power; and the allied *poleis* were bound to follow Sparta's lead when a congress of allies agreed to do so but not otherwise. That the members remained fully independent except in foreign policy was probably taken for granted rather than spelled out, but for a long time that independence was not, as far as we know, infringed. One question not formally posed and answered at the

beginning was how the opinions of the individual member poleis were to be ascertained and expressed. The *de facto* answer must have been that envoys sent to a League congress expressed an opinion in the light both of what they knew of public opinion at home and of the speeches which they heard there, and if the citizens at home disliked the opinion they expressed they would disown the envoys and refuse to honour the commitment into which the envoys had entered on their behalf.

This is the first instance of a hegemonic league, a league of *poleis* formed primarily for the pursuit of a common foreign policy, in which there is a *hegemon* with executive power but also a mechanism for consulting the other members and limiting the exercise of the executive power. For the *hegemon* this serves as a means of extending the *hegemon's* power over neighbouring *poleis* in a way which they can accept, without openly detracting from their status as independent *poleis*. For the other members it serves as a means of institutionalising the fact of life that more powerful *poleis* tend to dominate less powerful ones, but also of limiting that domination and giving the lesser *poleis* some say in the making of decisions with which they will have to comply.

The alliance formed in 481 to resist the invasion of Xerxes is perhaps better regarded as a separate alliance rather than as an extension of the Peloponnesian League;³⁷ but if we do not make too formal a thing of the Peloponnesian League we shall see that the two bodies were similar in nature, and the distinction between those two views of the alliance is perhaps one which could not have been made at the time. Executive power was vested in Sparta at the first meeting;³⁸ decisions on strategy were made by meetings of *probouloi* before the expeditions to Tempe and to Thermopylae and Artemisium,³⁹ and in more urgent circumstances by councils of generals after Artemisium and before and after Salamis.⁴⁰ The alliance was envisaged as remaining in force after its last campaigns, in 478, so that the Athenians could send troops to Sparta in accordance with it in 462/1 but resign from it subsequently.⁴¹

The Delian League at its inception followed the same pattern once more. The alliance was intended to be permanent, and since it was undoubtedly soon used for purposes other than fighting against Persia we should accept the statement of the *Ath. Pol.* that it was a full offensive and defensive alliance, in which the members swore to have the same friends and the same enemies.⁴² Athens was the *hegemon*, with the executive power. Policy decisions were made by a council of allies, to which the member *poleis*, which were *isopsephoi*,⁴³ sent representatives.⁴⁴ Except as regards foreign policy the allies were independent: despite the references

to *autonomia* in Thucydides,⁴⁵ it is likely that, as in the Peloponnesian League, that was taken for granted rather than spelled out,⁴⁶ and it is an attractive suggestion that the word *autonomia* was coined to refer to the internal independence which the member *poleis* found it increasingly hard to defend against the growing power of Athens.⁴⁷

Athens was to take the power of the *hegemon* much further than Sparta had done. Allies which paid tribute in cash were less well placed to resist Athens than allies which contributed their own forces and could if necessary withdraw them. Athens took a permanent alliance to mean permanent campaigning, which many of the members can hardly have envisaged and for which they could not sustain the enthusiasm; but the League was built up into a very large body of allies, most of them very much smaller and weaker than Athens, and in this state of *polypsephia*⁴⁸ it was easy for the Athenians to induce the council of allies to vote as they wished. By the second half of the fifth century Athens was infringing the *autonomia* of the allies in various ways:⁴⁹ democratic constitutions were imposed, as were governors and garrisons; lawsuits were transferred to Athens; offerings were demanded at Athenian festivals; poor Athenians were settled in cleruchies and rich Athenians were allowed to buy land for themselves in allied territory; *poleis* which provoked Athens and were coerced were treated as defeated enemies. Nothing in Thucydides directly states that the council of allies was abolished, but it is overwhelmingly likely that it was: we certainly find the Athenian assembly making decisions which ought to have been made by the council of allies if it still existed. This was a drastically new attitude to the rights and obligations of *poleis* which had voluntarily entered into an alliance, and it is not surprising that Thucydides writes of enslavement, in his own narrative as well as in speeches,⁵⁰ that it seems to have been admitted even in Athens that Athenian domination was like a tyranny,⁵¹ that Sparta began the Peloponnesian War claiming that it was going to liberate the Greeks.⁵²

Before we leave the fifth century, we must look at another kind of organisation larger than the individual *polis*, the federal state. In 519 Plataea, in the south of Boeotia, when it was under pressure from Thebes, appealed to Sparta and had its appeal redirected to Athens, and the upshot was a ruling from Corinthian mediators that Thebes should leave alone those of the Boeotians who did not want to ἐξ Βοιωτῶν τελέειν.⁵³ Behind that episode lies the fact that Thebes was organising the Boeotian *poleis* into a federal state; we have references to the federal officials called boeotarchs in 480 and 479.⁵⁴ The federation may have broken up after the Persian Wars, and for ten years in the middle of the

century Boeotia was under Athenian domination, but after 446 the federal state was revived, and passages in Thucydides and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* combine to give us the essentials of its structure.⁵⁵ In the individual *poleis* the full citizens, those possessed of a property qualification, were divided into four *boulai*: these took it in turn to act as the probouleutic body, the *boule* in the normal sense of the word, referring matters to the other three for a final decision. The federation was based after 427 on eleven units,⁵⁶ the largest *poleis* with their dependencies accounting for more than one and the smallest being grouped together to form one. All the federal institutions were based on these units: in particular, each unit provided one boeotarch and sixty members of the federal council. The federal council was divided into four *boulai*, which presumably functioned like the four *boulai* of the individual *poleis*.

Thus Boeotia had federal government and *polis* government, and a Boeotian was a citizen of Boeotia and of his *polis*, rather as Athens had *polis* government and deme government, and an Athenian was a citizen of Athens and a demesman of his deme. The difference, presumably, is that the Boeotian *poleis* were not only fewer but also more powerful and independent than the Athenian demes. We do not know in detail how power was divided between the *poleis* and the federation, though the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* states that the federation had common funds and taxes, and had *dikastai*; but it is likely that membership of his own *polis* meant more even to a Boeotian who was active at a federal level than membership of his own deme meant to an Athenian, and membership of the larger body meant correspondingly less, that boeotarchs and members of the federal council were more likely to think of themselves as representing the interests of their *polis*, as it were in an alliance, than Athenian officeholders were to think of themselves as representing the interests of their tribe or deme. It is symptomatic of this that Boeotian *poleis* can from time to time be unwilling to participate in the federation, as *poleis* can be unwilling to participate in a hegemonic league. The subject territory of Oropus sometimes objected to Athenian rule, but we never hear, and we should not expect to hear, of a secessionist movement in an Athenian deme.⁵⁷ It can be added that demes did not have separate relationships with other *poleis*, and did not have military forces which could be regarded as their own.

It is worth emphasising before we move on that both hegemonic leagues and federal states confront – instinctively rather than explicitly – the problem of how to govern a unit too large to satisfy Aristotle's requirements for a *polis*, that it is a community of *politai*, that all the citizens

can meet in an assembly, that all the citizens can know one another, that all the territory can be seen from the city. Their answer to the problem is representative institutions:⁵⁸ a council of allies in a hegemonic league, federal officials and a federal council in a federal state. Individual *poleis*, whether democratic or oligarchic, have direct government, where those eligible to hold office take it in turns to hold office and those eligible to take part in decision-making serve in turns on a council or meet together in an assembly. Fewer citizens have the opportunity to hold office in or serve on the council of their league or federal state, but those who do so are to an unspecified extent representing and speaking for their individual *polis*, and the *politai* of the individual *poleis* can feel that they are part of a larger community.

Sparta won the Peloponnesian War, at the price of surrendering the Greeks of mainland Asia Minor to Persia. The lesson which Sparta seems to have learned from the fifth century is that what Athens had done Sparta might do too. In the early fourth century we find her infringing the independence both of states which she had liberated from Athens and of members of the Peloponnesian League, and further strengthening her own position within her alliance by accepting cash payments in place of personal service from her allies.⁵⁹

We also see Sparta devising in the Common Peace a mechanism which might have become the basis for a more equitable union of *poleis* but which was in fact used first by Sparta and then by others as a means of increasing her own power, not by building up a league of allies but by weakening potential enemies. The principle on which the Common Peace treaties were based was that every *polis*, large or small, should be free and independent,⁶⁰ but that brings us back to the question underlying the whole of my paper, what units are the *poleis* which are entitled to be free and independent, and what should be done with larger and smaller units?

Sparta used the principle as an excuse for breaking up into their component parts hostile units which she wished to weaken. Athens was originally to have no overseas possessions (but eventually was allowed Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, first acquired early in the fifth century);⁶¹ the federal state of Boeotia was to be split into its component *poleis* (but at one stage Sparta considered allowing the federal state to survive on condition that Orchomenus could withdraw from it),⁶² and the *polis* of Mantinea was to be split into the villages from which it had been formed nearly a century before;⁶³ and the recent union of Corinth and Argos (to which we shall return) was undone.⁶⁴ Eventually the principle was to be

used against Sparta, when Messenia was liberated in 370/69 and subsequent treaties included a clause stipulating that Messenia was to remain independent.⁶⁵

Formally the Common Peace was an attempt to resolve the disputes of the Greek *poleis* without organising them in a hegemonic league. Xenophon's version of the Peace of Antalcidas is probably correct: it is a proclamation by the Persians to the Greeks of the terms on which the Corinthian War is to be ended, and a declaration that the Persians, with any Greeks who wish, will make war on any who do not accept the terms.⁶² Beyond that there is no evidence for a mechanism to make the peace work by deciding that a state had broken the terms and requiring action against that state: Sparta was in a dominant position, not because of a special clause in the treaty, but because Sparta had persuaded the Persians to proclaim these terms and Sparta would be able to interpret to the Persians what should count as a breach of the terms.⁶⁷ At any rate in later treaties in the series there were attempts to provide a mechanism.⁶⁸ In the peace before Leuctra there was what has been called a voluntary guarantee clause, by which participants in the peace were allowed to act against, and forbidden to support, a state which broke the peace.⁶⁹ In the peace after Leuctra there was a compulsory guarantee clause, obliging participants to act against a state which broke the peace. On that occasion participants swore to 'the treaty which the King sent down and the decrees of the Athenians and their allies':⁷⁰ it is hardly likely that the Athenians enlarged their Second League to include nearly all the Greeks, and the best explanation of the reference to the decrees of the Athenians and their allies is that the freedom and independence guaranteed to participants were to be interpreted as in the Second League.⁷¹ Compulsory action against any state refusing to comply was envisaged in the peace which the Thebans tried to obtain in 367,⁷² and Thebes wanted but Corinth refused to combine an alliance with the limited peace of 365;⁷³ after Mantinea the Greeks made a common peace and alliance.⁷⁴ Like the Peace of Antalcidas, however, these later treaties lacked not only a *hegemon* but any mechanism for ruling that the peace had been broken and that action was needed.

Athens seemed to have learned that with the Delian League she had gone much further than was acceptable in infringing the independence of the member *poleis*, and at the foundation of her Second League she promised that those infringements would not be repeated: this time the *poleis* were to be free and autonomous, governed under whatever constitution they wished, not subjected to a garrison or governor or required

to pay tribute, and there was to be no Athenian property in the territory of the member *poleis*.⁷⁵ There was a council of allies, independent of Athens to the extent of having a non-Athenian chairman,⁷⁶ but interacting with the Athenian council and assembly. As is well known, the reality did not live up to the ideal.⁷⁷ Athens did not become rich and powerful through this league as it had done through the Delian League, but we find instances of interference in internal affairs, garrisons and governors, collection of money (under the new name of *syntaxeis*) and the establishment of Athenian cleruchies; and, although the league's council was not suppressed, when Athens negotiated with Philip of Macedon in 346 it agreed to accept whatever Athens decided,⁷⁸ and its own recommendations were not adopted.⁷⁹

The Boeotian federal state was dismantled after the Peace of Antalcidas. Thebes was occupied by Sparta in 382, and this occupation of one of the leading *poleis* of Greece by another, when they had not even been at war with each other, was one of the most shocking events in Greek history: it was followed by the rule of the pro-Spartan party in Thebes, kept in power by a Spartan garrison. In 379/8 Thebes was liberated, and in the years that followed the Boeotian federal state was revived.

There are two points which we need to notice. First, although organisation by units and the office of boeotarch were retained, the sovereign body was not now a representative council but an assembly open to all Boeotian citizens,⁸⁰ and because Thebans could attend assemblies in Thebes more easily than men from other *poleis* the assembly will have been dominated by Thebes as the old council was not. Secondly, the history of the 370's and 360's shows other Boeotian *poleis* resisting the federal state and being dealt with harshly: Plataea was destroyed in 373/2;⁸¹ Thespieae with its dependencies was first forced to *συντελεῖν εἰς τὰς Θήβας* (which perhaps means to join the federation), then possibly the *polis* of Thespieae was dismantled, and finally Thespieae was destroyed and depopulated;⁸² after Leuctra Orchomenus was first given the status of an ally, which presumably means excluded from the federal state, and later destroyed.⁸³ Where we have evidence, for 371⁸⁴ and in inscriptions which may belong to the late 360's, the boeotarchs number seven:⁸⁵ it has been suggested that the units are the same as in the old federation, with Plataea added to Thebes once more and Thespieae and Orchomenus eliminated,⁸⁶ and that would give Thebes an absolute majority of units; but there are difficulties in this view.⁸⁷ Regardless of that, it is clear that the new federal state was dominated by Thebes to a much greater extent

than the old, and that citizens of the other *poleis* in Boeotia could not now feel that they were equal partners in a Boeotian *politeia*.

This phase in Greek history is ended, and the hellenistic period is foreshadowed, by the establishment of Philip's League of Corinth after Chaeronea. Philip combined three strands which we have been following in the fourth century: a Common Peace, which guaranteed the freedom and independence of the Greek states and sought to maintain a balance of weakness among them; a hegemonic league, with the Macedonian king as *hegemon* and with a council of allies which had its own presidential apparatus; and representation in proportion to size, as in federal Boeotia.⁸⁸

The leagues of Sparta, Athens and Thebes had been attempts to extend the power of one leading *polis* over other *poleis* in ways which the other *poleis* could accept because, at any rate in theory, their integrity as independent *poleis* was not undermined and they played a part in the decision-making of the larger body. Similarly the League of Corinth was an attempt to clothe Philip's domination of Greece in garments which the *poleis* and other states of Greece could accept. Here, however, Philip's dominant position was clear from the start. The foundation oath underwrote the kingdom of Philip and his descendants, and the position of the *hegemon* in the League; in Alexander's absence in Asia οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι deputised for him as *hegemon*;⁸⁹ clauses certainly present when the League was revived by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 302 and probably present at the beginning made decisions of the council binding and forbade the member states to call their representatives to account,⁹⁰ so that representatives would be more likely to vote as the *hegemon* wished than as their own states wished. The façade was still there, but in the League of Corinth the *politai* of the member *poleis* were certainly not partners in a greater community. For the smaller *poleis*, this subordination to a Macedonian king, who lived a long way away and had many other things to worry about, might in practice be less irksome than the subordination to one of the major Greek *poleis* to which they had become accustomed; but to a major *polis* like Athens, which had aimed to dominate rather than be dominated, incorporation in Philip's league meant not only humiliation but a serious loss of freedom.

In the hellenistic period the Greek cities had to manoeuvre between the great kings. Alexander the Great had announced himself as a liberator to the Greek cities of Asia Minor,⁹¹ and from Polyperchon's proclamation in 319⁹² there were many occasions when one or other of

the kings promised to respect the freedom of the Greeks whose support he was trying to win. The pessimistic view of this is that the freedom was a total sham, that none of the kings regarded his power as limited by such promises and that all the decisions that mattered were taken by the kings. The optimistic view, which I hold and which I think is becoming the fashionable view,⁹³ is that, as long as there was a plurality of kings, manoeuvring between them was not unlike the manoeuvring of the lesser cities between the greater in the classical period, that with the established cities of the Greek world proper (unlike the cities which they retained or founded inside their own kingdoms) the kings did not interfere directly very drastically very often, and that the citizens of the Greek cities were still able to think of themselves as *politai* of independent *poleis*.

One or two phenomena, which began in the classical period but are more prominent in the hellenistic, deserve some attention. First, the arrangements between states which are given the label *isopoliteia* or *sym-politeia*. The Plataeans may have been given a form of Athenian citizenship, actually or potentially, when they became allies of Athens in 519;⁹⁴ after the destruction of their city in 427 they were given Athenian citizenship of a special kind, with limited rights in the first generation.⁹⁵ At the end of the Peloponnesian War Samos was rewarded for its loyalty to Athens with a grant of Athenian citizenship, which could be exercised by Samians living in Athens, but this grant was explicitly intended to leave Samos in existence as a separate *polis*, allied to Athens but fully independent.⁹⁶ The effect of both arrangements was that men living in a *polis* with which their own *polis* had a special relationship could exercise the rights of a citizen there, as an exception to the normal Greek principle that citizenship was limited to those who fully belonged to a *polis* and could not be acquired as of right by those who settled in a *polis*.

Something more than that was perhaps involved in the deal struck between Argos and Corinth during the Corinthian War, at the beginning of the fourth century: our texts suggest that in some sense Argos gained possession of Corinth,⁹⁷ and that this could be represented as contrary to the principle of independence for all *poleis* on which the Common Peace treaties were based, so that when the Peace of Antalcidas was made the Spartans could threaten to use force if Argos did not withdraw from Corinth.⁹⁸ The minimum interpretation is that our texts are giving a biased picture of an *isopoliteia* agreement, by which Corinthians could exercise the rights of citizens when in Argos and Argives could exercise the rights of citizens when in Corinth,⁹⁹ but it is possible that eventually if not at first the agreement amounted to more than that, and that for a few

years Argos and Corinth to some extent coalesced into a single political unit, dominated by Argos and by those Corinthians who sympathised with Argos.¹⁰⁰

The hellenistic period provides many instances of treaties establishing *isopoliteia* or *sympoliteia*.¹⁰¹ Sometimes, as in a treaty between Pergamum and Temnus,¹⁰² two states give rights to each other's citizens on a basis of equality, as happened in theory on the minimal interpretation of the treaty between Argos and Corinth. On other occasions, as in a treaty between Smyrna and Magnesia by Sipylus,¹⁰³ a greater city absorbs a lesser, so that the product is a single *polis* which perpetuates the name and identity of the greater city; *politai* of both old cities become *politai* of the new, but those who were *politai* of the greater city will inevitably have preponderant influence, as our texts suggest was the case with Argos and Corinth. Citizenship still matters, as the package of rights which goes with full membership of a *polis*, but there is less sense that the *politai* are a community of families that have belonged together for generations. A growing network of *isopoliteia* agreements meant that there was a growing chance that a man could 'have the vote' in the city in which he lived, irrespective of whether that was 'his own' city or not.

An important part is played in the history of the Greek mainland by two leagues which were not the creation of a powerful city, like the hegemonic leagues of the classical period, but were based on an *ethnos*, a particular strand of the Greek people, and then expanded to take in members from outside their own *ethnos*. The Aetolians in the fifth and fourth centuries were a people who had both tribal units and city units, and they had some kind of federal organisation.¹⁰⁴ When the League expanded beyond Aetolia proper, neighbouring peoples were designated *tele* and perhaps given a status equivalent to that of one of the three tribes,¹⁰⁵ while more distant recruits were given *isopoliteia* either with one of the cities of Aetolia or with the League as a whole.¹⁰⁶ The hellenistic League had an assembly which held two regular meetings a year and could hold extraordinary meetings; as far as we know, those who attended the assembly voted as individuals; inscriptions mention a *synedrion* or *boule*, composed of representatives of the cities,¹⁰⁷ which joined with the *strategos* in enforcing grants of *asylia*; while literary texts mention the *apokletoi*, who could take fairly important decisions without waiting for the next meeting of the assembly.

An Achaean League existed, and was already prepared to incorporate outside members,¹⁰⁸ in the classical period. The League broke up at the end of the fourth century, but was revived in 281/0 and began to acquire

members from outside Achaea in 251/0. League business was transacted at four *synodoi* a year, which comprised meetings both of a council consisting of representatives of the cities and of an assembly open to all citizens. Towards the end of the third century major questions of foreign policy were transferred from the *synodoi* to specially convened *synkletoi*, which usually involved both council and assembly but on occasion could involve the council alone.¹⁰⁹ The council and the assembly both voted by cities.¹¹⁰

The individual cities of these leagues retained local autonomy, and in the Achaean League if not in the Aetolian they had an active political life of their own. We find two cities of the Achaean League making an agreement on lawsuits as if they were totally independent *poleis*,¹¹¹ though the League was involved in the appointment of the Megarians as arbitrators to decide a boundary dispute between Epidaurus and Corinth.¹¹² In the Aetolian League citizenship grants to foreigners are grants by the League of Aetolian citizenship, not tied to any particular *polis*;¹¹³ but in the Achaean League grants are grants by individual *poleis* of their own citizenship. In League affairs, the assemblies were not rubber stamps, but serious debates took place in them and the *strategoï* of the Leagues could not count on getting the vote to go as they wished. The danger to bodies larger than a single *polis* which had an assembly (as we have seen with the Boeotian federation as revived in the 370's) was that those living in or near the place of meeting could attend in large numbers and, even if the voting was by cities, exercise undue influence. Partly for this reason Philopoemen proposed in 188 that the Achaean League should abandon the rule that *synodoi* were always to be held at Aegium – and to get his proposal accepted he arranged for it to be discussed not at a *synodos* at Aegium but at a *synkletos* held elsewhere.¹¹⁴

These leagues were more equitable than the hegemonic leagues of the classical period. The citizens of all the constituent states could feel that citizenship of their own *polis* still mattered; in the League they were eligible for the major offices, were represented in the council and could attend the assembly, and no *hegemon* dominated the League, so there they could feel that they were genuinely participating members in a greater enterprise.

The last stage came with the Roman conquest. The freedom of the Greeks was promised yet again by Flamininus in 196.¹¹⁵ When Macedonia was made a Roman province, in 146, Greece was not incorporated in that or in any other province, but it was regarded by the Romans, if not understood by all the Greeks, as being under Roman

control. The wars of the last century of the Republic gave the Greeks a few last opportunities for manoeuvring between the greater powers, until Augustus ended the wars, and in 27 created a province of Achaia.

The Romans had developed a concept of citizenship which was different from Aristotle's view of *politai* sharing in a *politeia*. Citizenship had become essentially a matter of status and juridical rights, and it seemed not to matter that an increasing proportion of the citizens lived at a great distance from Rome and could not vote or hold office in Rome. Thus Roman citizenship was something which could perfectly well be combined with being a *municeps* of one's own *municipium* or a *polites* of one's own *polis*, and a solution was provided, though not a democratic solution, to the problem of reconciling membership of a small local unit with membership of a large state.

In the Greek world the most successful solutions had been those in which membership of the smallest units was still worthwhile but the large unit was organised in such a way that all could regard themselves as participating fairly in that: the demes and the *polis* of Athens, the cities and the *koinon* of Boeotia before the Peace of Antalcidas, the member states of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. As for our modern world, I think our best hope lies in the principle of subsidiarity which is emphasised by some people in the European Community, the principle that a matter should not be dealt with at a higher level if it can be dealt with adequately at a lower. However, I am afraid subsidiarity is not a magic word which will solve all our problems instantly, since it is not self-evident what are the units deserving to have their own level of government, and how it is to be decided whether a lower level's handling of a matter is adequate. We still need to work out for our world how people can be enabled to feel that they belong to a community of *politai* in a *politeia*.¹¹⁶

Notes

1 Arist. *Pol.* 3. 1276b1-2.

2 R.J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (U. of Alberta P., 1979), 90-1, without details.

3 Plutarch *ap. schol. Hes. Op.* 633-40 (Arist. fr. 565 Rose [Teubner]). For the archaeological record of the region of Thespieae and Ascræ see A. M. Snodgrass in *La Béotie antique* (Colloque C.N.R.S. 1983. Paris: C.N.R.S., 1985), 87-95, and in J. W. Rich & A. F. Wallace-Hadrill (edd.), *City and Country in the Ancient World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 12-14: there were very few occupied sites in the geometric period and not a large number until the classical, and there was not physically a city of Thespieae until the fifth century; Ascræ

was the main settlement of its district until the late hellenistic period, when it was deserted for about three hundred years. The first interpretation of the fragment on Ascra is that of Buck, *loc. cit.*; the second is that of Snodgrass, *La Béotie antique*, 94.

4 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3 cf. 17.3. Their physical migration was probably a short-lived phenomenon when they were afraid of an invasion from Athens.

5 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3.

6 Str. 8.3.2 (337). Argument about the date does not matter here. S. & H. Hodkinson, *BSA* 86 (1981) 239-96, esp. 279-91, suggest that the making and breaking of the synoecism did not have drastic effects on the pattern of settlement in the district.

7 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7, Diod. Sic. 15.5.4.

8 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-5.

9 W.G. Cavanagh in Rich & Wallace-Hadrill (n. 3, above), 107-9, notes that the archaeological record points to expansion from Athens towards the end of the dark age rather than centralisation on Athens of communities previously independent of it.

10 Its importance was first stressed by J. W. Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens* (Cambridge U. P., 1891) 167-8.

11 This may remain true whenever we date the incorporation of Eleusis into Attica. A. Andrewes in *C.A.H.*² III. ii (1982) 362-3, favoured a date c. 900 for the completion of the unification of Attica.

12 Plut. *Sol.* 8-10, 12. 5, with A. French, *JHS* 77 (1957) 241, R.J. Hopper, *BSA* 56 (1961) 208-17, L. Piccirilli, *ASNP*³ 8 (1978) 1-13. D. J. R. Williams, *AK* 23 (1980) 137-45, revives the view of K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² I. ii. 312-3, that the Spartan arbitrator Cleomenes (Plut. *Sol.* 10.6) was the king and that the final award belongs to the late sixth century.

13 Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 54.8, and the demotics in *IG II*² 1225-8.

14 E.g. A.W. Pickard-Cambridge rev. J.P.A. Gould & D.M. Lewis, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford U. P. 1968) 57-8. In this case an argument for the end of the sixth century is presented by W. R. Connor *C&M* 40 (1989) 7-32 = *Aspects of Athenian Democracy* (*C&M Dissertationes* xi [1990] 7-32).

15 Cf. *IG I*² 943 (Meiggs & Lewis 48) 96-7.

16 Cf. Arist. fr. 532 Rose (Teubner), Paus. 3.2.6; but on Pharis and Geronthrae, according to Pausanias abandoned by their original inhabitants and resettled by the Spartans, see P. A. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (Routledge, 1979), 106-8.

17 Great *Rhetra ap.* Plut. *Lyc.* 6.2.

18 E.g. H. T. Wade-Gery, *CQ* 38 (1944) 117 = *Essays in Greek History* (Blackwell, 1958), 70-1; Cartledge, *op. cit.* 107-8.

19 In the hellenistic period obes had their own officials and could pass decrees to honour them (e.g. *IG V.i.26* [Michel 182, *SIG*³ 932] – but by then the links between the obes and the villages on which they were originally based had been weakened (N.F. Jones, *Public Organization in Ancient Greece* [Mem. Amer. Philos. Soc. 176 (1987)] 121-3).

20 Cf. Cartledge, *op. cit.* 97-100, 178-85.

21 E.g. Her. 7.234.2, Thuc. 5.54.1, Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.21.

22 E.g. Thuc. 5.68; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15.

23 E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19.

24 On the helots see Cartledge, *op. cit.* 96-7, 160-77.

25 Arist. *Pol.* 7.1326a5-27a10.

26 M. H. Hansen, *SO* 56 (1981) 19-32, P. J. Rhodes, *Thucydides: History II* (Aris & Phillips, 1988), 271-6, for the fifth century, suggesting a higher figure than has commonly

been accepted; M. H. Hansen, *Demography and Democracy* (Herning: Systime, 1986), for the fourth century, championing the 31,000 of Diod. Sic. 18.18.5 against the 21,000 of Plut. *Phoc.* 28.7.

27 9,000 *kleroi*, Plut. *Lyc.* 8; 8,000 in 480, Her. 7.234.2.

28 Her. 1.65-8.

29 Her. 9.26.

30 Her. 1.149-51.

31 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sb. Berlin* 1906, 38-57, J. M. Cook, *C.A.H.*² III. i. 749-50, iii. 217, against H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge U. P., 1952), 2-6 with 62-5 nn. 5-19.

32 Her. 1.141.4; 6.7 cf. 5.109.3.

33 Her. 1.171.3.

34 Her. 6.11-2.

35 But I doubt the secrecy alleged in Her. 5.74.1.

36 G. E. M. De Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Duckworth, 1972), 105-23 with 339-40.

37 P. A. Brunt, *Hist.* 2 (1953-4) 135-63, esp. 141-6, against B. D. Meritt *et al.*, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, iii (Princeton: A.S.C.S.A., 1950: hereafter *A.T.L.* iii), 95-105 cf. 183-4. The case for regarding the alliance as an extension of the Peloponnesian League has been restated by A. Tronson, *Act. Class.* 34 (1991) 93-110.

38 Cf. Her. 7.148.4-149, 158.5-162, 8.2.2-3.

39 Her. 7.172, 175-7.

40 Her. 8.19; 49, 56-64, 1.74-82; 108.

41 Thuc. 1.102.1, 4.

42 *Ath. Pol.* 23.5.

43 Thuc. 3.11.4.

44 I accept the view of J. A. O. Larsen, *HSCP* 51 (1940) 175-213, P. Culham, *AJAH* 3 (1978) 27-31, that there was a single council in which Athens had one vote like every other member, against that of N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* 87 (1967) 41-61 = *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford U. P., 1973), 311-45, that Athens was counterbalanced by a council of allies in which Athens was not represented.

45 Especially Thuc. 1.97.1, 3.10.4-11.3

46 R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford U. P., 1972), 46, against *A.T.L.* iii. 228.

47 M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982), P. Karavites, *RIDA*³ 29 (1982) 145-62.

48 Thuc. 3.10.5.

49 I do not believe there was a formal distinction between autonomous allies and subject allies: see P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (*G&R New Surveys* 17 [1985]), 27, against J. B. Bury, *History of Greece* (Macmillan, 1900), 338-9 = J. B. Bury & R. Meiggs, *History of Greece* (4th ed. Macmillan, 1975), 210.

50 E.g. Thuc. 1.98.4; 3.10.4.

51 Thuc. 2.63.3 (Pericles), 3.37.2 (Cleon), Arist. *Eq.* 1111-4; cf. Thuc. 1.122.3 (Corinth).

52 Thuc. 1.139.3, 2.8.4.

53 Her. 6.108.2-5.

54 Paus. 10.20.3, Her. 9.15.1.

55 Thuc. 5.38.2, *Hell. Oxy.* 16.

56 Perhaps before 427, when Thebes added two units for Plataea and its dependencies to

its original two, there were nine units in all. Other problems concerning the units are explored by C. J. Dull in *Proceedings of the IIIrd International Conference on Boiotian Antiquities*, 1979 (McGill Univ. Mon. in Class. Arch. & Hist. 2. Amsterdam: Gieben, 1985), 33-9.

57 The existence of Eleusis as a state partly separate from Athens between 403 and 401/0 was not due to a desire for secession among the demesmen but was the result of the occupation of Eleusis by Athenian oligarchs (belonging to various demes) who were unwilling to live in a democratic Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.8-10, 23-4, 43; *Ath. Pol.* 39, 40.4).

58 This theme was stressed by J.A.O. Larsen, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Sather Lectures 28; U. of California P. 1955).

59 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21-2.

60 E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14 (392).

61 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15 (392), contr. And. 3. *De Pace* 12 (392/1), Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 (387/6).

62 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15 (392), 5.1.32-3 (387/6), contr. And. 3 *De Pace* 13 (392/1).

63 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-7, Diod. Sic. 15.5.3-5, 12.

64 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33-4.

65 E.g. Diod. Sic. 15.89.1-2 (362/1).

66 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31. E. Badian in *Georgica ... G.L. Cawkwell (BICS Supp. 58 [1991], 25-48* at 37-40, stresses that the peace is technically between two parties of belligerents; but autonomy is stipulated for 'the other Greek cities', and he suggests that Sparta tried to extend the peace as far as she could. The peace was to be 'common' in its application, if not in the list of those who swore to it.

67 Technically, it is argued by T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford U.P. for U. of Hull, 1965), 40 with n. 1, Persia was committed to action only if a state rejected the terms at the beginning; but Badian *op. cit.* 41-2, argues that on this point Xenophon's translation may be at fault, and in any case Sparta could still threaten to invoke Persia. Badian assumes that the treaty to which the Greeks swore must have included clauses on enforcement, although none are attested.

68 Cf. Ryder, *op. cit.* 68, 72.

69 Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18, reading εὐορκον ... τοῖς ἀδικούσιν (a suggestion which I first encountered in 1963 in the Oxford lectures of D.M. Lewis).

70 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2.

71 M. Sordi, *RFIC* 79 = ²29 (1951) 53-5, Cf. Ryder, *op. cit.* 71-2, 132-3.

72 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36.

73 Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10.

74 Diod. Sic. 15.89.1-2.

75 *IG* II² 43.19-31, cf. II² 34 and 44 (Michel 86, 1446, 87; *SIG*³ 147, 142, 148; Tod 123, 118, 124.

76 Inscription *ap. S. Accame, La lega ateniese del sec. IV a.C.* (Rome: Signorelli, 1941) 230, 14-6.

77 Despite the case made out by J.L. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (U. of California P., 1981).

78 Aesch. 2.60.

79 Aesch. 2.60-2, 3.69-72.

80 Cf. *IG* VII 2407 (= *SIG*³ 179), 2408, *SEG* XXXIV 355.

81 Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8 (with the correct date).

82 C.J. Tuplin, *Athen.*² 64 (1986) 321-4.

83 Diod. Sic. 15.57.1 with J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371-62 B.C.* (Harvard U.P., 1980), 66 and 291 n. 33; 15.79.3-6. That after Leuctra the allies of Thebes/Boeotia were

organised in a league with a council is wrongly denied by Buckler, *op. cit.* 222-3. The case is restated by D.M. Lewis in *Essays in the Topography, History and Culture of Boiotia* (*Teiresias* Supp. iii 1990) 91-3.

84 Diod. Sic. 15.52.1, 53.3, Paus. 9.13.6-7.

85 Cf. texts cited in nn. 80, 84 above.

86 G. Busolt & H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich: Beck, 1920-6) II 1429, P. Roesch, *Thespies et la confédération béotienne* (Paris: Boccard, 1965), 144-6, Buckler *op. cit.* 23.

87 C.J. Tuplin, *Athen.*² 64 (1986) 335-7. In particular, Orchomenus should have been a member in 371, when seven units are attested.

88 *IG II*² 236 (Tod 177), [Dem.] 17 *Foed. Alex.* For the *proedroi* see *IG IV*² 68 (*Staatsverträge* 446) l.c. 21-8, of 302.

89 [Dem.] 17.15 with [N.G.L. Hammond &] G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia II* (Oxford U.P., 1979), 639-46.

90 *IG IV*² 68 (*Staatsverträge* 446), l.c. 18-9, 20-1, with [Hammond &] Griffith, *op. cit.* 635-6.

91 Diod. Sic. 17.24.1, Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2.

92 Diod. Sic. 18.55.

93 Cf., e.g., P. Gauthier, *Πρακτικά 8th Int. Congr. Gr. & Lat. Epigr.*, 1982, I (Athens, 1984), 82-107.

94 Plataean speech *ap.* Thuc. 3.55.3, which not all scholars accept: see the commentaries of Gomme and Hornblower *ad loc.* We have seen above that some small neighbouring communities were in a state of *sympoliteia* with Plataea.

95 [Dem.] 59.104-6.

96 *IG II*² 1 (Michel 80, *SIG*³ 116 + 117, Meiggs & Lewis 94 + Tod 97).

97 And. 3. *De Pace* 26-7, Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6, etc., Diod. Sic. 14.92.1.

98 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34, 36.

99 E.g. J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford U. P., 1984) 357-62.

100 E.g. G. T. Griffith, *Hist.* 1 (1950) 245-52.

101 Modern scholars distinguish between *isopoliteia* agreed between two states which are to remain independent, by which citizens of each may exercise the rights of citizens in the other when they are there, and *sympoliteia*, by which two or more states are merged in one; but the terms are not always used in those senses in ancient texts.

102 *I. Pergamon* 5 (Michel 18, *OGIS* 265, *Staatsverträge* 555).

103 *Staatsverträge* 492 (Michel 19, *OGIS* 229). In this instance Smyrna is absorbing a smaller neighbouring state, as a greater state might have done in the classical period, and is at the same time acting as an agent of the Seleucid kingdom, to secure its whole neighbourhood for the Seleucids against the Ptolemies.

104 In Tod 137 Athens complains to the *koinon* about the conduct of one of the cities.

105 E.g. the Locrians, *SGDI* 2070.

106 E.g. *SIG*³ 522.3, *IG IX*² i.136.

107 *IG IX*².i 188 (Michel 22, *SIG*³ 546 B): Melitaea and Perea, in Phthiotic Achaëa, are currently united as a single *polis*, but League *dikastai* define the boundaries between the two, and Perea is given the right to withdraw from the union and in that case to send one member to the council.

108 Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1. On Achaëa in the archaic and classical periods see C. Morgan, *PSPS*² 37 (1991) 131-63, esp. 146-8.

109 Council alone, Polyb. 28.3.10; all men over thirty, Polyb. 29.24.6.

110 On the much-discussed problems of the Achaean council and assembly I follow the

most recent view of F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, iii (Oxford U. P., 1979) 406-14.

111 *IG* V ii 357 (*Staatsverträge* 567).

112 *IG* IV 926 (Michel 40, *SIG*³ 471).

113 *IG* IX² i 7,9,10.

114 Livy, 38.30.2-5, on which I follow E. Badian & R. M. Errington, *Hist.* 14 (1965) 13-17, Errington, *Philopoemen* (Oxford U. P., 1969) 137-40.

115 Polyb. 18.44.1-3, 46.1-9.

116 I thank members of the University of St. Andrews Classics Research Seminar for listening to a first version of this paper and discussing it with me; and my respondent E. Badian and all who discussed the paper with me in Copenhagen.

Plato on the Economy

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1. Introduction

We begin with one of Plato's more famous jokes. At any rate, the passage is well known and I take it to be making a joke. I am referring to Rep. II 368C-369A, where Socrates suggests that the enquiry into justice will make better progress if the interlocutors study its place in the city before tackling the justice of one man or individual. He argues the point by analogy. If something written in small letters is hard to make out, the situation can be retrieved if one finds the same message written in larger letters on a larger surface. Armed with his grasp of the large version the reader is equipped to return to the small letters and check whether they are the same. So with justice. A city can be characterised by justice no less than an individual – but it is larger, and so perhaps there is more justice in it than in the individual, and easier to make out.

Rehearsal of the passage serves to remind us that the official aim of the *Republic* is to investigate the justice of the individual, and more particularly to demonstrate that being just is more advantageous to the just person – to his soul, not simply his security or his reputation – than being unjust would have been. Formally speaking, the entire discussion of the *polis* is introduced and sustained in order to illuminate by analogy a question in personal ethics. But the power, elaboration and extent of Plato's treatment of the city and what makes it healthy or sick of course show that his preoccupation with questions of political theory goes much deeper and further in the *Republic* than the formal role of the city-soul analogy would require.

This disjunction between the real and the formal basis for the introduction of political theory into the design of the dialogue is, I submit, what 368C-369A intimates to the reader. As an argument it is frankly feeble. It is not in the least obvious that (as 368E maintains) justice belongs to the city as a whole as well as to a single man: justice here is *dikaio sunê*, which as its morphology confirms is a word denoting a *personal* characteristic. The idea that there might be *more* justice in the city than in the individual in some interesting and relevant sense is ill-defined, to say

the least. And the author of the *Phaedo* had already shown himself capable of securing conclusions about the soul without recourse to a larger canvas, even though it is true that most of the arguments in that dialogue work by appeals to analogy, or by treating the soul as a member of some wider class of entities whose properties are better understood than are its own.

2. Changing the subject

The passage about large and small letters (368C-369A) does not merely signal a switch of attention from the individual to the city. It also marks (a) the abandonment of a Socratic mode of investigation for the construction of theory, and (b) a decision to stop talking exclusively about justice and to open out discussion to embrace a whole range of questions about the nature of man and society.

(a) is a truth generally acknowledged. No reader of the *Republic* can fail to perceive the difference between the inconclusive Book I, conducted as a Socratic cross-examination in the manner of the early dialogues, and the rest of the work, where the interlocutors Glaucon and Adeimantus are required by Plato not to advance views which Socrates can then scrutinise, but to help *him* expound elaborate theoretical constructions by friendly encouragement and the occasional well-placed question. Scholars have recently become attracted to the idea that Plato wrote Book I the way he did precisely in order to show how the Socratic elenchus is *bound* to fail to deliver any positive doctrinal results. Either a Socratic interlocutor gives in to questioning too easily (like Polemarchus), and the reader is left with a sense that the argument has helped itself to slick short-cuts; or he offers fierce resistance (like Thrasymachus, paradigm of the aggressive anti-philosopher), so that no results are really achieved at all. Agreement on conclusions is either too easy or close to impossible. After offering in Book I a practical demonstration of the uselessness of *elenchus* as an instrument of inquiry, Plato can then tacitly move into a quite different mode of discourse from Book II onwards.

(b) has been less remarked upon. The contrast is in fact no less striking. Justice is the explicit and almost constant focus of the disagreements of Book I, particularly in the conversation with Thrasymachus. In the greater part of Books II-IV it is barely mentioned and seldom the thing the interlocutors are concentrating on. Indeed, the elusiveness of justice is itself one of the intermittent topics of this stretch of the dialogue. Thus

after initial construction of the first or economic city Socrates teases Adeimantus with the question (371E):

Wherever in the city are justice and injustice?
In which of the elements we have considered?

Adeimantus confesses to having no notion, unless they are to be found in the mutual needs of the citizens. Socrates makes encouraging noises in reply, but after a few further exchanges advocates looking beyond the first city to the city of luxury: perhaps then we shall discover where it is that justice and injustice come to be rooted in cities (372E). By the middle of Book IV the inquiry has still not succeeded in locating them, or so it is pretended. Plato has some fun making his hunters trying to flush justice out of its dark and impenetrable coverts, and then stumbling on its footprints where they did not expect (432 B-E).

But there is in the end an explicit positive outcome, as in Book I there is not, or at least not one to satisfy any of the interlocutors. The moral is fairly obvious. A direct assault on the nature of justice does not work. We must proceed crabwise, by indirection.

Why did the direct approach of Book I come to grief? Socrates simply has different intuitions about justice from those he argues with. Can it ever require us to harm another? Polemarchus thinks yes, he thinks no. Is it a function of intelligence and understanding? He thinks yes, Thrasymachus no. Does it benefit others or its practitioner? Thrasymachus thinks only others, Socrates its practitioner especially. The two sides appeal to analogy to reinforce their positions. But the analogies, too, conflict. Clearly the view of justice espoused by each party to the dispute depends on the views they hold on a range of related subjects.

Books II-IV take this point. Socrates is now made to develop a whole system of ideas about society, religion, education, human motivation and virtue before he ventures an account of justice. Books V-VII adumbrate an even more comprehensive epistemology and metaphysics appropriate to its understanding. Book X offers a speculative eschatological context. It is as though Plato is saying: if you want to think properly about justice, think about everything else first. He intimates a method which in later dialogues, with their obsessive digressions and abrupt changes of subject, becomes standard and sometimes (as e.g. in the *Theaetetus*) thematic.

The *Republic* works by constantly shifting the reader's sense of what the important questions are. Discussion of the city in Book II is formally introduced to illuminate the justice of the individual, but turns into an

enquiry into the whole rationale of society, which provides a broader framework for understanding human motivation than direct focus on the individual could have achieved. This provokes further questions (pursued initially in Book V) about women and their role in the community, and about what a ruler is and how he may best be educated. So what might have been seen as the natural culmination of the argument of the entire dialogue, viz. the proof that justice is psychic harmony at the end of Book IV, becomes little more than a staging post in a much longer and more daring intellectual journey, in which political themes are transformed into the epistemological and metaphysical preoccupations that dominate Books VI and VII. Concerns with justice continue to surface now and again, and are of course given final expression in the Myth of Er at the end of the last book of the dialogue. The official programme is never abandoned. But (for example) the philosopher who has fed on a vision of the Idea of the Good will inevitably approach the issue of what good there is in justice with a different mental set or mindedness from someone still working with the notion of advantage to an individual which was used in setting the terms of the original problem. The *Republic* to the end of Book VII has something of the structure of a sequence of Hegelian *Aufhebungen*, as the famous analogies of the line and above all the cave might have prepared us to recognise.

3. The economy

I have been using ‘city’ as a neutral English equivalent for Plato’s *polis*. Early in his discussion of what scholars refer to as ‘the first city’ (369-72) Plato comes close to defining the *polis* for present purposes as the settlement within a single dwelling place of persons calling upon each other’s specialist skills with regard to the necessities of civilised life (369C):

Men, being in want of many things, gather into one settlement many partners and helpers; one taking to himself another for one purpose, a third for another, to satisfy his many needs: and to this common settlement we give the name of city.

At the limit an extremely small community indeed could satisfy this criterion: Plato conceives a city consisting of just four or five specialist craftsmen (369D). This general approach to defining the city was of course subsequently taken up by Aristotle, but with the crucial difference that *Pol. I 2* makes the basic form of self-sufficient community the house-

hold, in contradistinction from the city, and defines it in terms not of economically functional skills and crafts, but of associations promoting bare survival: viz. the biological association of man and woman, and the governing relation of master and slave.

Should we infer that *polis* at 369-72 is unequivocally given the meaning 'economic community', and at 370C *polites* (citizen) 'economic functionary'? I think not. *Polites* can scarcely lose all its properly political connotations at the drop of a hat. Nor is it plausible that the right translation of the expression ἡ ἀληθινὴ πόλις at 372E, where Socrates says that the true city is as has just been described, should really not be 'true city' but 'true economic community' – as the context makes clear:

It isn't merely the origin of a city that we're considering, it seems, but the origin of a *luxurious* city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a fever, if that's what you want.

Trans. G.M. Grube (revised C.D.C. Reeve)

The point of studying the *polis* as understood at 369-72 is not primarily to get clear about the basic form of community but to understand something about the growth of justice and injustice in cities generally, i.e. in cities as most people would interpret the word *polis*. We should accordingly suppose that Plato assumes his readers will bring to the discussion of 369-72 the full range of associations which the words *polis* and *polites* would normally carry, and that his argument both there and thereafter involves a sophisticated play on our expectations of what it takes to be a *polis*, disappointed though those expectations may be.

For the account of the first city certainly omits mention of much that users of the word *polis* might have regarded as essential to a city: fortifications and a military capability, religion, governmental functions, provision for participation in political and judicial decisions. Readers acquainted with earlier political theory would probably have experienced a sharper shock. Protagoras's account of the origins of civilisation in the *Protagoras*, which of course may be modelled by Plato on sophistic sources, describes the fundamental industrial achievements of early man in terms echoed verbally (as we are presumably meant to notice) in the *Republic*, but sees them like religion as preexisting the foundation of cities, which are treated as impossible without military and political skills (*Prot.* 322 A-D; compare 322 A6-8 with *Rep.* 369 D1-10). Thus the *Republic's* first city excludes what is plausibly regarded in the *Protagoras* as essential

to the *polis*, and includes only what the *Protagoras* treats no less plausibly as prepolitical. Memories of the ideal city of Hippodamas of Miletus, like Protagoras a founder of the Italian colony of Thurii in 443 BC, might also be stirred. Like Plato Hippodamas recognised the need for craftsmen and farmers (identified as two separate classes) in a city, but also for warriors (*Ar. Pol.* II 8, 1267 b 30-3). Of course, Plato will shortly introduce the military (373E-374E), and deprive them of private property as Hippodamas did, but the deferral, and the suggestion that the city has grown to completeness (371E) before guards are so much as mentioned, would probably – ignorance of his text must dictate caution – strike readers of Hippodamas as distinctly odd, if they missed its irony.

The game Plato is playing here is not easy to make out. Commentators agree that the talk of the city coming into being (369A) does not indicate any *a priori* historical reconstruction or genetic analysis of the origins of civilisation or the state. As Cornford pointed out, when Plato offers a speculative historical account of the origins of laws and constitutions in Book III of the *Laws* (NB 676A, 676E, 678A) it follows a quite different sequence, and is based on an almost wholly distinct set of ideas. And Plato makes it clear that the *Republic's* 'first city' is a normative construction (e.g. 369E, 374B). So for example we need not infer from the introduction of the guards *after* it is complete that he believes war and the development of military arts postdated the invention of the economy (which as sketched here includes foreign trade and the market). If its significance is not diachronic, does Plato intend to suggest some logical or theoretical relationship between war and economy? E.g. that an economy devoted exclusively to the satisfaction of basic needs has no aggressive dynamic (373 BC), in contrast to one programmed for luxury and the unlimited acquisition of possessions, which will inevitably involve hostile designs on the territory of other states (372E-373E)? This certainly corresponds better to the text. But it won't do as the full story, or even as the most important part of it. We may leave aside the implausibility of supposing that it is demand only for luxury items from abroad, not the need for foreign supplies of more basic products, which will be likely to provoke war. This is all of a piece with the fantasy that a society with a developed market economy would be the ideal community of the golden age (372A-D): as Cornford commented, 'a satire on sentimental nostalgia for a supposed primitive state of nature'. More important is that nothing in Plato's subsequent discussion of the guards, i.e. the military specialists needed to wage war successfully, presupposes an economy focused on luxury. On the contrary, at one point in his account

of the puritanical regime proposed for the education of the guards he has Socrates remark that the interlocutors have been purging what they earlier described as a city of luxury (399E). This is strictly a *non sequitur*, since it was *not* the military, by Plato's argument, which conceived the appetite for high living in the first place, but those they exist to protect. The *non sequitur* simply reinforces the sense that the introduction of the warrior after the economic class does not really have much to do with a theoretical concern about the relationship between economy and war.

The key to understanding the first city, I suggest, is the connection between its functionalism and the concept of justice. We would naturally expect the chief object of the treatment of the economy to be the illumination of justice. So what needs to be shown is that it is specifically the stress on the specialisation of skills which is meant to cast that illumination.

It is first worth noting simply *that* the whole account is focused on specialisation. Indeed its extraordinary brilliance, unremarked by the mass of commentators, helps to draw attention to the centrality of this notion in the analysis of the economy. Like many other ancient writers before and after him, Plato makes skills fundamental to civilisation. And while Diodorus was to make need 'teacher to men in all things' (I8, 9), Plato proposed that what man primarily needs is the things whose production is the object of the basic skills. His key move is to argue that (1) he is not self-sufficient, and therefore looks for help from *others* who possess those of the skills he lacks himself; and (2) the optimal way of satisfying the need specified in (1) is to collect together *specialists* in (and only in) the relevant crafts and skills, since a specialist with a natural gift for his craft will do a better job than a non-specialist, or than someone practising more than one craft. So for Plato need teaches not so much skills (as Kulturgeschichte maintained) as the *specialisation* of skills.

From (2) he argues for the indispensability of the city as a market in which specialists can exchange the products of their labour. For (2) generates (3) the need for yet further craftsmen. By (2) production of the tools required by those producing the basic necessities of civilised life must be put in the hands of (3) a second wave of specialists (smiths, carpenters, herdsman, etc. as well as the farmers, weavers, shoemakers and builders already in post). (3) in its turn dictates (4) the need for exporters and importers, since the numbers in the city who will be required to practice all these specialisations can probably not be supported by local resources alone. But if (4) is met, the exporters/importers generate (5) a further need for many more farmers and other craftsmen to

supply home and overseas consumers; and (5) in turn will generate the need for (6) coinage and the market, which require (7) middlemen to operate the market, and provide the conditions for (8) labourers offering the use of their bodies for pay.

Moses Finley used to insist that there was no economic analysis in classical antiquity, and indeed no concept of the economy to promote interest in economic analysis. I do not recall that he ever discussed our present passage in detail, but his principal general argument for discounting such texts as this was that ancient writers were interested in specialisation of crafts, not division of labour, and in improvement of quality, not increase in productivity. So far as *Rep.* 369-71 is concerned, these distinctions appear to get no real purchase. Certainly Plato's argument is governed by the principle of specialisation of crafts. And the basis of the principle is the desirability of getting the job of producing the relevant artefacts done as well as possible. But Plato has in mind here the need *both* to achieve the best quality *and* to adopt the most efficient means of production – as the following stretch of dialogue makes clear (370A-C):

As you were speaking, I myself was thinking that, in the first place, no two of us are by nature altogether alike. Our capacities differ. Some are fit for one work, some for another. Do you agree?

I do.

Well, then, would better work be done on the principle of one man many trades, or of one man one trade?

One man one trade is better, he said.

Yes, for I fancy that it is also evident that, in work, opportunities which we pass by are lost.

That is evident.

I fancy that things to be done will not wait the good time of the doer. Rather the doer must wait on the opportunity for action, and not leave the doing of it for his idle moments.

He must.

And so more tasks of each kind are accomplished, and the work is better and is done more easily when each man works at the one craft for which nature fits him, that being free from all other occupations he may wait on its opportunities.

That is certainly the case.

(Translated A.D. Lindsay)

If specialisation of crafts is introduced partly for reasons of efficiency, it is by no means clear that it can be sharply differentiated from the idea – I take it the fundamentally utilitarian idea – of division of labour.

Above all, the sustained train of thought from (1) to (8) is evidently an *analysis*, which by appeal to the one principle of specialisation (2) demonstrates a dynamic explaining the development and expansion of a whole range of economic activities, culminating in the creation of the market. Of course, Plato does not go on to offer a theory of the mechanics of the operation of the market: there is nothing here approaching classical economics. What he does supply is a sort of transcendental deduction of the very existence of the market, which constitutes – I submit – the invention of the concept of an economy.

What is the point of this dazzling and dazzlingly original piece of theorising? Not, I take it, to launch the science of economics: Plato never capitalises on these ideas elsewhere, so far as I am aware. The object must rather be to convince us of how much about the life of a vigorously and effectively functioning city we can explain by reflection on the interplay and interdependence of the specialist skills needed to sustain its economic activity. For that will give us a clue about justice, as is indicated by a heavy hint dropped as soon as Socrates has got the understandably hesitant agreement of his interlocutor that with (8) – the introduction of wage-earning labourers – the city is complete (371E-372A):

Where are justice and injustice to be found in it? With which of the things we examined did they come in?

I've no idea, Socrates, unless it was somewhere in some need that these people have of one another.

Translated by G.M. Grube (revised C.D.C. Reeve)

The reader can be more specific than Adeimantus, and pinpoint the passage quoted above from 370A-C in particular. Its thesis is that, where men need the products others make or supply, it is best that each stick to the one task or function for which his natural capacities best equip him. And this of course anticipates the principle which Book IV will make the essence of justice in city and soul alike (432B-434C, 441CD, 442D-444A). A lot more discussion will be needed before Plato is ready to spell out the moral explicitly. But the narrowness of his focus in the presentation of the

first city is now explained. By excluding consideration of *everything* except an idealised model of the economy, he can begin to get us to concentrate on the sort of thinking about distinct but interdependent functions which progress in understanding justice will require.

The conception of the economy worked out at 369-71 may potentially throw light on justice. Has it anything to suggest about *injustice*? The short answer is: no, and that is why Socrates engineers the introduction of the luxurious city. This move, as the quotation above (p. 00) from 372E shows, is explicitly associated with the question of justice and injustice. And Socrates makes it as clear as need be that the appropriate equivalences are: true = healthy = just city; luxurious = diseased = unjust city.

The topic of the city of luxury is broached rather puckishly. Standing back and surveying his economic city, Plato writes tongue in cheek a rosy account of the life its citizens would enjoy, in terms designed to recall those myths of the golden age of Cronos/Saturn which *Kulturgeschichte* such as we encounter in *Prot.* 321-2 had of course endeavoured to subvert (372A-D). Glaucon knows his leg is being pulled, and breaks into the discussion wondering whether there might not be a little relish in the diet, and the whole business of eating made more comfortable with the introduction of couches and tables. This suggestion is greeted with a comic explosion on Socrates' part. He construes Glaucon's remarks as a request for a city devoted to luxury, and in a sort of mocking echo of the kind of *Kulturgeschichte* invention motif found e.g. in Aesch. *PV* 445-506 pretends this is the occasion for introducing a great range of 'superfluous' arts, no longer focused on the necessities of civilised life: he lists e.g. painters, musicians, poets, rhapsodes, actors, dancers, theatrical agents, the makers of cosmetics; wet-nurses, dry-nurses, beauticians, barbers, cooks, confectioners, doctors. After this outburst the argument settles back into a less playful tone, initiated by the observation that a city which is intent on unlimited acquisition of possessions will inevitably be expansionist (372E-373E). Hence, as we have noted, the origins of war (373E). The passage as a whole is too brief and rhetorical to furnish a deep insight into injustice. Yet we register the implication that uncontrolled appetites are the source of the fever that grips the luxurious city.

There is presumably a reason of general strategy why Plato begins his constructive theorising about justice and injustice with the first city and the city of luxury. The whole dialogue is launched by a discussion with an interlocutor – Cephalus – whose mental and spiritual horizons are

pretty much confined to wealth, possessions and the appetites. The key debate of Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus focuses for much of its course on the acquisition of possessions and in the end on the earning of wages or rewards (NB 345B-347D): the topic with which the analysis of the economy at 369-71 concludes (not, as we have seen, without irony). Plato evidently supposes that acquisition and its associated appetites constitute a sort of lowest common denominator in human motivation and in human understanding of value. Philosophical argument will therefore be best advised to start by engaging with that motivation and in terms intelligible to it. Hence the resort to the economy at 369-73.

These issues continue to preoccupy Plato even when he is long embarked upon his treatment of the guards (*phulakes*), i.e. specialists in warfare. If you keep a guard dog, it may savage those it is meant to protect. How is this to be avoided? Education – the education so thoroughly described in Book II and III – is the main thing. But provisions relating to housing and the holding of property will also remove incitements to bad behaviour and obstacles to good. So the guards must live in a communist barracks (416D-417B):

‘Consider, then,’ I said, ‘whether their manner of life and their dwelling-places must be of some such fashion as this if they are to answer our description. In the first place, no one shall have any private property, unless it is absolutely necessary. Secondly, no one shall have dwelling-place or storehouse which any one who pleases may not freely enter. To supply the proper necessities of men who are warrior athletes, and both prudent and courageous, they shall receive from the other citizens a fixed reward for their guarding, large enough to support them for a year and leave nothing over. They shall live in common, taking their meals at the public tables, as in an army. As for silver and gold, we shall tell them that they have the divine metals always in their hearts, given them by the gods, and have no need for men’s silver and gold; nay, that it is an act of impiety to pollute their possession of the divine gold by conjoining it with the mortal; for many unholy deeds are done for the common currency, but the coinage in their souls is unsullied. They alone in all the city are not allowed to handle or touch silver and gold, or to be under the same roof with it, or hold it in their hands, or drink out of gold or silver vessels; this will be their salvation, and the salvation of the city. But if at any time they acquire land or houses or money of their own, and are men of business and farmers instead of guards, they will become the hated masters instead of the allies of the other citizens. They will live their life, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, always in greater and more intense fear of the citizens within than of the enemies without, rushing to the very brink of destruction, and the city with them. For all those reasons,’ I said, ‘shall we not say that this is the manner in which our guardians must be provided with houses and other necessities, and shall we legislate accordingly?’

'Certainly,' said Glaucon.

(After A.D. Lindsay)

This is the passage in which Plato first announces his abolition of private property, not among the population at large, but just for the guards of the ideal city. The emphasis is not on their common life or on the positive benefits of communism. Plato has already indicated in the preamble that his object is, as we noted, the negative one of rooting out potential causes of vicious behaviour on the part of the guards towards the other citizens. It now becomes abundantly clear what he takes the chief such cause to be: wealth of any form. The pursuit of wealth brings about impiety to the gods, and hatred and fear in relations with other people.

These proposals about property and money, presumably inspired partly by Spartan institutions and partly by Hippodamas (*Ar. Pol.* II 8, 1267B 33-7), prompt two objections from the interlocutors. First, Adeimantus suggests that deprived of wealth the guards will enjoy none of the advantages of rulers, and will therefore be unhappy (419A). To this Socrates famously replies that what matters fundamentally is not the happiness of the guards or any other group within the citizen body, but that of the whole city. This maxim turns out to be a compendious way of saying that if the members of every class (and of every profession within every class) perform as well as possible the functions assigned to them, the city as a whole will so prosper that every class will 'partake of such happiness as their nature allows' (421C). Socrates then develops what he describes as the 'brother' of the maxim: extremes of riches and poverty are to be avoided anywhere in the city. For either saps the devotion of a worker for his craft, breeding luxury and idleness in the one case, meanness and villainy in the other, and political unrest in both (421C-422A). Book VIII will attempt to demonstrate this in detail, with its sociopathology of the diseases of oligarchy and democracy in particular.

Adeimantus' second objection has to do with the city's external relations. If it has no money how will it be able to go to war, particularly if it is compelled to take on a large and rich city (422A)? In reply Socrates forbears to point out that he has provided only that the guards should not be property owners, not that the city itself should be without resources. He resorts again to analogies, as so frequently in the *Republic*, initially with boxing before bringing in dogs once again. Two fat wealthy men who can't box are no match for a trained athlete; and lean and stocky dogs are a scarier proposition than fat and tender sheep. In general each

city with which Socrates' city will have dealings is not one but two cities in mutual enmity: a city of the rich and a city of the poor. Each should be played off against the other – then 'you will always have many allies and few enemies' (423A). What is more, you will actually be larger than either, if what counts is the number of fighting men.

If we step back and reflect on Plato's strategy in this whole stretch of text, we must be struck by the diagnosis that money is the root of all evil; or rather, that the acquisition of wealth, and indeed the failure to acquire it, is chief among the social conditions which foment hatred and fear between classes, and weaken their commitment both to their own social functions and to the social order which is built on the proper division of those functions. Let us remind ourselves once again of how from the very outset of the *Republic* Plato highlights as a dominant concern the question of the relation between wealth and virtue: prominently in the conversation with Cephalus (329E-331B), where it is the main topic; fleetingly and allusively at the very end of the argument with Polemarchus (336A); and massively in the hymn to injustice put in Thrasymachus' mouth at 343B-344C, which is of course followed by the long discussion of whether money-making is intrinsic to other skills – medicine, navigation, etc. – or a further and quite distinct preoccupation. Here Socrates, coming on to the case of the art of ruling, famously argues that the proper practitioner of that art will be ashamed to undertake the responsibilities of government for money (345E-347E).

So the treatment of the economy in Book II as the essence of civilised society is not something Plato works out only to forget or put out of sight in his much more extended and versatile discussion of the guards. The identification of economic activity and the production of wealth as fundamental to society reflects an idea that in different guises pervades much of the *Republic*. It is Plato's acute sense of the social and moral dangers inherent in it that inspires the isolation to which he condemns the guards.

4. Conclusion

There is vastly more to say about the *polis* in the *Republic* than I have begun even to adumbrate here. My aim has been to throw light on the passage in Book II where Plato turns formally to think about the city. It is a sequence of argument which has often puzzled commentators, so a new look at the text seemed worthwhile for this reason alone. More important for the contribution the paper makes to the present volume is

what it may have suggested about the nature of Plato's approach to the *polis*. 369-72 do not offer a theory about the *polis* which can be compared at all straightforwardly with e.g. Aristotle's in *Pol.* I 2. For example, the passage does not take nor even imply a stand on whether man is by nature sociable or a self-interested individualist, the fundamental issue which divides Aristotle and the Stoics from Thrasymachus and contract theorists from Antiphon to Epicurus. Instead it offers what is simultaneously a rather abstract model of one dimension of human activity, and an attempt to play arrestingly and indeed paradoxically with the conceptual equipment which thinkers like Hippodamas and the sophists had forged in order to get to grips with the nature of civilised society: play not just for the sake of play, but to advance – albeit indirectly – the fundamental moral enquiry of the *Republic*. Of course, Plato's model of the economy is a brilliant piece of theory. But though it claims to be an account of the *polis*, the claim is not quite serious, and certainly not definitive. It is a move in the first stages of a complex dialectic, whose later perspectives transcend if they do not cancel earlier points of view. Whether the reader of the *Republic* ever reaches a plateau where Plato's final view of the *polis* can be located is a disputed question.

Note

There is a mountainous bibliography on the *Republic* and on the related matters discussed here. I decided in the end not to annotate the paper, since proper referencing would be a huge undertaking and would in any case misrepresent the essentially ruminative nature of the enterprise it undertakes. The focus of the published version is sharper than in the draft discussed at the conference. I much benefited from the comments of the participants, which included a helpful set of notes from Mogens Herman Hansen and above all the wise reflections of my commentator, Karsten Friis Johansen, whose gentle emphases I have sought to develop in revision.

Polis and *Politeia* in Aristotle

OSWYN MURRAY

(RESPONDENT: JOHNNY CHRISTENSEN)

I begin with a mild protest. As everyone in this discussion is aware, the theme of this conference, *polis [esti] koinonia politon politeias*, is a phrase ruthlessly torn out of context by our respected organiser. The conclusion of an argument, and the half (the second half) of the protasis of a conditional clause cannot be regarded as a substantive definition. So let me start by putting the phrase back in its context, and considering what Aristotle is really trying to say at this point. We could of course evade many of the questions by insisting on leaving in Greek all the difficult words. But since the burden of my paper will be that Aristotle has a real problem here, and that that problem is also my problem, it is surely incumbent on me to begin by offering a translation and an explanation in modern terms.

Aristotle has been considering the question whether the city retains its identity as long as its citizens remain the same body of citizens (that is whether it is the citizens which define the city), or whether the city changes when the constitution changes. It is a typical Aristotelian *aporia*, in which he pushes to the limits the logical argument in order to establish the essential characteristic of a particular concept, or the essential relationship between two or more concepts, in this case the citizen, the city and the constitution (I give the crucial phrase in italics):

For if *the city is a type of community and is the community of citizens of a constitution*, then when the constitution becomes different in form and changes, it would seem necessary that the city too is not the same, just as we say that a chorus appearing as a comic and as a tragic chorus is different, though often it consists of the same men – and similarly that every other community and compound is different if the arrangement of the compound is different, as we say that the harmony of the same voices is different when it is Dorian and when it is Phrygian. If this is the case, it is clear that we must essentially call a city the same in respect of its constitution: whereas it may be called either a different name or the same name whether the same people are inhabiting it or completely different people (*Politics* III 3, 1276b1-13).

I have a further difficulty with the motto of our conference in that it is my personal opinion that the text quoted by our organiser is corrupt. The two consecutive genitives are most odd, and the text as we have it seems to me virtually untranslatable (though I have done my best): most commentators usually paraphrase it almost unrecognisably. Eaton saw the corruption, and Susemihl considered deleting the first genitive *politon*.¹ But I prefer the simple correction of Congreve, *politeia* for *politeias*. It seems indeed that Congreve is supported by the lost manuscript that lies behind William of Moerbeke's thirteenth century Latin translation, which reads: 'Siquidem est communicatio quaedam civitas, *est autem communicatio civium politia*, facta altera specie et differente politia, necessarium esse videbitur et civitatem non esse eandem.'

The only trouble with this text is that it is almost too neat, offering a perfect antithesis (apart from the absence of a definite article) with the previous clause: 'if the *polis* is a *koinonia*, and if the *politeia* is a *koinonia* of *politai*, when the *politeia* differs then the *polis* differs': that is, if A is a B and if C is also a B, being an arrangement of the members of A, when C changes, then A changes. My logical friends tell me that this is in fact a valid argument, as well as a view that Aristotle certainly held. For if giraffes are spotty and if giraffeness is the quality of being a giraffe, when giraffeness becomes striped then giraffes are no longer the same giraffes.

But let me leave this textual problem aside. Whatever Aristotle wrote or said, he is not here interested in asserting that the city *is* a community of citizens of a constitution, but in the consequence that, *if this is so*, then a change of constitution means a different city. Athens is no longer Athens under an oligarchy (or in Greek terms the Athenians are no longer the Athenians). This might lead us to question the hypothetical statement in the protasis; but, bizarre though his conclusion may seem to us, it is surely a logical consequence of Aristotle's view of the nature of the *polis*. To him it is indeed the *politeia* which defines the nature of the *polis*, not the citizens.

My paper presents a series of Aristotelian *aporiai*: it does not offer answers, but rather sympathy for Aristotle. For I find myself in almost the same difficulty, perhaps because I have consciously been trying to reach a formulation of the nature of the Greek *polis* which owes as much to Aristotle as to Weber and Durkheim. For me it is the rationality of the *polis* which distinguishes it from all other forms of political organisation.² Political organisations are normally time-bound, historically determined by a complex interplay of forces over generations: we can change them, but in doing so we are constrained by past traditions and by present

attitudes: we are not free to follow the dictates of reason, as the good citizens of Denmark have recently taught the rationalising functionaries of Brussels. The result is that, even when change is rationally planned, it often leads to unexpected and unwanted consequences; and the result is always a mess, a mixture of old and new with little more than random coherence. That after all was the chief justification for Karl Popper's espousal of the concept of 'piecemeal social engineering' as the only way forward for reform in a post-war world.³ His view of politics is even more dominant in a post-ideological world.

But I see the Greek city like Aristotle, as rationally determined. It has a history of course, but that history is determined by conscious change for the most part successfully carried out, and leading in various cities to a final form, a natural *telos*. The institutions are rationally interrelated and their working shows an acceptance of reason as the basis of political argument; in contrast to Rome, history neither explains nor justifies the institutions and political acts of the archaic and classical Greek city: I hasten to add in the case of Athens that, by the age of Demosthenes and even more by that of Lycurgus, history is gaining in importance as a justification for the constitution and for political action.

Like Aristotle, in order to create a believable social institution, I agree with Professor Ober in laying great emphasis on the notion of the city as a community or association (*koinonia*), and of the developed city as a network of interconnecting *koinoniai*, thus granting the *polis* both a unity and a social diversity necessary to its existence in history: Professor Ober has rightly emphasised this particular aspect of Aristotelian thought.⁴ But increasingly it seems to me that it is not sufficient simply to appeal to the concept of *koinonia* in order to make plausible the concept of the *polis* as a teleologically or rationally ordered entity independent of history. The problem remains with us, and can be seen to exist for all such attempts to create a meaningful order in history.

For Aristotle the *polis* is a natural phenomenon, to be explained as the proper ordering of human communities. There is firstly a necessary element of ordering, related to the vulnerability of man as an animal, as he explains in book I: physical danger and the complex needs of man require that he live in communities. But these communities can be ordered either in accordance with a command structure or by justice. The family for instance is a command structure, but the union of families towards the creation of cities is accompanied by the increasing importance of justice. Aristotle therefore excludes from his analysis those forms of statehood which continue to build on power structures – oriental despotisms,

theocracies, tribal societies. The reason for this is teleological: man is by nature an animal of the *polis* – by biological nature not necessity, for he possesses the faculty of language and therefore the ability to distinguish justice and injustice (1253a9-15). Man has an end which can only be achieved in the context of a *polis*; for the ultimate fulfilment of all man's potentialities, he needs the *polis*. That is why he says at both the beginning and the end of the *Ethics* (*NE* I 2-3, 1094a18-1095a13; X 9, 1181b1-23) that the study of ethics must be completed by the study of politics, which alone will provide knowledge of the form of association compatible with man's nature. Even the philosopher with his theoretical wisdom can exist as a whole man only within the *polis*, which alone can satisfy all aspects of his soul, the vegetable, the animal and the divine. Man is 'an animal of the *polis* (*politikon zoon*)', just as other animals find their *telos* in the pack or the hive; indeed he is the 'most political' of all gregarious animals (*Pol.* I 2, 1253a7-9).⁵ The *polis* is made by man as the highest form of organisation for man; and it is the nature of man as of all biological entities to aim at his end (cf. *Pol.* III 9, 1280a25-1281a11).⁶

So the development of society from the individual through the family to the city is natural, in accordance with man's nature. Here comes the first *aporia*: if that is true, why is it that not all humanity tends towards this *telos* of the city? History suggests that there are many successful and civilised societies which do not aim at the city. The answer for Aristotle lies in the different grades of humanity: 'Polis-ability' (*politike arete*), the ability to live together in just societies, is not distributed equally: it is universal in the sense that all have a certain basic share in it (since all can speak and reason), but it is distributed differently according to ethnic differences (*Pol.* III 10-13, 1281a11-1284b34). Some cultures may be naturally monarchic, in that one man possesses all or most of the political virtue; others are naturally oligarchic since a group of men outweighs the rest of the community in political virtue. The Greeks have a natural disposition to relatively equal distribution of political virtue, and therefore the *polis* is their natural habitat. Moreover it is biologically more advanced (as we might say), or teleologically more correct, to have a fairly even distribution of essential human characteristics throughout the community; and societies that have evolved towards the *polis* have thereby shown that they are the most human, while societies that exist under the despotism of one man or with unequal distributions of political privilege show themselves to be, not merely historically unfortunate, but natural slaves: their humanity is of a lesser grade, and they may legitimately be used in the service of the higher more human Greek city (*Pol.* I

5, 1254a17-1255a2). We may dislike this answer and believe it to be false, but it is nevertheless rational in being based on observation in conformity with a theory.

It is characteristic of Aristotle's theoretical focus that he does not stop to consider the interesting historical question, how other breeds of lesser humanity might reach their appropriate political forms. One could construct an answer for him, perhaps by charting a progression from family to village to tribe to oriental despotism rather than city; but even if Aristotle accepted this possible alternative he would I think see the two processes as separate, a bifurcation of human social development rather than an example in the non-Greek case of arrested development; for the tribe plays little part in his construction of the city. The fact is Aristotle's focus is on the *polis* not the *ethnos*, and the loss of his *Barbarian Customs* is no great loss either to political philosophy or to history.

The second *aporia* is I think more difficult for Aristotle. The *politeia* is the political organisation of the *polis*: since the *polis* is teleologically determined, should not all *politeiai* be the same, or at least tend to the same form? Why do different cities have different constitutions? It is true (as Prof. Christensen has reminded me) that although Greeks are a happy mixture of the northern 'thumetic' and the Asiatic 'dianoetic' types, ideally suited to the highest political development (*Pol.* VII 7, 1327b18-36), they themselves vary within a certain range; and some Greeks are less perfect than others, more barbarian-like in one or the other respect. However Aristotle does not make this the basis for a classification of constitutions. And even if the genetic or historical starting-point in different cities were held to be different, there should still be convergence towards the one ideal constitution, which will not need to be imposed by the philosopher, but will emerge as part of the rational-historical process.

There is of course a very important sense in which Aristotle believes that there is one best constitution, and that history is tending towards it. That constitution is aptly called the *politeia*, as if it encapsulated the essence of all political experience (*Pol.* IV 8-9, 1293b22-1294b40). In practical terms it is a modified democracy, a late-fourth century Athenian version of democracy laced with a bit (but a very small bit) of Spartan institutions – Aristotle being rather more critical of Sparta than Plato, as a result of the collapse of the Spartan myth. Such a 'hoplite' democracy is clearly what was emerging at Athens with the reforms of the *ephebeia* and the conservative tendencies of the age of Eubulus and Lycurgus.

But again Aristotle does not believe that all six forms of constitutions

are by-products of a development towards the one *politeia*. Must we believe that Spartans and Corinthians have a different distribution of political virtue from Athenians, as well as believing that Athenians have gone too far? A possible modern solution might be that this is in part what Aristotle means when he says that politics is not an exact science, but true only 'for the most part': it is not simply that the generalisations and rules of the science have to allow for exceptions; it may also be that the practitioners have to allow in human societies that they can only roughly aim at the target (*NE* I 3, 1094b12-27; cf. *Rhet.* I 2, 1357a22-34); perhaps the range of city organisations from Sparta to Athens is an index of the approximateness of the teleological process: all are really part of the same pattern, and there is ultimately no great difference between them. But Aristotle is far too interested in the detailed varieties and changes between constitutions for this explanation to be satisfying to him.

Aristotle's own answer to this problem is given at *Pol.* IV 3 (1289b27-1290a29). The variety of constitutions results from the diversity of citizens. All cities are composed of families; these families are rich or poor or middle class. The *demoi* may be involved in agriculture, in trade or manufacture. The rich too differ in respect of wealth and property, birth and merit. This gives rise to a variety of constitutions, for a *politeia* is an ordering of offices in relation either to power or equality.

This is Aristotle in his proto-Marxist or economic mode:⁷ the economy is seen to complicate the picture, in accordance with the struggle for power or the principles of an arithmetical or proportional justice. It involves very different principles from those which assert the biological necessity of the *polis*. For on this analysis the *polis* and the *politeia* are basically an ordering of *citizens*, and it should therefore be the citizens, not the constitution, which define the city.

Aristotle's interest in the substantive variety of constitutions compounds the problem. For it introduces a third *aporia*: how do constitutions change? How do they develop through history? In so far as each constitution approximates to the ideal, it should be immune from change, or capable only of one directional change. Aristotle is far too aware of the multifariousness and complexity of actual historical developments to be satisfied with this.

This problem is in turn connected to a fourth *aporia*: how are we to explain *stasis*? It is clear that political *stasis*, irreconcilable political differences leading to civil war and the destruction of whole communities, was endemic in the Greek world, and that Greek political institutions

never found a way of dealing with it (except possibly for the device of tyranny, that is the suspension of political life). This was a problem for all Greeks, not just historians and philosophers – Thucydides (III 82) expressed the general view when he saw *stasis* as a *nosos*, a disease of the body politic, for the most part inexplicable and incurable like the Great Plague itself: it had to be described so that it might be recognised in future in terms of symptoms and consequences. But Greek thinkers are strangely silent about the possible causes, taking refuge in a vivid but traditional descriptive picture without analysis.⁸ As I have argued elsewhere ('Cities of Reason' p.20-1), this relates to a basic difference between ancient and modern conceptions of politics: the absence of the conception of politics as the conflict of interests, the insistence on the community as a unity and the political act as the expression of the communal will, all this can be seen as one of the important consequences of the Greek *polis* as a *koinonia*, the embodiment of community values. But once true class war emerged, the Greeks had no way of controlling its consequences; and the absence of the conception of politics as conflict between interest groups, or a struggle for power, remains a basic weakness in Greek political thought.

Aristotle's own attempt to answer the problem of the general causes of *stasis* is given at the start of book V, and reflects his view of the reasons for the diversity of constitutions in book IV. The real cause of *stasis* is inequality. Men are both equal and unequal in many respects, and therefore desire either to be unequal in all respects or to be equal in all respects. Both inequality and equality are seen as types of justice; all men (and therefore all *poleis*) aim at justice, but they have different ideas as to what it is. Aristotle then proceeds to his long analysis of the ways in which inequality manifests itself; but the fundamental cause of *stasis* lies in inequality: *pantachou gar dia to anison he stasis* (1301b26).

This analysis too locates the origin of *stasis* in economic causes, and leads us back ultimately to the discussion in book I 8-11 on the economic basis of the *polis*. My point is that there are really two conceptions of the *polis* in Aristotle: one is of the economic and necessary *polis*, the other is of the natural and just *polis*. The necessary *polis* allows of diversity of constitution and change, the natural *polis* does not. The necessary *polis* is based on the concept of the *polis* as a community of citizens (*koinonia politon*) in all their diversity, in which the *politeia* reflects the economic activities of the citizens, and is closely related to the conception of them as producers and agents. The natural *polis* is based on the concept of a *polis* as simply a *politeia*, an ordering of the citizen body (*politai*) in rela-

tion to office holding (*archai*: *Pol.* III 6, 1278a8-9; IV 1, 1289a15-18). In this second case the *politai* are subordinate to the *politeia*, and when the *politeia* changes, the *polis* must change.

All these *aporai* are related, in that all concern the consequences of history for political theory. The possible effects of varieties of human nature, the differences in the development of *politeiai* and the variety of their final forms, the difficulty of explaining how they change, are all disturbances introduced by history into the theoretical picture. As Aristotle saw, it is not enough to say that politics is an inexact science valid only for the most part. His programme of the study of real *politeiai* was not just in order to provide the factual basis for his theoretical generalisations; it was an essential expansion of the theory.

In books IV-VI of the *Politics* Aristotle tried to tackle this basic weakness in his theory. In book IV he considered the relation of existing constitutions to the theory of politics, and the variety of such constitutions. In book V he considered the general causes of revolution and stability, and the causes of *stasis* in each variety of constitution. In book VI he turned to the modes of improving the stability or performance of democracies and oligarchies. The introduction which justifies all these books emphasises the practical nature of the art of politics: theory should lead to the improvement of existing political life. But there is in these books an element of casuistry that is ultimately unsatisfying.⁹ The practical application of theoretical views often degenerates into little more than clever tricks for promoting or overthrowing constitutions; and we learn little further about why this variety of constitutions exists and why there is no simple progression towards an ultimate *politeia*; even Plato had believed in a cycle of constitutions. The casuistry of political forms, how to stabilise, how to revolutionise, does not reveal why stability does not exist or the structural reasons for change.

The task Aristotle perhaps only dimly perceived in these books was carried on by his disciples with relentless efficiency. The great collections of examples of constitutions, laws and revolutions associated with the early Peripatos, from Theophrastus to Dicaearchus and Demetrius of Phaleron, constitute the most sustained programme of research into chance and change in political institutions in the ancient world. Our present fragments present little more than a collection of random factoids, and the conceptual framework is difficult to discover. But as H. Bloch argued long ago,¹⁰ it goes back to the perceptions of Aristotle himself.

Behind this later industry and behind the central books of the *Politics*

lie Aristotle's own collection of 157 *Politeiai*. It is perhaps here that we might expect Aristotle to face in concrete terms the problem of historical development and change in relation to the concept of the *polis*. The model of Aristotelian investigation is provided by the *Athenaion Politeia*; for this purpose it makes not the slightest difference whether it is by Aristotle himself or a pupil, for we must surely believe that it was Aristotle who provided the plan of research. I would also assume that all (or almost all) other *Politeiai* were designed according to the same model; that assumption is certainly capable of fitting the evidence available for most cities in Aristotle's day, and conforms to the fragmentary evidence we possess in the majority of cases.¹¹

The model chosen by Aristotle is surely new as a literary genre or research project; no previous writer can have designed works of this type, for he would have lacked the incentive.¹² On the other hand it is eminently sensible as a response to the needs of Aristotelian theory, and capable of being carried out by any reasonably competent member of the team. The model consists of a historical section based on the available literary sources, with some occasional but not systematic reference to documentary evidence; this is followed by a descriptive section of the political constitution of the city.

It may be that the fact that in the *Ath. Pol.* the word *politeia* denotes exclusively the political institutions of Athens suggests that Aristotle was not primarily concerned in any of these works with the wider ideological and educational issues: if so, the *Constitution of the Lakedaimonians* and that on the Cretans would have had a scope very different from the works of Xenophon, Ephorus and others, and very different from Aristotle's own observations in the *Politics*. I think this is a very difficult question which needs more thought; but, while social and cultural characteristics are not entirely absent from the surviving fragments of Aristotle's *Politeiai* and from the epitome of Herakleides, these do concentrate on historical events and political institutions.¹³ On the other hand we might imagine that the *Constitution of the Athenians* was misleading in this respect, since Aristotle did not regard Athens as being a *paideia* of anything.

What is clear is that, however standard the model, each city's *Politeia* will have looked different according to the sources available for the research and contemporary analysis. It is exactly a hundred years since Wilamowitz in his seminars of 1891/2 and through the summer of 1892 was working on the significance of these facts; it is appropriate to pay homage to the first serious modern work on Athenian local history, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893).

A century later, thanks to his work and that of a succession of scholars, among whom we should mention above all Felix Jacoby and our two colleagues at this colloquium, Mogens Herman Hansen and Peter Rhodes, the evidential basis of the *Constitution of the Athenians* is clear. Part 1 (chapters 1-41) is dependent on the tradition of the Atthis, especially on Androtion; this is filled out in a way that is almost certainly untypical of the Atthis (as it was of serious Greek historical works in all periods before the Judaeo-Christian historians) by quotations from poetry and semi-literary documents, genuine and forged; very occasionally and on a casual basis, appeal is made to official or inscriptional material, but there is no sign of systematic archival research by the author, who uses the texts but does not follow the methods of the Atthis. In contrast Part 2 (chapters 42-69) is based on the revision of the democratic law code inscribed in the *Stoa Basileios*; it is arranged by magistracies and offices, and ends with the procedure of the lawcourts; there is no place for a wider less institutional analysis.¹⁴ Given the available materials and purpose of the project, this was a sensible and economical way of organising the research: and (as I have said) it was one which was followed as far as possible for most of the *Politeiai*. For there are many parallels between the techniques of the *Constitution of the Athenians* and those found in the fragments of other works: to give one example, the layout and style of argument in Plutarch's *Lycurgus* chapter 6, with its use of documents, philology and poetry, is clearly derived from Aristotle, and is closely parallel to the *Ath. Pol.*'s discussion of Solon.¹⁵

Athens must, however, have presented a particular problem to the Aristotelian researcher interested in change. On the one hand there must have been far more evidence for Athenian constitutional development than for most cities; on the other hand Athens was not much given to violent *stasis*; as many modern scholars have noted it was a city with a high degree of unity, a genuine element of *koinonia*, despite the variety of citizen types it contained, its freedom 'to live as one wished' and its economic diversity; Athens was a genuinely pluralist society. It was therefore not a very good example of radical constitutional changes: it might be thought rather to favour that other Aristotelian vision of the *polis* as a natural institution developing according to an inner logic. Nevertheless the author of our work makes the most he can of violent revolution: he carefully places the origins of democracy in a period of Solonian *stasis* (*Ath. Pol.* 5); and he shows extreme interest in the events of 411 and 404 (*Ath. Pol.* 29-38), neither of which are of any serious importance for the nature of the Athenian *politeia*. In contrast we may note his

total lack of interest in the restoration of democracy, simply because it was a non-violent (but nevertheless, as Hansen has taught us, fundamental) revolution.¹⁶ It is obvious where our author's interests lie.

The history of the Athenian constitution is therefore conceived in narrow institutional terms, and as a series of sudden changes or *mini-staseis*. The theoretical basis of the *Ath. Pol.* is given in chapter 41, which (as Peter Rhodes has rightly said, o.c. p. 482) forms 'one of the most strikingly Aristotelian passages' in the work. Here the constitutional history of Athens is reduced to eleven changes or *metabolai*: the whole vocabulary describing these changes emphasises their radical nature by words like *metastasis*, *stasis*, *katalusis*, *katastasis*. This is the crucial theoretical chapter; and, as many commentators have noted, it has been tampered with. For there are in fact twelve, not eleven changes: the discovery of the forged constitution of Drakon has forced the author to insert another unnumbered revolution into the sequence, between numbers 2 and 3. This is usually thought to show that the constitution of Drakon is a late discovery, after the main body of the work had been completed; and there are other indications that this may be so.¹⁷

However I would like to suggest that it has also a far wider significance. It is generally assumed that the final 'author' of the *Ath. Pol.* inserted an additional constitution into an existing text, and that the original sequence of eleven constitutions was a considered verdict written by a first 'author' after he had completed his research and composed the historical narrative. I would rather see chapter 41 as the original schema of Athenian constitutional history set up by Aristotle, to which he required the historical evidence to conform, a framework constructed before the detailed narrative itself. As Peter Ghosh has brilliantly and finally proved, the original plan of Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* is to be found inserted in the work itself, as the 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West' at the end of volume III, nearly a decade after they were written, and in order to form a conclusion to the work as originally conceived.¹⁸ As in the case of Gibbon, I suggest that Aristotle has inserted his original plan of the historical section at the end of that section; and, as in the case of Gibbon, it is an inevitable consequence that the detailed narrative of the *Ath. Pol.* sometimes conflicts with its original plan, which fails to satisfy us in its new role as a conclusion. But in this case we have of course a further cause for puzzlement, for it may be that the man who laid down the plan and the man who carried it out are not one and the same, but master and pupil.

Chapter 41 is the crucial theoretical chapter. It shows that the *Constitution of the Athenians* was based on a model which was designed to answer questions posed by Aristotelian theory. Unfortunately it fails to answer those questions for two reasons. Firstly because the *stasis* model of political change may get over the static nature of the Aristotelian analysis of the *polis* as a *koinonia* by regarding all change as constituting immediately a new *polis* and a new *koinonia*; and it may solve the problem of the inevitability of a teleological development; yet it still does not explain why *stasis* occurs: it still does not accept that conflict is an intrinsic part of the political experience and requires institutions to mediate its effects. Like all other Greeks, Aristotle, after all his analysis of historical examples, is still unable to see that the *polis* has to be more than a *koinonia* if it is to survive class warfare.

Secondly of course, and more parochially, Aristotle's attempt fails because it is bad history. The history of Mytilene or Miletus or Corcyra might respond to the catastrophe theory of political change. But that theory is just not appropriate to the gradual development of Athenian political institutions: there were no revolutions in Athens; and to see Athenian history as a series of new constitutions attached to one named reformer and appearing in a single year is clearly false: to take two obvious examples, the Cleisthenic and the Ephialtic constitutions began with their eponyms, but each took more than a decade to come to fruition after the disappearance of their protagonists. Ironically, the one *Politeia* we possess is a *Politeia* of a city which is a particularly successful example of Aristotle's view of the *polis* as a *koinonia* (as Professor Ober points out in the second half of his paper): Aristotle would have been better using it to support his general theory, rather than trying to make it explain a weakness in that theory.

My conclusion is that the *Constitution of the Athenians* does not solve Aristotle's problem: it displays the same weaknesses as the analysis in the *Politics*, but in the historical mode. By asserting that the city is a community, and the constitution is a community of citizens, Aristotle is committed to believing in eleven (or twelve) *politeiai* each implying a completely new *polis* attached to the geographical locus popularly known as the city of Athens – eleven cities in place of one, and eleven sets of Athenians, whose identity of name disguises a complete discontinuity. QUOD EST ABSURDUM.¹⁹

Notes

- 1 In his first edition (Leipzig 1872); see his discussion of the problem in F. Susemihl, R.D. Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle I-V* (London 1894) 365.
- 2 'Cities of Reason', *The Greek City* ed. O. Murray and S. Price (Oxford, 1990) 1-25; 'History and Reason in the Ancient City', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 59 (1991) 1-13.
- 3 Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London, 1957).
- 4 See his contribution to this symposium, above, p. 129; also S. Everson, 'Aristotle on the Foundation of the State', *Political Studies* 36 (1988) 89-101.
- 5 In his response to this paper, Prof. Johnny Christensen rightly drew attention to *Hist. animal.* I 1, 488a, where living creatures are divided into either the gregarious or the solitary or those which are both, to which last man belongs; his gregariousness is 'political', having one common object in view, like the bee, the wasp, the ant and the crane. Of these some submit to a ruler, others are anarchic; but Aristotle does not categorise man in this respect.
- 6 For the problems in this conception see in general W. Kullmann, 'Man as a Political Animal', in D. Keyt, F.D. Miller, *A Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford 1991) 94-117.
- 7 See G.E.M. de Sainte Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981) 69-80; S. Meikle, 'Aristotle and Exchange Value', in Keyt and Miller (o.c.) 156-81.
- 8 H. Ryffel, *Metabole Politeion* (Bern 1949); for Aristotle see R. Polansky, 'Aristotle on Political Change', in Keyt and Miller (o.c.) 323-45.
- 9 As E. Barker saw in his characterisation of the analysis as 'The Trimmer's Opinion of the Laws and Government': 'The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of Aristotle's Politics', *Classical Review* 45 (1931) 162-72, at p. 164.
- 10 H. Bloch, 'Studies in the Historical Literature of the Fourth Century B.C.: III Theophrastus' *Nomoi* and Aristotle', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* Suppl. 1 (1940) 355-76.
- 11 J.J. Keaney, *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaiion Politeia* (New York 1992) 14 n.4 points out that the Arcadian League *Politeia* had no historical section, and that other cities, being no longer in existence, must have lacked a section on the present constitution; but with these exceptions the evidence supports the view below.
- 12 This was established by F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 211-5, which remains the best characterisation of the *eidōs* of the *Politeia*. Keaney's attempt to relate the genre to the idea of *Kulturgeschichte* in antiquity (o.c. chs.2-3) seems to me to rest on a series of confusions.
- 13 See the useful comments of Keaney o.c. ch. 19. For Herakleides see H. Bloch, 'Herakleides Lembos and his *Epitome* of Aristotle's *Politeia*', *TAPA* 71 (1940) 27-39. For the dangers in drawing conclusions from such evidence, see P.A. Brunt, 'On Historical Fragments and Epitomes', *CQ* 30 (1980) 477-94.
- 14 For the sources of these two sections see P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 5-37; for the *Stoa Basileios* see J.M. Camp, *The Athenian Agora* (London 1986) 100-5.
- 15 See my *Early Greece* (2nd edn London 1993) ch. 10.
- 16 M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1991) ch. 13.
- 17 Rhodes o.c. 84-7, 484-5. The only serious attempt to claim that the Draconian constitution is intrinsic to the original text is that of K. von Fritz, 'The Composition of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* and the So-called Draconian Constitution', *CP* 49 (1954) 73-93.
- 18 P.R. Ghosh, 'Gibbon's Dark Ages', *Journal of Roman Studies* 73 (1983) 1-23; 'Gibbon Observed', *ib.* 81 (1991) 132-56.

19 I would like to thank especially my respondent on this occasion, Professor Johnny Christensen, for his very helpful comments on the original version of this paper: he is responsible for causing me to clarify a number of points, as well as for those specific observations that I have noted. My thanks also to all the members of the group who made useful points in the lively discussion that ensued: they will find many of their comments reflected in the final text.

Les cités hellénistiques

PH. GAUTHIER

(RESPONDENT: MARCEL PIÉRART)

I. Les cités dans le monde hellénistique

A considérer le nombre, tout le monde en convient, la période hellénistique coïncide avec l'essor de la *polis*. Aux nombreuses cités fondées par Alexandre et les diadoques et peuplées de Gréco-Macédoniens, s'ajoutent les fondations royales plus tardives, fruits – et en même temps agents – de l'hellénisation de l'Asie Mineure profonde et du Proche-Orient méditerranéen. Or, à cette prolifération de cités correspond aujourd'hui, pour nous, la diversification des sources. Le tableau de "la cité classique" est surtout celui d'Athènes, connue grâce aux auteurs athéniens (ou vivant à Athènes). C'est le tableau d'une cité géante, riche en hommes et en ressources, et d'une cité hégémonique. Mais les nombreuses petites cités du monde égéen, les plus représentatives, restent à peu près inconnues de nous, du moins pour le Ve et le IVe siècle, sauf à être mentionnées par les auteurs athéniens comme alliées ou sujettes, consentantes ou révoltées, vis-à-vis d'Athènes, de Sparte ou de Thèbes. En revanche, grâce surtout aux inscriptions, nous connaissons – certes imparfaitement, mais de mieux en mieux – les institutions et les cultes de centaines de cités, grandes ou petites, depuis la Sicile jusqu'aux rives du Pont-Euxin et à l'Afghanistan.

Du point de vue qualitatif, la période hellénistique passe au contraire pour coïncider avec le déclin de la cité. En Grèce péninsulaire même, nombre de vieilles cités se regroupent au sein de *koina* égalitaires, achaien dans le Péloponnèse, béotien, phocidien ou locrien en Grèce centrale, rompant ainsi avec leurs traditions d'indépendance. D'autres *koina*, étolien ou épirote, dont la puissance et le rôle à l'époque hellénistique furent importants, accordent aux cités une place moindre qu'aux *ethnè*. D'une manière générale, sur la scène internationale, les rois (et certains *koina*) puis les Romains tiennent les premiers rôles: ils font l'Histoire, les cités la subissent. Les institutions civiques, on le concède, continuent à fonctionner, plus ou moins bien, mais la domination écrasante des monarchies, masquée aussi bien par le discours officiel des rois, qui se posent en

”bienfaiteurs“, que par celui des cités ”reconnaissantes“, aurait atteint en quelque sorte ”l’âme des cités“.¹ Aussi beaucoup de ces *poleis* mériteraient-elles d’être qualifiées de ”villes“ plutôt que de ”cités“. Les ”citoyens“, en effet, n’auraient eu, la plupart du temps ou à partir d’une certaine date, que la possibilité de gérer les affaires municipales: entretien des bâtiments publics, police de l’agora, panégyries et cultes, enseignement (recrutement des maîtres), etc. Le reste, c’est-à-dire l’essentiel, le maintien de l’autonomie ou l’aspiration à l’autonomie et à l’indépendance – thème omniprésent dans le discours officiel (décrets gravés) – relèverait en fait d’un passé révolu ou d’un idéal inaccessible.²

Il faut tenter de s’entendre. Malgré sa relative unité, le monde hellénistique ne forme pas un ensemble homogène, ni dans l’espace ni dans le temps. Parler de ”la cité hellénistique“, sans autre précision, c’est risquer d’aggraver les malentendus. J’ai naguère essayé de montrer que, sur le plan des institutions et des relations entre les cités et leurs notables, la haute époque hellénistique (de 330 à *ca.* 170-130) et la basse époque hellénistique (fin du IIe et Ier siècle *a.C.*) présentaient des caractères sensiblement différents.³ D’autre part, du IVe au IIe siècle, les possessions des souverains demeurèrent le plus souvent précaires. Relativement sûrs de leurs bases (la Macédoine des Antigonides, l’Egypte des Lagides, la Syrie et la Mésopotamie des Séleucides), les rois poussèrent leurs pions dans le monde égéen (monde de *poleis* par excellence), s’y affrontèrent à plusieurs reprises, mais – mis à part la possession de quelques bases – ne réussirent pas à y asseoir une domination uniforme et durable. L’existence même et la rivalité de plusieurs monarchies – ce que les théoriciens des relations internationales appellent un système multipolaire – constitua, pour les cités du monde égéen, un élément essentiel du jeu politique.

Pour évaluer le degré d’autonomie ou de sujétion des cités, il faut donc prendre en compte leur situation géographique et leur environnement politique, leurs dimensions et leurs ressources, leur prestige et leur statut. Il y avait, à l’évidence, peu de points communs, au IIIe siècle, entre une cité riche, puissante et indépendante comme Rhodes et une cité médiocre et sujette des Séleucides, comme l’était Apollonia de la Salbakè en Carie orientale.⁴ Inversement, une ”petite cité“ comme Priène, qui ne constituait pas un enjeu stratégique important pour les Séleucides et qui s’enorgueillissait d’administrer le *Paniônion*, sanctuaire commun aux douze (ou treize) cités ioniennes, put conserver, au IIIe siècle, une marge d’autonomie suffisante pour avoir à régler tous les problèmes d’un Etat – en particulier la défense de son territoire (forts et phrourarques, milices

civiques levées contre les Galates) et l'administration de ses revenus⁵ – alors que dans le même temps d'opulentes fondations comme Alexandrie en Egypte ou Antioche sur l'Oronte, capitales royales, n'avaient guère de cité que le nom, si du moins l'on entend par "cité" un Etat.

Les historiens modernes doivent s'exercer sans cesse à déjouer les pièges des discours officiels, à ôter les masques de rois patelins, en fait dominateurs, et de citoyens joyeux et reconnaissants, en fait terrorisés. Toutefois, en l'occurrence, la remarquable uniformité de ton des documents gravés – s'agissant des relations entre les rois et les cités hellénistiques – peut contribuer à les égarer. Car la définition du statut reste primordiale, comme l'avaient souligné L. et J. Robert. La présence ou l'absence de fonctionnaires royaux, de garnisons permanentes à la solde du roi et commandées par ses officiers ou, au contraire, de milices civiques formées et entraînées sur place, l'acquittement ou la franchise de "tribut" ou de "contributions", l'attribution, ou non, de certains revenus publics au Trésor royal: tous ces éléments, qui n'étaient certes pas négligeables pour les citoyens, permettent d'apprécier la "sujétion" ou l'"autonomie" des communautés hellénistiques à divers moments d'une histoire séculaire.⁶

Au sujet de l'évergétisme royal, il importe également d'établir des distinctions.⁷ Certes, d'une manière générale, l'*euergésia* royale n'était pas désintéressée et, comme l'a écrit J.-L. Ferrary, les Grecs des cités étaient "bien conscients de ce que les obligations de la reconnaissance pouvaient constituer le fondement d'une sujétion déguisée, ou du moins interdire la jouissance d'une pleine indépendance".⁸ Mais, ici encore, beaucoup dépendait de la puissance des cités, de l'intérêt stratégique qu'elles présentaient, ou non, aux yeux des souverains, de leur statut et de leur situation (par exemple, en Asie Mineure avant 189, le Séleucide n'entretenait pas les mêmes relations avec une cité sujette fondée par l'un de ses ancêtres, comme Laodicée du Lykos, et avec une cité *autonome* comme Milet, avec son fameux sanctuaire d'Apollon, divinité ancestrale de la dynastie), de leur prestige enfin, lorsqu'elles étaient le siège d'un sanctuaire panhellénique (Delphes, Délos, Samothrace, etc.).

Strabon écrit:⁹ "Les rois ont les moyens de soumettre les masses à leurs volontés par la persuasion ou par la force. C'est surtout par l'*euergésia* qu'ils persuadent. Car la persuasion par les discours n'est pas le fait des rois, mais des orateurs, tandis que nous parlons de persuasion royale lorsqu'ils font plier (les masses) à leurs volontés par leurs bienfaits; ils persuadent par la bienfaisance, ils contraignent par la force. L'une et l'autre s'acquièrent à prix d'argent. Possède en effet une nombreuses

armée celui qui a les moyens de l'entretenir, et peut accomplir de grands bienfaits celui qui possède de grands biens".¹⁰

La comparaison entre les deux modes de "persuasion" (l'éloquence des orateurs, l'*euergésia* des rois) n'a de sens, me semble-t-il, que si l'auteur considère le gouvernement des cités (aux mains des assemblées du peuple) – et non les relations internationales en général. C'est donc à l'égard des cités qui dépendent plus ou moins étroitement de lui que le roi use soit de la persuasion par les bienfaits, soit de la force. Les relations entre Ptolémée II et les Milésiens, dans les années 260, entre Séleukos II et les Smyrniens, après 246, pourraient illustrer assez bien le propos de Strabon: aux bienfaits (ou aux promesses) des rois succèdent les témoignages du dévouement des cités, dans des circonstances critiques (guerres), que récompensent éventuellement de nouveaux bienfaits.¹¹

En revanche, lorsque les rois rivalisent de générosité envers les Rhodiens après le séisme de 228/7,¹² envoient de riches offrandes à Delphes ou à Délos,¹³ lorsqu'un Attale I rachète pour les Sicyoniens la terre sacrée d'Apollon¹⁴ ou qu'un Antiochos IV donne de l'argent à Mégalopolis pour la construction des murailles, à Tégée un théâtre de marbre, pour le prytanée de Cyzique un service en or, etc.,¹⁵ ils se constituent sans doute un réseau d'obligées, tout en obtenant prestige et honneurs (statues), mais ils ne cherchent ni à s'immiscer dans le gouvernement ni à modifier le statut des cités en cause. L'exemple d'Antiochos IV, qui vient d'être évoqué, est particulièrement instructif à cet égard, puisque depuis la paix d'Apamée en 189/8 les Séleucides ont perdu tout droit (et aussi tout espoir, du moins à moyen terme) d'intervenir militairement et politiquement dans le monde égéen et en Asie Mineure cistaurique.

Peut-être conviendrait-il également de distinguer plusieurs catégories de bienfaits. Des dons ponctuels à des cités indépendantes dans le besoin pouvaient manifester à la fois la richesse et le caractère vraiment royal de leurs auteurs, sans obliger pour autant les communautés bénéficiaires à une reconnaissance éternelle. Au contraire, d'importantes fondations royales, dont le revenu annuel était destiné à permettre le fonctionnement de certaines institutions civiques, ne risquaient-elles pas d'aliéner durablement l'indépendance des cités ainsi "entretenues"? C'est ce que pourrait suggérer la lecture de Polybe. L'historien, en effet, semble approuver le refus par les Achaïens du don d'Eumène II, qui eût fait des membres de la *synodos* des stipendiés de Pergame, et blâme les Rhodiens d'avoir accepté, vers 160, un don analogue du même roi, dont le produit fut affecté au paiement des salaires des maîtres chargés de l'instruction des fils des citoyens.¹⁶ Toutefois, l'arrière-plan diplomatique et politique

de ces décisions a certainement pesé lourdement sur le jugement contrasté de Polybe sur ces deux affaires.¹⁷ Et le fait est que Diodore, quand il évoque le don d'Eumène II aux Rhodiens, adopte un ton tout différent. Loin de voir dans l'attitude des Rhodiens, comme Polybe, un symptôme de leur décadence, il loue leur "intelligence" et leur "dignité". Grâce à ces qualités, écrit-il, "ils ne cessèrent de recevoir des rois, pour ainsi dire, des tributs volontaires (ἔκρουσίους φόρους: c'est le vocabulaire de la domination royale, mais inversé). Honorant les puissants par des flatteries et par des décrets adroits, agissant en ces matières avec sûreté et pleine lucidité, ils s'attirent de multiples marques de reconnaissance et reçoivent de multiples dons de la part des rois (suivent les mentions de Démétrios I et d'Eumène II). Ainsi, les Rhodiens, qui sont parmi les Grecs ceux qui se gouvernent le mieux, firent que bien des dynastes rivalisaient pour être les bienfaiteurs de leur cité."¹⁸

La plupart des cités indépendantes ou autonomes n'avaient évidemment ni la puissance navale ni le prestige de Rhodes (même de la Rhodes affaiblie des années 160-150) et ne disposaient donc pas des mêmes marges de manoeuvre vis-à-vis des rois bienfaiteurs. Toutefois, en Grèce péninsulaire comme dans les îles de l'Egée ou sur le littoral de l'Asie Mineure, c'est-à-dire dans des régions où les intérêts des trois (puis quatre) grandes dynasties se heurtèrent constamment, nombre de cités purent soit préserver, soit reconquérir leur autonomie lorsque les circonstances leur furent favorables. Quant à l'évergétisme, dans la mesure où il fut tôt considéré comme un trait consubstantiel de la royauté hellénistique, qui exigeait d'être reconnu et proclamé par des communautés grecques, il devint certes un instrument de la politique des rois, mais un instrument dont les cités autonomes apprirent à jouer, elles aussi, du moment que se faisaient jour, auprès d'elles, les ambitions de rois rivaux.

Dans ce domaine également, d'importants changements se produisirent à la basse époque hellénistique. Après G.W.Bowersock, J.-L.Ferrary a souligné avec finesse les points de contact entre le système clientélaire des Romains et le système de l'évergétisme grec, correspondances qui permirent en quelque sorte aux Romains (au IIe siècle) de succéder aux rois, dans les relations avec les cités, sans trop de difficultés.¹⁹ Il a en particulier repris l'intéressant dossier des attestations épigraphiques (une bonne quinzaine désormais) du titre reconnu aux Romains en général, dans les documents officiels émanant de communautés grecques, de "communs évergètes", κοῖνοι εὐεργέται. Je reproduis seulement ici deux de ses remarques, d'abord sur la chronologie: "Ce n'est pas un hasard, croyons nous, si la référence aux Romains "communs évergètes" s'impo-

sa dans les années qui suivirent Pydna, c'est-à-dire au moment où, selon les mots de Polybe [III,4,3], il apparut de façon incontestable que tous devaient désormais obéir aux Romains et se soumettre à leurs volontés".²⁰ D'autre part sur le sens du titre: "Il constituait, dans une terminologie hellénistique, la reconnaissance de l'hégémonie exercée désormais sans contestation par les Romains sur l'*oikouménè* entière, et le renoncement définitif à l'*isologia*. Mais, et c'est en cela qu'il ne nous paraît pas pure adulation, il était en même temps un rappel du principe sur lequel devait se fonder cette hégémonie pour être acceptée par les Grecs: celui d'un échange de bienfaits et de reconnaissance obéissante".²¹

Je souscris entièrement à ces remarques. Cependant, de mettre l'accent sur la parenté des usages et des pratiques ne doit pas faire perdre de vue les nouveautés qui s'imposèrent alors aux cités. A des rois rivaux, plus ou moins puissants, plus ou moins proches et plus ou moins bien disposés à leur égard, succédait désormais pour les cités une puissance unique, en Grèce dès 168/7, en Asie à partir de 133-129. Les cités n'eurent plus le choix (sinon, pour leur malheur, lors de la Ière Guerre mithridatique, puis lors des guerres civiles). Même pour les cités "libres", les conditions du jeu politique avaient donc changé, car le bon usage de l'évergétisme était lié pour elles, comme je l'ai suggéré plus haut, à l'existence d'un système politique multipolaire.

Le vocabulaire lui-même exprime ce changement. Au IIIe siècle, dans les décrets des cités reconnaissantes, tel roi était loué pour son "attitude favorable" (προαίρεσις) ou sa "bienveillance" (εὐνοία) envers "la (notre) cité". D'Antiochos III les Tēiens disent, vers 204/3, qu'il ambitionne d'être "le commun bienfaiteur des cités grecques en général et de la nôtre en particulier".²² La formule est nouvelle. Du moins l'*euergésia* royale reste-t-elle circonscrite au monde des *poleis*. Les Romains, eux, sont proclamés "communs évergètes", sans précision, ou "communs bienfaiteurs de tous (les hommes)", une seule fois "des Grecs". Les communautés civiques se fondent désormais peu à peu dans la foule anonyme des clients ou des sujets de Rome.

Ce tour d'horizon avait d'abord pour but de rappeler quelques distinctions indispensables. "La cité hellénistique" est une étiquette équivoque, qui cache des situations et des statuts très différents, d'ailleurs variables selon les régions du monde grec et selon les subdivisions de la période hellénistique. Dans les développements qui suivent, consacrés aux institutions politiques, je m'attacherai principalement à l'étude des cités dont nous savons qu'elles disposèrent d'un minimum d'autonomie ou d'indépendance.

Mais ce tour d'horizon avait aussi pour but de faire ressortir la légitimité, disons même la nécessité, de l'étude des cités hellénistiques. Posons en effet la question: la diversité des situations et des statuts que l'on observe alors est-elle une nouveauté de l'époque hellénistique? Bien des cités d'Asie ne furent-elles pas dépendantes des rois Perses, de 545 à 480, puis de 386 à 334? Beaucoup de cités moyennes ou petites ne durent-elles pas, pendant des décennies, subir la loi d'Athènes, de Sparte ou de Thèbes? Qu'en était-il alors de "l'âme" de ces cités? L'historien de la période classique ne peut guère que poser la question, essentiellement pour des raisons documentaires. Comme je le rappelais en commençant, il dispose à de rares exceptions près, de sources athéniennes et adopte donc fatalement le point de vue de la cité hégémonique. Identifiée à Athènes, "la cité classique" apparaît sous un jour flatteur: c'est une communauté relativement forte et un État indépendant et entreprenant, épris de gloire militaire et acteur de l'Histoire. Mais les centaines de petites cités, que mentionne à l'occasion Aristote dans la *Politique* et qui jouèrent un rôle médiocre ou nul dans l'histoire politique, restent à peu près inconnues de nous; elles font seulement partie du décor.

Or, au sujet de la période hellénistique et à ne considérer que les cités, la situation est inverse. Sur les institutions politiques, judiciaires, militaires, etc., d'une grande cité indépendante comme Rhodes, les sources sont indigentes ou insuffisantes. En revanche, grâce en particulier aux découvertes épigraphiques, les innombrables petites cités, les "oubliées de l'Histoire", sortent tant soit peu de l'ombre qui les enveloppait à la période classique. Que l'étude de ces chétives communautés puisse décevoir ceux que passionne l'histoire politique est une chose. Mais qu'elle permette enfin d'esquisser le tableau des cellules politiques et sociales les plus représentatives du monde grec ancien est – ou devrait être – une évidence. En fait, l'étude des cités grecques, dans leur diversité, est seulement possible et fructueuse (et le sera de plus en plus) à partir de la période hellénistique.²³

II. A propos des institutions politiques

Ayant traité ailleurs, d'une manière générale, de la participation des citoyens dans les cités hellénistiques, je me bornerai ici à de brèves remarques sur les institutions politiques.²⁴

Les cités que nous connaissons par les inscriptions se disent et se reconnaissent "démocratiques". Au moins dans les documents de la

haute époque hellénistique, le terme *dēmokratia* garde sa valeur d'antan, par opposition à la tyrannie ou à l'oligarchie. La généralisation des régimes démocratiques, à partir des années 330-300, conduisit naturellement à l'idée que la démocratie était le régime normal, voire ancestral, de toute cité libre et que, comme l'a écrit justement Fr.Quass, "ne semble plus s'offrir à elle d'alternative acceptable sous la forme d'un autre régime".²⁵ A la basse époque hellénistique, dans certains documents sinon dans tous, *dēmokratia* en vient à ne plus signifier que "régime républicain", par opposition à la monarchie ou à la tyrannie. Les Romains ont probablement contribué à cette évolution. Favorables en principe aux "républiques" grecques opprimées par les rois, mais foncièrement hostiles à la démocratie d'assemblée, ils infléchirent, chaque fois qu'ils en eurent l'occasion, les institutions des cités ou des confédérations dans un sens oligarchique: sans être ni assez nombreux ni assez précis, les témoignages à ce sujet semblent convergents.²⁶

Cette *koinè* démocratique n'eût-elle été, à la haute époque hellénistique (et souvent aussi plus tard), qu'une forme abâtardie de démocratie ? A considérer le fonctionnement des institutions politiques, telles que les inscriptions (et parfois les auteurs) nous les font connaître, rien ne permet de l'affirmer. L'assemblée du peuple, ouverte à tous les citoyens, se réunit régulièrement, au moins une fois par mois. Elle débat de tout et vote, en général à main levée. Les décrets honorifiques ayant été généralement gravés, au moins sous forme de résumé, c'est cette catégorie de décisions qui forme, aujourd'hui, le plus clair de notre documentation. Documentation précieuse, néanmoins trompeuse. En fait, dans les archives publiques, les décrets honorifiques ne devaient représenter qu'une faible partie des décisions votées par l'assemblée. Sur le programme varié des assemblées nous sommes informés, de manière fort insuffisante, par des documents d'autre sorte et par des allusions dans les décrets honorifiques.

Si certaines assemblées (au moins dans certaines cités) étaient tout entières consacrées à l'examen des "affaires sacrées", *περὶ ἱερῶν*, dans la plupart des cas ce sujet formait seulement le premier chapitre des délibérations des assemblées; aucun étranger ne pouvait y être admis avant qu'il fût clos. La collection des lois sacrées, gravées en des occasions particulières, nous donne une idée des délibérations périodiques en ces matières: organisation des fêtes publiques, gestion des revenus et entretien des sanctuaires, examen des comptes des responsables, etc.

Les citoyens abordaient ensuite les autres sujets, que j'énumère briève-

ment: les *finances*, avec le vote sur la répartition des revenus, sur “l’administration” comme on dit à Érythrées et à Smyrne,²⁷ sur la couverture des dépenses imprévues, le comblement des déficits de revenus, le recours à l’emprunt ou aux souscriptions publics;²⁸ *l’approvisionnement en grain*, question vitale et plus ou moins cruciale suivant les années, entraînant soit l’institution de fonds permanents,²⁹ soit le recours à des *sitônai* élus, chargés de se procurer du grain à l’étranger;³⁰ *la défense de la ville et du territoire*, comportant l’entretien ou la reconstruction des remparts urbains et des forts situés en divers points du territoire,³¹ la désignation, l’entretien et le contrôle des phrourarques et des citoyens garnisaires;³² *les relations internationales*, avec la désignation ou l’accueil d’ambassadeurs chargés de proposer ou de renouveler des alliances, de préparer la conclusion de conventions judiciaires, de demander l’envoi de juges, etc.³³ Les guerres et les arbitrages entre cités voisines, au sujet de l’attribution d’une portion de territoire, ne manquent pas à la période hellénistique, ni en Grèce péninsulaire ni en Asie.

Si l’on ajoute la *législation*, que j’évoquerai plus loin, on retrouve ainsi les cinq sujets de délibération qu’Aristote jugeait être les plus importants pour toute assemblée de citoyens.³⁴ Ce que les sources contemporaines du philosophe ne permettent pas d’illustrer, sauf à propos d’Athènes, cité hors-norme, ce sont les inscriptions hellénistiques qui nous en instruisent pour de nombreuses cités petites et moyennes.

Une ou deux fois par an se tenaient des assemblées électorales, ἀρχαιρωσίου, dont nous connaissons, pour bien des cités, l’existence et la date, à défaut du fonctionnement.³⁵ Redressons à ce propos une interprétation courante. Comme nous l’apprend leur intitulé, un nombre non négligeable de décrets honorifiques, intéressant aussi bien des citoyens que des étrangers, fut voté à la période hellénistique, “en assemblée électorale”. Cette constatation a prêté à des commentaires désabusés. Le peuple, a-t-on dit, ne venait plus guère aux assemblées ordinaires. Aussi profitait-on des élections, qui attiraient davantage de monde, pour y faire adopter certains décrets honorifiques. En fait, loin d’indiquer la désaffection des citoyens pour les assemblées, dont nous disposons, en particulier au sujet de l’usage du quorum, suggèrent une forte participation.³⁶ Quant au vote de décrets honorifiques “en assemblée électorale”, il s’explique le plus simplement du monde. Pour tous les magistrats qui n’étaient pas soumis à reddition de comptes (tel était le cas, en particulier, pour les éponymes), c’était au moment où ils s’appêtaient à sortir de charge, dans les assemblées qui éliaient leurs successeurs,

qu'un membre du Conseil ou un citoyen ordinaire proposait de les honorer. Cet usage, étendu des citoyens aux étrangers honorés, est probablement très ancien: il est attesté depuis peu à Iasos au IV^e siècle a.C.³⁷

C'est sur le Conseil – mode de désignation et pouvoirs – que nos informations sont les plus pauvres. Les décrets nous laissent seulement apercevoir son rôle probouleumatique. Comme dans l'Athènes classique, le Conseil pouvait soit présenter à l'assemblée une proposition détaillée, que le peuple adoptait telle quelle, soit inscrire telle question à l'ordre du jour sans s'engager sur un texte. Cela étant, la part respective des membres du Conseil et des citoyens "ordinaires" dans l'initiative et dans l'élaboration des décrets reste difficile à apprécier, même lorsqu'on dispose de séries assez fournies de documents gravés, comme c'est le cas pour Athènes, Samos, Milet, Priène ou Iasos. L'opinion courante, selon laquelle les assemblées hellénistiques se seraient bornées le plus souvent à entériner les propositions de magistrats ou du Conseil,³⁸ devra être révisée ou du moins nuancée. Ainsi à Milet au III^e siècle a.C., l'assemblée pouvait désigner en son sein des commissaires (*synédroi*) en nombre variable, chargés d'élaborer et de présenter un projet de décret lors d'une assemblée ultérieure. Dans ces cas-là, qui paraissent avoir été assez fréquents, le Conseil n'intervenait pas, semble-t-il.³⁹ A Milet c'est seulement à partir des années 180-170 que le rôle des principaux magistrats, prytanes et préposés à la *phylakè*, dans la préparation et la proposition des décrets, paraît s'être développé aux dépens de l'initiative populaire.⁴⁰ Dans d'autres cités, comme Paros, Mytilène, Iasos, Cnide, Calymna ou Samos, apparaît une autre procédure. Les auteurs de la proposition dans l'assemblée sont bien tels magistrats ou représentants du Conseil. Mais cette proposition est (assez souvent) consécutive à un rapport écrit ou à une intervention orale présentés devant le Conseil et à l'assemblée par des citoyens ordinaires. "Sur le rapport écrit proposé par X et Y en vue d'honorer..."; "attendu qu'un tel, s'étant présenté devant le Conseil et devant l'assemblée, explique que (tel étranger) est dévoué à notre cité", etc.: ces formules établissent sans conteste, comme l'avait déjà marqué autrefois H.Swoboda, que l'initiative appartenait ici à des citoyens qui n'étaient pas membres du Conseil.⁴¹ Dans ces cas-là, le rôle du Conseil et des magistrats chargés de la proposition dans l'assemblée consistait à donner un avis favorable au projet présenté, à le mettre en délibération, puis aux voix, le jour venu.⁴² Vu le laconisme de bien des décrets gravés, il est permis de conjecturer que des formules stéréotypées comme "pro-

position des stratèges”, “des prytanes”, etc., dissimulent, en maintes cités, des procédures d’élaboration des décrets qui faisaient leur part aux initiatives des particuliers.

Les magistrats, enfin, étaient élus (ou tirés au sort), sans qu’apparemment aucune condition de cens fût exigée. Ici encore, l’intervention des Romains, à partir du II^e siècle a.C., modifia tant soit peu les choses, du moins dans certaines communautés, cités ou *koina*.⁴³ Sur l’élection à main levée dans l’assemblée, précédée des “propositions” de candidats (προβολαί) et des “contrepropositions” (ἀντιπροβολαί), éventuellement suivies du serment d’excuse (ἔξωμοσία), nos sources sont maigres, pour la période hellénistique comme pour la précédente.⁴⁴

Manquait-on de candidats? Un petit cercle de notables se trouvait-il contraint et forcé de monopoliser les charges? Notre documentation suggère de distinguer, à ce sujet, entre les diverses catégories de fonctions. Rangeons d’abord à part les fonctions spécialisées, qui exigeaient des compétences particulières et dans lesquelles certains titulaires étaient reconduits d’année en année (ainsi pour tels postes de secrétaires). Ces fonctions, qui n’entraînaient pas, en principe, de frais importants mais qui étaient absorbantes, étaient parfois (souvent?) rétribuées et ne manquaient sans doute pas d’amateurs.⁴⁵ Pourraient être regroupées, en second lieu, toutes les charges qui conféraient des responsabilités plus ou moins lourdes et dont les détenteurs avaient à manier des fonds publics: trésoriers, contrôleurs financiers, *teichopoioi* et, dans certaines cités au moins, agoranomes, gymnasiarques, etc. Tous ces magistrats avaient à rendre des comptes en fin de mandat: les mentions de cette procédure dans les inscriptions hellénistiques, qu’il s’agisse de rappeler cette obligation ou de louer tel magistrat de s’y être plié “comme il convenait” ou “conformément aux lois”, ne sont ni rares ni dépourvue d’intérêt.⁴⁶ Enfin, dans une troisième catégorie, je rangerais les fonctions certes prestigieuses, mais surtout onéreuses et connues comme telles: ainsi les stéphanéphores éponymes dans les cités d’Asie, de la côte thrace et du Pont, les théores, les agonothètes et, là où manquaient des revenus publics réservés ou le revenu régulier de fondations, les gymnasiarques, voire les agoranomes. Car s’ils avaient à faire preuve aussi de dévouement et de justice, les détenteurs de ces charges savaient, au moment où ils acceptaient de les assumer, qu’ils devraient délier les cordons de leur bourse. Aussi les rédacteurs des décrets soulignent-ils que, “sollicités par le peuple”, ils ont “accepté d’assumer” telle fonction, “alors qu’aucun

autre ne se dévouait". La générosité de ces magistrats, alliée à l'efficacité, pouvait parfois conduire à une itération plus ou moins forcée, soit aussitôt, soit quelques années plus tard.⁴⁷

C'est dans ce contexte qu'apparaissent parfois, en lieu et place des citoyens, les divinités ou les rois, "nommés" éponymes, agonothètes ou gymnasiarques.⁴⁸ Réservé ou limité, par définition, à un petit nombre de charges (aucun dieu ne pouvait être "nommé" stratège, phrourarque, théore, etc.), cet usage se développa inégalement selon les régions du monde grec et selon les périodes. Pour l'apprécier correctement, il faudrait également être mieux renseigné à propos de chaque cas sur les ressources des sanctuaires et sur les relations entre Trésor de la cité et Trésor des dieux. D'autre part, le recours à une divinité ou à un roi n'avait pas la même signification et ne répondait pas aux mêmes nécessités. Toujours est-il que l'argent du dieu (ou les libéralités d'un roi) servait à assumer les frais, de manière exceptionnelle ou plus ou moins régulière (à Héraclée du Latmos, le dieu fut éponyme pendant au moins quatorze années consécutives au début du IIe s.a.C.), d'une fonction onéreuse, voire ruineuse pour les simples particuliers.

Notons encore un autre usage très répandu à la période hellénistique, à savoir la brièveté du mandat de nombreux magistrats ou la rotation (mensuelle, trimestrielle, etc.) des membres de collèges annuels.⁴⁹ Deux explications ont été avancées. L'une vaut surtout pour les magistrats astreints ou poussés à l'*euergésia*: le souci d'abrégéer des fonctions trop lourdes et trop coûteuses. L'autre vaut principalement pour les magistrats militaires, stratèges et phrourarques: la volonté de ne pas conférer de trop longs pouvoirs à des hommes susceptibles de devenir les maîtres de la cité.⁵⁰

Ces brèves remarques à propos des magistrats permettent peut-être de mieux cerner la question obligée du caractère démocratique ou oligarchique du recrutement de la classe politique. Certes, il suffit de lire Polybe et les attendus des décrets honorifiques pour se convaincre que les notables, citoyens à la fois fortunés et bien formés (notamment à la rhétorique), jouèrent un rôle considérable dans les démocraties hellénistiques. Mais une telle constatation, formulée d'une manière aussi générale, est d'une grande banalité: le rôle des notables n'est ni une nouveauté de l'âge hellénistique, ni une caractéristique des seules démocraties antiques.⁵¹ Or la documentation hellénistique, parce qu'elle provient de cités et de régions très diverses et qu'elle commence à être assez fournie pour certaines d'entre elles, invite à tenir compte de plusieurs variables. L'une d'elles réside dans les dimensions très inégales du corps civique et du

territoire des cités. Dans une toute petite communauté, notait Aristote dans la *Politique* (voir en particulier VI, 11, 1296 a 7-8), la classe moyenne est laminée, tous les citoyens se regroupent en riches et en pauvres. Lors même qu'un régime démocratique s'y installe, un petit nombre de familles a tendance à accaparer les charges. Une autre variable réside dans l'ampleur (ou la médiocrité) et surtout la régularité (ou l'irrégularité) des revenus publics. Les crises financières répétées enfantent l'évergétisme (ou les révolutions) et favorisent donc l'accaparement des charges onéreuses par les représentants des familles les plus huppées. L'étude de Délos indépendante fournit un contre-exemple clair. Déchargée de toute dépense militaire et appuyée sur les richesses d'Apollon, la démocratie délienne, au IIIe s.a.C., ignore aussi bien l'évergétisme civique que la monopolisation des fonctions par un petit nombre de familles.⁵² Enfin, à ce sujet aussi, il faut tenir compte de la chronologie. A partir du IIe s.a.C., l'affaiblissement puis la disparition des monarchies d'une part, l'établissement et de le développement des relations avec les dirigeants romains d'autre part, favorisèrent l'émergence d'une minorité de notables, "grands évergètes", dont le rôle dans les affaires de la cité devint prépondérant. Avec ou sans transformation brutale des institutions, la démocratie se transforma peu à peu en oligarchie en maintes cités, ce qui ne put déplaire aux Romains.

Dernière institution à considérer: la justice. Ayant déjà évoqué ce sujet ailleurs et comptant y revenir dans une étude plus détaillée, je me borne ici à quelques généralités. Dans des communautés restreintes, comme l'étaient la plupart des *poleis*, où le fossé entre "riches" et "pauvres" était ou paraissait considérable, les jurys populaires ne fonctionnaient à peu près bien que dans les périodes de relative prospérité et de paix. Dès qu'une crise survenait, ainsi après une guerre ruineuse ou après plusieurs années de mauvaises récoltes, le problème des dettes devenait aigu et l'impartialité des tribunaux était mise en cause. Les "procès non jugés" (*ἀδίκαστοι δίκαι*) s'accumulaient, la guerre civile menaçait.⁵³ A lire les auteurs (Thucydide, Xénophon, Aristote), il ne semble pas que les démocraties du Ve et du IVe Siècle *a.C.*, Athènes exceptée, aient trouvé de remède à ces difficultés. A la période hellénistique, deux phénomènes nouveaux apparaissent.

1) Dès la fin du IVe siècle, en Asie Mineure et dans les îles, les diadoques puis les rois ordonnent ou conseillent aux cités sujettes ou dépendantes, lorsqu'elles connaissent des troubles prolongés, de faire venir un tribunal étranger, c'est-à-dire un ou plusieurs juges venus d'une ou de plusieurs cités amies. Connue par les décrets gravés, après la fin de

leur mission, en l'honneur des juges, cette pratique se généralisa au III^e siècle, indépendamment du statut des cités en cause. L. Robert a parfaitement mis en lumière les mécanismes de l'institution: les délibérations dans les cités troublées, l'ambassade et la demande, la désignation des juges dans les cités requises, l'activité des juges, d'abord conciliation, puis jugement "selon les lois de la cité", le vote des honneurs pour les juges et leur secrétaire.⁵⁴ Pour un certain nombre de cités, le recours aux juges étrangers devint quelque chose de prévisible, sinon de banal, comme le montrent les formules par lesquelles les rédacteurs de décrets évoquent "les juges qui, après ceux-là, viendront dans notre cité".⁵⁵ Ayant fait ses preuves, le système se perpétua jusqu'à la fin de l'époque hellénistique et même au delà.

L'historien des institutions enregistre avec intérêt cette nouveauté de l'âge hellénistique, mais il doit prendre garde en même temps au caractère déséquilibré de notre documentation. Les décrets pour les juges étrangers étaient normalement gravés, parfois en deux exemplaires (l'un dans la cité d'accueil, l'autre dans la cité d'origine); on en a donc retrouvé beaucoup et leur nombre ne cesse de croître d'année en année. En revanche, le fonctionnement d'un tribunal civique ordinaire laisse peu de traces. Il faut des circonstances particulières (un procès public important) ou la gravure d'un règlement comportant des clauses pénales, ou encore la conclusion d'une convention judiciaire avec une cité voisine, pour que l'on apprenne l'existence et la composition, donc l'activité, des tribunaux civiques. En fait, tout porte à croire qu'à l'époque hellénistique, en Asie comme dans les îles, les tribunaux locaux, composés soit de magistrats, soit de jurés (percevant alors un *misthos*, ainsi à Milet, à Samos, à Délos) comptaient toujours au nombre des institutions civiques régulières et accomplissaient, plus ou moins bien, leur travail. L'institution des juges étrangers permettait, en cas de blocage, d'éviter le pire et de "rétablir la concorde dans le corps civique". Elle ne se substituait pas à la justice civique en temps ordinaire, elle constituait une soupape de sûreté en temps de crise.

2) L'évolution fut différente en Grèce péninsulaire. A la fin du IV^e et au III^e siècle *a.C.*, le phénomène majeur y fut l'éclosion ou l'expansion de *koïna* égalitaires, béotien, achaien, étolien, épirote (le cas de la Thessalie, soumise à la Macédoine, est particulier). Bien que nos sources soient très insuffisantes, il semble que fonctionna, dans le cadre de ces confédérations, une justice à deux niveaux: d'une part des tribunaux locaux dans chacune des cités (ou des communautés) membres, d'autre part un tribunal fédéral, qui avait compétence pour certaines catégories de causes

et qui pouvait également offrir un recours vis-à-vis des tribunaux civiques.⁵⁶ Pour apprécier l'efficacité du système, nous ne disposons que de deux données contradictoires, ou du moins divergentes. C'est d'un côté le tableau de l'anarchie judiciaire en Béotie, tel que l'a peint Polybe; mais ce tableau, d'ailleurs partial, ne vaut expressément que pour les dernières décennies du III^e siècle.⁵⁷ D'un autre côté, l'évolution ultérieure semble prouver rétrospectivement les vertus du système. C'est en effet à partir du moment où telle confédération est dissoute que l'on voit les cités, naguère unies en son sein, recourir à des juges étrangers. Même observation à propos de Delphes qui ne fit appel à des juges étrangers qu'après 190, lorsqu'elle fut libérée de la domination étolienne.

III. Cité-état et cité-société

Ces brèves considérations sur le succès de l'institution des juges étrangers, d'abord en Asie puis en Grèce péninsulaire, permettent de reprendre en conclusion la question (évoquée au début de l'exposé) de l'unité ou de l'hétérogénéité du monde des cités à la période hellénistique. Si l'on s'attache au statut et à l'histoire politiques, ce monde apparaît singulièrement hétérogène: entre les cités indépendantes ou qui furent tantôt indépendantes, tantôt dépendantes, et les cités sujettes, entre les vieilles cités du monde égéen et les fondations royales de l'Orient méditerranéen, c'est toute une mosaïque de statuts et de situations qu'il faut inventorier. Il devient alors manifeste que toutes les *poleis* hellénistiques ne furent pas des États autonomes et que celles qui le furent ne le furent pas toutes au même degré ni avec la même permanence. Et cependant toutes les *poleis* présentaient un certain nombre de caractéristiques communes, qui faisaient qu'elles se reconnaissaient réciproquement comme d'authentiques cités et qu'elles entretenaient des relations plus ou moins régulières, quel que fût par ailleurs le statut politique de chacune d'entre elles. C'est cette relative unité, culturelle, religieuse et sociale que met en relief une bonne part de la documentation dont nous disposons – et d'abord l'expansion de la "langue commune", la *koinè*. J'en évoquerai rapidement les deux principaux chapitres, en prenant appui sur les décrets de Colophon pour Polémaïos et Ménippos, récemment publiés.⁵⁸

Le premier a trait à l'éducation et à la culture. La cité hellénistique est inconcevable sans un ou plusieurs gymnases, que fréquentent quotidiennement les adolescents, puis les jeunes gens jusqu'aux environs de la

trentaine. Les disciplines athlétiques et militaires d'une part, littéraires et musicales d'autre part, forment les deux volets complémentaires – mais dont l'importance respective varie beaucoup selon les cités et selon les époques – de l'éducation qu'y reçoivent les "libres". Ainsi dit-on de Polémaïos, honoré vers la fin du IIe s.a.C.: "Encore à l'âge où il sortait de l'éphébie, étant assidu au gymnase et, nourrissant son âme des plus belles études et ayant entraîné son corps par l'habitude des exercices physiques..." (la suite sera citée plus loin).⁵⁹ Maîtres de lettres et rhéteurs, poètes et musiciens qui y enseignent sont souvent des étrangers, comme le sont aussi certains des jeunes gens qui fréquentent le gymnase.

Soulignons un point essentiel. S'il est considéré à juste titre comme l'expression et le symbole de l'hellénisation de telle et telle communautés de l'Orient méditerranéen, le gymnase reste avant tout, dans les cités égéennes plus ou moins indépendantes, le creuset du corps civique. L'éphébie, dont le caractère militaire et civique reste indélébile en dépit des évolutions, et l'entraînement physique au gymnase préudent, en maintes cités, au recrutement des milices locales: patrouilleurs et garnisaires sont toujours des citoyens (sauf, naturellement, lorsque la cité est aux mains d'un tyran ou d'une puissance extérieure). D'autre part, la formation intellectuelle, notamment rhétorique, prépare les futurs orateurs et avocats de la cité. Comme l'ont rappelé à plusieurs reprises L. et J. Robert, le don de "persuasion" (πείθειν) demeure indispensable, à la fois dans l'assemblée du peuple pour y faire adopter "les conseils les plus utiles" et dans les périlleuses ambassades à Rome (ou auprès des magistrats romains) pour en obtenir les "décisions les plus avantageuses pour la patrie".⁶⁰ Symbole de la *paideia* hellénistique aux yeux de tous, Grecs et non-Grecs, le gymnase reste, dans nombre de cités, l'école du citoyen.

Le second chapitre, complémentaire du précédent, touche aux dieux et aux concours qui sont célébrés pour eux. A côté des concours locaux et dotés de prix en argent, plus ou moins fréquentés et recherchés, la période hellénistique voit se multiplier, à partir du milieu du IIIe siècle, les concours "sacrés" ou "stéphanites", triétériques ou pentétériques, qui rassemblent les athlètes et les musiciens venus d'un peu partout.⁶¹ Je citais plus haut la clause du décret de Colophon pour Polémaïos qui évoque son assiduité au gymnase; elle se termine ainsi: "...il a remporté des couronnes dans des concours sacrés". L. et J. Robert commentent: "A cette époque les concours sacrés sont largement répandus et il en existe un presque dans chaque ville importante. Polémaïos n'a pas eu à faire de longs voyages pour remporter ces succès; d'ailleurs s'il avait vaincu

même seulement aux Néméennes ou aux Isthmiques, on l'eût dit. Non loin de Colophon étaient alors concours sacrés les Dionysia de Téos, les Ephéseia d'Ephèse, les Didymeia de Milet, les Héraia de Samos, les Leucophryneia de Magnésie du Méandre, les Athénaia de Priène, les Pythia et les Olympia de Tralles, les Théogamia de Nysa et aussi les Asklepéia de Cos, les Panathénaia et Euméneia de Sardes et les Rômaia de Kibyra".⁶²

Les catalogues de vainqueurs qui nous sont parvenus montrent bien le rayonnement inégal de tous ces concours, dont le nombre ne cessa d'augmenter (mais avec parfois de longues interruptions, suivies d'*ananéōsis*). Les théores chargés par la cité organisatrice d'annoncer la date et la célébration de la prochaine panégyrie parcouraient tout le monde grec et en visitaient toutes les cités, sans se préoccuper de leur statut ni de leur renommée. De même, dans les listes de vainqueurs, un Rhodien ou un Sicyonien voisinent avec un *Alexandreu*s d'Égypte ou un *Ptolémaieus* de Barkè en Cyrénaïque. Ainsi se répand dans les cités hellénistiques, du moins pour les citadins disposant d'un minimum de biens et de loisirs, une culture commune, que dévoilent les cultes, les fêtes et les concours, la langue, l'éducation physique et intellectuelle, le droit et les institutions. C'est dans cette optique qu'il paraît légitime de parler de "la" cité hellénistique. Le succès d'une institution comme celle des juges étrangers s'explique en partie par le sentiment d'appartenance à une communauté, tout en le renforçant de façon très efficace. Les juges qui viennent d'une cité étrangère ont toujours à juger "selon les lois de la cité", entendons de la cité qui les a appelés, et ils doivent donc "prendre une exacte connaissance du droit local".⁶³ Mais le va-et-vient perpétuel des juges étrangers d'une cité à l'autre a contribué en même temps au brassage des droits: "Il y avait donc adaptation et uniformisation des droits des cités par une classe de citoyens éclairés, qui multipliait son expérience juridique et approfondissait son expérience politique".⁶⁴

Tout cela fait que les relations entre cités sont exprimées et vécues à la période hellénistique sur un mode nouveau par rapport à la période précédente. Au Ve et au IVe siècle, il n'y a d'autre parenté, s'agissant des *poleis*, que celle qui lie les colonies à leur métropole. La communauté de "Stamm", invoquée surtout pendant la Guerre du Péloponnèse, Doriens d'un côté, Ioniens de l'autre, ne constitua guère plus qu'un argument rhétorique destiné à justifier les alliances militaires ou les conflits.⁶⁵ A la période hellénistique, les liens entre colonie et métropole demeurent étroits et chargés de sens, comme le montrent certains exemples clairs et détaillés.⁶⁶ Mais, en outre, les cités aménagent, développent et publient

les traditions relatives à leurs origines (ici encore le rôle des conférenciers du gymnase, historiens et poètes, fut capital), traditions qui leur permettent d'établir et de proclamer les liens d'"amitié" (φιλία), d'"intimité" (οἰκειότητα), enfin de "parenté" (συγγένεια) qui les unissent à d'autres communautés.⁶⁷ Or les relations de "parenté" sont invoquées prioritairement dans deux catégories de documents: les décrets pour des juges étrangers et les décisions relatives à la demande (par la cité organisatrice) puis à la reconnaissance (par les autres cités) de nouveaux concours sacrés. En revanche, elles ne figurent jamais dans le préambule de traités d'alliance militaire. La parenté, l'intimité ou seulement l'amitié, qu'elles soient invoquées pour demander de l'aide ou pour manifester la reconnaissance, justifient désormais des oeuvres de paix, qui concourent elles-mêmes à l'unité – toute relative néanmoins – du monde des cités.

Notes

1 Formule d'Éd. Will, *Poleis hellénistiques: deux notes* dans *Échos du Monde Classique / Classical Views* 32 (1988), 334.

2 Telle est la thèse qui s'exprime tout au long du livre de W. Orth, *Königlicher Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit* (Munich, 1977), dont je citerai un passage de la conclusion (pp. 179-180): "So gross die Bedeutung des Autonomie-Begriffes in der politischen Diskussion der Zeit sicher gewesen ist, so wenig wurde die politische Wirklichkeit von ihm geprägt. Es treffen hier aufeinander eine von Wunschvorstellungen durchsetzte Ideologie und die Realität der Macht. Der Illusion einer völligen völkerrechtlichen Freiheit nachzuhängen, unterliessen die Poleis auch dann noch nicht, als sie längst hatten erleben müssen, wie sogennante autonome Städte vom Range Ilios etwa sich zu sklavischer Unterwürfigkeit gegenüber dem Monarchen gezwungen gesehen hatten".

3 *Les Cités Grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs*, BCH Suppl. XII (1985), chapitre I.

4 J'invoque cet exemple à dessein, puisqu'il est longuement analysé par L. et J. Robert, *La Carie II* (1954), notamment pp. 300-302.

5 C'est ce qu'enseigne la lecture attentive des *Inchriften von Priene* (1906). Voir en particulier, contre les thèses de W. Orth, *op. cit.*, 102-111, Ph. Gauthier, J. Savants 1980, 35-50; et, à propos de la fiscalité, *Chiron* 21 (1991), 49-68.

6 W. Orth., *op. cit.* note 2, a tenté de "décrypter" les documents officiels, mais n'a pas utilisé la typologie des marques d'autonomie ou de sujétion qu'avaient esquissée L. et J. Robert (*supra* note 4).

7 J'essaie de compléter ici ce que j'ai écrit dans mon ouvrage sur les bienfaiteurs (*supra* note 3), pp. 40-53, et de tenir compte des observations d'Éd. Will, *loc. cit.* (note 1), 330-335.

8 *Philhellénisme et impérialisme* (1988), 119.

9 Il use du présent, mais son propos vaut clairement, comme en d'autres passages, pour la période hellénistique.

10 Strabon IX, 2, 40, C 415, cité par J.-L. Ferrary, *op. cit.*, 120 note 251.

11 Ptolémée II et Milet: *Delphinion* 139. Séleukos II et Smyrne: OGI 228 et 229.

- 12 Polybe V, 90, 5-8; cf. mes *Bienfaiteurs*, 53-54.
- 13 Voir Ph.Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos* (1970), chapitre XVI.
- 14 Polybe XVIII, 16,1-2; cf.L.Migeotte, *L'Emprunt public* (1984), 78-79.
- 15 Liv.XLI, 20, 5; cf. O.Mørkholm, *Antiochus IV of Syria* (1966),56-62.
- 16 Les Achaïens et Eumène: Polybe XXII, 8-9; cf. F.W.Walbank, *Commentary III, ad loc.*; J.-L.Ferrary, *op.cit.* (note 8), 120 et note 250. Les Rhodiens et Eumène: Polybe XXXI, 31, avec le commentaire de F.W.Walbank.
- 17 Cf.F.W.Walbank, *op.cit.*, III, p.190; Ed.Will., *Hist.pol.II²* (1982), p.383 (en note).
- 18 Diodore XXXI, 36. Utilise-t-il ici Polybe, comme on l'a supposé? En tout cas, il exprime un jugement très différent.
- 19 J.-L.Ferrary, *op.cit.*(note 8), 117-132, citant (131-132) G.W.Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (1965),12-13.
- 20 *Op.cit.*, 130.
- 21 *Op.cit.*, 131.
- 22 P.Herrmann, *Antiochos der Grosse und Teos, Anadolu IX* (1965),p.34, B, 11.6-8 (cité par J.-L.Ferrary, *op.cit.*,129).
- 23 Voir mes réflexions dans *Opus VI-VIII* (1987/1989), 187-202.
- 24 Voir ma contribution ("Les cités hellénistiques: épigraphie et histoire des institutions et des régimes politiques) dans les *Actes du VIIIe Congrès d'épigr.gr.et lat.*, Athènes 3/9 octobre 1982 (1984), 83-107, ainsi que le chapitre I de l'ouvrage *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (IVe -Ier siècle a.C.). Contribution à l'histoire des institutions*, BCH Suppl.XII (1985).
- 25 Fr.Quass, *Zur Verfassung der griechischen Städte im Hellenismus*, Chiron 9 (1979), 37-52 (la citation à la p.40).
- 26 Sur tout ce qui précède, voir l'excellente mise au point de J.-L. Ferrary, *Les Romains de la République et les démocraties grecques*, *Opus VI-VIII* (1987/1989), 203-216.
- 27 Cf.L.Robert, *Hellenica VII* (1949), 177-178.
- 28 Voir en particulier les deux ouvrages de L.Migeotte, *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques* (1984) et *Les Souscriptions publiques* (1992).
- 29 Cf.L.Migeotte, *Le Pain quotidien dans les cités hellénistiques. A propos des fonds permanents pour l'approvisionnement en grain*, dans les *Cahiers du Centre Glotz II* (1991), 19-41, qui réunit et analyse la documentation.
- 30 Voir brièvement M.-Th. Couilloud-Le Dinahet, *Les Magistrats grecs et l'approvisionnement des cités*, dans *Cahiers d'Histoire* 33 (1988), 321-332.
- 31 Il peut suffire ici de renvoyer au recueil commenté de F.G.Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften* (2 volumes, 1959 et 1961), avec les observations de L.Robert, *Gnomon* 42 (1970), 579-603.
- 32 La documentation sur ce sujet est assez abondante, qu'il s'agisse d'Athènes, des îles ou des cités ioniennes d'Asie. J'ai traité de ces questions dans mes conférences de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études pendant quatre ans (de 1982 à 1986): voir le *Livret* annuel avec le résumé des conférences. Le sujet est à présent repris dans son ensemble par un auditeur canadien, Patrick Baker.
- 33 Voir le recueil (pour la période 338-200 a.C.) de H.Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, tome III (1969).
- 34 *Rhét.*I, 1359 b-1360 a. Cf. mon *Commentaire des Poroi de Xénophon* (1976), 10-11.
- 35 Je donnerai ailleurs la liste commentée des témoignages pour la période hellénistique.
- 36 Je me permets de renvoyer à des études antérieures: *Quorum et participation civique dans les démocraties grecques*, dans *Du Pouvoir dans l'Antiquité: mots et réalités*, Cl.Nicolet éd. (1990), 73-99; *L'inscription d'Iasos relative à l'ekklesiastikon (I.Iasos 20)*, *BCH* 114 (1990), 417-443.

- 37 Voir les décrets publiés par G.Pugliese Carratelli, *Rend.Acad.Lincei* 40 (1985), 149-155; cf. *SEG* 36 (1986), 982-983; *Bull.épigr.* 1990, 276.
- 38 Cf. mon rapport au VIII^e Congrès (supra note 24), 84 note 4, avec les références aux ouvrages d'A.H.M.Jones et de Cl.Préaux.
- 39 Voir H.Müller, *Milesische Volksbeschlüsse* (1976), 20-28.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 55-56.
- 41 Les textes connus à la fin du XIX^e siècle sont cités et analysés par H.Swoboda, *Die griechischen Volksbeschlüsse* (1890), 102-109. Sur le rapport écrit, notamment à Samos et à Iasos, voir L.Robert, *Rev.Phil.*1978, 244 et note 15 (*Opera Minora* V, 440), avec les renvois à des travaux antérieurs et les références à des documents récemment publiés. Au sujet de Samos, cf.également W.Transier, *Samiaka*, diss. Mannheim 1985, 48-51.
- 42 Voir là-dessus les réflexions de H.Müller, *op.cit.*, 86-92, avec l'analyse de l'exemple de Kalymna.
- 43 Cf.J.-L.Ferrary, *loc.cit.* (supra note 26), 210-211.
- 44 On en trouvera l'essentiel *apud* M.Piérart, *BCH* 98 (1974), 129-132, 139-141. Parmi les récentes découvertes, une longue inscription d'Oinoanda en Lycie montre la survivance de ces procédures au II^e s.p.C.: voir M.Wörle, *Stadt und Fest in kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien. Studien zu einer agonistischen Stiftung aus Oinoanda* (Munich, 1988), notamment 77-100.
- 45 Voir, à propos de Délos où les comptes des hiéropes offrent une mine de renseignements, les exemples analysés par Cl.Vial, *Délos indépendante, BCH Suppl.X* (1984), 191-196. D'autres exemples seraient à commenter: *I.Priene* 4 (Priène) cf. Ad. Wilhelm, *Attische Urkunden* V (*SB Wien* 220,5 – 1942), 116; *Delphinion* 147, 5-6 (Milet); *SEG* XVI, 295, 11 (Oropos).
- 46 Voir, au sujet de Délos, Cl.Vial, *op.cit.*, 158-162. Je donnerai ailleurs la liste commentée des témoignages dispersés, émanant d'autres cités.
- 47 A la fin de la période hellénistique, le décret d'Istros pour Aristagoras en offre une illustration, à propos de l'agoranomie: *Sylloge*³ 708, 38-44.
- 48 Cf.L.Robert, *Hellenica* II (1946), 51-64; L.et J.Robert, *J.Savants* 1976, 234-235; J.et L.Robert, *Fouilles d'Amyzon* I (1983), 244 et 251.
- 49 Voir G.Busolt-H.Swoboda, *Gr.Staatskunde*, notamment I (1920), 419-420 et 467-468, qui serait à compléter.
- 50 Sur ce dernier point, voir L.et J.Robert, *J.Savants* 1976, 196-198.
- 51 Cf.J.K.Davies, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens* (1981).
- 52 Fondées sur une documentation fournie, les analyses de Cl.Vial *op.cit.*, 262-269, sont d'autant plus intéressantes qu'elles portent sur une communauté civique assez restreinte (environ 1200 citoyens).
- 53 Voir l'étude de L.Robert citée à la note suivante, en particulier 774-775.
- 54 L.Robert, *Les Juges étrangers dans la cité grecque, Xenion. Festschrift für Pan.J.Zepos* (Athènes, 1973), 765-782 (*Opera Minora* V, 137-154).
- 55 Références *apud* A.M.Woodward et L.Robert, *Ann.Br.Sch.Ath.* 29 (1927/1928), 68.
- 56 Voir, à propos des Béotiens, P.Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (1982), 404-407; au sujet des Achaïens, J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968), 236-237.
- 57 Polybe XX, 6, 1-2. Cf.M.Feyel, *Polybe et l'histoire de Béotie au III^e s.* (1942), 274-277; F.W.Walbank, *Commentary on Polybius* III (1979), *ad loc.*; P.Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (1982), 404 sqq.
- 58 L.et J.Robert, *Claros* I,1, *Décrets hellénistiques* (1989).
- 59 *Op.cit.*, 18-20.
- 60 *Op.cit.*, 23-27 et surtout 39-40 (sur *πείθειν*).

- 61** Outre les ouvrages anciens, en particulier celui, toujours utile, de Th.Klee, *Zur Geschichte der gymnischen Agone an griechischen Festen* (1918), voir la synthèse de L.Robert dans les *Actes du VIII Congrès d'épigraphie gr.et lat.* (Athènes,1984), 35-45, fondée sur de nombreuses études antérieures: voir en particulier *Rev.Phil.* 1967, 14-32 (*Opera Minora* V,354-372); *Les Epigrammes satiriques de Lucillius sur les athlètes. Parodie et réalités*, dans *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* XIV (1969), 181-291 (*Opera Minora* VI.317-427).
- 62** *Op.cit.* (note 58),20.
- 63** L.Robert, *loc.cit.* (note 54),777.
- 64** *Ibid.*,778.
- 65** Cf.Éd.Will, *Doriens et Ioniens* (1956).
- 66** Pharos et Paros: L.Robert, *BCH* 59 (1935),489-513; *Hellenica* XI-XII (1960),505-541; cf.récemment P.Derow, *Z.Pap.Ep.*88 (1991),261-270. Téos et Abdère: L.et J.Robert, *J.Savants* 1976, 212-213.
- 67** O.Curty, *Les Parentés légendaires entre cités grecques* (thèse de Fribourg, 1992, à paraître), rassemble les textes et offre une très utile synthèse sur ce sujet.

The Greek City in the Roman Period¹

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This paper will concentrate on the Imperial period, the first three centuries AD, when 'the Greek city' is more visible to us than at any other time. For it is from this period that the vast majority of the surviving remains of Greek cities date; it was in these centuries, except for the last few decades, that the largest number of Greek cities struck coins; and, above all, it was in this period that the Greek cities provided the fullest expression of their own communal identity, through the medium of inscriptions. Although there are cities, such as Athens, Ephesus, Miletus, and others in Caria and Lycia, which provide substantial numbers of Hellenistic inscriptions, in almost all cases there is a sharp decrease in the extremely troubled period of the first century BC, the time of the Mithridatic wars and the Roman civil wars, largely fought on Greek soil. The victory of 'Imperator Caesar Divi filius', soon to add the name 'Augustus', both allowed and stimulated the production of public inscriptions on an unprecedented scale. In this sense the Augustan regime marks an epoch in the history of Greek inscriptions which is almost comparable to that which it certainly signals, as Géza Alföldy has shown, in the history of Latin epigraphy.² In the inscriptions, as in the coins and in the physical and monumental structure of the Greek cities, the person, that is the name and the image of the Emperor, was to play an essential role.³ How Greek cities expressed their complex relationships to the new line of individual rulers is one of the central aspects of what 'the Greek city' of the Imperial period was.

In a wider sense, however, the expression 'the Roman period', as regards the history of Greek cities, covers a far larger timescale, which begins centuries earlier and continues several centuries later than the High Empire. The Greek expansion into Italy, Sicily and the coasts of Gaul and Spain in the archaic period had meant that from the very beginning Rome belonged on the fringes of the Greek world. Caere (Agylla), a few kilometres from Rome, was adopting the custom of the Greek *agōn*, as a form of expiation, in the middle of the sixth century.⁴ At the end of that century, as a detailed Greek narrative preserved by

Dionysius of Halicarnassus records, the tyrant of Cumae, Aristodemus, played an important role at the time of the expulsion of Roman kings and in conflicts with the Etruscans.⁵ Similarly, Roman contacts with Massilia go back at least to the early fourth century, when spoils from the Gauls were deposited by the Romans in the Massiliote treasury at Delphi, and when Justin claims that there was already a treaty between Massilia and Rome.⁶ Already in the next couple of centuries, Greek cities were presented with the problem of how to construe the identity of the Romans, the significance of their claimed descent from Aeneas, and thus the nature of their relationship to themselves. These questions are of course already explicit in the famous inscription of the 190s BC from Lampascus, describing an embassy to Massilia and then to Rome, to claim protection (against Antiochus III) on the basis of a mythical common descent.⁷ Other elements of the mythical identity of Rome are reflected in a more recently-found inscription of about the same date from Chios, recording the creation there of a monument representing 'the founder of Rome, Romulus, and his brother Remus'.⁸

By that time of course all the Greek cities of Italy had become *socii navales* of Rome, while one, Posidonia, had been re-founded as the Latin *colonia* of Paestum, and another, Dicaearchia, as the Roman *colonia* of Puteoli.⁹ The Greek cities of Sicily had provided the battleground for the First Punic War;¹⁰ while in the Second the kingdom of Hiero had come to an end, Syracuse had fallen, and the whole island had become a Roman province, with a complex network of statuses and obligations, later to be illuminated by Cicero's *Verrines*.¹¹ The history of the later Greek city under Roman rule in the West – on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, on the coast of Gaul (Massilia with Nicaea and Antipolis), in Italy (above all Neapolis, still a major centre for Greek festivals in the Imperial period) and in Sicily, is a major historical topic, which cannot be properly treated here. It need only be stressed, as regards the complex relations of the wider Greek world to Rome in the Hellenistic period, that this area, though certainly marginal, was never unknown or irrelevant. In Livy's narrative of the year 199 BC, for instance, we read how a meeting of the Aetolian league was addressed by ambassadors from Macedon, who reminded them that Syracuse, Messina, Lilybaeum, Rhegium, Tarentum and Capua were all now subject to Rome.¹² By the time that Livy was writing Diodorus had already given the history of Greek Sicily, from the earliest times to his own day, a central place in his universal *Bibliotheca*;¹³ while if any Greeks had ever been disposed to read Latin, they could have studied the most 'Hellenistic' of all universal histories,

the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus, a Vocontian who surely owed his historical culture to the influence of Massilia.¹⁴

This is not the place to rehearse the successive steps which gave Rome a central place in the Greek world: first the suppression of the revolt of Andriskos, the defeat of the Achaean league and the establishment of the province of Macedonia, including Greece proper; and then the end of the Attalid kingdom and the formation of the province of Asia. But for how a Greek city would manage its dealings both with Roman governors and with the political institutions of the city, a central place will now be claimed by the two vast inscriptions from Claros, published by Louis Robert (posthumously) and by Jeanne Robert.¹⁵ These two inscriptions, neither complete, of the last third of the second century, still come to 275 lines (that for Polemaios) and 159 lines (for Menippos), and provide by far the most complex and detailed picture so far available of Greek cities in the period of the transfer of power from the Attalids to Rome. Out of many details, only one need be noted here: that by gaining the friendship of leading Romans Polemaios was able to benefit his fellow-citizens (of Colophon) by creating for his native city relations of patronage (πατρωνεῖαι, in the plural) with the 'best men'.

As regards the first century BC, we should not forget the small Greek cities which lined the coast of Illyricum, for instance Issa and its colony Tragurion, whose embassy to Julius Caesar at Aquileia is recorded in an inscription.¹⁶ Or, on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean, the Greek cities of Cyrenaica, which were abandoned to fend for themselves for several decades after Ptolemy Apion had left his kingdom to the Roman people in 96 BC. This interval of involuntary independence is now brilliantly illuminated by an inscription from Berenice: after the death of the king the city was first besieged by *kakourgoi*, and then, being unwallled, was twice sacked by pirate fleets. Very typically, the inscription is in fact in honour of a local benefactor, Apollodorus, who apart from his military role seems also to have gone on an embassy to the Roman Senate.¹⁷

A very similar situation, of acute political and military danger, necessitating political and military action to seek protection, or at least benevolence, from wherever it could be found, is reflected in the famous inscription from Dionysopolis on the Black Sea honouring a citizen named Acornion; he had performed ceremonials during the stay there over the winter (probably 62/1 BC) of C. Antonius, had been on an embassy to Burebista, 'first and greatest of the kings in Thrace', in the interests of his city, and had also been sent by Burebista as ambassador

to Pompeius at Heraklea Lynkestis. There he had taken the opportunity to represent the interests not only of the king, but also of his city. As its benefactor, in a way which was becoming a prime function of the communal institutions of the Greek city, he was to be honoured with a crown each year at the Dionysia and with a statue at the most conspicuous point in the agora.¹⁸

The story could be paralleled many times over in the complex, disturbed and violent relations of the cities of the Black Sea region with local kings and dynasts, with Mithridates and with the Romans. But if we are to think of what the 'Roman peace' brought by Augustus really meant, one essential starting-point is the whole succession of 'local histories' offered by the *Geography* of Strabo. For obvious reasons of local knowledge and sympathy these gain an added force when they relate to northern Asia Minor: not only his wonderful evocation of his own city, Amaseia in Pontus (561), but also the brief vignette of the rise of Gordioucome to be the city of 'Iuliopolis' (574), or his account of Sinope in the later Hellenistic and Republican period:¹⁹

The city itself is beautifully walled, and is also splendidly adorned with gymnasium and market-place and colonnades. But although it was such a city, still it was twice captured, first by Pharnaces, who unexpectedly attacked it all of a sudden, and later by Lucullus and by the tyrant who was garrisoned within it, being besieged both inside and outside at the same time; for, since Bacchides, who had been set up by the king as commander of the garrison, was always suspecting treason from the people inside, and was causing many outrages and murders, he made the people, who were unable either nobly to defend themselves or to submit by compromise, lose all heart for either course. At any rate, the city was captured; and though Lucullus kept intact the rest of the city's adornments, he took away the globe of Billarus and the work of Sthenis, the statue of Autolycus, whom they regarded as founder of their city and honoured as god. The city had also an oracle of Autolycus. He is thought to have been one of those who went on the voyage with Jason and to have taken possession of this place. Then later the Milesians, seeing the natural advantages of the place and the weakness of its inhabitants, appropriated it to themselves and sent forth colonists to it. But at present it has received also a colony of Romans; and a part of the city and the territory belong to these.

Nothing could more accurately convey the sense of a long tradition, a period of acute danger and disturbance, the value placed on public buildings, or (in this case) the impact of Roman colonisation.

Equally significant, if sometimes more confused geographically, is Strabo's account of the Phoenician cities, their extremely varied fortunes during the progressive break-up of the Seleucid kingdom, the rise here too, as in Syria proper, of a generation of local tyrants, finally suppressed

by the Romans, and the imposition of the Roman peace.²⁰ In the case of Phoenicia Strabo makes a direct and unmistakable connection between the disorders of the first century BC and the establishment in 15 BC of the *colonia* of Berytus – Colonia Iulia Augusta Felix Berytus, which was to be perhaps the only established ‘island’ of Latin culture in the whole of the Greek world of the eastern Mediterranean.²¹

In spite of all the problems which its composition raises, the *Geography* of Strabo cannot but serve as the most important picture which we have of the Greek world as it was when Imperial rule began. Precisely two of its most important functions are, firstly, to recall how the present situation of each place could be seen in the context of a distant, often mythological, past; and, secondly, to record how so many places had faced violent external threats and internal disturbances in the first two thirds of the first century BC. In the established Empire it is in general true that cities, when they collectively recalled the past, tended to avert their gaze from the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, to focus on mythological origins and (if they could) on the Classical past.²² Strabo is closer in time to the most troubled period, and therefore all the better evidence for how much the imposition of peace really meant.

One place of which Strabo makes only two passing mentions is Aphrodisias in Caria.²³ It ought to have attracted his attention, however, for it too had taken part in the military conflicts of the first century. In 88 BC, when the two communities of the ‘Plaraseans’ and the ‘Aphrodisieis’ still formed a joint political unit, their *dēmos* had decided to march out, accompanied by *paroikoi* and slaves, to help Q. Oppius, besieged by Mithridates in Laodicea. Whether or not they had ever arrived (or had contrived not to arrive in time?), they had taken care, when Oppius was released after the Peace of Dardanus, to remind him of their loyalty, and to seek his patronage (πατρωνήα), which he granted; he would also, he wrote, speak in their favour before the Senate and People when he reached Rome. In the Triumviral period the city gained both a *foedus* (ῥοκιον) and a long *senatus consultum*, of 39 BC, with provisions for its free status. Everything was owed, as is quite clear, to the identification of the Aphrodite whose temple stood there with Venus, as the mythological ancestress of the Julian house. But the locus of power in Rome was changing. When the new ruler wrote (whether before or after 27 BC is uncertain) to tell the Samians that the privilege given to the Aphrodisians was unique, he said ‘You yourselves can see that *I* have given the privilege of freedom to no people except the Aphrodisians’.²⁴ Such rights could now be seen as being at the personal disposition of a monarch.

These inscriptions are of crucial importance for understanding the Greek city of the Imperial period. Firstly, as inscriptions, they *are* in fact of the Imperial period. The two relating to Oppius were cut in the second century AD; the long series from the Triumviral period belong to the 'archive wall' on the *parodos* of the theatre, and date, as inscriptions, to the first half of the third century. Aphrodisias had in fact no Classical, still less archaic or mythological, history, but had emerged as a privileged community in the last decades of the Republic. Here at least, that troubled period was not forgotten, and could not be. How significant was it, for a Greek city of the second century AD, that such a re-cut inscription might serve to remind its citizens of one essential role of every city-community of the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic period which it had now lost namely its military function? In that respect, even if Platea might send off a contingent to assist Marcus Aurelius on his northern campaigns,²⁵ there could be no continuity with the Greek city of before the Augustan peace. Or might there be, none the less? The poorly-recorded history of the third-century invasions shows that some cities might indeed resume their ancient military role.²⁶

Equally significant, the archive from Aphrodisias is one reflection of the range of privileged statuses which emerged out of the conflicts of the late-Republican period, when cities sought the favour of Rome, while Rome, equally, used all possible diplomatic means to ameliorate the effects of brutal oppression and exaction by grants of alliances and favours. The cities of the Greek world in the Imperial period might therefore retain one or more of the following rights. (It would be extremely difficult to state what combinations of these rights were normal, or how common it was for one to be enjoyed without the others). The possibilities were: a *foedus*, as enjoyed by Aphrodisias and also (for instance) by Tyre, as Ulpian's well-known celebration of it recalls;²⁷ *libertas*, meaning, as the imperial documents from Aphrodisias put it, that the city was 'exempt from the schedule of the province' (ἐξηρημένη τοῦ τύπου τῆς ἐπαρχείας). This certainly implied exemption from the jurisdiction, and the personal visits, of the governor; but it does also seem, as is shown in Hadrian's letter to Aphrodisias, to have carried with it *immunitas* from Roman taxation. It is not, however, possible to assert that these two latter rights could never be dissociated.²⁸

Finally, there was the status of Roman *colonia*, which almost certainly, in this early period, carried with it automatically exemption from all forms of direct taxation (what the lawyers were later to label *tributum soli* and *tributum capitis*). At the moment of Actium, Roman colonisation was

still a minor phenomenon in the Greek world. The known cases are Tauromenium, probably in 36 BC;²⁹ Corinth, re-founded in 46 BC; Philippi, made a *colonia* in 42 BC; Cassandrea; Buthrotum; probably Dium; Lampsacus; possibly Alexandria Troas and Parium; Apamea in Bithynia; briefly Heraclea Pontica; and Sinope (see above).

There are many uncertainties in the list, which would be considerably lengthened if we added the certainly Augustan *coloniae*. The most notable of these are, firstly, a group in Sicily; secondly Berytus (see above); and finally the important series in Pisidia and neighbouring regions.³⁰ We will look later at the very significant process, characteristic of the established Empire, by which Emperors came to grant the title of *colonia* to Greek cities, without the settlement of actual colonists; for even this involved a transformation of the formal structure and constitution of each city, and (in theory at least) the public use of Latin.³¹

The 'real' colonisation of the Caesarian, Triumviral and Augustan period (the only major period of colonisation outside Italy in Roman history) should be stressed, however, for it combined with two other very well-known processes to produce marked changes in what we understand as 'the Greek city': these are of course the widespread private emigration to the provinces by Roman citizens from Italy, and their settlement in Greek cities; and the steadily increasing scale of the granting of Roman citizenship to individuals, and hence to their descendants, in the Greek cities. It is not necessary here to accumulate references to modern studies of these two processes; but it may be noted simply that our knowledge of both, as regards the Imperial period, is very largely a function of the sudden explosion of the 'epigraphic habit', referred to above.

Taken all together, however, these processes, along with others to which we will come, meant that 'the Greek city' of the Imperial period would be more correctly described as 'Graeco-Roman': that is, as a fusion or *mélange* of languages and constitutions, types of public entertainment, architectural forms, and religious institutions. The role of colonisation within this process of fusion has perhaps not been sufficiently stressed, so an example will be given from a series of second-century inscriptions from the *colonia* of Cremna in Pisidia. In principle of course, *coloniae* were supposed to use Latin in their public life. An important Augustan inscription from the *colonia* of Alexandria Troas indeed shows this rule in operation. It honours C. Fabricius Tuscus, *duovir* and *augur* in the *colonia*, who apart from a long list of military functions had been 'praef(ectus) ... operum quae in colonia iussu Augusti facta sunt'; the inscription was put up 'd(ecreto) d(ecurionum)'.³²

Elsewhere, however, and no doubt in Alexandria Troas too with the passage of time, Greek tended to reassert itself, while still being deployed to express those new and distinctive institutions which had been created by the establishment of the *colonia*. Hence for instance there is a group of inscriptions from Cremna, which come from series of statue-bases, of Herakles, Nemesis, Athena, Hyg(i)eia and Asklepios, put up by the *colonia*.³³ One example will suffice to illustrate the fusion of languages and concepts involved:

τὸν Ἑρακλέα
ἢ κολωνία
δυανδρία<ι>ς πενταετηρικῆ[ς]
τῶν ἀξιολογωτάτων Φλα.
Ἄουιδίου Φαβιανοῦ Καπιτω-
νιανοῦ Λουκίου καὶ Ῥοτει-
λιανοῦ Λογγιλλιανοῦ
Καλλίππου

The deities honoured are all addressed in purely Greek names. But otherwise the names of the *duoviri*, Flavius Avidius Fabianus Capitolianus and Rutilianus Longillianus Callippus, are almost entirely Latin, using both the lengthened forms and the extended combination of names (since Rutilianus' *praenomen* is omitted) characteristic of the later imperial period. 'Colonia' is duly transliterated. More than a century and a half after the foundation of the *colonia*, Cremna could not be characterised either as 'Greek' or as 'Roman'; for it was evidently both.

Colonisation was however a relatively isolated example of a positive measure taken by Rome which had the immediate effect of introducing Roman, and Latin, elements into a Greek social and cultural environment. Paradoxically, it was far outweighed in its effects by the creation of new Greek cities, both by Emperors and by dependent Kings; foundations by both often had mixed, Graeco-Latin, names borrowed from those of the ruling Imperial dynasty. The first and most prominent of the Imperial foundations was of course Nicopolis, founded to commemorate Actium, created by the concentration of population, involving a re-distribution of votes in the Delphic amphictyony, and giving rise to a new and central element in the circuit of Greek athletic and theatrical festivals, the 'Actia'. It seems to be as early as the 20s BC that we have the first reflection of this new element, in the inscription from Pergamon recording the victories of Glycon at the Olympian, Pythian, Actian and Nemean games.³⁴ But in spite of its name, and its new role among Greek

cities, it can be argued that Nicopolis was a double community, both a Greek city and a Roman *colonia*, not physically distinct.³⁵

If it were really so, it was a rare case. More commonly, both Emperors and kings spread over the map of the Greek world an ever-denser network of Greek cities, whose Greek names incorporated Latin, that is (almost always) Imperial, personal names. It is superfluous to give more than examples, since the process was detailed with remorseless care by A.H.M. Jones: Sebastē, Caesarea, Tiberias, Germanicia, Claudiopolis, Flaviopolis, Flavia Neapolis, Traianopolis, Marcianopolis, Hadrianopolis and Hadrianoutherae, and so on to Philippolis and two places called Maximianopolis, a Diocletianopolis and of course Constantinopolis itself.³⁶ The real nature of such refoundations cannot be pursued further here, for only very detailed local examination would serve to make clear how far in each case urbanisation, in various forms, had preceded the creation of the 'new' city, and how radical the changes in local social structures were. We cannot always distinguish a new foundation, and the creation of a new urban structure, from the mere acquisition of a new Imperial name, as when Palmyra became 'Hadrianē Palmyra'; or be certain as to how much new building accompanied any such transformation, or what role was played by Imperial initiative and benefaction.³⁷ What is clear in two well-known cases is that an Imperial decision to grant the status of city to an existing community could be a response to initiative from below. Hence the letter, in Latin, addressed to a governor by an Emperor whose name is lost, agreeing that Tymandus in Pisidia has fulfilled the criteria for achieving city-status; in this case the availability of sufficient persons (50, initially) to act as *decuriones*, pass decrees and elect magistrates.³⁸ Different criteria are set out by Constantine in allowing the claim of Orcistus in Phrygia: its previous possession of the rank of *civitas*, its location at the meeting-place of four roads, a well-watered site – and the fact that the population are Christian.³⁹ Both Imperial communications embody a general statement of favour towards the creation of new *civitates/poleis*, without allowing us to determine on whose initiative such a creation normally depended.

The question of construction, urban development and architectural techniques will also not be pursued further here, except to emphasise that it was not merely *coloniae* which we would do better to characterise as 'Graeco-Roman' rather than as 'Greek' cities. For even the 'Greek' cities tended to exhibit a range of 'Graeco-Roman' features: theatres, usually of the 'Roman' type with a raised stage; temples on a raised podium, with a frontal axis; occasional amphitheatres; and more often perhaps theatres

adapted to accommodate gladiatorial shows or wild-beast hunts; baths and colonnaded streets – all these represented a language of urbanism and public architecture which was shared with the generally less developed cities of the Latin-speaking West.⁴⁰

Nor is it necessary to review here the administrative and political aspects of the role of Greek cities within the Roman Empire, or their internal constitutional and financial structure. It may be sufficient to note that the independence of the last fully self-governing *koinon*, that of Lycia, was removed by Claudius in AD 43, when the area became part of the new *provincia* of 'Lycia et Pamphylia'.⁴¹ The *koinon* itself continued, though with features which made it, not entirely typical of the 'provincial' *koinon* familiar from other areas; nothing of significance can yet be added to the study of these by J. Deininger.⁴²

As regards individual *poleis*, it is beyond question that, while the formal constitution found almost universally was that of ἄρχοντες, βουλή and δῆμος, the βουλή was normally now a body whose members retained their position for life, and represented the upper class of the community; it is also noticeable, as we have seen, that it was assumed that the prospective βουλή of Tymandus would be responsible for electing magistrates. A tendency towards oligarchic regimes determined by class and wealth is thus undeniable, without its being demonstrable, except in the case of Pontus and Bithynia, that such a non-democratic regime was actually instituted by Roman regulation.⁴³ The question of for how long the ἐκκλησία of a typical *polis* continued to meet, and what real powers it will have exercised, would deserve further examination. What is in any case certain about the Greek, or Graeco-Roman, city of the Imperial period is the central place occupied by the βουλή. That essential role is mirrored by the vast range of archaeological evidence for city *bouleuteria* or *curiae*, now collected and assessed for the first time by Jean-Charles Balty.⁴⁴

In any case the broad themes of the political functioning of the Greek cities, treated in the great work of A.H.M. Jones, have recently been re-examined, as regards the period between Augustus and Severus Alexander, in a masterly study by Maurice Sartre.⁴⁵ It is particularly valuable that Sartre has been able to place the 'Greek city' of this period within the framework both of the geographical and administrative evolution of the Empire on the one hand, including the role and progressive disappearance of 'client kingdoms', and of a series of regional studies on the other. The areas treated are: Greece and Macedonia; Thrace and Moesia Inferior; Asia Minor; Syria and Arabia; Judaea (and the Jewish Diaspo-

ra); and Egypt. The Greek cities of the Western Mediterranean and the Adriatic thus inevitably remain outside his brief. So, more regrettably, do those of the Bosporan kingdom, which have produced a substantial crop of inscriptions;⁴⁶ those of Cyrene, whose inscriptions have yet to be collected in a corpus, but which include important items, for instance of course the five 'Cyrene edicts' of Augustus; and letters of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius on membership of the Panhellenion, and on the question of where jurisdiction should be given by the proconsul of the geographically divided province of Crete and Cyrene. The full corpus of Cyrenaican inscriptions, being prepared by J.M. Reynolds, and including a substantial number of Jewish inscriptions, will be of great interest.⁴⁷

For obvious reasons the Greek cities of the Parthian Empire also lay outside the scope of Maurice Sartre's work. The available evidence on Seleucia on the Eulaeus (Susa), Spasinou Charax (Mesene) or the cities of Babylonia, notably Seleucia on the Tigris, as they were in the first three centuries AD, has not increased greatly in recent years.⁴⁸ Nor has much greater attention been paid to those places which in the second and third centuries were incorporated in the Roman Empire. The most notable is of course Dura-Europos, the study of which, as it was both in the Parthian and the Roman periods has been gravely hampered by the failure to produce a corpus of its inscriptions, in an unprecedented range of different languages.

Somewhat more progress has been made with the Greek cities produced by Hellenistic colonisation in northern Mesopotamia. Long part of the Parthian Empire, they came under Roman rule with the conquests of Septimius Severus in the 190s, and many then underwent a rapid transformation into Roman *coloniae*, producing documents in an inextricable mélange of Greek, Syriac and Latin.⁴⁹ Like the 'Greek cities' of other regions, they were carefully treated in A.H.M. Jones' great survey; but both their character as self-governing 'Greek' cities and their bilingual Syriac/Greek culture render them mysterious, if extremely interesting, and their history will not be pursued here.⁵⁰ But it should be noted that the history of this region will soon be illuminated by the publication of a new archive of Greek and Syriac documents from the Middle Euphrates of the 230s to 250s.⁵¹

This rapid sketch is intended only as a reminder that, fundamental as Maurice Sartre's *L'Orient romain* is, its programme is dictated the geographical shape of the Roman Empire up to 235; if its subject had been not 'the Roman orient' but 'the Greek city', it would have been relevant to explore some more marginal zones of the existence of the 'Greek city';

perhaps 'the frontiers of Greek city life' might be a topic, another day, for a different colloquium.

As it is, it is inevitable that if we try to characterise the most salient features of the Greek city of the Roman Imperial period, we should focus on the central zone, Greece (Achaëa) itself, Macedonia, the province of Asia, Pontus and Bithynia, Lycia, and to a lesser extent the other provinces of Asia Minor. Our conceptions are necessarily dependent on the survival of literature which illuminates these places, the presence of substantial bodies of inscriptions and the existence of physical remains. In large and important areas when substantial numbers of 'Greek cities' were to be found, such as central Asia Minor or the Near East west of the Euphrates (the Roman provinces of Syria, Judaea/Syria Palaestina and Arabia) these conditions are only partially present, and historical study is only now beginning to bring some aspects of social and cultural history into focus.⁵¹

None the less, there is one medium by which the Greek cities of the Roman period, in all areas, expressed their identity, and whose products are available to us in vast numbers, and independently of the types of evidence mentioned above. This is of course the coinage of the cities, whose significance requires some emphasis. Ramsey MacMullen's phrase 'the epigraphic habit' has justly established itself as a key element in our perception of the Roman Empire and its cities.⁵³ For the sheer scale of communal and individual self-expression through the medium of public writing in permanent form is one of the most striking features of Imperial city culture. But so also is the profusion of coinage, with the extra dimension that it involved the selection of visual images to accompany the (inevitably brief) written legends. The figures are remarkable: over 530 Greek cities or *koina* minted coins at one time or another, in the first three centuries of the Empire, and the largest total for a single reign was reached under Septimius Severus (AD 193-211), namely something over 360.⁵⁴ The result is an extraordinarily rich repertoire of images-plus-legends deployed to express the collective identity of cities; to portray and sometimes name the deities which were important to them; and on occasion to commemorate recurrent events, such as festivals, which played a central point in their collective existence, or individual events, such as visits by Emperors. It is important to stress that the city coins, almost all only in bronze, were produced discontinuously; their strictly economic function, and their role within the framework of properly 'Roman' coinage, in gold, silver and bronze, awaits serious analysis. More important is the conclusion which has to be drawn from the late Konrad Kraft's study

of the coinage of Asia Minor.⁵⁵ He showed that the same workshop (however we might imagine the physical reality of a ‘workshop’) might produce coins for two or more different cities. We cannot therefore speak of ‘the mint’ of Ephesos, or of any other city, but only of *coins* ‘of’ Ephesos; and this term can be used legitimately only where the city (or rather community, see below) concerned is explicitly named. Deductions of the form that (for instance) silver tetradrachms struck under Caracalla, but naming no city, were produced by ‘the mint of Laodicea’, because the types resemble those on coins of Laodicea, are wholly illegitimate.⁵⁶ We have no basis for imagining the existence of stable city ‘mints’; all that we can know is the coins themselves, as extremely explicit, and – in artistic terms – often very refined and beautiful expressions of collective identities and values. How, where and by whom they were actually produced or manufactured is a matter of speculation.

Until very recently the best introduction to these coins, the ‘Greek Imperials’, has been in a well-illustrated study by K. Harl of the Greek city-coinages of the period from AD 180 to their complete disappearance in approximately the third quarter of the third century.⁵⁷ It is a pity that this fine study, consistently trying to set this coinage in a wider social and ideological context, does not attempt to explain the reasons for its disappearance (other than the depreciation of the Imperial silver coinage) or the economic effects of the cessation of local minting. But for the latter question it would be necessary to distinguish *minting* – the production of new coins – from *circulation* – the use as a medium of exchange of coins of various origins and dates.

If the economic effects of this great change are highly uncertain, the abandonment of local coining cannot fail to be seen as the loss of a crucial means of self-expression by several hundred Greek cities. In the longer term, it can be taken as an aspect of the transformation of later Greek cities from pagan collectivities, symbolised above all by images of their deities and of the temples which housed their cult-statues, into Christian communities under bishops. But since city-coining was never to revive, no Greek city in the Roman Empire ever had occasion to adorn its coins with Christian images or legends.

Our knowledge of city-minting in the early part of the period, from *circa* 44 BC to AD 69, has now been transformed by the publication of the first part of a really major project, *The Roman Provincial Coinage*.⁵⁸ For the first time *all* the provincial coinages of the first century of the Empire have been assessed and catalogued; further volumes (how many?) will carry the story to the cessation of minting in the later third century.

It is too early to assess in any detail the significance of this already gigantic contribution, which at a stroke transforms our ability to envisage the Roman Empire from the standpoint of hundreds of separate provincial communities. But three features stand out. Firstly, the scale and geographical range of coining. In the first two-thirds of a century of the Empire local communities in Spain and Africa might also produce coins. But by the reign of Claudius (AD 41-54) they fall silent, and coinage becomes one of a range of ways in which the Roman Empire gave, or allowed, a specially privileged status to Greek cities. Beyond that, the number of Greek cities producing coins increased rapidly in the third century, to reach (as mentioned above) a maximum of over 360 under Septimius Severus. At that moment it was at least one-and-a-half centuries since any community which was not Greek, and which belonged to the Roman Empire, had minted its own coins. The exception proving the rule is of course the Hebrew coinage of the Jewish Revolt and the Bar Kochba War; but at those moments, each prolonged for several years, the community concerned did not 'belong' to the Empire.

The second feature which is (almost) all-pervasive is the name and image of the reigning Emperor. Except where local eras were used, it is of course precisely the presence of this name and image which allows us to arrange the coins of any one community in a temporal sequence. The naming and portrayal of the Emperor is not universal: there is a large category of city-coins from all areas of the Greek East in which other images (most often of gods) and legends are substituted for the portrait and name of the Emperor. Such coins are conventionally labeled 'pseudo-autonomous', on the presupposition that they embody some special privilege, or special degree of freedom from Roman control: but none such can in fact be identified. None the less it is surely significant that Tyre is both the only 'Greek city' in the Empire which continued to use some non-Greek (Phoenician) letters on its coins right up to the moment of its transformation in the 190s into a Roman *colonia*; and that was it one of only three cities (the others being Chios and Athens) which never (up to the same point) named or portrayed the reigning Emperor on its coins.⁵⁹

The presence of the name and the image of the Emperor has to be taken as one of the dominating features of the collective life of the Greek city in the imperial period. This applies, as noted above, very widely to the names of the cities themselves, and not merely to those transformed into Roman *coloniae*; to the personal names of individual citizens, in which the *nomina* of successive ruling houses – 'Iulius', 'Claudius',

‘Flavius’, ‘Ulpus’, ‘Aelius’, ‘Aurelius’, ‘Septimius’ – were ever more prominent, transliterated into their Greek forms; to the cults and temples of the Emperors, reigning or deceased, and individual or collective (‘the *Sebastoi*’); to the identities of public buildings, like the ‘Hadrianic Baths’ revealed at Antioch in Syria by a new document of AD 245;⁶⁰ to the names of months in city calendars; to the names of tribes or other sub-units of the communities; to the names of festivals; to the actual clothing of *agōnothētai* or *archiereis* (see below); to the presence of honorific statues of Emperors and members of their families; and to the prominence of inscribed letters from Emperors, written in Greek, and of other inscriptions recording privileges granted to individuals by Emperors. It is not too much to say that the public self-expression of the ‘Greek-city’ in the Empire embodied at every level an explicit recognition of the distant presence of the Emperor. When the Emperor travelled, that presence might become real; but our evidence, however biased, is enough to show that a real, concrete connection between city and Emperors was maintained far more intensively by the constant traffic in embassies, whether on diplomatic missions or in pursuit of requests or disputes, to bring city-decrees before the Emperor, address him in person, and bring back a letter in Greek in reply.⁶¹ As we see in the case of a letter of Caracalla of AD 213, even an Imperial letter to an individual, about the obligations to his *patris* of another individual, might be ‘read out in the theatre’, in this case that of Philadelphia in Asia.⁶²

The purpose of doing that was of course to publicise it before the citizens, meeting in the theatre, ‘where it is their custom to take counsel’, as Tacitus wrote of the Antiochenes in Syria.⁶³ When aroused, the citizens might even gather spontaneously in the theatre, as *Acts* represents the *Ephesioi* doing when provoked by Paul’s teaching.⁶⁴ But these allusions reflect a much more important truth about what we call, in some ways misleadingly, a ‘Greek city’. A Greek city was not essentially a ‘place’ or an urban centre; it was a community of individuals. The point is made with great clarity, but without further development, in an important chapter by Joyce Reynolds on ‘Cities’ in the context of the administration of the Empire.⁶⁵ Thus when an Emperor wrote, as we would say, ‘to Pergamon’, that was not in fact how he expressed himself: his letters would go to ‘the *archontes*, *boulē* and *dēmos* of the *Pergamēnoi*’; or, if ‘to Aphrodisias’, ‘to the *archontes*, *boulē* and *dēmos* of the *Aphrodisieis*’. The point is not a trivial one, for we consistently mistranslate, and therefore misconceive, the nature of the communal attachments which gave people their identity, in the eyes of both themselves and others. Confronted with

'Dionysios the *Halikarnasseus*', we invariably write 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus', as if what he belonged to were a point on the map; but it was not, it was a community of citizens.

This point is consistently reinforced by the extremely extensive evidence of communal designations on the coinage 'of cities'. Here too, we would be less liable to confuse ourselves if we called it the coinage of 'communities'. The male genitive plural is by far the most common grammatical form of identification on the coins: so, to take only some cases from the index of *RPC I*, ΑΙΖΑΝΙΤΩΝ, ΑΛΑΒΑΝΔΕΩΝ, ΑΜΙΣΗΝΩΝ. There are exceptions, though they are far less common; occasionally we do find a place-name used to identify the origin of a coin. So for example, from the same source, ΑΜΙΣΟΣ, ΓΑΔΑΡΑ, ΓΕΡΑΣΑ, ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ. But the fact that we now can, at least for the first hundred years of the Empire, read right across the entire local (or communal) numismatic production of the provinces is the first great service which *Roman Provincial Coinage I* has rendered. In a profound sense, an important means of approach to the communities of the Empire, and to the 'Greek city' above all, has been opened up for the first time.

I have placed a lot of emphasis on this material, precisely because in this now organised and intelligible form, it is new. But the Greek city of the Empire has of course revealed itself to us primarily via inscriptions. It is impossible to sum up the wealth of information contained in the tens of thousands of Greek city inscriptions of the Imperial period, which now constitute a genre of literary expression in themselves. Instead, it may be preferable to attempt to present, and bring out the significance of, a few choice examples, published in the last few years. The two most revealing both illustrate the mass, collective character of the life of the Greek city (or community), a point heavily and correctly stressed by Ramsey MacMullen and Robin Lane Fox in their studies on the paganism of this period.⁶⁶ But they also reflect the way in which the collective ceremonials and observances of Greek communities under the Empire gave a special place to the figure of the Emperor.

The first inscription comes from a relatively little-known corner of the Greek world, the modest city of Kalindoia in Macedonia.⁶⁷ With a certain poetic appropriateness, it dates from the first year of the Christian era, and thus forms a pair with a comparable inscription from Kyme, of 2 BC – AD 2, published a decade ago.⁶⁸ Like thousands of other inscriptions of the period, the latter honours a *euergetēs* who had offered hospitality and public shows to the people: moreover 'during the *Kaisareia* celebrated by Asia, as he had promised, he carried out sacrifices and

banquets where the flesh of the victims was consumed, having made a sacrifice of oxen to the Emperor Kaisar Sebastos and to his sons and to the other gods...'

But this document, significant only for being so characteristic of the epigraphic expression of the next three centuries, is far exceeded in importance by that from Kalindoia, which presents in concentrated form, and very early, almost all the values of Greek communal life, in its relation to the Empire. It therefore deserves translation in full:

Year 148 (of the provincial era of Macedonia, AD 1)

The *politarchai*, after a preliminary resolution by the *bouleutai*, and an *ekklēsia* being held, declared before the *demos*:

Since Apollonios son of Apollonios son of Kertimos, being a good man and deserving of every honour, having accepted spontaneously the priesthood of Zeus and Rōmē and Caesar Augustus *divi filius*, has exhibited so much nobility, living up to the high reputation of his ancestors and of his own virtue, as to omit no excess of expenditure on the gods and his native city, providing from his own resources throughout the year the sacrifices offered monthly by the city to Zeus and Caesar Augustus; and has also offered all manner of honours to the gods, and provided for the citizens feasting and lavish entertainment, similarly dining the whole populace, both en masse (λαϊκῶς) and by *triklinia*, and organising the procession at the festival so as to be varied and striking, and putting on the contests in honour of Zeus and Caesar Augustus in elaborate and worthy style ... has shown his generosity to his fellow-citizens by asking from the city leave to take over the public sacrifices offered during the festival to Zeus, Caesar Augustus and the other benefactors, and has provided them at his own expense; and having sacrificed oxen has entertained each of the citizens throughout the whole festival, by *triklinia* and on a mass basis, and made the most lavish distributions to the tribes, so that, wherever they wished to take their pleasure, they did so by his grace. Not only has he spared no expense, but he has had a statue of Caesar made at his own cost, and has offered it as a permanent memorial of the beneficence of Augustus to all mankind; he has thus provided an additional ornament for his native city, and for the god the appropriate honour and favour.

For these reasons it seems appropriate to the *boulē* and *dēmos* to praise him for the enlightenment of his spirit and of his generosity towards his native city, to crown him with a wreath and to vote a stone (marble?) image of himself, of his father Apollonios and his mother Stratto; to set up the statues and the decree in whatever place in the agora the *agōnothetēs* (Apollonios) chooses, in order that other citizens might be

rendered eager to seek honour and to contribute generously to their native city. When the decree was voted (by the assembly), Apollonios accepted the honour and the gratitude of his homeland, but relieved the city of the expense. It was voted on the 14th of Daisios.

This very early inscription encapsulates almost all the key features of the public life of the Imperial Greek city: the role of festivals and of public, communal celebrations; the importance of public writing and publicly-placed images; the 'presence' of the absent Emperor, both as an object of worship and as visibly represented in his statue; and the central significance of the complex symbolic, political and financial exchanges between leading individuals and the mass of their fellow-citizens which made up the institution of euergetism. Given the early date, one element is missing: the progressive extension to the leading families in most Greek cities of the Roman citizenship, and, following, on that the acquisition by their members of positions in the equestrian service and the Roman Senate. This steady evolution, known to us almost entirely through honorific inscriptions put up by their native cities, is familiar, and need not be re-examined here.⁶⁹ The effect was, firstly, that in all cities the ruling circle of office-holders and members of the *boulē* showed a steadily increasing proportion of Latin names, normally in the standard triple Roman form of *praenomen*, *nomen* and *cognomen* (the latter very frequently still a Greek name); and with that, in principle at least, the application to their family structures and property-relations of Roman private law (for instance *patria potestas*). But neither the rules of the pre-existing private law of the Greek cities nor the real extent of the currency of Roman private law can be easily understood.⁷⁰ The spread of the Roman citizenship to individuals, and hence families, culminating in the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, was however yet another respect in which the 'Greek' city of the Imperial period was in reality 'Graeco-Roman'. A secondary effect was that those persons who served as *equites* or senators 'belonged' not only to their native cities, but also to a much wider world, whose varied regions might be represented before their fellow-citizens in the record of the places where they had served, incorporated in inscriptions put up in their honour.

The processes touched on above might have led to a wholesale loss, or even suppression, of the historical identities of Greek cities, and their absorption into an undifferentiated Graeco-Roman culture and outlook; or on the contrary, to a clear ideological 'resistance', and to a reassertion of historic identity; to actual armed resistance on the part of cities or regions; or, perhaps, to a claim to Greek dominance within that Graeco-

Roman world on which the Empire had imposed so high a degree of unity. As regards the last possibility, we have seen above that it was indeed the case that Greek cities enjoyed privileges, like coinage, or the fact that Emperors and governors paid them the compliment of addressing them systematically in Greek, which did indeed mark them out from the urban communities of the West. But their status was thereby explicitly recognised, and no Greek cities, or groups of cities, offered any parallel to the major Jewish revolts of AD 66-74 and 132-5. It was however not merely a strategic shift towards the Eastern frontier which meant that Constantine's new capital would be situated in the Greek world, on the route between the Danube and Euphrates, and would have a Greek name. It was also a symbol of the fact that in the end *Graecia capta* did indeed imprison her captor.

As regards the first possibility, the signs of any real loss of cultural identity were indeed very few. Latin literature, for instance, seems to have gained extraordinarily little currency in the Greek East; and there is no certain evidence even of the translation of Virgil until Constantine included part of a Greek version of the *Fourth Eclogue* in his *Address to the Assembly of the Saints*.⁷¹ Roman law, however, as taught in the schools of the Roman *colonia* of Berytus, did, from the third century onwards, act as a magnet for the youth of the Greek cities.⁷² Looking in the reverse direction, it is of real significance that the history of Rome is largely 'constituted' for us by Greek writers of the Imperial period, Dionysius from Halicarnassus, Plutarch from Chaeronea, Appian from Alexandria and Cassius Dio from Nicaea.⁷³ The latter three were all Roman citizens, the middle two of equestrian rank and the last-named a senator and consul.

None the less, the most interesting and significant new items of evidence, or new studies of already-known evidence, of the last few years has tended to show a reassertion of historic and mythological identity in the framework of the collective life of the Greek city. But this cannot properly be seen as a movement 'against' Rome (and here again the contrast with the two great Jewish revolts is fundamental). The most systematic of all these reassertions, indeed, the Panhellenion, was the work of the Emperor Hadrian.⁷⁴ In more specifically local contexts, the symbolic and communal assertion of a city's identity will have been the work of its local governing class – but in the cases known to us this was a class in which the Roman citizenship, and even Roman office-holding, were already widespread. At Athens indeed, there are clear indications that actual Roman office was not sought as frequently as elsewhere. None the less,

the Roman citizenship was common among the upper classes, and the resistance to the Herulian invasion of the 260s was led by a member of a family which had long held the citizenship, Herennius Dexippus.⁷⁵ Athens remained, even after the Herulian invasions, a major Hellenic centre. But the most systematic communal recreation, or re-enactment, of the past which modern study has revealed was that at Sparta. Spawforth's study has shown, however, that this re-creation, whose salient features drew tourists from all over the Greek world, did not really reproduce at all precisely the institutions of Archaic and Classical Sparta, and was the work, as elsewhere, of a local elite among whom the Roman citizenship was increasingly common. Note for example the inscription of the early third century in which a group of his *sunarchontes*, all with Roman names, honour 'Pop(lios) Mem(mios) Pratolaos also called Aristokles Damarous, *aristopoleiteutēs*, for his protection of the Lykourgan customs, and his benevolence towards them'.⁷⁶

An equally vivid picture of the communal evocation of tradition is provided by Guy M. Rogers' analysis of the foundation of Vibius Salutaris in early second-century Ephesos.⁷⁷ Salutaris was of course a Roman citizen, and equestrian office-holder; the route of the procession which his foundation instituted would take the participants down streets which had been completely transformed by monumental public building in the course of the first century AD; the statues to be carried included representations of Trajan and Plotina, as well as the personified Senate, equestrian order and *populus Romanus*; and the terms of the foundation were approved by the proconsul and his *legatus*. But the prime honorand was the main deity of the city, Artemis; and the other statues included one of Enonymos, son of Kephios/Ouranos and Ge; Pion; probably Androklos, the mythical founder of the city; and certainly Lysimachos, the early-Hellenistic refounder, as well as Augustus himself. The rituals celebrated the present as the fulfilment of a long history, not an opposition between Greek past and Roman present.

But of course the primary place among all recent work on the Greek city of the Roman period must belong to Michael Wörle's publication of the foundation-inscription of a new *agōn*, the *Dēmstheneia*, set up at Oenoanda under Hadrian by a leading local notable, and Roman citizen, C. Iulius Demosthenes.⁷⁸ This almost perfectly preserved inscription of 117 lines perhaps surpasses all others in its expression of the structure and values of the Imperial Greek city. I will isolate only a few features. First of all there is something of which our evidence rarely gives so vivid an impression, the list of villages (*kōmai*), with associated *monagriai*

(farmsteads?) in the territory of Oenoanda which are listed as being due to contribute cattle for sacrifice (ll.72-83). Then there is the detailed specification of the content of the various forms of competition, and the prizes to be attached to them, listed in the chronological sequence which is to be followed (11.38-46):

- 1) Trumpeters and heralds (ἀγῶν σαλπικτῶν καὶ κηρύκων). 50 *den.*
- 2) Composers of Prose Encomia (ἀγῶν λογ[ι]κῶν ἐνκωμιογράφων). 75 *den.*
- 3) Poets (ἀγῶν ποιητῶν). 75 *den.*
- 4) Oboists (ἀγῶν χοραύλων). 1st prize 125 *den.*, 2nd 75.
- 5) Comic Poets (ἀγῶν κωμωδῶν). 1st prize 200 *den.*, 2nd 100.
- 6) Tragic Poets (ἀγῶν τραγωδῶν). 1st prize 250 *den.*, 2nd 125.
- 7) Kitharodes (ἀγῶν κιθαρωδῶν). 1st prize 300, 2nd 150.
- 8) Open competition (διὰ π[άν]των). 1st prize 150 *den.*, 2nd 100, 3rd 50.
- 9) Mime-artists and acts and displays (μῆμοι καὶ ἀκροάματα καὶ θεάμα[τα]). No prizes.
- 10) Other acts giving pleasure to the city (τῶν ἄλλων ἀκροαμάτω[ν] τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τῇ πόλει). 600 *den.* in all.
- 11) Gymnastic competitions for citizens (γυμνικὰ πολειτῶν ἀγωνάκια). 150 *den.* in all.

The detailed specification given here makes possible, not to say imperative, a comprehensive new study of the competitive festival in the Greek world of the Imperial period, in which the primacy continued to the end to be held by the ancient games of Delphi, Olympia, Nemea and the Isthmus, together with the Actia of Nicopolis. There have been important preliminary studies: for instance the excellent collection of agonistic inscriptions published by L. Moretti in 1953; the two suggestive papers by the great Louis Robert, cited by Stephen Mitchell in his review-article on Wörrle's book (with an English translation of the text); and the collection of the inscriptions relating to the artists of Dionysus in the new edition of Pickard-Cambridge on the dramatic festivals of Athens.⁷⁹ But none comes anywhere near being the full-scale study of the hierarchy of types of festival (from the major ones to the most local), as well as their geographical distribution and their allocation over the calendar, which could now be undertaken. Their geographical distribution alone would almost serve to define the world of the Greek city: from Zeugma (but *not* across the Euphrates) to Bostra (the 'Aktia Dousaria'), Gerasa and Tyre; in Cappadocia and all of Asia Minor; in Egypt (but only at a modest local level); at Puteoli, Naples and (from Domitian

onwards, with the 'Kapetolia') at Rome itself; at Massilia (but also at any other western Greek cities?).

Their distribution in space was also, at least as regards the more important contests, an allocation in time, as two inscriptions from Aphrodisias explicitly state. One of them, concerned with the setting-up of a festival in a manner quite close to that at Oenoanda, seems to schedule the festival 'before the [departure of the competitors] to Rome'. In another, a High Priest of Asia also makes regulations for a festival, and lays down that it will be held 'in the period between the celebration of the Barbilleia at Ephesus and [? the provincial games] of Asia'.⁸⁰

The games set up at Oenoanda, like so many others, were due to the *philotimia* of a local notable who was also a Roman citizen; the procedures for ratifying it involved other locals who were also Roman citizens; the terms were approved both by the governor and by Hadrian himself, whose letter opens the inscription; and images of the Emperor were to be deployed in the proceedings.

But perhaps the most telling detail in the great inscription from Oenoanda relates to the golden crown which the *agōnothetēs* was to wear, with 'relief portraits of the Emperor Nerva Trajan Hadrian Caesar Augustus and our leader, the ancestral god Apollo'.⁸¹ This passing allusion has much greater significance than might appear at first sight. The crown combining images of a deity and the Emperor, to be worn by an *agōnothetēs* at a festival, might be taken as a symbol of that whole 'Romano-Greek' complex of beliefs, customs and communal observances which constituted the collective life of the 'Greek' city in the Imperial period. In archaeological terms it is also noteworthy that comparable such crowns are worn by some of the local notables portrayed in the remarkable statuary from Aphrodisias of this period.⁸² But, more significantly, a crown of precisely this type appears in one of the most brilliant of literary evocations of the challenge which Christianity offered to the beliefs, customs and collective values of the Greek city, the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, of which one version at least was already in circulation by the end of the second century. When Paul and Thecla reach Antioch (apparently the one in Pisidia), Alexander, 'one of the first of the Antiochenes', lays hold of her. But she resists, tearing his cloak and dashing from his head a golden crown with an image of the Emperor.⁸³

The *Acts of Paul and Thecla* represents only one of a series of Christian portrayals of the life of the Greek city, of the crisis caused in it by the preaching of Christianity, and of the profound transformations which

then came about. One of the most striking is the *Life* of Gregorius Thaumaturgus by Gregory of Nyssa. Written in the 380s, this novelistic portrayal of Christian preaching in the mid-third century vividly evokes the public buildings and popular festivals of cities in Pontus, and seems to be unique in explicitly portraying the establishment of a calendar of Christian martyr-festivals as a conscious device to create a new 'rhythm' of city life (the term used is very significant: μεταρροθμιζων).⁸⁴ That the communal structures and the pagan calendar, or 'rhythm', of the Graeco-Roman city did in fact, over a period of not much more than a century, succumb to the new Christian world of bishops, churches, shrines of martyrs and a new calendar of feasts is of course certain. Julian's short-lived attempt to revive it met with only a limited response. His last letter, written as his army marched east from Antioch in 363, might be taken as the epitaph of the pagan city.⁸⁵

From Litarbae I proceeded to Beroea, and there Zeus by showing a manifest sign from heaven declared all things to be auspicious. I stayed there for a day and saw the Acropolis and sacrificed to Zeus in imperial fashion a white bull. Also I conversed briefly with the senate about the worship of the gods. But though they all applauded my arguments very few were converted by them, and these few were men who even before I spoke seemed to me to hold sound views. But they were cautious and would not strip off and lay aside their modest reserve, as though afraid of too frank speech.

Looking at the pagan Graeco-Roman city of the fourth century, we might, as Oswyn Murray suggests to me, wish to emphasise the extraordinary stability, or ossification, of culture and values which bound it to the Classical Greek city of some seven centuries earlier. On this view it succumbed because it did not change, and could not. On the other hand, we might rather emphasise its vast progressive diffusion since then, with the effect that the Greek-speaking city now provided the primary form of identity for perhaps 30 million people; the growth in size, architectural adornment and urban facilities, such as aqueducts, characteristic of very many of them; the wider unity symbolised by the cycle of athletic and 'musical' festivals; and their involvement, in many different ways, practical and symbolic, in the Roman Empire. It is no accident that the 'Greek city' whose ruins we can still see was the 'Graeco-Roman city' of the Imperial period. But Christianity was to triumph all the same.

The preaching of Christianity was not of course the only crisis which steadily transformed the Greek city in the later Imperial period. Invasions touched much of the Balkans, Macedonia, Greece, Asia Minor and

Syria; the depreciation of the Imperial coinage *seems* (see above) to have been the factor which brought about the ending of city coinage; the subdivision of provinces tended to bring the governors closer to the individual city, and it is in any case noticeable that building in the cities of the later Empire depended more on the initiative of governors than it did on local benefactors. Equally, the tradition of euergetism seems to have been profoundly damaged by a change which the Emperors themselves introduced, as a way of rewarding those who served under them. That is to say that from around AD 300, various civilian and military ranks in the Imperial service started to be conceived of as conferring a permanent named status on their holders; and these statuses in their turn came to confer a life-long immunity from *archai*, *leitourgiai* and membership of the *boulē* in a man's city. The 'flight of the councillors' into imperial office, so characteristic of the fourth century, was in fact an artificial creation by the Emperors themselves, whose consequences they tried in vain to limit.⁸⁶

After the conversion of Constantine and his subsequent defeat of Licinius, the new freedom and Imperial backing given to Christian communities could be followed, at first slowly and erratically, by Christian attacks on temples, leading sometimes to their destruction and replacement by churches.⁸⁷ None of this meant of course that what we call 'the Greek city' simply vanished. On the contrary, work at, for instance, Athens, at Aphrodisias in Caria and at Scythopolis in Syria Palaestina has demonstrated how complex a story of communal life, and even of extensive new construction in the fourth to sixth and seventh centuries, remains to be written.⁸⁸ In the Syrian region, however, major changes in the pattern of urbanism may have been under way even before the Islamic conquests of the seventh century;⁸⁹ in Asia Minor, as the work of Clive Foss has suggested, the Persian invasions of the early seventh century may have marked a decisive change.⁹⁰ But these are as yet mere pointers. It remains the case that the 'Greek city' which we can know best is the Romanised Greek city of the high Imperial period, whose physical remains, inscriptions and coins offer us a uniquely rich public 'image', which still leaves fundamental questions of social and economic history unanswered. But a very different history, whose framework would be a changed relationship to the now Christian Emperors, could now be written, on the basis of changing types of evidence, to do justice to the complex evolution of the 'Greek', or 'Graeco-Roman', city of the fourth to seventh centuries.⁹¹

Notes

- 1 This paper owes a great deal to the comments of the participants in the colloquium, above all those of Ph. Gautier. I have avoided reproducing here items of bibliography which are deployed in his paper. But if it were felt that there was a certain convergence of view between our two contributions I should be well satisfied.
- 2 G. Alföldy, 'Augustus und die Inschriften: Tradition und Innovation', *Gymnasium* 98 (1991), 289.
- 3 ² For a brief sketch of some aspects of this transformation, F. Millar, 'State and Subject: the Impact of Monarchy', in F. Millar and E. Segal (eds.), *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* (1984), 37, which owes much to S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: the Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (1984).
- 4 Herodotus I, 167.
- 5 Dionysius, *Ant. Rom.* VII, 3-10.
- 6 Plutarch, *Camillus* 8; Justin XLIII, 5, 10.
- 7 *Syll*³ no. 591. English translation in M. M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest* (1981), no. 155.
- 8 See P. S. Derow and W. G. Forrest, 'An Inscription from Chios', *ABSA* 77 (1982), 79 = *SEG XXXI*, no. 777. See O. Hansen, *Eranos* 85 (1987), 101.
- 9 For a general account of Posidonia/Paestum, as revealed by excavation, see now J. G. Pedley, *Paestum: Greeks and Romans in Southern Italy* (1990); for Dicaearchia/Puteoli, M. Frederiksen, *Campania* (1984), ch. 14.
- 10 D. Roussel, *Les Siciliens entre les Romains et les Carthaginois à l'époque de la première guerre punique* (1970).
- 11 For the most recent survey of later Republican Sicily see R. J. A. Wilson, *Sicily under the Roman Empire: the Archaeology of Roman Province 36 BC – AD 535* (1990), ch. 1: 'Background'.
- 12 Livy XXXI, 29-30.
- 13 See K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (1990), esp. 191f.
- 14 See J. M. Alonso-Nuñez, 'An Augustan World History: the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus', *Greece and Rome* 34 (1987), 56.
- 15 Louis and Jeanne Robert, *Claros I: décrets hellénistiques* (1989). The passage quoted is from the decree for Polemaios, col. II, ll. 24-33: ἐνέτυχεν μὲν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις Ῥωμαίοις καὶ φανεῖς ἄξιός τῆς ἐκείνων φιλίας τὸν ἀπὸ ταύτης καρπὸν τοῖς πολεῖταις περιεποίησεν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας τῆ πατρίδι συνθέμενος πατρωνείας. See also J. Touloumakos, 'Zum römischen Gemeindepätronat im griechischen Osten', *Hermes* 116 (1988), 304, and esp. the important recent paper by J.-L. Ferrary, 'Le statut des cités libres dans l'Empire Romain à la lumière des inscriptions de Claros', *CRAI* 1991, 557.
- 16 See R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus* (1969), no. 24.
- 17 Edited by J. M. Reynolds in J. A. Lloyd, *Excavations at Sidī Khrebish, Benghazi (Berenice)* I (Supp. to *Libya Antiqua* V, 1982), 233, no. 1. See A. Laronde, *Cyrène et la Libye hellénistique* (1987), 463f. (photograph, text, translation and discussion).
- 18 *Syll*³, no. 762 = *IGR* I, no. 662 = G. Mihailov, *IG Bulg.* I2 (1990), no. 13. English translation in R. K. Sherk, *Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus* (1984), no. 78.
- 19 Strabo, *Geog.* XII, 3, 11 (546), Loeb trans. (with minor emendations).
- 20 For the political history of the Greek cities of both Phoenicia and Syria proper see the

very useful studies by J. G. Grainger, *The Cities of Seleukid Syria* (1990), and *Hellenistic Phoenicia* (1992).

21 Strabo, *Geog.* XVI, 2, 19 (756). On Berytus as a *colonia* see F. Millar, 'The Roman *Coloniae* of the Near East', in H. Solin, M. Kajava (eds.), *Roman Eastern Policy and Other Studies in Roman History* (1990), 7, on pp. 10-23.

22 E. Bowie, 'Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic', *Past and Present* 46 (1970), 3 = M. I. Finley (ed.), *Studies in Ancient Society* (1974), 166.

23 Strabo, *Geog.* XII, 8, 13 (576); XIII, 4, 15 (630).

24 J. M. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome* (1982), nos. 2-3 (Oppius); 6-13 (Triumviral period). The phrase quoted is from no. 13: ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ὄραν ὅτι τὸ φιλόφρων τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐδένι δέδωκα δῆμῳ πλὴν τῶ τῶν Ἀφροδεσιεῖων. His name is given as Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ θεοῦ Ἰουλίου υἱὸς Αὐγουστος. But whether the last word, normally translated Σεβαστός, rather than transliterated, is original is uncertain.

25 A. Plassart, 'Une levée de volontaires thespiens sous Marc-Aurèle', *Mélanges G. Glotz* II (1932), 231; the correct context was established by C. P. Jones, 'The Levy at Thespieia under Marcus Aurelius', *GRBS* 12 (1971), 45.

26 See F. Millar, 'P. Herennius Dexippus: the Greek World and the Third-Century Invasions', *JRS* 59 (1969), 12.

27 *Dig.* L, 15, 1.

28 Reynolds, *Aphrodisias*, no. 15 (Hadrian); 48 (legal prevention of visits by proconsul). For discussions of these complex questions see R. Bernhardt, *Imperium und Elutheria: die römische Politik gegenüber den freien Städten des griechischen Ostens* (1971); *Polis und römische Herrschaft in der späten Republik, 149-31 vor Chr.* (1985); and Ferrary, *op. cit.* (n. 14).

29 So Diodorus XVI, 7, 1. See Wilson, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 33-4 (suggesting that the actual colonisation took place in 21 BC).

30 See still B. M. Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor* (1967): Antiochia in Pisidia; Cremna; Olbasa; Comama; Lystra; Parlais. For the background see now S. Mitchell, 'The Hellenization of Pisidia', *Mediterranean Archaeology* 4 (1991), 119.

31 Pp. 240f below.

32 *AE* 1973, no. 501.

33 G. H. R. Horsley, 'The Inscriptions from the so-called "Library" at Cremna', *Anat. Stud.* 37 (1987), 49 = *SEG XXXVII*, nos. 1175-85. The example given is no. 1176.

34 See E. Chrysos (ed.), *Nicopolis I: Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Nicopolis* (1987). For the inscription from Pergamon see L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni agonistiche greche* (1953), no. 58.

35 For this view see N. Purcell, 'The Nicopolitan Synoicism and Roman Urban Policy', in Chrysos, *op. cit.*, 71.

36 A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* 2 (1971).

37 See esp. S. Mitchell, 'Imperial Building in the Eastern Roman Provinces', *HSCPh* 91 (1987), 333, with a shorter version in S. Macready and F. H. Thompson (eds.), *Roman Architecture in the Greek World* (1987), 18, a valuable series of studies on the influence of Rome on the physical character of Imperial Greek cities.

38 *MAMA* IV, no. 236.

39 *MAMA* VII, no. 305.

40 For the most penetrating study of urban architecture, drawing equally on Greek East and Latin West, see W. L. MacDonald, *The Architecture of the Roman Empire II: An Urban Appraisal* (1986). For the widespread adoption in the Greek East of what are categorised as 'Roman' architectural techniques see H. Dodge, 'The Architectural Impact of Rome in the

- East', in M. Henig (ed.), *Architecture and Architectural Sculpture in the Roman Empire* (1990), 108.
- 41 Suetonius, *Div. Claud.* 25; Dio LX, 17, 3-4. The fullest account so far available is *RE* s.v. 'Lykia', Supp. XIII (1973), cols. 265-308 (S. Jameson). Subsequent discoveries would allow a major new account. For the formation of the province see D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950), 529.
- 42 J. Deininger, *Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit* (1965). For the Lycian *koinon*, pp. 69ff.
- 43 For a very careful collection of the evidence see G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981); App. IV: 'The Destruction of Greek democracy in the Roman period'.
- 44 J.-M. Ch. Balty, *Curia Ordinis: Recherches d'architecture et d'urbanisme antiques sur les curies provinciales du monde romain* (1991).
- 45 A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (1940); M. Sartre, *L'Orient romain: provinces et sociétés provinciales en Méditerranée orientale d'Auguste aux Sévères (31 avant J.-C. – 235 après J.-C.)* (1991).
- 46 V. V. Struve, *Corpus Inscriptionum Regni Bosporani (CIRB)* (1965); see V. F. Gajdukevič, *Des bosporanische Reich* (1971).
- 47 For the five Cyrene Edicts see still the discussion by F. de Visscher, *Les édits d'Auguste découverts à Cyrène* (1940). For the letters of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, J. M. Reynolds, 'Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and the Cyrenaican Cities', *JRS* 68 (1978), 111. The Jewish inscriptions are collected by G. Lüderitz, *Corpus jüdischer Zeugnisse aus der Cyrenaika* (1983). A corpus of the inscriptions of Cyrenaica is being prepared by J.M. Reynolds.
- 48 See still, for some of them, N. Pigulevskaya, *Les villes de l'état iranien aux époques parthe et sassanide* (1963). See also S. A. Nodelman, 'A Preliminary History of Characene', *Berytus* 13 (1960), 83.
- 49 For these places as *coloniae* see F. Millar, *op. cit.* (n. 20), on pp. 38-9, and 46-50 (Edessa).
- 50 See Jones, *op. cit.* (n. 35), ch. 11; F. Millar, *The Roman Near East (31 BC – AD 337)*, Pt. II, ch. 7 (in press, due for publication by Harvard University Press).
- 51 For a prompt report (with full publication of one document) see D. Feissel and J. Gascou, 'Documents d'archives romains inédits du Moyen Euphrate (IIIe s. après J.-C.)', *CRAI* 1989, 535.
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- 54 Tom B. Jones, 'Greek Imperial Coins', *North American Journal of Numismatics* 4 (1965), 295; see A. Johnston, 'Greek Imperial Statistics: A Commentary', *RN* 26 (1984), 240.
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- 60 See Feissel and Gascou, *op. cit.* (n. 50), no. 1: ἐν ταῖς Ἀδριαναῖς θερμοαίαις.
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- 70 For a sketch of the problem see H. Galsterer, 'Roman Law in the Provinces: Some Problems of Transmission', in M. Crawford (ed.), *L'impero romano e le strutture economiche e sociali delle province* (1986), 13.
- 71 Constantine, *Oratio ad Coetum Sanctorum* 19-21.
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- 73 See now E. Gabba, *Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome* (1991); C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (1971); F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (1964). There seems to be no overall study of the historical work of Appian. See in general E. Gabba, 'The Historians and Augustus', in E. Segal and F. Millar, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 61.
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- 75 See G. M. Woloch, *Roman Citizenship and the Athenian Elite, AD 96-161* (1973); F. Millar, *op. cit.* (n. 25), 12.
- 76 *IG IV.1*, no. 544: διὰ τε τὴν περὶ τὰ Λυκούργια ἔθνη προστασίαν. See Spawforth in

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- 77 G. M. Rogers, *The Sacred Identity of Ephesos: Foundation Myths of a Roman City* (1991).
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- 79 L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni agonistiche greche* (1953); L. Robert, 'Deux concours grecs à Rome', *CRAI* 1970, 6; L. Robert, 'Discours d'ouverture', *VIIIth Int. Cong. Gr. and Lat. Epig. 1982* (1984), 35; S. Mitchell, 'Festivals, Games and Civic Life in Roman Asia Minor', *JRS* 80 (1990), 183; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens²*, revised by J. Gould and D. M. Lewis (1968, reissued with corrections and suppl., 1988), 306f. (the inscriptions relating to artists of Dionysus).
- 80 Reynolds, *op. cit.* (n. 23), no. 59, l. 5: πρὸ τῆς εἰς Ῥώμην [ἀποδημήσεως ἀγωνίστων..]; no. 57, ll. 22-3: ἔσται χρ<ό>[νος]/ ὁ ἀπὸ [Βαρ]<β>ιλλήων τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ [ἀγομένων] πρὸς [Ῥοιναῖ] Ἀσίας.
- 81 Ll. 52-3 (trans. Mitchell): στέφανον χρυσοῦν [ἔχον]τα ἔκτυπα πρόσωπα Αὐτοκράτορος Νέρουα Τραϊανοῦ Ἀδρια[νοῦ] Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ καὶ τοῦ προκαθη[γέτ]ου ἡ[μῶν] πατρῶου Θεοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος.
- 82 For a photograph and brief account of one of them see K. T. Erim, *Aphrodisias: City of Venus Aphrodite* (1986), 65.
- 83 *Acts of Paul and Thecla* 26-39 (Syriac text), see Price, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 170.
- 84 Gregorius, *Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi*, PG XLVI, cols. 893-957. See col. 953: πρὸς καινὸν βίον μεταρρυθμίζων πᾶσαν ἀθρώως τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν γενεάν. See R. Van Dam, 'Hagiography and History: the Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus', *Classical Antiquity* 1 (1982), 272.
- 85 Julian, *Ep.* 58, Loeb trans; Bidez-Cumont, *Ep.* 98.
- 86 These points briefly summarise the conclusions of F. Millar, 'Empire and City, Augustus to Julian: Obligations, Excuses and Status', *JRS* 73 (1983), 76.
- 87 See G. Fowden, 'Bishops and Temples in the Eastern Roman Empire, AD 320-435', *JThSt* 29 (1978), 53.
- 88 For late-Roman Athens see esp. A. Frantz, *The Athenian Agora XXIV: Late Antiquity, AD 267-700* (1988); for Aphrodisias see esp. C. Roueché, *Aphrodisias in Late Antiquity* (1989), and *Performers and Partisans in Aphrodisias in the Roman and Late Roman Periods* (1992). For the current excavations at Scythopolis see esp. *Excavations and Surveys in Israel* 7/8 (1988/9), 15-32. Note (p. 27) the mosaic inscription of building-work carried out under the governorship of Palladius Porphyrius, probably in the fourth century.
- 89 See H. Kennedy, 'From Polis to Madina: Urban Change in Late Antiquity and Early Islamic Syria', *Past and Present* 106 (1985), 3.
- 90 C. Foss, 'The Persians in Asia Minor and the End of Antiquity', *EHR* 90 (1975), 721, reprinted along with other papers in his *History and Archaeology of Byzantine Asia Minor* (1990), no. I. Note also his studies of individual cities: *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (1976); and *Ephesus after Antiquity* (1979).
- 91 See for instance M. Whittow, 'Ruling the Late Roman and Early Byzantine City: a Continuous History', *Past and Present* 129 (1990), 3.

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